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The  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  British  perception  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  between 
1951  and  1956.  In  particular  it  examines  the  understanding  that  British  diplomats, 
politicians  and  civil  servants  had  of  the  process  of  change  which  the  death  of  Stalin 
stimulated  in  the  Kremlin's  relations  with  the  outside  world.  The  core  of  the  study  centres 
around  1955,  as  this  was  the  pivotal  point  for  the  British.  With  the  ascendancy  of 
Khrushchev  there  was  perceived  not  only  a  new  emphasis  in  Moscow  on  the  necessity  of 
avoiding  global  war  between  East  and  West,  but  also  a  new  interest  in  economic 
competition. 
By  1956  Whitehall  and  concluded  that  there  were  a  number  of  factors  informing  the 
Soviet  re-evaluation  of  foreign  policy.  Among  which  were:  the  stabilisation  of  the 
Western  alliance  culminating  with  West  German  rearmament  in  1955;  the  cost  of  defence 
expenditure  both  in  armaments  and  in  supporting  the  satellite  regimes  and  China;  the 
development  of  American  and  Soviet  thermonuclear  potentials.  The  latter  was  thought  by 
the  British  to  be  the  most  profound  in  its  implications  on  the  Soviet  approach  to  the  future 
of  international  relations.  The  Soviet  leadership  certainly  appeared  eager  to  be  friendly 
and  particularly  to  communicate  an  awareness  of  the  grotesque  futility  of  a  war  employing 
the  latest  weaponry.  To  this  end  they  agreed  to  the  Geneva  Summit  of  1955.  Anthony 
Eden  and  Harold  Macmillan  were  convinced  by  this  meeting  that,  in  Macmillan's  words, 
"there  ain't  gonna  be  no  war".  For  a  few  brief,  golden  months,  it  seemed  in  London  as  if 
the  Cold  War  might  even  be  negotiated  into  history. 
However,  by  the  end  of  1955  it  was  apparent  to  the  British  that  Geneva  did  not  mean 
the  Kremlin  had  liven  up  aspirations  to  global  supremacy,  rather  that  the  means  to  this 
end  were  now  to  be  different.  Khrushchev,  according  to  the  Foreign  Office  analysis, 
placed  a  new  emphasis  on  the  role  of  economic  power  in  the  process  of  undermining 
Western  forms  of  politics  and  society,  both  directly  in  the  potential  of  Soviet  style 
economies  to  out-perform  capitalist  and  in  the  use  of  economic  muscle  as  a  conduit  of 
political  influence  through  economic  aid  and  trade.  The  latter  policy  appeared  to  play  a 
crucial  role  in  the  Soviet  attempt  to  take  advantage  of  the  birth  of  post-colonial  states  in 
Asia  and  Africa. 
The  thesis  does  not  go  on  to  discuss  in  any  detail  the  implications  of  the  above  for 
British  foreign  policy,  but  it  does  make  a  broader  point  about  the  bearing  which  British 
perceptions  of  Soviet  policy  had  upon  their  attitude  to  Egypt  before  and  during  the  Suez 
Crisis.  The  threat  of  global  war  might  have  receded,  but  the  Soviet  Union  was  now  seen 
to  be  posing  a  new  challenge  to  British  influence  in  areas  of  the  world  which  were  still  of 
vital  economic  importance,  Egypt  being  chief  among  them.  Britain's  influence  in  the 
Third  World  was  not  only  challenged  by  the  rise  of  indigenous  nationalisms,  but  these 
nationalisms  could  now  turn  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  succour  and  support.  From  this 
perspective  Britain's  position  was  more  precarious  than  it  had  ever  been  before. Table  of'  Contents 
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There  is  something  of  a  hiatus  in  the  historiography  of  Britain  and  the  Cold  War. 
Most  research  has  up  until  recently  concentrated  oll  the  issue  of  greatest  controversy, 
the  part  played  by  Britain  in  the  initial  developnlent  of  East-West  rivalry.  This  is 
understandable,  not  least  because  the  releasing  of  official  documents  imposes  its  own 
delay,  it  does,  however,  leave  the  reader  wondering  quite  what  was  to  happen  next? 
Indeed  some  discussions  of  the  decline  in  Britain's  world  role  in  the  years  after  1945 
treat  the  Cold  War  almost  as  a  side  show  which  impinged  very  little  upon  the  main 
course  of  events.  Britain  may  have  had  a  more  substantial  role  to  play  immediately 
after  1945  than  many  have  given  her  credit  for,  but  very  quickly  her  lack  of  super 
power  standing  left  her  as  not  much  more  than  an  interested  observer.  Such  a  state  of 
affairs  might  not  be  so  very  bad  if  the  Cold  War  were  a  static  thing  which  once  set  up 
an  running,  remained  true  to  the  original  pattern.  This  was,  of  course,  not  to  be  the 
case. 
In  fact  the  Cold  War  underwent  very  considerable  changes  in  the  course  of  the 
1950's,  and  it  is  the  British  understanding  of  these  changes  with  which  this  thesis  is 
concerned.  In  particular  it  will  examine  the  way  in  which  British  diplomats, 
politicians  and  civil  servants  perceived  the  process  of  re-evalution  in  foreign  policy 
which  the  death  of  Stalin  stimulated  within  the  Kremlin.  The  discussion  will 
concentrate  around  the  year  1955  because  -  as  far  as  the  British  were  concerned  -  this 
was  the  pivotal  point.  Khrushchev's  ascendancy  marking  a  new  departure  for  the 
Soviet  Government  in  its  relations  with  the  outside  world.  So  great  was  the  innovation 
that  the  British  were  forced  to  think  of  the  threat  which  the  Soviet  Union  posed  to 
Britain's  vital  international  interests  in  a  fundamentally  different  way. 
Stalin's  death  cane  at  an  interesting  point  in  the  technological  rivalry  between 
East  and  West.  With  the  development  of  thermonuclear  potentials  in  the  Soviet  Union 
and  America  a  new  stage  in  the  military  balance  was  reached  which  had  the  most 
disturbing  implications  for  either  side's  war-making  potential.  The  Soviets  fumbled 
towards  an  understanding  of  these  implications  between  1953  and  1955  and  by  1955 
they  were  persuaded  to  change  their  foreign  policy,  at  least  partly,  to  take  account  of 
the  unacceptable  level  of  destruction  which  these  new  weapons  promised  in  a  future 
war. 
There  were  to  be  substantial  manifestations  of  this  during  1955;  the  Geneva 
Conference,  the  Czech-Egyptian  arms  deal  and  the  visit  by  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev 
to  India  and  the  Far  East.  In  essence  the  Soviets  wanted  to  ensure  that  the  use  of  their 
new  capacities  would  not  prove  necessary.  To  this  end  a  warmer  relationship  was 
needed  with  the  West,  and  thus  the  Geneva  process  was  begun.  However,  this  did  not 
mean  that  the  Soviets  had  given  up  their  aspirations  to  global  supremacy,  rather  the 
end  was  to  be  achieved  by  different  means.  Herein  lay  the  impetus  behind  the  Soviet 
Union's  new  found  interest  in  sponsoring  the  armament  of  Egypt  and  in  attempting  to 
extend  her  influence  into  the  "underdeveloped  world"  by  providing  economic  aid  and Preface  /  Page  6 
trade  agreements  with  countries  such  as  Burma.  By  1956  it  was  apparent  to  Britain 
that  she  was  dealing  with  a  Soviet  foreign  policy  which  posed  a  lessened  danger  of 
war,  but  an  increased  threat  to  the  maintenance  of  her  position  in  a  number  of 
important  parts  of  the  world. 
This  is,  essentially,  as  far  as  the  thesis  will  run.  It  is  not  part  of  the  present 
limited  exercise  to  investigate  in  detail  the  impact  which  the  above  perception  had 
upon  British  policy.  Yet  there  are  important  issues  which  this  discussion  does  throw 
some  light  upon.  The  Soviet  role  in  the  Siez  Crisis  itself  has  not  benefited  from  close 
examination  and  certainly  she  did  not  play  any  very  dramatic  role  until  the  very  end  of 
the  affair.  Nonetheless,  it  is  only  possible  to  fully  Understand  the  international  context 
in  which  the  British  Government  was  operating  if  the  role  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  also 
understood.  For  example,  the  panic  which  surrounded  Eden  and  his  confederates 
during  the  crisis  has  been  the  cause  of  considerable  bafflement  to  historians.  Why  did 
an  apparently  able  and  experienced  politician  take  leave  of  his  senses  and  sanction 
sordid  skulduggery  which  moreover  was  inept  in  conception  and  inadequate  in 
execution?  This  panic  is,  perhaps,  more  explicable  when  we  understand  the  increasing 
frustration  which  was  felt  in  London;  from  September.  1956  the  Soviets  had  seemed 
almost  to  take  over  the  position  of  influence  in  Egypt  which  Britain  had  herself  once 
enjoyed.  Much  of  the  surprise  at  Nasser's  announcement  of  the  nationalisation  of  the 
canal  was  because  Whitehall  was  so  exercised  by  the  likelihood  of  the  Soviets  stepping 
in  to  finance  the  Aswan  Darn.  The  sense  that  Britain  was  facing  a  supreme  challenge 
was  not  merely  a  rhetorical  conceit  used  by  Eden  to  justify  folly,  it  also  expressed 
something  of  his  sincere  understanding  of  the  problem. 
This  illustrates  a  broader  issue.  British  defence  and  foreign  policies  were  not 
simply  the  construct  of  domestic  forces,  they  were  also  a  response  to  her  perception  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  wider  world.  The  following  is  offered  as  an  attempt  to 
examine  part  of  that  perception  at  a  crucial  point  in  the  decline  of  British  fortunes  in 
world  affairs. 
I  ought  also  to  make  a  few  words  of  acknowledgement  to  the  many  people, 
mentioned  and  unmentioned  below,  who  have  helped  in  a  wide  variety  of  ways  to 
make  the  writing  of  this  thesis  possible:  nay  Supervisor  for  his  patience  and  wisdom; 
the  staffs  of  Glasgow  University  Library,  the  Public  Record  office  and  the  British 
Library:  Mike  Black  and  Morna  Black  for  assistance  in  the  battle  to  overcome  my 
technophobia.  There  were  also  those  who  helped  with  accommodation  in  London, 
Gordon  and  Carolyn  Clark,  Hugh  Hunter  and  Nichola  Swann  being  the  chief  who 
suffered  my  visitation  with  forbearance.  'Many,  many  thanks  must  jo  to  my  parents, 
brothers,  sister  and  sister-in-law  for  their  support  and  encouragement.  And  at  the  last 
apologies  to  those  who  over  the  past  year  have  had  to  live  in  the  same  flat  as  I  through 
the  lingering  half-life  of  my  thesis,  Clara  Donnelly  and  Judy  Wakelincy 
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Soviet  Foreign  Policy  And 
Its  British  Interpreters,  190-196 
As  this  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  perception  which  the  British  Government  had  of 
union. 
developments  within  the  Soviet  von  it  seems  sensible  to  start  by  examining,  from  the 
perspective  of  our  own  time,  what  was  actually  going  on  in  Russia  between  1952  and 
1957,  particularly  in  respect  of  foreign  policy.  This  is  not  least  the  case  because  the 
chronology  of  events  in  the  Soviet  Union  largely  provides  the  agenda  for  what  is  to  come. 
Needless  to  say  there  is  insufficient  space  to  do  the  subject  justice,  but  it  does  not  seem 
necessary  for  the  present  limited  purpose  to  be  exhaustive.  Also,  this  preliminary 
analysis,  with  the  assistance  of  hindsight  and  a  large  amount  of  secondary  work  by 
historians  and  political  scientists,  will  set  down  something  of  a  bench  mark  against  which 
the  British  view  at  the  time  may  be  judged  and,  perhaps,  vice-versa. 
Once  this  has  been  attempted  there  will  be  a  discussion  of  the  means  by  which  the 
British  Government  formulated  its  opinion  of  Soviet  developments.  Some  of  the 
characters  who  played  central  roles  in  this  process,  at  the  level  of  the  British  Embassy  in 
Moscow,  the  Foreign  Office  in  London  and  the  politicians,  will  be  introduced.  The  inter- 
relationship  between  these  different  groups  in  the  apparatus  of  foreign  policy  will  also  be 
examined.  It  is  important  to  gain  some  understanding  of  the  means  by  which  the  Foreign 
Office  developed  its  opinions  and  disseminated  them  throughout  Whitehall. 
The  personal  roles  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  Prime  Minister  in  the  formulation  of 
Britain's  foreign  policy  in  the  1950's  must  equally  be  addressed,  at  least  to  some  extent  for 
there  is  probably  a  whole  thesis  awaiting  to  be  written  on  this  issue.  The  imperatives  of 
personal  prejudice  and  ambition  are  crucially  important  in  understanding  reactions  at  the 
highest  executive  level  which  did  not  always  fall  neatly  in  line  with  the  opinions  being 
canvassed  by  permanent  officials.  In  this  Churchill  was  more  guilty  than  Eden,  but  even 
Eden's  complicated  personality  and  diplomatic  peccadillos  led  him,  at  times,  to  attitudes 
subtly  at  variance  to  those  of  his  civil  servants. 
SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY,  1952-1956 
The  move  from  British  history  to  Soviet  is  in  many  ways  a  disorientating  one.  The 
former  provides  an  embarrassment  of  government  publications,  records,  private  papers 
and  public  sources  which,  although  inevitably  flawed,  provide  an  invaluable  basis  for  our 
understanding  of  the  past.  In  the  case  of  the  Soviet  Union  even  basic  matters  of  fact  can 
still  be  issues  of  some  controversy.  Despite  the  appearance  of  recent  titbits,  mainly 
memoir  accounts,  and  the  possibility  that  more  may  still  be  put  into  the  public  domain, 
1  See  R.  Conquest,  Power  and  Policy  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  pp.  50-7 
,  on  the  issue  of  evidence  and  the 
study  of  Soviet  politics.  Also,  Un  Ra'anan,  The  U.  S.  S.  R.  :  What  is  Ascertainable  and  how  can 
such  Knowledge  he  Obtained"  in  Uri  Ra'anan  and  Charles  Perry  eds,  The  U.  S.  S.  R.  Today  and 
Tomorrow,  Problems  and  Charges,  pp.  1-16. Chapter  1/  Pa`_e  S 
very  little  material  concerning  the  operation  of  Government  itself  is  yet  available.  2  The 
main  sources  for  study  of  the  Soviet  Union  remain  the  speeches  and  pronouncements  of 
the  executive  and  the  newspapers  which  acted  as  a  major  conduit  of  such  opinions  to  the 
Soviet  public.  These  have  already  been  exhaustively  raked  over  by  a  large  body  of 
commentators.  3  Over  the  past  decades  there  has  been  very  little  added  to  the  information 
on  which  to  base  analysis  .4 
Indeed  the  greatest  change  to  happen  in  Soviet  history  over  recent  years  has  more  to 
do  with  the  perspective  from  which  we  view  it,  rather  than  in  the  sources  themselves. 
Now  that  the  Soviet  satellite  system  has  collapsed  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Communism 
within  Russia  is  no  more,  it  is  possible  to  look  upon  Soviet  history  as  a  discrere  subject 
with  its  own,  separate,  alpha  and  omega.  The  Cold  War  itself  becomes  a  truly  historical 
phenomenon,  the  development  of  which  can  be  traced  from  beginning  through  maturity  to 
its  end.  It  is  now  possible  to  see  more  clearly,  although  by  no  means  for  the  first  time,  the 
significant  turning  points  in  its  existence;  one  of  these  was  the  new  approach  to  foreign 
and  domestic  policy  embarked  upon  by  Khrushchev  in  1955.  Khrushchev's  initiatives 
were  to  set  the  parameters  of  Cold  War  rivalry  for  the  rest  of  the  Soviet  period. 
However,  it  was  dimly  apparent  even  under  the  stifling  rigidity  of  Stalin's  last  years 
that  all  was  not  entirely  satisfactory  with  the  Soviet  Union's  external  relations.  6  Indeed 
even  during  the  Khrushchev  period  Western  commentators  such  as  Marshal  Shulman 
were  going  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  changes  towards  a  more  flexible  foreign  policy 
which  came  to  a  climax  under  Khrushchev  had  already  begun  before  Stalin's  death  in 
1953.7  Shulman  dated  the  turning  point  thus, 
2  These  include  Andrei  Gromyko,  Memories,  Feliks  Chuyev,  Sto  sorok  beseel  c  4t4olotovym  (One 
Hundred  and  Forty  Conversations  with  Molotov),  an  enticing  title  if  ever  there  were  one,  the 
testimony  of  Malenkov's  son  Andrei  and  various  addenda  to  the  material  on  Khrushchev.  This 
latter  category  encompasses  N.  S.  Khrushchev,  Khrushchev  Remembers,  the  Glasnost  Tapes,  and 
other  additions  to  the  already  extent  memoir  account.  Khrushchev's  speech  writer  from  1960-64  has 
written  his  version  of  the  Khrushchev  years,  Fedor  Burlatsky,  Khrushchev  and  the  First  Russian 
Spring.  There  has  also  been  the  publication  by  Izvestiia  of  the  July,  1953,  Central  Committee 
stenographic  record,  "Delo  Beria",  Izvestiia  TsK  KPSS  (January-February),  1991.  This  was  the 
meeting  at  which  the  arrest  of  Beria  was  settled. 
3  See  F.  J.  Fleron,  Jr.,  E.  P.  Hoffman  and  R.  F  Laird  (eds.  ),  Soviet  Foreign  Policy,  Classic  and 
Contemporary  Issues,  pp.  1-2  for  an  illustration  of  the  relatively  stable  nature  of  the  study  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy. 
4  See  James  Richter,  "Re-examining  Soviet  Policy  Towards  Germany  During  the  Beria  Interregnum", 
for  a  discussion  of  the  latest  primary  evidence  which  has  become  available 
5  For  an  overview  of  the  period  up  to  Gorbachev  see  Erik  P.  Hoffman,  "Soviet  Foreign  Policy  Aims 
and  Accomplishments  from  Lenin  to  Brezhnev",  in  Classic  Issues  in  Soviet  Foreign  Policy,  pp  49- 
71. 
6  See  William  M1cCa,  ý_.  Jr.,  Stalin  Embattled,  1943-1948,  for  an  in  depth  analysis  of  Stalin's  foreign 
policy. 
7  Marshal  Shulman,  Stalin's  Foreign  Policy  Reappraised.  Shulman,  whose  book  was  First  published 
in  1963,  sums  up  his  argument  on  paffe  one  as  follows, 
The  prevailing  interpretation  of  recent  Soviet  foreign  policy  emphasizes  Stalin's  death  as  the 
great  watershed  event,  from  which  is  charted  the  shirt  toward  a  more  flexible  policy,  broadly 
known  by  the  term  "peaceful  coexistence.  "  Although  this  emphasis  properly  draws  attention  to 
the  new  departures  of  the  more  recent  period  and  to  the  dynamic  character  of  Soviet  policy,  it Chapter  1/  Pag; 
-- 
9 
From  the  end  of  the  Berlin  blockade  in  1949  to  the  Nineteenth  Congress  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  October,  1952,  there  were  unmistakable 
sins  of  a  marked  evolution  in  the  Soviet  strategic  outlook  toward  Western 
Europe,  of  a  ,,  roping  toward  a  more  effective  adaptation  to  the  new  political  and 
technological  facts  of  life.  8 
Chief  of  these  new  "facts  of  life"  was,  of  course,  the  implications  of  atomic  warfare.  ` 
Shulman  goes  on  to  argue  that  Stalin's  foreign  policy  expressed  this  new  thinking  in  a 
softening  of  relations  with  the  West.  Restraint  was  shown  where  hitherto  the  Soviets  had 
indulged  in  provocation  and  more  subtle  encouragement  was  now  given 
to  centrifugal 
'forces  in  the  "capitalist"  world,  in  particular  neutralism  and  anti-colonialism.  10  This  is 
seen  by  Shulman  as  Khrushchevism  before  Khrushchev.  Stalin's  refurbishment  of  policy 
was  furthered  by  an  increasing  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Government  to  the 
"international"  peace  movement,  which  had  been  kicked  off  during  1949  in  Paris  by  a 
World  Peace  Conference  hosted  by  the  French  Communist  parts'.  11  This  trend  is  awarded 
by  Shulman  the  familiar  tag  of  "rightist",  as  opposed  to  more  orthodox  and  belligerent 
"leftism". 
However,  earlier  and  more  recent  opinions  stress  the  continuity  in  Stalin's  late  years 
rather  than  the  change.  12  Indeed  some  su  rest  that  Stalin  was  becoming  more  inflexible 
in  his  approach  to  the  outside  world  than  the  reverse.  John  Van  Oudernaren,  in  a  recent 
and  very  substantial  study  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  since  1953,  argues  that  in  Stalin's 
increasing  emphasis  upon  foreign  Communist  Parties  as  a  means  to  conduct  foreign 
policy,  rather  than  dialogue  with  `Western  countries  in  the  United  Nations  or  Foreign 
'Minister's  meetings  ,  the  Soviet  policy  was  in  fact  becoming  more  radical.  1'  The  key 
contrast  with  his  successors  lay  in  Stalin's  desire  at  all  cost  to  maintain  direct  political 
control  from  Moscow  over  the  international  Communist  movement, 
gives  insufficient  attention  to  significant  changes  in  outlook  and  behaviour  which  bean  to  be 
manifested  before  the  death  of  Stalin. 
8  ibid.  p.  1. 
9  ibid.  pp.  111-114. 
10  ibid.  p.  '259. 
11  ibid.  pp.  92-99.  For  an  alternative  view  see  J 
World  War  II,  pp.  97-99. 
1'  See  Soviet  policy  Since  World  War  11,  p. 
conclusion, 
L.  Nogee  and  R.  H.  Donaldson,  Soviet  Policy  since 
100.  Nozee  and  Donaldson  come  to  the  following 
[T]actical  changes  during 
__ 
Stalin's  later  life  were  not  sufficient  to  brine  about  a  major 
reorientation  of  the  Soviet  approach  to  the  world.  What  was  needed  was  a  more 
thoroughgoing  reassessment  of  the  international  situation,  which  in  turn  necessitated  a 
disavo'..  al  of  some  of  Stalin's  own  fundamental  theses  on  foreiggn  policy.  In  a  very  real  sense, 
the  ageing  dictator  had  outlived  his  usefulness  to  his  country,  and  only  with  his  death...  would 
a  more  venturesome  strategy  to  attempt  to  break  the  stalemate  of  the  Cold  War  emerge. 
Also  see  Adam  B.  Ulam.  Expansion  and  Coe_ristence,  The  History  of  Soviet  Foreign  Polic. 
, 
1917- 
67,  p.  01. 
11  John  Van  Oudenaren.  Detente  in  Europe,  The  Soviet  Union  and  the  West  since  1953,  pp.  1^-ýO. Charter  1/  Pa`_e  10 
[T]he  innovative  element  in  the  Malenkov  and  Khrushchev  policies  was  not  that 
the  USSR  sought  to  mobilise  Communists  and  fellow  travellers  in  support  of 
Soviet  policy  objectives,  but  that  they  reached  out  to  organizations  and 
institutions  that  they  did  not  control  and  that  were  often  overtly  hostile  to  the 
USSR  in  a  long-term  effort  to  promote  the  "relaxation  of  tensions.  "14 
The  more  Stalin's  policy  eschewed  direct  contact  with  those  he  had  no  control  over,  in 
particular  the  West,  the  more  conservative  and  inflexible  it  became.  Shulman,  in  essence, 
had  grabbed  hold  of  the  wrong  end  of  the  stick.  This  is  the  reading  which  I  find  most 
convincing,  not  least  because  it  fits  best  with  the  British  Government's  view  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  at  the  time. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  there  were  no  nuances  of  future  change,  especially  in  the  area 
of  "doctrine".  Indeed  the  British  were  to  pick  up  the  rumbles  of  ideological  adjustment  in 
1951  and  1952,  as  will  be  discussed  below.  However,  in  terms  of  the  development  of 
policy  the  new  thinking  was  yet  to  be  put  into  practice.  l5 
Certainly,  the  jockeying  for  the  succession  which  was  to  preoccupy  the  leadership 
after  Stalin's  death  in  1953  and  1954,  is  discernible  in  retrospect  during  the  very  early 
fifties.  16  Indeed  Robert  Conquest  interpreted  the  Doctor.  '  Plot,  which  was  publicly 
announced  in  January,  1953,  as  the  prelude  to  a  selective  purge  by  Stalin  upon  those  who 
were  attempting  to  establish  personal  power  bases  from  which  to  launch  their  claims  to 
the  succession.  17  The  plot's  origins  and  history  are  far  from  clear,  but  the  accusations 
implicated  a  number  of  important  and  largely  Jewish  physicians  in  an  attempt  to  kill 
leading  Communists.  '8  Fortuitously  for  all  concerned,  Stalin's  health  took  a  very  sudden 
turn  for  the  worse  and  before  such  sinister  cunning  on  his  part  as  may  have  intentioned 
the  affair  became  clear,  he  went  to  his  eternal  reward.  In  the  aftermath  of  Stalin's  death 
the  Doctor's  Plot  was  swiftly  discredited  by  the  new  Government.  On  April  4th,  1953  the 
tables  were  turned  and  they  who  had  been  accusers  became  accused.  19  In  line  with  this  J 
14  ibid.  p.  20. 
15  ibid.  p.  17. 
16  See  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  79-191;  British  and  other  Western  observers  of  the  time  were  more 
impressed  by  the  ,, -rip  which  Stalin  maintained  on  power  up  to  the  very  end.  This  is  an  issue  which 
will  be  dealt  with  in  chapter  2. 
17  ibid.  pp.  185-191.  Conquest  argues  that  Lavrenty  Beria,  the  chief  of  the  secret  police,  was  the  main 
victim  which  Stalin  had  in  his  sights  in  1952  and  early  1953. 
18  There  is  an  account  by  Khrushchev  of  the  Doctors'  Plot,  which  lays  the  emphasis  very  much  upon 
Stalin's  insane  paranoia,  N.  S.  Khrushchev,  Khrushchev  Remembers,  pp.  282-287.  This  was  the 
line  which  Khrushchev  took  on  the  matter  in  his  Secret  Speech  to  the  20th  party  Congress  of  the 
Soviet  Communist  Party  in  February,  1956.  Conquest  points  out  that  Stalin  probably  had  more 
rational  political  ends  in  sight  than  Khrushchev  was  prepared  to  admit.  A  key  objective  in 
Khrusihchev'  s  revelations  was  to  foist  all  the  blame  for  the  errors  of  the  past  upon  Stalin,  thus 
leaving,  the  Communist  system  of  government  itself  and  Stalin's  acolytes  blameless.  On  this  point 
see  P(m-cr  and  Policy  pp.  171-1  2.  There  is  a  recent  English  translation  of  the  memoir  of  a  Doctor 
who  fell  under  suspicion,  Yakov  Rapoport,  The  Doctor's  Plot,  Stalin's  Last  Crime.  It  dives  a 
valuai-,  le  and  moving  account  of  the  late  Stalinist  state's  impact  upon  its  citizens.  Also  by  Louis 
Rapoport  is  Stalin's  'ar  iizainst  the  Jews.  The  Doctor's  Plot  and  the  Soviet  Solution. 
19  The  fate  of  Dr  Lydia  T,  imashuk,  whose  letter  had  sparked  of  the  original  investigation,  is  a  fitting 
testimony  to  Soviet  ter,,  iversation.  On  April  4th,  1953.  Pravda  announced  that  she  was  to  be Chapter  I/  Pace  11 
sudden  change  in  the  political  atmosphere,  Molotov  was  re-appointed  as  Foreign 
Minister.  He  had  lost  the  post  in  1949  to  the  prosecutor  of  the  great  show  trials  of  the 
thirties,  Andrei  Vyshinskii.  `Molotov  had  increasingly  fallen  victim  to  Stalin's  suspicions 
and  anti-semitism,  the  latter  through  Madam  Molotov  who  ývas  sent  to  a  concentration 
camp  on  account  of  being  Jewish. 
From  the  5th  March  1953  to  before  the  4th  April  Stalin's  heirs  engaged  in  what  might 
be  termed  the  first  round  of  the  succession  battle.  It  was  clear  from  the  start  that  the 
emphasis  in  the  new  regime  was  upon  "collective  leadership".  -'(?  To  this  end  Malenkov, 
thought  by  many  to  have  been  Stalin's  favourite,  was  forced  by  the  14th  March  to  choose 
between  his  positions  of  Prime  Minister  and  Secretary  of  the  Party's  Central  Committee. 
Malenkov  did  not  choose  wisely,  perhaps  beguiled  by  Stalin's  preference  for  State  as 
against  Party  titles  in  the  latter  years  of  his  reign.  '  1  As  a  consequence  of  this 
Khrushchev,  who  was  left  as  the  senior  secretary  and  in  effect  promoted,  gained  the  pole 
position  within  the  Party  Secretariat  from  which  he  was  to  launch  his  ultimately  successful 
bid  for  power.  However,  in  the  interim  the  key  issue  was  that  no  one  figure  should  inherit 
sufficient  political  power  to  be  able  to  turn  himself  into  a  "new  Stalin.  " 
Indeed  it  was  largely  because  of  his  challenge  to  this  news  principle  of  "collective 
leadership"  that  Lavrenty  Beria  was  arrested  in  the  June  of  195  3.  He  was  to  be  tried  and 
executed  later  in  the  year.  Beria,  whose  position  as  overseer  of  the  M.  V.  D.  arm  of  the 
security  service  had  been  confirmed  in  the  aftermath  of  Stalin's  death,  seems  to  have  been 
the  first  to  put  forward  a  clear  bid  for  untrammelled  power  and  for  his  pains  won  the 
distinction  of  being  the  last  top-level  leader  to  Low,  his  life  as  a  direct  result  of  conflict 
within  the  Soviet  elite.  22  By  the  end  of  1953  "collective  leadership"  seemed,  at  least  to 
foreign  observers  of  Soviet  politics,  to  have  become  firmly  entrenched  and  to  have 
weathered  its  first  real  challenge. 
This  turmoil  at  the  top  was  accompanied  by  a  softening  of  the  domestic  rigours  of 
Stalin's  last  years  and  was  also  to  have  important  implications  for  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
Despite  considerable  debate  between  1945  and  1953  over  the  importance  of  consumer 
industries,  the  Soviet  economy  was  still  very  substantially  biased  towards  heavy  industry. 
This  resulted,  inevitably,  in  considerable  privation  for  the  Soviet  domestic  consumer.  2 
The  new  leadership,  at  least  in  its  perception  of  the  popular  mood  in  spring  1953,  seems 
to  have  feared  that  the  loss  of  Stalin's  authority  might  fatally  undermine  the  regime's 
stripped  of  the  Order  of  Lenin  which  she  had  been  awarded  by  a  grateful  Stalin  on  January  the  20th. 
See  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  206-207. 
For  an  in  depth  analysis  of  domestic  politics  at  this  point  see  Power  and  Policy'.  pp.  195-227. 
1  Stalin's  authority  after  1945  was  not  based  upon  any  position  within  Government  or  Party,  but  upon 
the  very  peculiar  personal  power  which  he  had  developed  over  the  years  of  his  grotesquely  ruthless 
dictatorship,  see  for  example.  R.  Conquest,  The  Great  Terror,  pp.  445-463. 
22  See  Khrushchev  Remembers.  pp.  321-311. 
23  Althouý,  h  there  had  been  some  dalliance  with  expansion  in  the  supply  of  consumer  foods  in  1945 
and  1946,  as  the  international  situation  turned  more  chilly  the  demands  of  security  and 
reconstruction  favoured  a  renewed  emphasis  on  heavy  industry.  For  more  detail  see  Timothy 
Dunmore.  Soviet  Poiirics,  194-5-1953,  pp.  42-73,  and  also  by  Dunmore,  The  Stalinist  Command 
Economy,  The  Soviet  State  Apparatus  and  Economic  Policy  19-J5-53.  pp.  95-11  5. Chapter  1/  Page  1' 
standing  within  the  Soviet  Union.  Consequently.  a  relaxation  of  economic  tempo  ww  as 
embarked  upon  which  was  to  give  the  consumer  a  higher  priority  in  the  planning  of 
industrial  consumption.  This  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  "collective  leadership"  to 
pander  to  its  people,  as  we  shall  see,  was  the  subject  of  considerable  comment  by  British 
observers  at  the  time.  In  the  words  of  a  more  modern  commentator,  George  Breslauer, 
Perhaps  because  of  fear,  perhaps  for  other  reasons,  a  rather  broad  consensus 
emerged  within  the  national  leadership  on  the  need  to  break  with  the  past,  and  to 
offer  a  new  deal  to  the  urban  and  rural  consumer.  Malenkov,  Khrushchev,  even 
Kaganovich  endorsed  such  a  program,  while  -Molotov  grudgingly  accepted  it  as 
something  of  a  regrettable  necessity.  24 
This  policy  was  to  be  maintained  through  1953  and  into  1954,  when  it  too  began  to 
become  a  pawn  in  the  continuing  competition  between  `Ialenkov,  and  Khrushchev  for 
authority. 
Furthermore,  the  Soviet  Leadership's  need  for  calmness  at  home  informed  a  new 
flexibility  in  the  Soviet  approach  to  external  relations.  This  tendency  was  bolstered  by  an 
awareness  of  the  counter  productive  nature  of  the  extremes  of  Stalin's  diplomacy. 
Malenkov's  utterances  in  the  matter  were  to  have  a  particularly  profound  effect  upon 
Churchi11.25  However,  the  problem  which  preoccupied  Soviet  foreign  policy  in  195-3) 
seems  to  have  remained  very  much  that  which  it  had  been  in  1952,  the  dander  of  West 
German  re-armament.  On  this  there  was  considerable  debate  within  leadership  as  to  the 
best  course  of  action.  26 
It  appears  that  Beria,  at  one  extreme,  was  even  prepared  to  see  a  united  capitalist 
Germany  as  the  price  for  its  neutralisation.  Ulbricht  and  the  nascent  regime  in  East 
Germany  were,  in  this  view,  little  more  than  diplomatic  cannon  fodder.  '-7  Malenkov, 
apparently,  tended  towards  this  end  of  the  spectrum,  although  he  was  not  quite  as  radical 
in  attitude  as  Beria. 
This  preparedness  to  deal  with  the  West  was  also  informed  by  a  sanguine  view  of  the 
changing  nuclear  balance.  '8  As  the  Soviet  Union  developed  her  own  thermonuclear 
bomb,  on  top  of  the  atomic  weapons  already  manufactured,  Malenkov's  and  Beria's 
24  George  W.  Breslauer,  Khrushchev  and  Brezhnev  as  Leaders:  Building  Authority  in  Sorer  Politics, 
p.  5. 
25  A  matter  which  will  be  afforded  considerable  attention  below. 
26  On  this  see  Richter,  "Re-examining  Soviet  Policy  Towards  Germany".  He  makes  very  interesting 
use  of  the  latest  material  to  come  out  from  the  Soviet  Union  to  examine  the  debate  over  German 
policy  which  went  on  within  the  leadership  during  1953.  My  treatment  of  the  issue  is  essentially 
his. 
1,  See  Richter  and  Victor  Baras,  "Beria's  Fall  and  Ulbricht's  Survival,  "  Soviet  Studies  27:  3  (July 
1975),  pp.  381-95.  Also  there  is  a  very  recent  biography  of  Bena  which  deals  with  his  role  in  the 
succession  struggle  and  foreign  policy,  Amy  Knight,  Beria,  Stalin's  First  Lieutenant.  pp.  176-200. 
25  Malenkov  was  to  develop  this  theme  in  1954  with  his  Supreme  Soviet  election  speech  of  the  12'th 
March.  A  full  English  translation  is  in  Current  Di  est  of  the  Soviet  Press,  1954,  Vol.  7,  No.  11, 
pp.  ti-S.  For  a  very  recent  and  detailed  study  of  Soviet  nuclear  capacities  which  , uses  the  latest 
Soviet  information  see,  Steven  J.  Zaloga,  Target  America,  The  Soviet  Union  and  the  Strategic  Arms 
Race,  1945-1964. Chapter  1/  Pa,, 
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confidence  in  the  Soviet  ability  to  deter  Western  aggression  increased.  So  much  so  that, 
some  would  argue,  the  West  may  have  missed  an  opportunity  to  end  the  Cold  War  in  the 
months  after  Stalin's  death.  29 
James  Richter  suggests  that  these  opinions  were  also  informed  by  a  desire  to  reduce 
the  importance  of  ideology  in  policy.  Given  that  both  Beria  and  Malenkov  relied  upon 
State  structures  for  their  power  bases,  such  a  move  could  only  have  increased  their 
control  over  the  reigns  of  power.  30 
On  the  other  extreme,  Foreign  Minister  Molotov  retained  a  diehard,  Stalinist 
commitment  to  the  defence  of  Ulbricht's  regime.  Furthermore,  on  ideological  grounds  he 
was  not  one  to  consider  that  a  "modus  vivendi"  with  the  West  was  desirable,  even  if 
attainable.  '  1  Khrushchev  was  associated  with  this  opinion,  although  not  with  quite  the 
same  devotion.  As  a  man  whose  power  was  rooted  in  the  Party  he  had  a  clear  interest  in 
maintaining  the  importance  of  orthodox  doctrine  in  the  prosecution  of  foreign  policy.  ''- 
It  was  this  more  traditional,  Molotov-Khrushchev  view  which  emerged  triumphant  by 
the  summer  of  1953  and  the  arrest  of  Beria.  Thereafter  `Iolotov's  position  within  the 
leadership  allowed  him  a  crucial  role  in  the  development  of  foreign  policy.  From  the 
middle  of  1953  to  the  beginning  of  1955  that  policy  revolved  around  attempts  to  break  up 
29  This  is  a  view  canvassed  by  some  historians  of  Western  foreign  policy,  see  NI.  Steven  Fish,  "After 
Stalin's  Death:  The  Anglo-American  Debate  Over  a  New  Cold  War,  "  Diplomatic  History  10:  1 
(Fall.  1986).  It  is  also  a  view  which  James  Richter  seems  to  support  in  his  Ph.  D.  dissertation. 
"Action  and  Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign  Policy:  How  Leadership  Politics  Affect  Soviet 
Responses  to  the  International  Environment".  However,  Richter  himself  does  not  think  that  the 
most  recent  evidence  from  the  Soviet  Union  supports  the  thesis.  On  Soviet  policy  towards  Germany 
he  concludes  that  the  most  opportune  moment  for  dialogue  was  the  period  before  Beria's  arrest. 
Given  that  in  the  immediate  post-Stalin  period  Soviet  policy  was  in  flux  and  that  not  until  after 
Beria's  arrest,  in  the  late  summer  and  autumn  of  1953,  were  Western  observers  prepared  to  stick 
their  necks  out  and  make  longer  term  estimations  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  (see  below  on  this),  it 
would  have  required  a  very  substantial  leap  in  the  dark  for  Western  Governments  to  drop  their 
existent  policies  and  go  achasing  after  a  flicker  of  light  from  Moscow.  There  may  well  have  been 
more  to  Churchill's  intuitive  grasping  after  summit  diplomacy  in  1953  than  many  thought  at  the 
time,  but  few  Governments  are  prepared  to  take  grave  risks  with  their  nation's  security  based 
largely  upon  subjective  feeling.  Moreover,  in  "Re-examine  Soviet  Policy  Towards  Germany". 
Richter  concludes, 
In  sum,  the  new  information  suggests  that  no  realistic  opportunity  to  reunify  Germany  existed 
in  the  months  after  Stalin's  death.  The  Soviets  had  decided  in  late  May  [19531  not  to  abandon 
East  Germany  in  return  for  a  demilitanzed,  united  Germany...  no  Western  proposal  could  have 
chan_"ed  their  mind  in  the  short  time  before  Beria's  arrest  in  late  June. 
30  ibid.  pp.  15-16. 
31  ibid.  p.  17,  Using  One  Hundred  and  Forrv  Conversations  with  Molotov,  Richter  outlines  Molotov's 
position  as  follows, 
His  [Ltolotov's]  vision  of  socialism's  unrelenting  struýýle  against  the  forces  of  capitalism 
caused  him  to  reject  Beria's  suggestion  that  a  capitalist  Germany  could  ever  be  neutral  or 
"peaceful".  Even  if  the  government  ostensibly  supported  neutrality,  a  capitalist  Germany 
necessarily  would  support  the  imperialists  in  case  of  war.  Furthermore,  as  Molotov  conceived 
war  to  be  inevitable,  the  strategic  significance  of  Germany's  industrial  potential  and  position  in 
the  centre  of  Europe  was  far  to  great  to  hand  the  country  over  to  the  class  enemy. 
Richter  goes  on  to  point  out  that  ýiolotov's  use  of  conciliatory  rhetoric  was  ýntireIy  ýYnlcal.  It  v.  -as 
designed  to  prise  the  Western  Alliance  apart  rather  than  brink  East  and  West  together. 
32  ibid.  pp.  11-19. Chaptzr  1/  Pa`:?  14 
the  Western  Alliance  over  the  issue  of  German  rearmament  in  particular,  what  was  known 
by  the  British  Foreign  Office  as  "wedge  driving".  It  had  its  greatest  success  during 
August,  1954  in  the  failure  of  the  European  Defence  Community. 
By  the  reopening  of  the  Foreign  Ministers'  Conference  season  in  January  1954  after  a 
hiatus  of  some  six  years,  it  was  clear  to  the  West  that  the  Soviets  were  not  prepared  to 
give  way  on  any  fundamentals.  Indeed,  the  new  and  more  subtle  Soviet  diplomacy  was  if 
anything  creating  more  difficulties,  particularly  for  West  Germany's  rearmament,  than 
Stalin's  elephantine  blundering.  If  there  had  been  a  "window  of  opportunity"  which  all  in 
the  West  but  Churchill  had  turned  their  backs  upon,  it  was  not  open  for  very  long. 
1954  saw  the  intensification  of  a  new  round  of  domestic,  Soviet  political  dog- 
fighting.  Beria  having  been  "legally"  disposed  of,  the  competition  increasingly  centred 
around  the  ambitions  of  Nlalenkov  and  Khrushchev.  '  t  This  expressed  itself  in 
controversy  over  a  number  of  issues,  the  most  substantial  of  which  were  agricultural  and 
economic  policy.  3' 
On  agriculture  Khrushchev  saw  himself  as  something  of  an  expert  and  it  was  in  this 
area  that  he  devoted  much  of  his  energy  in  1954.36  In  essence  the  view  with  which  he 
associated  himself  was  that  the  Soviet  grain  problem  could  best  be  dealt  with  by 
increasing  the  amount  of  land  under  cultivation.  This  "virgin  lands  scheme"  became  a 
preoccupation  for  Khrushchev  in  the  years  to  come.  Indeed,  the  increasing  troubles 
which  it  ran  into  by  the  early  1960's  contributed  to  the  groundswell  of  dissatisfaction 
which  led  to  Khrushchev's  own  fall  from  power  in  1964.  However,  in  1954  it  gave  him 
an  issue  with  which  to  campaign  against  Malenkov.  Malenkov,  by  contrast,  remained 
happy  with  the  Stalinist  approach  which  emphasised  mechanisation  and  centralised 
control  in  the  intensification  of  agriculture  upon  such  land  as  was  already  in  use.  British 
observers  were  well  aware  at  the  time  that  this  argument  was  raging,  however,  as  we  shall 
see  they  did  not  go  on  to  draw  the  right  conclusions  regarding  the  struggle  for  power 
within  the  Kremlin. 
The  other  domestic  issue  around  which  the  Malenkov/Khrushchev  rivalry  cris  fII  isecl 
was  the  balance  between  heavy  and  consumer  industries  in  the  economy.  As  late  as 
August  1954  the  argument  seemed  to  have  been  won  by  those  who  advocated  the 
33  See  below. 
34  For  a  detailed  examination  of  this  period  see,  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  '?  8-ý6'  and  "action  and 
Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign  Policy",  pp.  144-166. 
35  At  least  this  is  the  view  of  most  subsequent  Western  analysts  of  the  power  struggle,  for  example, 
Power  and  Police.  Richter  suggests  that  such  accounts  tend  to  downplay  the  importance  of  foreign 
policy.  However,  he  provides  little  in  the  way  of  concrete  evidence  to  support  his  claim  that 
foreiý:  n  policy  was  the  deciding,  factor  in  the  decline  of  Malenkov.  Having,  said  this  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  the  Soviet  failure  to  prevent  West  German  rearmament  in  1954  came  as  a  substantial 
blow  to  both  \Ialenkov's  and  Molotov's  prestige.  "Action  and  Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign 
Policy".  pp.  162-165- 
336  For  a  thorough  treatment  of  this  whole  question  see  Martin  McCauley,  Khrusiichev  and  the 
Development  of  Soviet 
. -igriculture,  the  Virgin  Land  Programme  1953-1964,  pp.  40-75.  Also,  W. 
Hahn,  The  P(,  iitics  (ý  Soº'iet  Agriculture. Chapter  1/  Page  15 
sacrifice  of  heavy  industrial  to  consumer  production.  '?  It  was  only  in  'November,  1954, 
that  the  argument  began  to  hot  up  once  again.  `lalenkov  remained  a  firm  champion  of 
the  consumerist  approach  while  Khrushchev  seemed  to  ally  himself  with  those  who 
retained  a  Stalinist  predilection  for  the  primacy  of  the  industrial  staples.  Despite  being 
aware  that  the  reactivation  of  this  debate  was  laden  with  political  overtones,  once  more 
the  Foreign  Office  in  London  would  fail  to  conclude  that  the  political  infighting  was 
about  to  reach  another  climax. 
This  was  indeed  the  issue  which,  at  least  superficially,  precipitated  Nialenkov's  fall 
from  Premiership  on  the  8th  February,  1955.  In  his  letter  of  resignation  of  the  same  day, 
Malenkov  confessed  his  error  in  the  areas  of  agricultural  and  economic  policy.  From  this 
point  onwards  Khrushchev  was  clearly  primus  inter  pares,  his  ally  Bulýanin  replaced 
Malenkov  as  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  However,  `Ialenkov  was  not  yet 
definitively  beaten  as  he  retained  his  seat  as  one  of  nine  members  on  the  Party  Presidium. 
It  was  not  until  1957  and  Khrushchev's  route  of  the  "Anti-Party  Group",  that  he  was  able 
to  exclude  his  immediate  rivals  from  their  positions  of  power  at  the  centre.  38 
Nevertheless,  a  decisive  phase  in  Khrushchev's  bid  for  control  had  been  passed,  hereafter 
he  was  to  be  concerned  with  the  consolidation  and  defence  of  the  dominant  position 
which  he  had  established  for  himself. 
Despite  these  developments,  in  the  area  of  external  relations  Khrushchev  was  yet  to 
stamp  his  own  character  upon  policy.  In  order  to  topple  Malenkov  from  the  Premiership, 
during  the  consumer  industry  debate  Khrushchev  had  allied  himself  with  %Iolotov  and 
those  within  the  leadership  who  remained  loyal  to  Stalin's  approach,  although  even  at  this 
point  it  was  clear  that  Khrushchev  and  Molotov  did  not  see  eye  to  eye  on  all  matters.  39 
Once  this  end  had  been  achieved  Khrushchev  had  no  further  use  for  such  attachments, 
indeed  they  became  a  positive  hindrance  to  his  attempt  to  revamp  and  update  Soviet 
thinking  in  important  areas  of  policy.  Given  that  Molotov  remained  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  :  airs  until  June,  1956,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  during  early  1955  the  debate 
within  the  Kremlin  shifted  its  focus  from  internal  to  external  issues. 
Uri  Ra'anan  argued  that  this  debate  is  illustrated  in  the  inconsistencies  of  Molotov's 
8th  February,  1955,  key  note  speech  on  foreign  affairs  to  the  Supreme  Soviet.  This  was, 
of  course,  the  same  convocation  at  which  Malenkov  was  forced  to  resign.  On  the  issue  of 
relations  with  Yugoslavia  Molotov  remained  firmly  Stalinist  in  blaming  Tito  for  the  1948 
split  in  contrast  to  the  conciliatory  attitude  which  Khrushchev  was  to  take  in  the  following 
months.  However,  on  the  question  of  the  reunification  of  Austria,  Molotov  gave 
evidence  of  a  softening  of  the  Soviet  attitude  which  was  shortly  to  result  in  the 
37  ibid.  pp.  73--4. 
38  See  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  292-  28.  Also,  Carl  Linden,  Khrushchev  and  the  Soviet  Leadership, 
1957-1964,  pp.  22-57  :  Roy  and  Zhores  Medvedev.  Khrushchev,  the  Years  in  Power,  pp.  66-80. 
39  Uri  Ra'anan,  The  USSR  Arms  the  Third  World:  Case  Studies  in  Soviet  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  88-92. 
According  to  Ra'anan  Molotov  was  already  being  squeezed  out  of  important  foreign  policy 
decisions  by  Khrushche".  most  notably  in  September  1954  when  Molotov  did  not  accompany 
Khrushchev  and  cronies  to  what  was  effectively  a  summit  meeting  with  the  Chinese  Government. Chipar  1/  Pave  16 
withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  from  that  countrv.  40  It  is  at  this  point  that  the  opinions  of 
Khrushchev  are  to  be  seen.  As  Molotov  was  later  roundly  to  condemn  Khrushchev  for 
the  loss  of  Soviet  control  over  her  Austrian  occupation  zone  under  the  terms  of  the 
Austrian  State  treaty  it  seems  unlikely  that  this  was  a  course  foreshadowed  on  8th 
February  by  Molotov's  own  inspiration.  41  Ra'anan  argued  that  the  sr  `ech  was  a 
compromise  cobbled  together  from  two  very  different  understandings  of  how  the  Soviet 
Union  was  to  behave.  Niolotov  continued  to  stand  for  the  cautious  approach  which  Stalin 
had  maintained  in  his  dealings  with  non-Communist  countries.  42  Khrushchev,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  eager  both  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  which  seemed  to  Titter 
in  the  decolonialised  areas  of  the  "under-developed  world"  and  to  reduce  tensions 
between  East  and  West.  An  Austrian  settlement  seemed  in  this  latter  view  to  give  the 
Soviet  blessing  to  "neutralism"  so  much  in  vvo(-,  ue  in  Asia  and  went  a  long  way  to 
persuade  the  West  of  the  value  of  negotiation.  Indeed,  the  British  were  left  in  some  little 
confusion  as  to  exactly  where  Soviet  foreign  policy  was  joint  at  this  point,  back  to  Stalin 
or  forward  to  something  altogether  new. 
A  further  point  at  issue  was  nuclear  doctrine.  Molotov  remained  of  the  Stalinist 
opinion  that  unconventional  weaponry  did  not  fundamentally  alter  the  way  in  which  the 
Kremlin  should  think  about  and  fight  a  future  %  orld  war.  Khrushchev  and  his  associates, 
however,  displayed  a  much  keener  awareness  of  the  need  to  bring  Soviet  military  thinking 
into  line  with  recent  developments  in  thermonuclear  technology.  In  particular  that  it  was 
no  longer  possible  to  conceive  of  any  useful  purpose  for  a  war  which  would  bring  into 
play  such  destructive  explosives.  Malenkov's  premature  assertion  in  1954  that  total  war 
would  now  spell  the  end  of  civilisation  was  about  to  enjoy  its  vindication  as  it  was 
Khrushchev  whose  star  continued  to  ascend.  43 
By  the  end  of  1955  NIolotov  was  looking  decidedly  dog-eared  as  his  position  within 
the  leadership  was  eroded  by  Khrushchev's  swelling  power.  At  the  Foreign  L'linister's 
Conference  at  Geneva  in  October  Western  officials  noted  that  Molotov  seemed 
subservient  to  directives  from  Moscow  in  a  manner  which  had  been  unthinkable  in 
1954.44  It  was  Khrushchev's  fresh  and  venturesome  approach  to  domestic  and  foreign 
affairs  which  triumphed  through  1955  and  into  1956. 
40  ibid.  pp.  102-122. 
41  ibid.  pp.  104-105. 
42  ibid.  pp.  6-7.  Ra'anan  argues  that  the  dichotomy  between  the  old  and  the  new  approach  is  acutely 
demonstrated  in  the  contrast  between  'Molotov's  and  Khrushchev's  attitudes  towards  Egypt  in  late 
1954  and  early  195",.  Khrushchev  was  keen  to  be_in  the  cooperation  between  the  two  states  which 
led  in  September  1955  to  the  selling  of  arms  to  Egypt  via  Czechoslovakia.  Molotov  considered  it  a 
deflection  from  the  Soviet  Union's  crucial  interests,  European  security  and  relations  within  the 
Communist  Commonwealth.  Also  see  Karen  Da  wisha,  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  Towards  Egypt,  pp. 
4-11,  Mohnez  Niahmond  El  Hussini,  Soviet  E,.  ptiaii  Relations,  194-5-35,  pp.  25-43  and  Galia 
Golan,  Soviet  Policies  in  the  . 
Diddle  East  from  WIV71  to  Gorbachev,  pp.  7-13. 
43  For  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  stru_g`,  Ie  between  Khrushchev  and  Molotov  see  Richter,  "Action 
and  Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign  Policy",  pp.  '00-303. 
44  In  October,  1055,  Molotov  was  also  forced  to  publish  a  humiliating  mea  culpa  :,  onceming  his  8th 
February  speech  of  the  same  year  to  the  Supreme  Soviet.  Molotov's  error  concerned  his  reticence 
to  accord  socialism  its  full  triumph  within  the  USSR,  see  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  2-63-270. Chapter  I/  Pace  I 
Khrushchev's  "new  look"  was  underpinned  by  the  realisation  that  it  was  no  longer 
acceptable  to  conceive  of  the  Cold  War  coming  to  a  hot  resolution.  However. 
Khrushchev's  commitment  to  the  struggle  for  socialism  without  the  Soviet  Union 
remained  fundamental.  The  Cold  War  was  now  to  be  won  by  reliance  upon  economic  and 
social  means,  in  the  treasure  house  of  Soviet  jargon,  the  old  Leninist  term  "peaceful  co- 
existence"  was  dusted  off  and  given  a  new  coinage.  No  longer  did  it  merely  mean  a 
delaying  of  the  cataclysmic  show-down  between  capitalism  and  socialism  until  a  more 
propitious  hour;  at  the  20th  Party  Congress  in  1956,  Khrushchev  would  spell  out  clearly 
that  such  a  show-down  would  involve  an  unacceptable  degree  of  mutuality  Rather,  the 
Soviet  Union  would  demonstrate  its  economic  and  social  superiority  by  out-producing 
and  out-living  the  West.  In  the  new  historical  circumstances  there  was  no  need  of  war.  t5 
The  20th  Party  Congress  was  the  culmination  of  a  trend  of  thinking  which  had  become 
the  dominant  strand  in  Soviet  foreign  policy  by  1955. 
Even  before  the  20th  Party  congress  the  dimensions  of  the  new  policy  were  visible 
As  it  was  necessary  to  persuade  the  West  that  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  at  any  point  want 
war,  it  was  also  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  West  itself  would  not  consider  that  war  was 
in  its  own  interests.  In  order  to  achieve  this  Khrushchev  flung.  himself  with  some  aplomb 
into  summit  diplomacy.  The  Geneva  Conference  in  the  summer  of  1955  was  the  first  and 
most  impressive  fruit  of  this  new  effort.  46 
The  other  key  area  in  which  Khrushchev  presided  over  profound  change  in  Soviet 
relations  with  the  outside  world  was  in  its  policy  towards  the  third  world.  Stalin  had 
largely  ignored  one  of  the  defining  trends  of  the  post  1945  era,  the  end  of  the  European 
Empires  overseas.  Although  sparkles  of  interest  in  Asia  were  already  to  be  discerned 
before  1955,  Khrushchev  embarked  upon  an  ambitious  and  innovative  attempt  to  woo 
newly  independent  countries  to  the  Soviet  influence  by  the  use  of  economic  power, 
regardless  of  the  political  nature  of  their  regimes.  47  This  meant  that  he  was  prepared  to 
spend  vast  amounts  of  money  courting  countries  such  as  Egypt  whose  Government  ,.,,,,  as 
inflexibly  hostile  to  native  Communist  Parties.  48  The  two  most  spectacular  incidents  of 
Khrushchev's  new  policy  in  1955  were  the  Czech-Egyptian  arms  deal  of  September  and 
Bulganin's  and  Khrushchev's  tour  of  India  and  the  Far  East  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
er  the  ylobalisation  of  Soviet  Alvin  Rubinstein  argues  that  Khrushchev  presided  o,, 
foreign  policy.  The  Soviet  Union  was  attempting  to  draw  into  its  sphere  of  influence 
states  which  were  not  contiguous  with  its  borders  and  which  were  by  no  means 
Communist.  Indeed,  in  an  ironical  way,  the  Soviet  Government  was  behaving  in  a 
49  manner  reminiscent  of  Britain  during  her  imperial  zenith. 
45  For  a  discussion  of  the  importance  of  Khrushchev's  role  as  innovator  see  Soviet  Forei,  n  Policy  since 
World  War  11,  pp.  114-126- 
46  See  Detente  r'i  Europe,  pp.  31-50,  and  Khrushchev  Remembers.  pp.  392-400. 
47  Elizabeth  K.  Valkenier,  The  Soviet  U,  zion  and  the  Third  World,  an  Economic  Bind,  pp.  1-11. 
48  On  the  complex  and  turbulent  relationship  between  Nasser  and  Khrushchev  :  ee  Mohamed  Heikal. 
Sphinx  and  Commissar,  the  Rise  and  Fall  of  Soviet  In  Jluence  in  the  .  Arab  ,  Vorld,  pp.  11-147. 
49  Alvin  K.  Rubinstein.  Moscow's  Third  World  Stratet'v,  pp.  3-38. Chapter  1/  Pace  18 
The  crises  of  Suez  and  Poland  and  Hungary  in  the  second  half  of  1956  would  play  a 
defining  role  in  this  process.  They  did  not  fundamentally  change  Soviet  foreign  policy,  or 
indeed  the  way  in  which  the  British  Government  had  come  to  view  it.  However,  they  did 
draw  very  clearly  the  limitations  which  Moscow  placed  upon  the  process  of  detente  and 
"peaceful  coexistence".  Some  of  the  wilder  hopes  given  birth  by  the  "Geneva  Spirit"  of 
1955's  summit  diplomacy  were  proved  unfounded  and  it  was  made  apparent,  if  it  were  not 
already,  that  Khrushchev's  innovations  were  about  changing  the  parameters  within  which 
the  rivalry  between  East  and  West  was  to  be  expressed,  rather  than  bringing  that  rivalry 
to  an  end. 
From  the  perspective  of  our  own  time  Khrushchev's  innovations  look  somewhat 
foredoomed.  The  1950's  and  early  60's  were  the  last  years  in  which  the  economic  threat 
of  competition  from  the  Soviet  Union  was  to  be  taken  very  seriously  in  the  `'est.  With 
the  advent  of  the  information  revolution  of  the  late  60's  the  Soviet  economy  looked  ever 
more  dowdy.  From  the  stagnation  of  the  Brezhnev  years  and  the  economic  and  social 
breakdown  under  Gorbachev  there  was  to  be  no  resurgence  of  Soviet  power.  By 
Khrushchev's  criteria,  as  set  out  at  the  Twentieth  Party  Congress,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
as  to  who  lost  the  Cold  War.  Although  Khrushchev  was  right  in  emphasising  the 
importance  of  domestic  social  and  economic  strength  in  peaceful  competition  with  the 
West  he  was  wrong  to  have  faith  in  the  Soviet  Union's  capacities. 
Molotov's  attitude  towards  Khrushchev's  foreign  adventurism  seems,  historically  to 
have  been  right.  It  was  not  in  Egypt,  India  or  Cuba  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  delivered  a 
mortal  blow,  or  indeed  fatal  wounding  was  inflicted  on  the  West.  Rather  it  was  at  home 
and  in  Europe  within  the  immediate  satellites  that  the  regime  began  to  come  apart  at  the 
seams.  In  emphasising  the  importance  of  devoting  resources  and  attention  to 
strengthening  that  which  was  clearly  under  Soviet  control,  Molotov's  approach  might 
have  better  equipped  the  Soviet  Union  to  keep  up  economically  and  socially  with  the 
West.  Instead,  billions  of  roubles  were  spent  on  regimes,  such  as  Nasser's,  which 
stubbornly  maintained  their  independence  or  at  the  very  best  provided  the  Soviets  with 
only  a  limited  return  on  their  capital.  However,  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  a  study 
quite  beyond  the  bounds  of  this  present  work. 
THE  BRITISH  PERCEIVERS 
Attention  now  turns  to  the  machinery  with  which  the  British  Government  formulated  its 
opinion  of  Soviet  policy.  -`')  There  were  two  sections  within  the  Foreign  Office  which 
were  particularly  concerned  with  the  gathering  and  interpretation  of  information  about 
50  There  is  a  very  useful  Appendix,  __ivin-  a  hrief  resume  of  the  F.  O.  hierarchy  and  short  biographies 
of  personnel,  in  Victor  Rothwell.  Britain  and  the  Cold  War,  1941-194,.  pp.  45;  -461. Chapter  1/  Pie  19 
developments  in  the  Soviet  Union;  the  Northern  Department  and  the  Research 
Department,  Soviet  Section.  The  Northern  Department's  purlieus  also  included 
Scandinavia,  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia.  However,  the  rest  of  the  Communist  East 
Europe  and  Yugoslavia  was  the  concern  of  the  Southern  Department.  This  geographical 
division  was  a  hangover  from  earlier  times  when  it  made  more  political  sense.  Given  the 
importance  which  changes  in  the  relationship  between  Yugoslavia  and  the  Soviet  Union 
were  to  play  in  Moscow's  foreign  policy  throughout  the  fifties,  such  organisational 
eccentricities  cannot  have  helped  the  Foreign  Office  in  its  task. 
The  Northern  Department  was  much  the  senior  in  the  partnership,  although  it  was  in 
the  Research  Department  that  the  greatest  expertise  on  Soviet  affairs  was  to  be  found.  In 
the  preparation  of  briefs  and  submissions  for  politicians  such  as  the  Foreign  Secretary,  it 
was  the  Research  Department  which  provided  much  of  the  detailed  analysis  and  the 
Northern  Department  which  had  the  final  say  in  the  process  of  drafting  the  finished 
product. 
The  third  direct  influence  on  the  British  view  came,  unsurprisingly,  from  the  Embassy 
in  Ioscow.  This  was  one  of  the  top  ranking  British  Embassies,  however  due  to  the 
limitations  imposed  upon  its  size  and  operations  by  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  regime  it 
attained  nothing  like  the  prestige  or  importance  of  its  sister  in  Washington.  It  was  indeed 
regarded  by  those  fortunate  to  enjoy  its  florid  architecture  as,  in  the  words  of  Sir  William 
Hayter's  memoir,  "a  difficult  Embassy".  51  Although  access,  both  to  the  Soviet  people  and 
Government,  was  to  improve  very  substantially  over  the  period  of  Havter's 
Ambassadorship,  the  Embassy's  view  on  Soviet  affairs  was  informed  by  little  more  than 
that  which  was  available  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  London  by  other  means.  Much  of  the 
reportage  back  to  Whitehall  was  concerned  with  resumes  of  press  coverage,  learned 
articles  and  books,  public  pronouncements  by  the  leadership  and  so  forth. 
This  point  should  not,  however,  lead  us  to  devalue  the  role  which  the  Embassy 
played.  The  Foreign  Office  "view"  was  constructed  by  a  process  of  dialogue  between 
these  three  parts  of  a  wider  institution  and  although  the  Embassy  may  have  had  no  more 
information  on  which  to  base  its  analysis  it  did  not  have  any  less.  Furthermore,  staff  as 
well  as  ideas  were  transferred  from  one  area  to  another  and  it  was  in  the  Embassy 
opposite  the  Kremlin  that  many  had  their  first  direct  experience  of  the  Soviet  Union.;  '- 
51  Sir  William  Hayter, 
.4 
Double  Life,  pp.  98-154.  Hayter  described  the  frustrations  of  his  position  in 
1953  on  arriving  in  Moscow  in  the  following  passage  from  p.  98, 
It  is  customary  for  an  ambassador  newly  arrived  at  his  post  to  send  a  despatch  to  the  Foreign 
Office  recording  his  first  impressions.  I  conformed  to  this  custom,  but  with  some  reluctance. 
Of  what  value.  I  asked,  were  the  reactions  of  a  sold-fish  in  a  bowl,  peering  through  opaque 
and  refracting  `_lass  at  an  utterly  alien  world,  all  contact  with  which  was  denied  him' 
See  also  Sir  Curtis  Keeble,  Britain  and  the  Soviet  Union,  1917-89,  pp.  2,38-266. 
52  Sir  William  Hayter.  for  example,  returned  from  his  Ambassadorial  post  to  London  in  January  1957, 
to  become  a  Deputy  Under-Secretary  with  responsibility  for  both  the  Southern  and  Northern 
Departments.  This  was  the  second  hi,,  hest  rank  which  a  permanent  officiai  could  achieve  .,.  ithin  the 
Foreign  Office.  See 
.1 
Double  Life,  p.  155. Chapter  1/  Page  "0 
What  impact  the  Secret  Service  may  have  had  upon  the  development  of  Britain's 
attitude  towards  the  Soviet  Union  is  difficult  to  say  as  no  records  are  available  on  which 
to  base  an  analysis.  However,  as  this  thesis  is  interested  with  the  end  result  in  terms  of 
the  Government's  broad  understanding  of  Soviet  policy  rather  than  the  means  by  which  it 
was  reached  this  is  perhaps  not  so  important.  -' 
The  staff  who  populated  Foreign  Office  departments  were  essentially  split  into  two 
groups,  the  "generalists"  and  the  "specialists".  The  former  were  the  more  exalted 
category  who  dominated  the  high  profile  ambassadorial  appointments,  and  upper  reaches 
of  the  Home  Departments.  As  such  it  was  these  people  who  had  the  most  frequent  and 
direct  contact  with  Government  Ministers.  They  tended  to  come  from  rather  exalted 
social  backgrounds  and  were  shuffled  around  diplomatic  posts  and  responsibilities  at 
regular  intervals.  As  they  were  supposed  to  be  informed  as  to  the  overall  direction  of 
British  foreign  policy,  so  the  theory  went,  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  not  limit 
themselves  to  anyone  particular  part  of  it.  54 
The  "specialists",  who  from  the  Research  Department's  provided  in  depth  analysis 
bringing  to  bare  a  much  greater  degree  of  linguistic,  economic  and  political 
understanding,  remained,  on  the  whole,  at  a  relatively  lowly  "clerical"  level.  -'-"'  They 
included  people  who  were  to  go  on  to  develop  notable  careers  without  the  Foreign 
Service,  Violet  Conolly  and  Robert  Conquest  being  perhaps  the  most  prominent  examples 
in  the  Soviet  sphere. 
This  dichotomy  can  be  over  emphasised,  an  absence  of  specialist  Soviet  knowledge 
was  not  a  prerequisite  of  Northern  Department  appointments.  Indeed  Thomas  Brimelow, 
who  became  the  Head  of  the  Northern  Department  in  1957  was  exceedingly 
knowledgeable.  He  acted  as  an  interpreter  during  the  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  visit  to 
Britain  in  1956.  Most  of  those  operating  within  the  Northern  Department  had  spent  some 
time  at  the  Moscow  Embassy.  56  However,  officials  above  the  departmental  level  in  the 
53  There  are  a  number  of  works,  particularly  on  the  late  40's  and  early  50's,  dealing  with  the  issue  of 
intelligence.  For  example  see  the  volume  of  articles  edited  by  Richard  J.  Aldrich,  British 
Intelligence,  Strategy  and  the  Cold  War,  1945-51.  In  his  introduction  to  the  volume  Aldrich 
emphasises  the  need  for  more  research.  See  also  Carl-Christoph  Schweitzer,  (ed.  ),  The  Changing 
Western  Analysis  of  the  Soviet  Threat. 
54  A  Double  Life,  pp.  51-52,  Hayter  discusses  this  dichotomy  in  terms  of  his  experience  in  China  in 
the  thirties.  A  mordant  critique  of  the  impact  which  this  philosophy  had  upon  British  diplomacy 
since  1945  is  developed  by  Geoffrey  McDermott,  a  one-time  F.  O.  official,  in  The  Eden  Legacy  and 
the  Decline  of  British  Diplomacy.  In  essence  he  asserted  that  the  gentlemanly  amateurism  which  the 
traditional  approach  fostered  ill-suited  Britain  to  deal  with  an  increasingly  complex  and  dynamic 
international  situation. 
55  See  Anthony  Adamthwaite's  criticism  of  the  Forei`_n  Office's  disdain  for,  and  lack  of,  expertise, 
particularly  in  the  increasingly  crucial  area  of  economics,  "The  Foreign  Office  and  Policy  Making", 
pp.  18-19,  in  John  W.  Young,  (ed.  ),  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Churchill's  Peacetime  Administration 
1951-1955. 
56  For  example  the  career  of  J.  A.  Dobbs  as  recorded  in  the  Foreign  Office  List.  He  was  stationed  in 
the  Moscow  Embassy  Secretariat  form  1949-1950,  the  Northern  Department  from  1951  to  the  end 
of  1954  when  he  returned  to  the  Embassy,  where  he  stayed  until  February  1957.  In  December, 
1954,  he  qualified  for  an  allowance  in  Russian.  This  meant  that  he  had  attained  sufficient  aptitude 
in  the  language  to  be  awarded  a  bonus.  In  February  1957,  however,  he  was  seconded  to  the 
Commonwealth  Relations  Office  and  sent  to  New  Dehli. Chapter  1/  Pace  21 
main  did  not  share  the  detailed  knowledge  of  those  o  'er  whom  they  had  responsibility  and 
those  within  departments  enjoyed  career  paths  which  worked  consciously  against 
specialisation.  After  working  for  four  years  as  Head  of  the  Northern  Department,  H.  A. 
F.  Hohler  went  on  in  1957  to  become  the  Minister  at  the  British  Embassy  in  Rome. 
This  tradition  was  in  contrast  to  that  of  the  United  States.  American  diplomats  up  to 
the  highest  rank  were  trained  with  specialism  very  clearly  in  mind.  The  careers  of  the  two 
most  prominent  State  Department  experts  on  the  Soviet  Union  of  the  fifties,  George 
Kennan  and  Charles  Bohlen,  provide  an  instructive  comparison  with  those  of  their  British 
counterparts.  57  Bohlen  was  the  U.  S.  Ambassador  to  Moscow  from  1953  to  1957  and 
spent  most  of  his  career  as  a  diplomat  in  Moscow  or  as  an  expert  in  the  State  Department 
on  Soviet  affairs,  in  which  capacity  he  attended  the  great  war-time  conferences  at  Yalta 
and  Potsdam.  He  did  spend  two  and  a  half  years  in  Manila  from  1957  to  1959,  but  his 
transfer  there  had  more  to  do  with  personality  and  political  problems  and  it  caused  him 
considerable  frustration  that  his  Soviet  expertise  should  be  so  wasteVY  Hayter's  reaction 
to  his  own  equally  unexpected  promotion  to  be  Ambassador  in  Nfoscow,  as  recorded  in 
his  memoirs,  reflects  the  difference  between  British  and  American  approaches  to  overseas 
representation.  59  Bohlen's  last  big  diplomatic  post  was  as  Ambassador  to  France  from 
1962. 
Putting  the  question  of  staff  development  to  one  side.  some  thought  must  be  given  to 
the  hard  data  on  which  the  British  Government  based  its  analysis  of  Soviet  developments. 
It  will  become  very  clear  in  the  course  of  this  dissertation  that  the  Foreign  Office  was 
dependent  on  the  public  pronouncements  of  the  regime  as  the  most  substantial  indicators 
of  Soviet  policy.  Newspapers,  public  speeches,  learned  journals,  plan  results,  budget 
announcements  and  so  forth  formed  the  meat  of  the  Embassy's  reportage  and  the  basis  of 
the  Research  Department's  work.  All  of  which  contributed  the  building  blocks  with  which 
the  Northern  Department  put  together  its  assessment  of  what  was  going  on  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  When  Robert  Conquest  published  his  book,  Power  rund  Policy  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  in 
1961,  he  was  using  the  same  kind  of  sources  as  he  had  whilst  working  for  the  Foreign 
Office  up  to  1956.  The  only  new  advantage  which  he  had  as  a  historian  was  that  of 
perspective. 
57  See  George  F.  Kennan,  Memoirs,  and  Charles  E.  Bohlen,  Witness  to  History,  1929-1969.  From  the 
opening  of  formal  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  liltiion  by  Roosevelt  in  the  thirties  the 
Americans  had  gone  to  considerable  effort  to  build  a  cadre  of  Soviet  experts  to  man  their  new 
Embassy  and  assist  the  State  Department  in  the  formulation  of  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union. 
Some  historians  have  ,  one  so  far  as  to  argue  that  this  tradition  had  a  profound  impact  upon  the  way 
in  which  the  Americans  viewed  the  Soviets  after  1945  and  played  an  important  role  in  the 
development  of  the  Cold  War,  particularly  Daniel  Yergin  in  Shattered  Peace:  the  Origins  of  the 
Cold  War  and  the  National  Security  State. 
58  Witness  to  History,  pp.  441-458  and  in  particular  pp.  450-45  1.  The  Secretary  of  State,  John  Foster 
Dulles  seems  not  to  have  been  overly  fond  of  Bohlen.  Neither  was  the  right-wine  of  the  Republican 
Party  which  harboured  suspicions  of  Bohlen's  sympathies  with  Soviet  ideoloý,  y.  He  was  tainted,  in 
their  eyes.  by  the  supposed  dishonourable  appeasement  of  Stalin  it  Yalta. 
59  A  Double  Life,  pp.  )5-97. Chapter  1/  Page  22 
This  dependence  on  "official"  sources  for  information  is  an  important  point.  Debates 
about  Soviet  policy  were  carried  out  in  a  shadowy  world  of  supposition.  Much  depended 
on  the  Foreign  Office's  reading  of  very  limited  and  prejudiced  evidence.  For  example,  the 
British  were  to  accept  the  Kremlin's  lip-service  to  "Collective  Government"  and  entirely 
misinterpret  the  rumblings  of  competition  between  Nlalenkov  and  Khrushchev  for  power 
during  1954  and  early  1955,  so  that  Malenkov's  fall  in  February,  1955,  took  them  quite  by 
surprise. 
Even  after  the  liberalisation  of  Soviet  dealings  with  foreign  diplomats  once  Stalin  was 
dead,  there  was  little  to  be  learned  by  direct  and  private  contact  between  Embassies  and 
the  Soviet  Government,  or  for  that  matter  the  Russian  people.  6°  Tuch  of  these  new 
contacts  consisted  of  unrevealing,  if  entertaining,  diplomatic  receptions  which  Stalin's 
successors  enjoyed  with  alcoholic  aplomb.  Contact  with  the  Soviet  on  the  street  was  no 
more  enlightening.  61  Western  Observers  were  little  advantaged  by  the  improvement  in 
atmospherics  which  the  death  of  Stalin  had  allowed.  62  But  then  this  was  a  long,  -standing 
problem  which  was  not  to  have  improved  very  much  despite  Khrushchev's  new  style  of 
government.  633 
The  process  by  which  the  Foreign  Office  refined  its  raw  data  down  into  a  digestible 
assessment  of  Soviet  policy  is  reasonably  easy  to  follow  in  the  Records  available.  A 
central  purpose  of  the  Foreign  Office  paraphernalia  was  to  reduce  Soviet  affairs  to 
intelligible  summaries  for  Ministers  as  the  basis  for  the  development  of  policy.  This  was 
achieved  by  the  production  by  the  Embassy  of  quarterly  summaries  of  events  in  the  Soviet 
60  ibid.  p.  105,  Sir  William  Hayter  puts  it  as  follows, 
Like  my  colleagues,  I  had  high  hopes,  when  the  Soviet  leaders  started  their  new  policy  of 
accessibility,  that  this  would  mean  the  beginning  of  normal  diplomatic  activity  in  Moscow. 
We  would,  we  thought,  engage  in  frank  confidential  discussion  with  our  new  friends,  in  which 
the  serious  issues  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  rest  of  the  world  would  be  sorted  out  in 
genuine  dialogues.  But  it  did  not  turn  out  like  that.  Each  of  the  Soviet  leaders  carried  his  own 
private  Iron  Curtain  around  with  him.  Responses  were  predictable:  conversations  were  like 
Pravda  leading  articles  on  one  side  and  The  Times  leading  articles  on  the  other;  well-grooved 
long-playing  records  went  round  and  round. 
61  The  post-Stalin  thaw  allowed  two  distinct  sub-genres  of  embassy  reportage  to  flourish.  The 
trawling  of  casual  conversations  with  Soviet  Joe  citizen  and  the  diplomatic  junket.  Of  the  former 
FO  371  111671  NS  1015i2,  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Chancery  to  Northern  Department,  4th 
January,  1954,  is  a  good  example.  On  the  latter,  the  Minister  at  the  British  Embassy,  Paul  Grey's 
account  of  the  Indonesian  Embassy's  drunken  celebration  of  their  independence  day  at  FO  371 
111823  NS  1965/1,  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Grey  to  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  18th  Aut  ust,  1954, 
provides  an  entertaining  picture  of  the  convivial  side  to  peaceful  coexistence  in  all  its  essential 
vacuity. 
62  FO  371  111671  NS  1015/2,  Despatch  from  Washington  Embassy,  J.  H.  A.  Watson  to  Northern 
Department,  3rd  February,  1954.  Watson  was  commenting  on  the  opinions  of  American  Soviet 
watchers, 
As  George  Kennan  likes  to  say,  there  are  no  experts  of  the  Soviet  Union.  only  varying  degrees 
of  ignorance...  In  the  circumstances  every  fact  and  every  probable  deduction  is  precious;  and  I 
have  great  sympathy  with  Violet's  [Conolly]  desire  to  know  just  how  the  various  experts  arrive 
at  the  conclusions  they  Jo. 
63  Conquest  discussed  the  matter  it  `reater  length  in  Power  and  Policy,  pp.  50--5.  published  first  in 
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Union  and  ad  hoc  despatches  on  matters  . 
hich  were  considered  of  importance.  Day  to 
day  diplomatic  activities  and  reporting  was  generally  dealt  with  by  telegram.  The 
Northern  and  Research  Departments  drafted  memos  and  reports  on  matters  of  immediate 
moment  and  on  long-term  trends  indicative  of  Soviet  foreign  and  domestic  policy.  There 
was  a  process  of  dialogue  at  work  between  the  home  departments  and  the  Embassy  by 
which  opinions  were  tested,  refined  and  approved.  In  this  process  the  Northern 
Department  assumed  an  executive  role,  having  the  final  say  in  submissions  to  politicians 
and  Permanent  Under-Secretaries.  However,  such  submissions  were  representative  of  a 
broad  spectrum  of  contribution. 
There  was  also  the  need  to  keep  other  departments  within  Whitehall  and  foreign 
postings  conversant  with  the  most  recent  developments  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
assessments  of  Soviet  policy.  To  which  end  Moscow  despatches  of  importance  were 
circulated,  in  particular  Quarterly  Reports,  as  summaries.  These  were  bolstered  by  the 
production  of  Intelligence  Reports  on  questions  of  importance.  64  The  Northern  and 
Research  Departments  in  tandem  with  the  Moscow  Embassy  played  a  crucial  role  in 
developing  understanding  of  Soviet  affairs  throughout  Government.  65 
Thus  it  is  reasonably  easy  to  trace  changes  in  the  perception  of  the  Soviet  Union  on 
the  part  of  the  Foreign  Office.  More  problematic  is  the  relationship  between  this  barrage 
of  opinion  and  the  politicians  whose  responsibility  it  was  to  make  decisions.  The  Foreign 
Secretary's  position  is  perhaps  clearest,  in  so  far  as  he  was  the  direct  recipient  of  much  of 
what  the  Northern  Department  produced  and  his  submissions  to  Cabinet  in  turn  reflected 
the  opinions  of  his  permanent  officials.  As  regards  the  Prime  Minister  the  Prime 
Minister's  Private  Office  Papers  are  an  important  indication  of  what  was  physically  placed 
before  him,  although  they  are  by  no  means  a  reliable  guide  as  to  what  he  had  time  or 
inclination  to  read.  Furthermore,  the  briefing  papers  which  formed  the  prelude  to 
international  conferences  were  prepared  by  the  Foreign  Office  Departments  concerned. 
Their  advice  might  have  been  dismissed,  as  was  often  the  case  with  Churchill,  but  it  was 
impossible  to  avoid. 
The  case  of  Churchill's  positive  attitude  to  Summit  diplomacy  is  interesting  in  another 
sense.  Churchill's  personal  conviction  in  favour  of  a  meeting  with  the  Soviets  in  1953  and 
1954  was  pitted  against  a  Government  which  was  united  in  support  of  the  contrary 
Foreign  Office  view.  Despite  Churchill's  wriýýliný  it  was,  fundamentally,  the  majority 
which  carried  the  day.  In  order  to  gain  an  accurate  understanding  of  what  the  British 
Government's  attitude  to  the  Soviet  Union  was  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  thinking  of 
that  Government  at  a  very  much  wider  level  than  merely  its  political  chief.  66 
64  For  example,  FO  371  111706  NS  1073/37,  Draft  Intel.  [intellitzence  report]  on  Peaceful 
coexistence. 
65  Another  good  example  of  the  process  of  cross-fertilisation  by  which  Intels  were  created  is  at,  FO 
371  111672'  NS  101515,.  ),  Minute  by  R.  A.  Lon;  mire  of  Soviet  Section  F.  O.  R.  D..  January  lath, 
1955. 
66  James  Richter  falls  into  the  error  of  confusing  the  opinion  of  the  British  Government  with  that  of 
Churchill.  In  "Re-examinin:  Soviet  Policy  Towards  Germany",  p.  10  he  contrasts  the  Lukewarm Chapter  I/  Pave  24 
Ho%  ever,  banal  as  the  observation  may  be,  the  thought  processes  of  an  individual  do 
not  admit  of  precise  or  easy  analysis.  Only  Harold  `'1acmillan  seems  to  have  been  in  the 
habit  of  committing  his  ruminations  to  paper,  in  memorandum  for  the  benefit  of  himself 
and  others  within  Government.  Indeed  as  Anthony  Adamthwaite  has  commented  this 
problem  is  made  much  worse  by  important  gaps  in  the  records  . vhich  make  it  difficult  to 
follow  with  any  precision  the  decision  making  process.  67  The  most  damaging  trend  post 
1945,  from  a  historian's  perspective,  was  the  increasing  dependence  upon  the  telephone 
and  informal  meetings  to  do  business.  Most  of  these  conversations  have  gone 
unrecorded.  With  the  ever  increasing  pressure  of  work  and  the  complexity  of  problems  to 
be  dealt  with,  the  paper  centred  operation  of  the  pre  1939  Foreign  Office  became 
compromised. 
Nonetheless,  there  is  a  very  substantial  body  of  material  available  to  the  historian  on 
which  the  following  analysis  is  based.  Furthermore,  the  task  is  perhaps  made  easier  as  I 
am  more  concerned  with  the  general  context  within  which  policy  decisions  concerning  the 
Soviet  Union  were  made,  rather  than  the  decisions  per  se. 
response  of  the  Eisenhower  Administration  to  the  Malenkov  Government  in  1953  with  "Bntain's" 
reaction, 
Britain  responded  more  boldly:  on  April  20  and  more  explicitly  on  May  11  Prime  Minister 
Winston  Churchill  suggested  the  leaders  of  the  four  victorious  powers  hold  a  summit  meeting. 
o7  The  Foreign  Office  and  Policy-making',  pp.  2-3. Chapter  2 
Churchill,  Malenkov  and  the  Search  for  a  Summit 
"Whoring  after  the  Russians" 
"One  is  in  danger  of  thinking  of  Molotov  as  a  sort  of  benevolent  middle-man  -  Auntie 
-  he  smiles  so  nicely  and  talks  so  gently  to  us.  " 
Evelyn  Shuckburgh. 
Churchill's  re-election  in  the  October  of  1951  had  been  despite  the  best  efforts  of  the 
Labour  Party  to  portray  him  as  a  warmonger;  efforts  which  culminated  somewhat 
hysterically  in  the  excitement  of  election  day  with  the  Daily  . Mirror's  infamous  banner 
headline,  "Whose  Finger  On  the  Trigger"?  l  However,  over  the  subsequent  four  years 
Churchill  was  to  prove  himself  such  a  passionate  crusader  for  the  cause  of  world  peace 
that  it  seemed  to  many  of  his  colleagues  he  was  willing  to  sacrifice  even  his  country's 
basic  security  interests  towards  that  end.  After  the  death  of  Stalin  in  March,  1953,  his 
search  for  a  confabulation  between  East  and  West  grew  to  an  almost  childish 
obsession.  Indeed  Churchill's  attempts  to  realise  his  last  great  vision  came  close  to 
wrecking  his  own  Government  in  1954  before  they  petered  out  into  the  long  twilight  of 
his  retirement  in  1955.2  By  that  point  it  was  clear  that  the  Daily  Mirror's  persiflage 
was  very  wide  of  the  mark. 
The  explanation  for  this  disappointing  dichotomy  between  hopes  and 
achievements  must  be  sought,  largely,  in  terms  of  what  was  in  fact  the  substantially 
unchanged  nature  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  up  to  1955.  Churchill  was  alone  in  his 
perception  of  a  "window  of  opportunity"  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  Stalin's  death. 
Although  others,  including  the  Americans  under  Eisenhower,  were  prepared  to  make 
peaceful  noises,  they  were  born  essentially  of  publicity  considerations  rather  than  any 
upwelling  of  confidence  in  the  efficacy  of  dialogue.  Indeed  the  Foreign  Office  quickly 
came  to  the  conclusion  through  1953  that  in  terms  of  their  international  stance,  in 
essence  and  in  tactical  detail,  there  was  little  to  choose  between  Stalin  and  Malenkov. 
Some  of  the  excessive  Soviet  cussedness  of  the  past  had  been  discarded,  but  then  it  had 
been  largely  counter  productive  anyway.  Churchill's  restless  striving  for  talks  with  the 
Soviets  was,  at  least  within  the  limited  circles  of  government,  a  rather  private 
obsession.  3  However,  this  melancholic  footnote  to  Churchill's  career  is  not  in  itself 
the  main  subject  of  the  following  exposition.  4 
I  See  John  Young,  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Churchill's  Peacetime  Administration,  pp.  55-5-17 
. 
2  ibid.  pp.  55-S0. 
3  FO  337/  1  106527  NS  1021/108G,  contains  a  minute  written  by  Sir  Alvery  Gascoigne  recording  a 
meeting  between  himself  and  Churchill  on  the  19th  August,  1953.  The  record  was  kept  without  the 
knock  ledge  of  No.  10.  It 
-, 
ives  an  interesting  vignette  of  the  differences  and  limitations  thereof 
between  Churchill  and  the  Foreign  Office.  It  was  over  Churchill's  touching  faith  in  the  meeting  of 
minds  that  he  and  Gascoigne  disagreed.  rather  than  in  the  fundamentals  of  Soviet  policy.  This,  in 
essence,  was  the  division  between  Churchill  and  the  rest  of  his  Government  up  until  1955. 
4  For  a  substantial  treatment  of  this  subject  per  se  see  : Never  Despair,  pp.  653-1128.  Gilberts 
account  of  Churchill's  last  years  in  office  is  dominated  by  this  theme.  Indeed.  Churchill's  rational Chapter  2/  Page  26 
The  crucial  basis  of  Britain's  Cold  War  policy  throughout  Churchill's 
administration  was,  much  as  it  had  been  on  Attlee's  departure  from  office,  the 
development  of  the  strength  and  cohesion  of  the  Western  Alliance.  However,  the 
means  which  were  applied  to  this  end  under  Churchill  differed.  The  British 
Government  after  1951  was  to  place  an  increased  emphasis  upon  the  rearmament  of 
West  Germany  rather  than  the  extravagant  expansion  of  Britain's  armed  forces  which 
Labour  had  envisaged  in  1951.  '  Until  the  developments  of  1955  the  British 
Government  did  not,  in  the  main,  consider  that  Soviet  foreign  policy  had  materially 
changed,  at  least  not  so  that  any  substantial  realignment  of  British  policy  were  required 
in  response.  6  The  military  rehabilitation  of  Germany  continued  to  be  a  vital  objective 
which  even  Churchill  was  not  prepared  to  surrender  in  the  hope  of  Soviet  concessions. 
In  this  context  his  restless  wooing  of  the  Soviets  was  a  positive  hindrance  to  the 
execution  of  policy  and  perhaps  even  vaguely  dishonest.  The  French  in  particular 
proved  all  too  willing  to  delay  the  evil  hour  of  German  rearmament  for  the  sake  of 
Summitry. 
Yet  despite  this  rather  gloomy  outlook  the  two  years  between  the  death  of 
Stalin  and  the  fall  of  Malenkov  were  not  without  their  share  of  diplomatic  interest  and 
in  comparison  with  the  immediate  post-1945  period,  some  success.  In  1954,  first  at 
Berlin  and  even  more  so  at  Geneva.  Eden  as  Foreign  Secretary  proved  able  to  act  the 
role  of  intermediary  between  the  Soviets  and  the  Americans  with  considerable  skill  and 
achievement.  Furthermore  the  Foreign  Office  began  clearly  to  discern  a  number  of 
trends  of  substantial  long-term  significance,  a  discernment  which  allowed  the  British 
Ambassador  in  1956  to  view  the  innovations  of  the  20th  Party  Congress  with  a  certain 
dejä  vu.  Even  in  the  last  days  of  Stalin's  life  it  was  apparent  that  the  focus  of  Soviet 
policy  was  beginning  to  move  away  from  the  stalemate  of  Europe  to  virgin  territory  in 
what  was  then  referred  to  as  the  Under-Developed  World. 
However,  it  was  not  apparent  during  NMlalenkov's  Premiership  what  these  early 
indications  were  to  become.  In  many  ways  they  were  embedded  within  a  resolutely 
traditional  Soviet  foreign  policy  which,  for  example,  was  more  concerned  to  subvert 
existing  "bourgeois  nationalist"  regimes  in  Asia  and  Africa  than  it  was  to  court  them. 
Malenkov's  foreign  policy  caused  not  a  fraction  of  the  surprise  and  consternation 
which  Khrushchev's  bold  initiatives  through  1955  inspired  in  Whitehall. 
Nor  were  the  Foreign  Office  prognostications  of  the  Soviet  scene  necessarily 
always  accurate.  The  consensus  opinion  through  1954  was  that  such  controversies  as 
for  hanging  on  to  power,  apart  from  elf'-centered  sentiment  and  a  growing  disillusionment  with 
Eden.  seems  to  have  been  the  fulfilment  of  a  fate-decreed  role  as  Peacemaker  General  for  the  world. 
5  C.  J.  Bartlett  dwells  on  the  irony  of  a  Conservative  Government  reducing  a  Labour  defence  budget. 
The  Long  Retreat.  a  Short  History  of  British  Dcfr  ice  Polio,,  1945-1970,  p.  78.  Also  on  German 
rearmament  and  the  European  Defence  Community  see  Full  Circle  pp.  29-52.  pp.  146-174,  and  The 
Foreisrr  Police  of  Churchill's  Peacetime,  -Itlmiiii.  vtrcatioli.  pp.  81-102. 
6  See  the  discussion  of  the  British  Govern  nment'ý  view  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  at  the  start  of  1955 
below  in  chapter  3. Chapter  2/  Pa, 
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there  existed  within  the  leadership  were  merely  policy  debates  between  colleagues  Who 
accepted  the  constraints  of  collective  leadership  upon  their  individual  ambitions.  The 
most  embarrassing  error  of  judgement  came  over  the  interpretation  of  the  relationship 
between  Khrushchev  and  Malenkov  through  1954  and  into  1955.  The  fall  of  the  latter 
in  the  February  of  1955  caught  all  the  foreign  Legations  in  Moscow  quite  by  surprise. 
As  in  Stalin's  day  the  British  still  observed  the  Soviet  Union  as  through  a  glass  darkly. 
THE  END  OF  THE  STALIN  ERA 
By  the  19th  Congress  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  the  British  Government  had  come 
to  the  firm  conclusion  that  Soviet  policy  towards  the  outside  world  had  settled  into  a 
stable  orthodoxy.  In  contrast  to  fears  about  the  outbreak  of  war  at  the  turn  of  the 
decade,  by  1952  it  seemed  to  the  British  highly  unlikely  that  the  Soviets  were  about  to 
launch  an  attack  upon  the  west.  Rather  they  had  settled  into  a  long  period  of  political 
hostility,  thrOU211  which,  according  to  Stalin,  the  West  would  be  defeated  without 
recourse  to  World  War  III.  It  was  apparent  to  the  British  that  such  a  rivalry  might  yet 
lead  the  Soviets  inadvertently  into  war,  but  military  experts,  Foreign  Office  officials 
and  politicians  all  considered  it  very  unlikely  that  Moscow  actually  wanted  such  a 
conflict.?  This  was  a  view  with  which  the  Americans  were  fundamentally  in 
agreement  by  the  beginning  of  1952.8  Yet  these  relatively  sanguine  assumptions  about 
Soviet  policy  did  not  give  much  of  a  fillip  to  Churchill's  personal  search  for  a  Summit. 
Throughout  the  First  years  of  Churchill's  second  administration  it  proved  impossible  to 
bring  even  the  Foreign  Ministers  to  the  Conference  table.  9  In  the  context  of  a  military 
stalemate,  bitter  political  rivalry  and  continuing  diplomatic  frustration,  the  outlook  for 
Conference  diplomacy  continued  to  look  bleak. 
As  early  as  1951  it  became  apparent  to  the  Foreign  office  that  the  political 
struggle  was  becoming  more  important  than  the  military  in  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
Through  1951  a  series  of  "Partisans  for  Peace"  conferences  were  held  in  Moscow, 
attended  by  the  representatives  of  the  international  "Peace  Movement",  at  least  so 
7  PREM  11  369,  this  tilt  contains  an  extensive  documentation  of  the  British  rationale  for  scaling 
down  the  military  timetable.  a,  -,  reed  in  consultation  with  NATO.  during  1951,  desi`_ned  to  meet  a 
Soviet  threat  no  longer  considered  imminent  by  1952.  See  also  Defence  Committee  reports  and 
memos  for  1952  at  CAB  131/14,  by  1952  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  did  not  consider  war  at  all  likely  in 
the  period  up  to  1955.  It  soon  became  clear  that  Stalin's  death  did  not  necessitate  any  change  in  this 
opinion.  Churchill,  however,  did  not  want  their  views  passed  on  to  the  Americans  for  fear  they 
might  lead  them  to  reduce  their  defence  expenditure.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  considered,  in  his 
self-assurance,  that  the  Americans  were  capable  of  drawing  their  own  conclusions,  which  were  in 
fact  not  so  very  different  from  the  British,  see  footnote  S.  D.  (53)  13th  Meeting,  14th  October, 
1952  and  D  (53)  45. 
S  FRUS  195_-1954.  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  954-961:  National  Intelligence  Estimate  48,8th  January,  195?. 
9  Churchill  had  himself  proposed  talks  with  the  Soviets  in  late  1951,  to  little  avail,  see  Churchill's 
In,  (/in  Summer,  pp.  396-397.  Such  attempts  as  ,  Lere  made  by  Eden  to  get  meetings  between 
Fore[, 
-,  n  Minister's  started  were  concentrated  around  the  unfinished  business  of  German  unification. 
There  was  inevitably  concern  that  Soviet  moves  on  the  issue  were  designed  more  with  West  German 
rearmament  in  mind  than  a  relaxation  in  international  tension.  See,  for  example,  Cabinet 
conclusions  for  12th  \Iarcn  and  16th  April,  195_.  CAB  1281-`4 Chapter  2/  Pa, 
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called  by  the  Soviets-10  It  became  ever  more  clear,  both  from  Soviet  diplomatic 
innovations  such  as  the  peace  conferences  and  in  the  ideological  tone  of  Soviet  articles 
and  commentaries,  that  the  fear  of  a  "preventative"  war  launched  by  Stalin  was  indeed 
a  chimera.  The  Soviet  emphasis  was  increasingly  seen  to  be  on  political  methods  as 
the  means  to  achieve  their  external  ambitions.  It  appeared  that  they  had  now  accepted 
a  long  period  of  "coexistence"  with  the  West. 
However,  British  observers  were  very  careful  to  define  the  limitations  of  this 
period  of  grace.  On  the  15th  December  1951  the  Moscow  Embassy's  Secretariat  sent 
back  to  London  an  analysis  of  one  of  a  recent  spate  of  articles  which  they  felt 
representative  of  the  general  trend  in  Soviet  thinking  on  foreign  policy.  The  article  by 
G.  Deborin  had  been  published  in  the  Soviet  journal  "Questions  of  Economics"  and 
was  concerned  with  a  definition  of  peaceful  coexistence.  The  then  British 
Ambassador,  Sir  Alvery  Gascoigne,  in  summing  up  the  views  to  which  his  staff  had 
arrived,  made  the  following  comment, 
The  conclusions  suggested  by  this  memorandum  are  of  some  importance. 
They  imply  that,  when  the  Soviet  authorities  speak  of  peaceful  co-existence, 
they  mean  not  co-existence  without  conflict,  but  only  co-existence  without 
major  war.  Nor  do  the  Soviet  authorities  regard  this  peaceful  co-existence  as  a 
state  of  indefinite  duration,  but  only  as  a  temporary  (though  possibly 
prolonged)  postponement  of  the  complete  victory  of  Soviet  Socialism  over 
capitalism.  11 
This  Embassy  despatch  sparked  of  considerable  discussion  in  the  Northern 
Department  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Soviet  Section  of  the  Foreign  Office 
Research  Department.  The  debate  centred  around  the  ideological  implications  of  this 
10  FO  371  100815  NS  1013/35,  From  Sir  Alvery  Gascoigne,  Moscow,  to  F.  O.,  17th  July,  1952. 
Gascowne,  the  Ambassador,  in  the  Quarterly  Report  for  April  to  June  1952  condemned  the  Peace 
Campaign  in  no  uncertain  terms, 
The  aim  may  be  summed  up  in  once  sentence,  to  convince  the  free  world  (and  dissidents  in  the 
Communist  world)  that  they  cannot  be  saved  by  reliance  on  the  United  States,...  the  Kremlin  is 
intent  on  two  things;  to  undermine  the  resolution  in  Germany,  France,  and  Great  Britain  to 
proceed  with  the  integration  of  West  Germany  into  the  Atlantic  Alliance,  and  to  rob  the  United 
States  of  the  fruit  of  any  victories  which  they  may  secure. 
11  FO  371  94848  NS  101515,  From  Sir  Alvery  Gascoiýne,  Moscow  to  the  F.  0.,  15th  December 
1951.  Gascoigne  continued  to  spell  out  the  implications  of  Soviet  thought  on  external  affairs  in 
195  1,  although  he  also  counselled  caution  in  predicting  likely  Soviet  action  rrom  theory,  as  follows, 
The  Soviet  authorities  regard  it  as  an  opportunity  to  change  the  balance  of  power  in  their 
favour,  partly  by  building  the  power  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  partly  by  winning  over  the  countries 
defeated  in  the  second  world  war,  together  with  the  colonial  and  "semi-dependent"  countries, 
to  the  Soviet  camp  and  partly  by  allowing  time  to  weaken  the  capitalist  camp  by  the 
development  of  its  internal  contradictions.  The  alternative  to  peaceful  co-existence  thus 
conceived  is  a  third  world  war.  This  like  peaceful  co-existence  [in  the  Soviet  view],  would 
lead  to  the  final  overthrow  of  capitalism  and  "imperialism",  but  only  at  enormous  cost  in  lives. 
This  the  Soviet  Government  would  prefer  to  avoid. 
The  difference  between  Stalin's  coexistence  and  Khrushchev's  to  be  is  quite  clear.  No  third  camps 
and  neutrals  and  no  definitive  renunciation  of  the  Leninist  theory  of  "triý_htful  collisions"  was  vet 
even  hinted  at. Chapter  2/  Page  29 
change,  from  overtly  belligerent  to  political  tactics.  In  particular  the  validity  of  the 
Leninist  dogma,  which  insisted  that  the  triumph  of  socialism  over  the  capitalism  of  this 
world  could  only  be  achieved  through  violence,  seemed  to  be  called  into  question. 
Would  the  Soviets  chaff  to  discard  it,  ignore  it,  modify,  or  adhered  to  it  with  all  the 
rigour  of  the  past?  Members  of  F.  O.  R.  D.  canvassed  the  view  that.  in  the  words  of 
Violet  Conolly,  "the  "frightful  collisions"  theory  may,  as  a  result  of  the  interplay  of 
"creative  Marxism",  have  gone  by  the  board".  12  Despite  this  the  Northern 
Department  decided  that  it  was  far  to  rash  to  conclude  on  the  given  evidence  that 
Lenin's  collisions  had  been  entirely  abandoned  rather  than  merely  postponed.  Mr 
Lunghi  of  the  Northern  Department  asserted  that,  "[w]e  have  not  even  had  indirect 
evidence  that  "creative  Marxism"  has  rendered  Lenin's  theory  obsolete".  13 
H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  the  Head  of  the  Northern  Department  was  in  full  agreement  with 
his  immediate  colleague.  "Frightful  collisions"  had  most  likely  not  yet  been  written 
out  of  capitalism's  Gotterdämmerung.  14  This  was  the  view  officially  supported  by  the 
Foreign  Office.  However  all  the  contributors  to  the  discussion  were  quite  sanguine 
that  the  Soviets  were  not  about  to  pre-empt  their  own  eschatology  by  immediately 
indulging  in  war.  Stalin  seemed  far  too  cautious  and  confident  in  the  inevitability  of 
Socialism's  superior  place  in  the  onward  rush  of  History  to  countenance  the  destruction 
which  such  a  war  would  inevitably  entail. 
The  Foreign  Office  was  not  the  only  department  in  Whitehall  which  gave 
greater  emphasis  by  1951  to  the  political  rather  than  the  military  threat  posed  by  the 
Soviets.  In  November  1951  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  prepared  a  Report  for  a  meeting 
of  NATO  which  was  to  be  held  in  Rome  on  the  24th  of  that  month.  After 
summarising  the  basic  objective  of  the  Soviet  Government  and  the  means  disposed  to 
achieve  it  the  report  went  on  to  assert  that, 
12  FO  371  94848  NS  1014/15,  Minute  by  I.  V.  Conolly,  F.  O.  R.  D.,  of  the  February,  1952. 
Robert  Conquest,  also  of  F.  O.  R.  D.,  shared  the  view  that  Soviet  ideology  might  well  have  been 
allowed  quietly  to  take  account  of  new  realities.  The  supporters  within  the  F.  O.  for  accepting 
some  flexibility  in  the  Soviet  approach  to  ideology  put  their  case  no  more  strongly  than  this.  If, 
pace  Marshal  D.  Shulman,  Soviet  ideological  and  policy  changes  in  the  mid  to  late  50's  can  be 
traced  as  far  back  as  the  end  of  Stalin's  regime.  the  controversial  brilliance  and  novelty  such 
developments  had  inspired  in  the  new  leadership  by  1956  can  not.  See  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  Since 
World  War  11,  pp.  79-80  and  Detente  in  Europe,  pp.  17-20. 
13  FO  371  94848  NS  1015/30,  Minute  by  Mr  Lunghi.  Northern  Department,  of  22nd  February,  1952. 
Lun,,  hi  went  on  to  offer  his  own  supposition, 
fly  own  guess.  and  of  course  it  can  only  be  a  guess,  based  on  open  Soviet  sources,  is  that  the 
majority  of  opinion  among  Soviet  leaders  led  by  Stalin,  hopes  to  avoid  the  "frightful 
collisions"  for  as  long  as  possible  until  the  capitalist  world  is  weakened  by  the  "falling  away" 
of  the  majority  of  the  countries  of  the  non-socialist  world  from  the  capitalist-imperialist  camp, 
and  their  incorporation  into  the  "democratic  anti-imperialist"  camp,  but  at  the  came  time  their 
'realism"  leads  them  to  believe  that  eventually  the  "frightful  collisions"  will  be  unavoidable... 
There  may,  of  course,  be  others  among  the  Politburo  who  believe  that  the  time  for  the 
"frightful  collisions"  is  now  it  hand. 
14  ibid.  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  the  Head  of  the  Northern  Department,  had  already  adopted  this  line  as  the 
Department's  in  his  letter  to  the  Embassy  in  \los,;  oýý,  or  the  I  Sth  February,  1952  on  the  subject. Charter  2/  Pa  , -,  e  30 
[W]hile  the  Soviet  leaders  have  in  some  cases,  e.  g.  Korea  and  Indo-China, 
utilised  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Soviet  Satellites  to  commit  armed  aggression 
by  proxy,  they  are  skilful  tacticians  and  their  actions  have  so  far  shown  their 
aversion  to  jeopardising  Russian  national  security  by  the  direct  use  of  the 
Soviet  Armed  Forces  to  further  their  objectives.  15 
The  Chiefs  of  Staff  did  not  altogether  rule  out  the  possibility  that  the  Soviets  might 
yet  launch  a  war  to  nip  Western  rearmament  in  the  bud.  However,  the  report  made 
clear  that  the  main  threat  which  Soviet  military  superiority  posed  to  the  West  was  in 
terms  of  the  political  leverage  it  afforded  to  them.  By  the  summer  of  1952  such  was 
the  Government's  mood  of  confidence  in  the  Soviets'  abstinence  from  military  force, 
that  Anthony  Eden  went  so  far  as  to  warn  the  Cabinet  against  the  danger  of  public 
complacency  as  a  consequence.  16 
As  the  19th  Party  Congress  approached  in  the  autumn  of  1952,  the  British 
Government  was  provided  with  further  support  for  this  view  of  Stalin's  foreign  policy. 
The  Embassy  continued  to  deliver  reports  which  asserted  that  the  Soviets  were 
prepared  for  an  extended  period  of  political  rivalry.  Moreover  they  seemed  confident 
of  their  ability  to  defeat  the  West  by  non-military  means.  In  the  Moscow  Embassy's 
Quarterly  Report  for  July  to  September  1952  the  Minister  Paul  Grey  made  comment 
on  the  interest  which  the  coming  Congress  had  created  in  Moscow.  17  Yet,  he  thought 
that, 
This  unsatisfied  curiosity  did  not,  however,  remove  the  impression  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  now  set  on  a  rigid  course,  which  involves  no  concession  to 
the  West  and  no  relaxation  of  internal  effort.  To  judge  by  all  the  signs,  Stalin 
regards  the  external  world  as  still  doing  his  way  and  the  Soviet  Union  as  well 
15  PREM  11  369,  this  report  was  put  before  the  NATO  Council  meeting,  in  Rome  of  the  24th 
November,  1951  along  with  an  American  consort  submitted  by  a  committee  which  Averill  Harriman 
chaired 
16  CAB  129/54  C(52)  257,  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  23rd  July, 
1952.  Eden,  in  terms  that  were  after  Stalin's  death  to  he  applied  by  him  to  Churchill's  Soviet 
diplomacy,  confessed  his  reservations, 
I  atn  a  little  disturbed  by  recent  indications  that  public  expressions  of  satisfaction  about  the 
increased  strength  of  the  West  and  the  reduced  chances  of  Soviet  ain  ression,  however 
justifiable  in  themselves,  may  create  the  impression  that  we  are  out  of  the  wood  and  can  afford 
to  relax  our  efforts.  Her  Majesty's  Ambassador  in  Brussels  has  recently  reported  that 
authoritative  statements  of  this  kind  are  already  lessening  the  will  to  keep  up  the  defence  effort 
in  Belgium.  And  in  other  countries,  opposition  to  the  defence  effort,  particularly  in  France 
and  Germany,  is  already  so  strong  that  it  is  vital  not  to  dive  it  any  further  encouragement. 
17  FO  371  100S15,  NS  1013/49.  From  Paul  Grev.  Moscow  to  the  F. O..  10th  October,  1952.  These 
Quarterly  Reports,  it  should  he  noted,  were  the  main  means  by  which  Whitehall  and  the  Foreign 
Office,  including  overseas  posts,  were  kept  informed  of  developments  in  Soviet  politics,  economics 
and  foreign  policy.  There  were,  indeed,  a  number  of  complaints  made  on  the  reports  for  1952  by 
staff  in  London  due  to  their  increasing  length  and  turgidity.  This  made  them  unsuitable  as  they 
were  supposed  to  he  easily  assimilated  summaries  of  the  collective  Embassy  and  Northern 
Department  view.  Some  of  these  criticisms  were  indeed  made  on  the  above  report  itself  at  the  same 
PRO  reference.  Sir  William  Hayter's  tenure  in  Moscow  was  to  see  the  institution  renovated  to  the 
Northern  Department's  satisfaction. Chapter  ?/  Pi, 
-,  c  31 
able  to  stand  up  to  any  strains  in  which  the  antagonism  between  the  two 
camps  may  involve  it. 
The  Embassy  considered  that  the  forthcoming  Congress  was  not  to  be  a  stage  for 
innovation  but  a  consolidation  of  the  existing  direction  of  the  reime.  Furthermore, 
Khrushchev's  publication  in  the  summer  of  1952  of  his  thesis  detailing  forthcoming 
innovations  in  Party  structure  and  in  particular  the  change  in  nomenclature  by  the 
dropping  of  Bolshevik  from  Party's  title  were  taken  as  indication  of  "the  change  in 
character  of  the  rulers  of  the  Soviet  Union  from  revolutionaries  to  technocrats".  18  This 
was  considered  a  further  evidence  that  the  Soviets  were  unlikely  to  be  tempted  by 
military  adventurism  in  foreign  policy. 
The  one  aspect  of  the  Congress  which  had  sparked  some  speculation  about  the 
possibility  of  change  within  the  regime  was  the  appointment  of  Malenkov  as  linkman 
between  Party  and  Congress.  This  seemed  suggestive  of  his  grooming  for  the  role  of 
heir  apparent,  or  as  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  had  it,  "deputy  Fahrer".  19  However,  on  the 
future  of  Stalin's  command  of  policy,  Grey  made  the  following  comment, 
His  [Stalin's]  distinctive  characteristic  is  that  he  has  perfected  the  machine 
which  now  drives  the  Soviet  Union  along  the  course  laid  down  by  Lenin.  It 
may  be  that  with  the  perfecting  of  the  machine  a  younger  generation  can  be 
given  more  powers  of  management,  but  the  direction  and  the  driving  will 
surely  remain  his. 
However,  Stalin  was  not  prepared  even  to  make  a  semblance  of  concession  in 
favour  of  his  lieutenants.  During  the  Congress  in  the  October  of  1952  it  became 
apparent  that  Stalin's  control  had  been  tightened  rather  than  relinquished  to  a  putative 
successor.  "'O  Furthermore,  in  terms  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  the  Congress 
18  FO  371  100823  NS  10110/2,  Minute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  28th  August,  1952.  Hohler  was  clearly 
not  convinced  that.  as  Khrushchev  had  it,  Bolshevik  and  Communist  "now  expressed  the  same 
meaning". 
19  ibid.  Hohler  went  on  to  suooest  that, 
It  is  equally  possible  that  the  decision  was  motivated  by  the  desire  to  spare  Stalin  the  ordeal  of 
a  four  hour  speech  which  might  have  lead  him  to  appear  aged  and  ailing  on  such  an  important 
occasion. 
Hohler  also  made  the  following  comforting  general  observation  about  the  details  of  the  next  Five 
Year  Plan  which  had  been  announced  in  tandem  with  the  convocation  of  the  Congress.  He  thought 
that  the  priorities  outlined 
[slu`,  gest  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  continuing  a  policy  of  developing  its  economic  and  military 
potential  rather  than  concentrating  on  immediate  military  striking  power. 
20  FO  371  100823  NS  10110/7,  Report  from  Embassy,  Moscow  to  F.  O..  17th  October.  1952.  On 
Stalin's  role  at  the  Congress  and  position  within  the  Party  they  made  the  following  comment, 
The  Congress  has  left  Stalin  in  the  position  he  occupied  before  it  bean.  It  has  not  conferred 
on  G.  M.  \talenkov  any  added  lustre  beyond  the  fact  that  he  was  chosen  to  speak  on  behalf  of 
the  Central  Committee.  It  is  probable  that  Stalin  could  not  have  stood  the  strain  of  making  so 
lone  a  speech  as  that  '.  hich  \lalenkov  delivered...  There  was  no  vestige  of  independence  or 
originality  in  Nlalenkov's  speech.  It  ,  %a:  a  faithful  reflection  of  Stalin's  expressed  views.  Nor 
\cas  there  any  indication  that  Ntalenkov  was  heing  `,  roomed  for  the  succession.  The Chapter  2/  Page  32 
demonstrated  that  Soviet  policy  was  to  carry  on  as  before.  The  Embassy  summed  up 
its  impressions  thus, 
The  XlXth  Party  Congress  has  produced  no  surprises  as  regards  Soviet 
internal  or  foreign  policy.  For  some  time  to  come  it  seems,  there  is  to  be  no 
significant  change. 
Indeed  so  apparently  redundant  did  the  Congress'  proceedings  seem  that  the 
Embassy  considered  the  only  reason  Stalin  had  called  it  was  the  necessity  of  obtaining 
its  rubber  stamp  on  important  changes  in  the  Party  Statutes  and  the  methods  and 
membership  of  the  Central  Committee.  21  These  were  developments  which  the  Foreign 
Office  thought  could  only  further  entrench  his  personal  authority. 
The  Embassy  summed  up  the  implications  which  the  Congress  had  specifically  for 
Soviet  foreign  policy  in  a  despatch  of  the  27th  October.  22  The  Congress,  despite  its 
prolixity,  had  been  a  sterile  affair, 
The  policies  laid  down  in  the  previous  Congresses  and  adhered  to  with 
astonishing  fidelity  through  reverses  and  successes  will  remain  the  same.  So 
will  the  aim,  which  is,  ultimately,  world  communism  and,  as  a  first  stage  to 
it,  communism  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
... 
Stalin  has  set  his  face  against 
reconciliation,  and  has  reaffirmed  the  old  thesis  of  his  party  that  imperialism 
must  be  destroyed. 
Stalin  gave  the  impression  of  a  man  supremely  confident  in  the  rightness  of  his 
cause  and  in  the  particular  policies  by  which  it  was  to  be  furthered.  Although  the 
Soviet  Union  was  now  thought  much  less  likely  to  indulge  in  aggressive  adventurism, 
the  Embassy  concluded  that  in  essence  Soviet  policy  in  1952  was  no  different  from  that 
of  1948.23  The  Cold  War  had  settled  into  a  stable  but  bitter  rivalry.  Given  this  bleak 
outlook  it  is  little  wonder  that  Churchill's  attempts  to  play  the  role  of  peacemaker 
achieved  nothing  during  the  first  two  years  of  his  administration. 
uncertainty  in  this  respect  which  existed  before  the  Congress  has,  therefore,  not  been  dispelled. 
On  the  contrary  Stalin's  status  as  sole  prophet  of  the  Party  had  been  enhanced  by  the 
publication  on  the  eve  of  the  Congress  of  his  lengthy  "Cor  mentaries"  and  there  is  still  no  one 
else  who  seems  able  to  till  this  role. 
'I  ibid. 
, 
From  Grey.  Moscow  to  F.  O.,  23rd  October,  195'.  The  despatch  was  FO  37  1  100831  NS  10'6/32 
- 
seen  by  both  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary.  Sir  William  Stran`_  went  so  far  as  to 
suggest  that  a  letter  of  thanks  ought  to  be  sent  to  the  Embassy  for  its  clanty.  Grey  went  on  to  make 
the  following  observations  about  Soviet  policy, 
[T]he  holding  of  the  Congress  this  year  is  a  sign  that  a  long  process  of  stock-taking  and 
calculation  has  reached  a  culminating  point:  and  that  the  conclusion  has  now  crystallised  that 
there  is  no  immediate  emergency  and  that  the  cold  war  has  not  only  paid  dividends  but  that  the 
Soviet  union  can  stand  it  better  and  loner  than  can  the  Western  Powers.  we  must  accept  an 
indefinite  period  of  economic,  political  and  psychological  pressure.  It  will  be  applied  no  less 
ruthlessly...  Stalin  seems  fundamentally  to  he  relying  on  t  long,  prods  of  attrition  to  gain  his 
ends. 
'_3  ibid. Chapter  2/  Pace  33 
MALENKOV  TAKES  OVER 
The  first  real  encouragement  which  Churchill  received  came  on  the  5th  March, 
1953.24  In  the  Prime  Minister's  eyes  the  death  of  Stalin  was  a  cloud  laden  with  silver 
opportunity.  ''  %Ialenkov's  insistence  that  there  were  no  international  problems  which 
could  not  be  settled  by  negotiation  provided  further  encouragement  for  Churchill. 
Despite  the  fact  that  this  sanguine  attitude  was  shared  neither  by  the  Americans  nor  the 
Foreign  Office,  he  continued  through  1953  vigorous  in  his  search  for  a  "parley". 
It  was  very  quickly  apparent  to  the  British  Government  that  there  was  to  be  no  one 
successor  to  Stalin.  By  April  it  was  clear  that  authority  lay  in  a  Committee  of  five,  of 
whom  Malenkov,  Molotov  and  Beria  were  believed  to  be  the  most  important.  ''6 
Malenkov  was  considered  to  be  the  most  influential,  but  by  no  means  a  replacement 
for  the  dead  man.  27  The  appointment  of  Khrushchev  to  the  position  of  Secretary  of 
the  Central  Committee  of  the  CPSU  on  the  14th  March,  when  it  became  public 
knowledge  after  a  Government  announcement  on  the  21st,  was  not  considered  to  have 
weakened  Malenkov's  position.  28  There  was  no  perception  in  early  1953  that  the  latter 
two  were  to  become  the  main  contenders  for  power,  nor  that  Khrushchev  would  use 
his  new  position  at  the  head  of  the  Party  Secretariat  in  Stalin's  manner  of  old.  Indeed, 
as  we  shall  see,  all  the  way  up  to  Malenkov's  fall  in  1955  neither  the  British  nor  the 
Americans  drew  the  right  conclusions  on  this  point  from  the  available  evidence 
Although  the  softer  tone  adopted  by  this  new  Soviet  Government  towards  the  West 
was  not  merely  sneered  at  by  the  Embassy  in  Moscow,  the  Foreign  Office  remained 
profoundly  doubtful  that  it  presaged  any  fundamental  change.  '-9  Their  reaction  to 
24  PREM  11/540,  Sir  Alvery  Gascoigne  attended  Stalin's  funeral  on  the  9th  'larch,  1953.  In  a  report 
to  London  of  the  16th  March  he  expressed  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the  5th  had  actually  been  the 
date  of  Stalin's  death,  not  least  because  it  would  have  `_iven  little  time  for  the  embalmers  to  do  their 
work.  He  relayed  the  following  appreciation  of  the  ceremonial, 
To  say  that  I  was  impressed  by  the  funeral  ceremony  would  be  an  under-statement.  The  lying 
in  state  in  the  Hall  of  Columns,  while  it  was  a  somewhat  sinister  and  barbaric  display  with  no 
religious  atmosphere  about  it,  brought  back  with  full  force  the  history  of  communism  and  of 
those  who  have  invented  this  particularly  vicious  but  powerful  form  of  ideology.  Stalin  will,  I 
presume,  rank  in  history  as  a  cruel,  cold-blooded  and  ruthless  tyrant.  And  yet  there  is  no 
gainsaying,  the  fact  that  he  was  a  great  man...  As  I  looked  for  the  last  time  on  his  face,  I 
envinced  the  bitterest  feeling  of  regret  that  he  should  have  chosen  because  of  the  canker  of 
Marxism  and  of  his  overweening  desire  for  power,  the  path  which  has  led  him  and  his  country 
away  from  the  comity  of  civilised  nations. 
25  See,  "Churchill,  the  Russians  and  the  Western  Alliance:  the  three-power  conference  at  Bermuda. 
December  1953"  in  The  EnQiish  Historical  Review.  Vol.  Cl,  1986:  p.  894.  Young  makes  clear  that 
the  Bermuda  Conference  was  as  much  a  French  and  American  attempt  to  dampen  Churchill's 
enthusiasm  as  it  ',  as  a  preparation  for  a  four  power  conference. 
26  PRENI  11/540,  Telegram  No.  '_S2,  from  Gascoigne.  Moscow  to  London.  72nd  April.  1953. 
i  PRE`l  11/540,  Despatch  from  Gascoigne  to  London,  "Analysis  of  the  Changes  in  the  Government 
of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Following  the  Death  of  Marshal  Stalin",  16th  %larch.  1953. 
28  PREI  11/540.  Quarterly  Report,  Gascoi_ne,  Moscow  to  London,  13th 
, -\pril.  1953. 
29  PRE\1  11/429.  In  a  telegram  of  the  25th 
. -\pril,  1953  from  Moscow,  Gascoigne  reported  on  the 
Soviet  reaction  to  Eisenhower's  "chance  for  peace"  speech  of  the  16th  April  (see  Eisenhower,  The Chapter  2/  Page  34 
Churchill's  renewed  enthusiasm  for  talks  was  far  from  positive.  Evelyn  Shuckburgh 
recorded  this  unease  in  his  diary, 
The  PNI  suggested  that  there  should  be  a  Molotov-Eden  meeting.  A.  E.  is 
attracted...  Past  troubles  are  forgotten  in  a  new  atmosphere  of  optimism.  I 
am  very  disturbed  about  this.  The  Russians  have  not  made  any  concession 
which  is  more  than  a  trifle  [Shuckburgh  was  referring  to  the  negotiations 
towards  a  settlement  for  Korea],  but  they  look  as  if  they  are  going  to  adopt  a 
much  cleverer  policy  for  dividing  and  weakening  the  %ýý  est  than  Stalin  ever 
30  did.  If  so  we  should  be  cautious  and  not  rush  in.  ' 
Indeed  Shuckburgh  records  that  Eden  was  initially  as  eager  as  Churchill  over  talks 
with  Molotov,  to  the  dismay  of  the  Foreign  Office.  31  This  alarm  was  shared  by  the 
other  members  of  the  Government  who  expressed  similar  concerns  in  a  meeting  of  the 
Atlantic  Committee  of  the  Cabinet.  32  Gascoigne  and  the  Moscow  Embassy  were  also 
of  this  opinion.  Malenkov's  beneficence,  they  suggested,  probably  had  as  much  to  do 
with  the  internal  weakness  of  the  new  regime  as  anything  else.  ý3  The  West,  Gascoiýne 
President,  pp.  94-96).  The  Soviet  reaction,  he  pointed  out,  was  conspicuously  lacking  of  Stalinist 
vitriol.  In  terms  of  substance,  however,  the  new  Soviet  leadership  had  very  little  new  to  offer.  This 
last  point  was  underlined  in  a  covering  minute  of  the  same  day  by  Sir  William  Strang  for  the  Prime 
Minister  (PREM  11/540).  Changes  in  domestic  policy,  particularly  the  release  of  those  condemned 
by  Stalin  in  the  "Doctor's  Plot",  also  caused  considerable  surprise.  In  the  Moscow  Embassy 
Quarterly  Report  for  January  `larch  1953,  dated  lath  April,  Paul  Grey  made  the  following  addenda 
The  apparent  departure  from  attitudes  which  while  Stalin  was  alive,  seemed  immutable,  is 
astonishing  enough.  But  even  more  remarkable  is  that  the  process  of  change  should  have  been 
initiated  before  he  was  cold  in  his  grave... 
30  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  83;  Diary  entry  for  the  24th  to  30th  March,  1953.  Shuckbur;  h  went  on, 
But  the  idea  of  a  meeting  with  Molotov  becomes  exciting.  Winston  said,  "if  it  is  Mol,  you  go. 
But  if  it  is  Mal,  it's  me.  "  More  punning  of  this  kind  appears  in  minutes  from  the  PM  about 
Ike  and  Egypt.  Something  about  "unwise  counsels  moving  in  by  the  Byraode"  [Byraode  was 
to  become  the  U.  S.  Ambassador  to  Cairo].  I  was  instructed  to  obtain  the  [Foreign]  Office 
view  on  a  possible  Eden-Molotov  meeting.  I  do  so  through  Strang  who  organises  a  meeting 
with  Bob  Dixon,  Paul  Mason  and  Harry  Hohler.  All  are  against  the  idea... 
31  ibid.  pp.  84-86.  In  his  diary  entry  for  April  Ist  Shuckburgh  was  sufficiently  exasperated  with 
Churchill's  idea  to  describe  it  as  "whoring  after  the  Russians".  Eden  was  able  to  summon 
significantly  more  enthusiasm  for  the  project  despite  his  worsening  illness.  See  also  Anthony  Eden, 
pp.  361-362. 
32  CAB  134/766,  Atlantic  (Official)  Committee  of  the  Cabinet,  "Conclusion  of  Foreign  Office  Paper 
on  recent  Developments  in  the  USSR",  17th  April,  1953.  See  also  Vever  Despair,  p.  817. 
33  PREM  11/540,  Despatch  from  Gascoi`_ne.  Moscow  to  London,  9th  April,  1953.  Also  Telegram 
No.  282.  Ga,,  coiý_ne.  Moscow  to  London,  22nd  April,  1953.  In  his  Despatch  Gascoione  considered 
the  most  important  moves  towards  a  more  relaxed  international  stance  by  the  Soviets  to  be  the  offer 
of  their  "f=ood  offices"  with  the  North  Koreans  over  sticking  points  in  the  ne  zotiations  at 
Panmunjom,  acceptance  of  Dag  Hammarskjold  as  tN  Secretary  General  and  certain  conciliatory 
gestures  in  German.  He  concluded  in  terms  which  gave  some  cheer  to  Churchill's  attitude, 
So  little  is  known  of  the  character  and  views  of  `lalenkov  and  Bena  that  it  would  be  wise  to 
keep  an  open  mind  in  interpreting  Soviet  motives  since  Stalin's  death.  It  is  much  to  soon  to 
draw  any  firm  conclusions.  But  the  Soviet  internal  situation,  coupled  with  the  problems  of  the 
new  leaders  in  consolidating  their  power  in  a  totalitarian  state,  could  themselves  explain  the 
new  and  apparently  more  cautious  trends  in  Soviet  forei`_n  policy.  there  is  no  evidence  of  any 
active  challenge  to  the  present  rulers,  but  they  have  )h%,  iously  found  it  expedient...  to  make  the Chapter  2/  Page  35 
concluded  in  a  summary  of  Soviet  policy  on  the  9th  April  1953,  would  need  to  handle 
the  problem  carefully  if  it  were  not  to  get  its  fingers  burnt. 
However,  despite  the  reservations  of  permanent  officials,  Churchill  was  able  to 
use  his  control  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  mischievous  effect  during  Eden's  incapacity 
after  a  botched  gall-stone  operation  on  the  12th  April,  1953.34  On  the  11th  May 
Churchill  made  his  famous  appeal  in  a  House  of  Commons  speech  for  a  meeting  with 
the  Soviets,  much  to  the  consternation  of  a  recuperating  Eden  and  an  unconsulted 
Marquis  of  Salisbury  who  at  this  point  was  Lord  President  of  the  Counsel.  35 
Churchill's  speech  ended  with  the  following  stirring  coda, 
If  there  is  not  at  the  summit  of  the  nations  the  will  to  win  the  greatest  prize 
and  the  greatest  honour  ever  offered  to  mankind,  doom-laden  responsibility 
will  fall  upon  those  who  now  posses  the  power  to  decide.  At  the  worst 
participants  in  the  meeting  would  have  established  more  intimate  contacts.  At 
the  best  we  might  have  a  generation  of  peace.  36 
However,  illness  was  to  fell  Churchill  himself  before  he  was  able  to  take  his 
initiative  any  further.  37  On  the  23alJune,  1953,  during  a  dinner  for  the  Italian  Prime 
Minister,  he  suffered  a  stroke  which  was  to  put  him  out  of  active  politics  until 
October.  It  was  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  ironically  given  his  distaste  for  the  speech 
of  11th  May,  who  was  left  carrying  the  high  hopes  which  Churchill's  rhetoric  had 
stirred  in  the  British  public  as  he  now  took  over  control  of  the  Foreign  Office  from 
Churchill. 
carrot  more  evident  than  the  stick  in  their  handling  of  the  Soviet  population  and  also  to  adopt 
more  fluid  and  even  more  conciliatory  tactics  in  foreign  policy.  Such  tactics  might  well  prove 
more  dangerous  to  western  cohesion  and  to  the  building  up  and  maintenance  of  the  military 
and  economic  strength  of  the  West  than  the  bludgeoning  xenophobia  displayed  by  Stalin  since 
1946.  but  this  change  of  tactics  offers  an  opportunity  to  the  Western  Powers,  who  should  meet 
Soviet  conciliatory  moves  half  way  with  a  view  to  reaching:  agreement  on  specific  outstanding 
questions. 
34  PREI  11/421,  despite  also  the  advice  of  Eisenhower  who,  in  a  telegram  of  5th  May,  1953,  voiced 
reservations  very  similar  to  those  of  the  Foreign  Office.  He  expressed  particular  concern  over  the 
impact  that  such  a  meeting  would  have  on  the  other  Western  Allies.  There  were  no  indications,  in 
Eisenhower's  view,  that  there  had  been  any  substantial  change  in  Soviet  policy.  Some  words  in  the 
final  sentence,  underlined  by  the  Prime  Minister  himself,  give  the  key  to  Churchill's  Soviet 
diplomacy;  "Naturally  the  final  decision  is  yours".  His  search  for  a  Summit  between  1951  and  1955 
was  very  much  a  private  odyssey. 
35  See  Anthony  Eden,  pp.  3622-6  and  , Never  Despair,  pp.  827-833.  Salisbury  made  one  of  his  many 
threats  to  resin  by  way  of  futile  retaliation.  John  Colville  recollected  in  The  Fringes  of  Power,  p. 
667,  that, 
He  [Churchill]  made  his  speech  wholly  contrary  to  Foreign  Office  advice  since  it  was  felt  that 
a  friendly  approach  to  Russia  would  discoura_'c  the  European  powers  working  on  the  theme  of 
Western  union...  I  thou,  -,  ht  it  a  statesmanlike  initiative  and  knew  it  to  be  one  which  was 
entirely  Churchill's  own. 
36  Never  Des  pair,  pp.  83l  -3' 
F  See  "Churchill,  the  Russians  and  the  Western  Alliance",  pp.  S93-896 Chapter  ?/  Page  36 
Salisbury's  estimation  of  Soviet  policy,  which  he  put  before  the  Cabinet  before  his 
departure  to  Washington,  very  much  followed  the  lines  of  the  M  oscow  Embassy's 
opinion.  He  commented, 
In  the  external  field  there  have  been  many  steps  to  reduce  international 
tension,  although  without  affecting  basic  Soviet  long-term  policies.  These 
steps  can  be  explained  by,  (i)  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  new  rulers  to  acquire 
popularity  and  to  establish  their  internal  position  free  from  external  worries; 
(ii)  fear  of  America  (the  atom  bomb,  industrial  potential,  and  possible 
impatience);  and  (iii)  a  desire  to  weaken  and  divide  the  Western  World.  38 
The  most  significant  goodwill  gesture  had  been  Soviet  support  for  an  armistice  in 
Korea,  but  even  here  Salisbury  did  not  consider  that  anything  of  any  substance  had 
been  conceded  to  the  West.  39  Salisbury  was  also  concerned  with  instability  in  the  East 
European  Satellites,  evidenced  particularly  in  East  Germany  during  June.  40  He  was 
anxious  that  they  should  not  be  put  to  any  rash  use  by  John  Foster  Dulles.  41  Despite 
these  considerable  reservations  Salisbury  was  very  much  aware  that  the  "initiative"  of 
Churchill's  11th  May  speech  had  to  be  maintained;  at  least  that  is  in  so  far  as  the 
public  demanded  it.  The  Prime  Minister  had,  essentially,  hemmed  the  Government  in. 
Even  as  Salisbury  was  preparing  to  ;o  to  America  there  occurred  a  further 
substantial  political  convulsion  in  the  Soviet  Union.  42  On  July  10th,  1953  the  Soviet 
38  PREM  11/373,  C:  v1(53)187,3rd  July,  1953;  Memorandum  by  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State  for 
Forei, 
-,  n  Affairs. 
39  PREM  11/540,  Telegram  No.  510,  from  Gascoi`=ne,  Moscow  to  London,  11th  July,  1953.  In 
preparation  for  Salisbury's  Washington  visit  Gascoiýjne  reported  on  Soviet  policy.  He  emphasised, 
once  a,  -vain, 
that  much  of  the  "softer"  approach  to  internal  and  external  matters  was  born  of  the  new 
regimes  attempt  to  entrench  its  position.  Internal  liberalisation  was  largely  to  be  explained  by  its 
anodyne  effect  on  the  Soviet  population.  Ltalenkov's  international  concessions  were  described  by 
Gascoivne  as  "cheap  lifts".  The  situation  in  Eastern  Europe  was,  though,  considerably  more 
unstable,  largely  because  of  the  strains  of  forced  Stalinisation  and  Industrialisation,  the  pace  of 
which  had  been  considerably  increased  to  meet  Western  rearmament.  This  was  particularly  so  in  the 
case  of  East  Germany.  Here,  if  anywhere,  was  the  success  of  Western  policy  which  Dulles  had 
been  vaunting  in  America. 
40  On  the  East  German  disturbances  see  Arnulf  Baring,  Uprising  in  East  Germany:  June  17th,  1953 
41  ibid.  Salisbury  outlined  Anglo-American  differences  in  respect  of  the  satellites  in  the  following 
way,  although  some  Foreign  Office  officials  took  another  view  (FO  371  106527  NS  1021/97), 
making  a  prescient  warning, 
The  main  difference  between  ourselves  and  the  American  Administration  is  that  the  American, 
no  doubt  partly  influences  by  their  different  domestic  situation,  have  hitherto  wanted  to  let 
events  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  develop  further  before  embarking  on  any  high-level  talks. 
There  also  seems  now  to  be  a  new  and  more  dangerous  American  tendency,  which  has  its  roots 
in  the  Republican  election  campaign  and  was  illustrated  by  a  recent  statement  by  Mr.  Dulles, 
to  interpret  the  situation  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  as  already  very  shaky  and  therefore  to 
advocate  new  although  unspecified  measures  to  encourage  or  even  promote  the  early  liberation 
of  the  satellite  countries.  It  is  my  intention  to  resist  American  pressure  of  this  kind.  A  policy 
of  pin-prick  is  calculated  to  exasperate  the  Russians  and  is  most  unlikely  to  help  the  unhappy 
peoples  of  the  occupied  countries.  The  last  thin,,  we  want  to  do  is  to  bait  the  Russian  and 
satellite  Governments  into  taking,  violent  measures  against  them. 
42  On  the  Allied  Foreign  Minister's  meeting  in  Washington  ACC  Churchill,  the  Russians  and  the 
Western  Alliance"  and  also  FRUS  1952-54,  Vol.  V.  pp.  1607-1696. Chapter  2/  Pace  37 
Government  announced  the  arrest  of  Beria.  43  In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  event 
neither  the  British  nor  American  observers  in  Moscow  were,  very  sensibly,  prepared  to 
stick  their  heads  and  predict  the  long  term  consequences  of  the  event  44)  gjthough 
Churchill  was  eager  to  put  it  into  as  rosy  a  light  as  possible.  45  In  terms  of  its 
significance  to  Soviet  internal  affairs,  even  after  Beria's  execution  in  December,  the 
matter  remained  largely  opaque.  46  However  in  the  area  of  external  policy,  the  dust 
seemed  to  settle  altogether  more  obligingly.  47 
On  the  8th  August,  1953  Malenkov  gave  a  substantial  speech  to  the  Supreme 
Soviet  which  included  detailed  coverage  of  internal  and  external  affairs.  48  Nlalenkov's 
most  startling  revelation  concerned  the  development  of  a  Soviet  Hydrogen  Bomb.  By 
the  end  of  August  Paul  Grey  was  bold  enough  to  send  a  prognosis  of  Soviet  policy 
back  to  Whitehall.  49  This  analysis  went  substantially  beyond  defining  Soviet 
motivations  in  terms  of  the  new  regime's  entrenchment.  50  In  it  he  grappled  with  what 
appeared  to  be  a  contradiction  in  Soviet  policy.  Soviet  rhetoric  continued  to  promote 
negotiation  whilst  they  effectively  rebuffed  any  concrete  proposals  for  talks  which  the 
West  put  forward.  Having  allowed  for  an  amount  of  confusion  on  the  part  of  the 
Kremlin  after  events  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  fall  of  Beria,  Grey  concluded, 
Malenkov's  speech  of  August  8  indicated  that  the  Kremlin  has  a  perfectly 
clear,  consistent  and  sensible  general  strategy.  Like  Stalin,  the  new 
Government  wish  to  keep  out  of  major  wars  and  to  devote  their  energies  to 
increasing  the  strength  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Communist  bloc, 
including  East  Germany.  They  seem  to  have  realised  that  this  policy  was 
threatened  by  the  extreme  degree  of  international  tension  which  Stalin's 
policies  provoked  in  the  last  years  of  his  life,  by  the  existence  of  a  "focus  of 
war"  in  Korea  and  by  the  danger  of  a  revival  of  German  armed  might  in 
Europe.  The  new  Government  have  taken  three  decisions:  first  to  reduce 
43  Both  the  American  Embassy  and  the  British  were  well  aware  that  Beria's  fate  had  been  sealed  at 
least  12  days  before.  Bohlen  thought  that  the  27th  June  was  the  most  likely  date.  see  FRUS  1952- 
54,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  1207  and  PREM  11/540,  Gascoi-gne  Telegram  No.  510. 
44  FRUS  1952-54,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  1207  and  PREM  11/540,  Telegram  No.  507,  from  Gascoigne, 
Moscow  to  London,  11th  July,  1953.  Both  Ambassadors  considered  it  possible  that  a  Stalin  style 
purge  would  follow  Beria's  dismissal.  There  was  further  speculation  among  the  diplomatic  corps  in 
Moscow  that  Beria  had  been  the  main  agent  of  liberalisation.  This  view  was  not  positively 
supported  in  either  the  British  or  American  Embassies. 
45  ,  'ever  Despair,  pp.  862-863 
46  FO  3-71/106519  NS  1011/59 
47  PREM  111540,  Minute  by  Evelyn  Shuckburgh  for  John  Colville,  14th  August,  1953.  Shuckburgh 
thought  a  note  on  the  rise  of  Khrushchev  should  be  brought  to  the  Prime  Minister's  attention  as  this 
phenomenon  was  "one  of  the  more  important  recent  developments  inside  Russia".  Although  the 
Embassy  Quarterly  Report  for  July  to  September,  1953  (PREM  11/540)  emphasised  that  the  Party 
Secretariat  remained  firmly  under  the  control  of  the  Presidium. 
48  FRC'S  1952-1954,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  1210,  In  a  telegram  of  8th  August,  1953  to  Washington  Bohlen 
described  it  as  "certainly  the  most  important  and  realistic  statement  of  current  Soviet  policy  since 
Stalin'-  death.  "  Apart  from  any  thin;  --Ise  \lalenkov  hinted  at  the  Soy  iet  development  of  a 
Hydrogen  bonmb. 
4a  PREI-1  1/540.  Despatch  from  Grey,  Moscow  to  London,  24th 
. August,  1953. 
50  FRUS  1052-34  Vol.  VIII.  In  his  telegram  of  10th  August  Bohlen  thought  Mtalenkov's  speech  a 
confirmation  that  changes  in  policy  since  March  stemmed  from  "sources  deeper  than  simple 
manoeuvre  or  even  function  of  palace  intri`,  ue.  " Chapter  2/  Page  38 
tension;  second,  to  liquidate  the  focus  of  war  in  Korea;  and  third,  if  at  all 
possible,  to  prevent  the  revival  of  German  militarism.  51 
The  Soviet  Government  had  already  achieved  a  reduction  in  tension  and  an  end  to 
the  fighting  in  Korea.  Their  main  interests  were  now  to  find  a  political  settlement  of 
the  Korean  war,  control  atomic  weapons  and  stop  the  rearmament  of  Germany.  Such 
vacillations  as  they  suffered  were  over  tactics  rather  than  strategy.  Although  there  was 
some  difference  of  opinion  in  the  Northern  department  over  the  detail  of  Grey's 
report,  there  was  no  dissension  from  the  main  lines  of  his  analysis.  52  Furthermore  to 
Sir  William  Strang  it  came  as  the  most  melodic  of  music,  in  appropriately  warring 
disharmony  with  Churchill's  romantic  attitude  towards  summit  talks.  53 
To  translate  the  essence  of  Grey's  view  into  the  language  of  modern  politics,  the 
new  leaders  in  the  Kremlin  thought  that  Stalin  had  erred  not  in  the  fundamentals  of 
policy,  but  in  his  use  of  rather  dowdy  "packaging".  54  This  judgement  has,  I  think, 
stood  the  test  of  time.  For  the  Soviets,  so  the  British  Embassy  concluded,  negotiations 
were  advantageous  only  within  very  strictly  defined  limits.  55  And  that  advantage  was 
for  them  to  be  had  at  the  expense  of  both  Western  cohesion  and  the  success  of  the 
E.  D.  C.  56 
By  the  arrival  in  Moscow  of  the  new  British  Ambassador,  Sir  William  Hayter, 
Grey's  impression  of  Soviet  policy  had  been  further  underlined.  On  the  24th 
November,  Hayter  sent  the  Embassy's  view  of  Soviet  policy  to  London  by  way  of 
contribution  to  the  preparations  for  the  three  power  meeting  (Britain,  France  and  the 
United  States)  at  Bermuda  in  December  1953. 
51  PREM  11/540,  Grey's  despatch  of  24th  August  was  received  with  considerable  approval  in 
Whitehall,  so  much  so  that  Sir  William  Strang  brought  it  to  the  Prime  Minister's  attention.  Minute 
of  3rd  September,  1953  by  Mr.  T.  Grady  for  Mr.  A.  A.  D.  Montague  Browne. 
52  FO  371  106527  NS  1021/99,  Minutes  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  of  27/8/53,  P.  Mason  of  27/8/53  and  F. 
Roberts  of  ?  8/7/53. 
53  See  footnote  50,  also  footnote  4. 
54  PREM1  11/540,  Grey  further  developed  this  view  in  a  despatch  from  Moscow  to  London,  of  the  5th 
October,  1953.  In  it  he  discussed  the  ideolo,,  ical  dimension  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  in  more  detail 
and  came  to  the  conclusion  that, 
At  present,  in  fact,  the  evidence  suggests  that,  where  Malenkovism  departs  from  Stalinism,  it 
is  in  the  direction,  not  of  innovation,  but  of  a  reaffirmation  of  traditional  principles  neglected 
or  believed  to  he  neglected  or  wrongly  applied  by  Stalin  in  his  last  years. 
55  This  is  contrary  to  the  faith  placed  in  Churchill's  reading  of  Soviet  policy  by  M.  Steven  Fish  in  his 
article  ".  After  Stalin's  Death:  The  Anglo-American  debate  over  a  New  Cold  War"  in  Diplomatic 
History,  1986  (10:  1).  His  belief  that  %talenkov  fought  alone  in  the  Kremlin  for  detente  seems 
similarly  ill  founded.  British  and  American  observers  were  of  the  firm  opinion  that  the  Soviet 
Government  acted  collectively  throughout  1953  to  1955.  Indeed,  in  1953  the  most  likely  candidate 
for  the  title  of  lonely  liberal  was,  ironically,  Beria.  (PREM  11/540,  Telegram  No.  580,  Gascoigne, 
Moscow  to  London,  10th  August.  1953).  If  Dr  Fish's  analysis  is  right.  then  the  fundamental  flaw  in 
British  diplomacy  lay  in  its  perception  of  Soviet  policy  rather  than  in  its  execution.  See  John  Young 
in  "Churchill  the  Russians  and  the  Western  Alliance"  for  a  judicious  comment  on  the  "missed 
opportunity"  debate. 
56  On  Britain  and  the  E.  D.  C.  see  Saki  Dockrill,  Britain's  Policý'  for  West  German  Rearmament  1950- 
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The  first  important  point  which  seems  to  me  to  be  established  is  that  there  has 
been  no  real  change  in  this  country's  foreign  policy  as  a  result  of  Stalin's 
death...  It  is  now  clear  that  the  new  Soviet  Government  still  adhere  to  the 
twin  policies  of  consolidating  their  own  extended  empire  and  of  undermining 
the  rest  of  the  world.  They  talk  of  co-existence,  but  they  visualise  it  as  the 
co-existence  of  the  snake  and  the  rabbit.  ', 
Hayter  went  on  to  emphasise  that  "the  only  real  change  is  a  change  of  method.  " 
Stalin's  abrasiveness  had  become  counterproductive  and  consequently  "other  and  more 
subtle  methods  of  weakening  the  Western  World  are  henceforward  to  be  adopted.  " 
H.  A.  F.  Hohler  noted  that  Hayter's  views,  which  were  hardly  startling,  were  in  very 
close  accord  with  those  of  the  Northern  Department  and  it  was  in  this  vein  that  the 
Foreign  Office  advised  the  British  delegation  at  Bermuda  about  Soviet  foreign 
policy.  58  This  was  advice  which  Churchill  did  not  appear  eager  to  benefit  from  whilst 
flying  to  Bermuda,  preferring  as  he  did  to  read  C.  S.  Forester  rather  than  Government 
briefs.  59  Given  that  the  collective  wisdom  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  little  more  than  a 
cold  douche  to  his  expectations  this  is  not  surprising.  60 
1953  ended  with  little  in  the  way  of  refreshment  for  Churchill  in  his  search  for  a 
summit.  Indeed  the  concensus  view  of  the  British  Government  was  that  underneath  the 
new  cordiality,  nothing  very  much  had  changed  in  Soviet  policy  at  all.  Such  change  as 
there  had  been  was  quite  possibly  even  dangerous  in  the  effect  it  might  have  on 
Western  unity  and  public  opinion.  The  Soviet  acceptance  of  talks  at  the  Foreign 
Minister  level  on  the  26th  November,  1953,  was  interpreted  by  the  Foreign  Office  in 
this  context.  61  In  particular  its  attempt  to  place  World  security  on  the  agenda  was 
considered  little  more  than  a  ploy  to  reduce  the  potential  for  a  Soviet  embarrassment 
over  Germany  whilst  allowing  them  maximum  room  for  mischief.  Churchill's 
disregarded  brief  explained  Soviet  policy  thus, 
They  have  evidently  decided  since  the  riots  of  17th  June  and  Adenauer's 
victory  in  the  West  German  elections  that  they  cannot  afford  to  relax  their 
own  position  in  East  Germany  and  at  the  same  time  to  step  up  their  diplomatic 
and  propaganda  offensive  against  the  Western  alliance,  playing  especially  on 
French  fears  of  a  rearmed  Germany.  62 
57  FO  371  106527  NS  1021/118,  Despatch  from  Sir  William  Hayter,  Moscow  to  London,  24th 
November,  1953- 
58  FO  371  106527  NS  1021/118,  Minute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  3/  12'53.  Shuckburgh  consigned  similar 
reservations  about  Soviet  policy  to  his  diary  on  the  Ist  December,  1953;  Descent  to  Suez  p.  111. 
59  Never  Despair,  p.  916.  The  novel  was  aptly  titled  Death  to  the  French. 
60  FO  371  106542  NS  1075114  and  15.  The  final  revision,  after  the  Soviet  note  of  26th  November, 
saw  the  Soviet  regime  after  Bena's  fall  as  stable.  The  course  which  it  had  adopted,  despite  its 
consumerist  and  less  extreme  manner,  was  in  essence  i  continuation  of  Stalin's  policy. 
61  FO  371  111669  NS  101313,  the  opinion  of  the  . 
anxncan  Ambassador  was  very  similar,  see  FRUS 
1951-1954,  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  1220-1`  22 
63  FO  371  106542  NS  1075/15. Chapter  2/  Page  40 
The  Bermuda  Conference  itself  was  an  inconclusive  and  disappointing  affair. 
Talks  with  the  Soviets  at  Berlin  for  January  1954  were  agreed  by  the  Western  powers, 
but  that  could  equally  have  been  done  by  less  glamorous  means.  63  Bermuda  is  perhaps 
more  interesting  because  of  the  light  it  throws  on  inter-allied  relations  than  any 
revelation  of  attitudes  towards  the  Soviet  Union.  64 
1954  was  to  prove  a  more  active  year  in  terms  of  conference  diplomacy,  although 
it  was  to  be  through  Eden's  approach  rather  than  Churchill's.  65  At  Berlin  and  more 
especially  at  Geneva  Eden's  flair  for  detailed  negotiation  and  conciliation  was  to  be 
used  at  its  best.  However,  the  impact  which  this  diplomatic  contact  had  upon  the 
British  perception  of  the  fundamentals  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  was  very  limited. 
FOREIGN  MINISTERIAL  MEETINGS 
After  considerable  discussion  between  the  four  powers  on  apparently  unimportant 
issues  such  as  the  location  and  timing  of  a  Foreign  Ministers  Conference,  agreement 
was  reached.  66  It  was  finally  settled  that  it  would  take  place  in  Berlin  from  25th 
January  to  19th  February,  1954.  The  conference  lived  up  to  the  limited  expectations 
which  the  British  had  of  it.  Much  of  their  planning  for  negotiations  with  the  Soviets 
was  concerned  with  how  best  to  turn  them  to  the  advantage  of  the  E.  D.  C.  Little  hope 
was  expressed  as  to  the  probability  of  achieving  a  respectable  settlement.  Indeed  Eden 
was  quite  explicit  about  the  aim  of  British  policy  in  a  Cabinet  Memorandum  of  11th 
January  1954  on  "The  Problem  of  Security  in  Europe". 
The  Russians  have  built  up  a  most  effective  security  system  in  Europe.  Their 
basic  objective  now  is  the  withdrawal  of  the  U.  S.  A.  from  Europe.  67  Despite 
N.  A.  T.  O.,  the  Western  Powers  have  not  yet  completed  an  effective  security 
63  A  full  record  of  the  conference  proceedings  can  be  found  at  FRUS  1952-1954,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  1710- 
1837. 
64  For  detail  on  the  Bermuda  Conference  see  "Churchill,  the  Russians  and  the  Western  Alliance". 
Also,  Never  Despair,  pp.  916-942  and  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  110-116. 
65  PREM  11i668,  P%1/53/334,  Memorandum  by  Eden  for  Churchill.  25th  November,  1953.  In  this 
memo  Eden  put  the  case  for  negotiating  from  specifics  to  general  issues, 
If  we  were  to  press  prematurely  for  a  Five-Power  meeting  we  should  risk  increasing  our 
difficulties  with  the  Americans  over  the  Far  East  and  thus  playing  into  the  Russian's  hands. 
But  if  we  can  agree  to  work  towards  such  a  meeting  by  stages,  beginning  with  the  Korea 
Conference,  there  is  a  real  chance  of  our  being  able  to  gradually  overcome  them. 
66  PREM  11/664,  considerable  energy  was  expended  on  debating  whether  the  conference  should  take 
place  half  in  the  West  of  the  city  and  half  in  the  East,  the  Soviet  view,  or  a  quarter  in  each  of  the 
different  W.  W.  II  allied  zones,  the  Western  view.  In  the  end  the  West  conceded.  Churchill,  in  a 
minute  of  the  14th  January,  194,  quoted  Bismarck  in  support  of  the  "sensible  party  giving  way". 
This  advice,  unacknowledged,  found  its  way  into  Eden's  memoirs,  Full  Circle,  pp.  61-62.  Eden's 
account  manages  to  -, 
tve  the  impression  that  the  Soviets  too  were  forced  to  compromise  on  their 
position  which  was.  in  tact,  not  the  case. 
67  ibid.  Eden  predicted,  "The  Russians  are  likely  to  pose  as  the  champions  of  "Europe  for  the 
Europeans",  including  themselves  but  not  the  Americans".  This  was  very  much  the  line  which 
Molotov-.  diplomacy  was  to  take  in  the  wake  of  the  Berlin  conference,  through  to  the  entry  of  West 
Germany  into  NATO. Chapter  '-  /  Page  41 
system  of  their  own.  It  must  be  completed  by  associating  Western  Germany 
in  the  common  effort  and  so  denying  the  potential  resources  of  a  reunited 
Germany  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  preventing  a  reunited  Germany  from 
playing  of  the  Western  Powers  against  the  Russians  or  vice  versa.  68 
In  line  with  this  strategy  Eden's  recommendations  for  Britain's  tactics  at  Berlin  were 
more  concerned  with  how  best  to  wrong  foot  the  Soviets  than  coming  to  an  agreement 
with  them, 
The  main  positive  Western  objectives  in  Berlin  will  be  to  make  progress 
towards  a  German  Peace  Treaty  and  to  conclude  the  Austrian  Treaty.  An 
important  negative  objective  will  be  to  ensure  that  French  ratification  of  the 
E.  D.  C.  treaty  is  not  further  delayed  by  the  Berlin  Conference.  We  must 
avoid  creating  the  impression  that  we  (and  more  particularly  the  Americans) 
are  in  such  a  hurry  to  get  on  with  the  E.  D.  C.  that  we  are  not  aiming  at 
serious  negotiation  on  Germany  and  Austria.  We  must  therefore  establish  the 
position  that  we,  unlike  the  Russians,  have  a  practical  plan  for  German 
reunification,  which  would  produce  a  representative  all-German  Government 
with  which  alone  a  peace  treaty  can  be  negotiated.  69 
Inevitably,  Eden  recommended  that  the  break  up  of  negotiations  should  be  over  the 
Soviet  refusal  to  agree  to  free  elections  in  Germany  rather  than  on  their  pet  issue,  the 
removal  of  American  military  bases  from  Europe.  70 
Evelyn  Shuckburgh,  who  accompanied  Eden  as  his  Private  Secretary,  expressed 
his  approval  of  British  policy  in  the  lead  up  to  Berlin.  71  He  thought  the  biggest 
problem  that  they  had  to  deal  with  was  caused  by  Churchill's  preoccupation  with 
summitry  and  the  false  expectations  in  the  public  which  it  seemed  to  have  aroused. 
Shuckburgh's  disdain  was,  perhaps,  a  little  misplaced  as  Churchill  himself  was  in 
complete  agreement  that  the  West  could  not  afford  to  sacrifice  the  commitment  of 
Western  Germany  to  the  E.  D.  C.,  or  failing  that  NATO,  in  the  pursuit  of  a  settlement 
68  PREM  11/664,  C(54)10,11th  January,  1954;  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  Eden  went  on  to  make  allowance  for  the  Soviet  need  for  reassurance  as  to  the  defensive 
character  of  the  E.  D.  C.  However,  the  fundamental  point  remained,  the  West  could  not  afford  to 
come  to  an  agreement  over  Germany  which  sacrificed  the  opportunity  of  adding  German  military 
strength  to  that  of  NATO. 
69  PREM  11,664,  Memorandum  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  11th  January,  1954.  Eden  concluded  as 
follows, 
This  analysis  may  seem  rather  sombre.  But  I  do  not  wish  to  leave  my  colleagues  under  any 
misapprehension  over  the  difficulties  and  clan-gers  of  this  meetin-,  -,, 
desirable  as  it  is  as  a 
contrihution  to  the  reduction  in  world  tension  and  to  a  less  abnormal  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 
70  PREI  11/664.  \lcmorandum  by  the  Foreign  Secretary.  After  a  conversation  with  the  Soviet 
. 
Ambassador  in  London.  Malik,  on  the  23rd  December,  1953,  Eden  noted  the  Russian's  expression 
of  concern  for  Europe.  This  Eden  interpreted  in  the  context  of  their  attempt  to  brand  American 
bases  as  an  alien  blight  on  the  continent.  See  Anthony  Eden,  p.  3,5  for  Robert  Rhodes  lames' 
positive  response  to  Eden's  positional  diplomacy. 
71.  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  12S:  for  Bohlen's  preview  of  the  Conference  see  FRUS  1952-1954,  Vol.  VIII, 
pp.  1.3-  L25. Chapter  2/  Page  42 
at  Berlin.  72  In  essence  Churchill's  attitude  towards  Soviet  diplomacy  differed  with  the 
Foreign  Office  in  terms  of  tactics  rather  than  strategy.  No-one  suffered  under  the 
illusion  that  the  Soviets  were  at  all  likely  to  respect  Western  interests.  Ultimately  there 
was  less  difference  between  Churchill  and  the  Foreign  Office  than  some  might 
imagine.  The  biggest  problem  was  Churchill's  fundamentally  romantic  approach  to 
foreign  policy. 
It  was,  indeed,  on  the  issue  of  free  all-German  elections  before  unification  that  the 
Conference  stumbled.  There  was  simply  no  way  that  the  Soviets  were  prepared  to 
Lose  their  control  over  the  eastern  half  of  the  country  merely  to  watch  the  whole 
become  a  powerful  addition  to  the  west.  73  Equally,  even  Churchill  asserted  that  a 
neutralised,  united  Germany  would  be  a  substantial  blow  to  western  interests  and 
security  in  Europe.  There  was  in  fact  no  common  ground  to  afford  room  for  Eden's 
undoubted  diplomatic  charm  to  come  into  operation.  74  His,  and  Churchill's,  policy 
devolved  into  an  attempt  at  damage  limitation,  in  particular  the  salvaging  of 
Ministerial  talks  on  Korea  and  the  Far  East  from  the  wreck. 
The  Berlin  Conference  was  little  more  fruitful  as  a  guide  to  Soviet  domestic 
politics  and  in  particular  the  relationship  between  individual  leaders  within  the  "new 
team".  On  this  issue  Eden  found  Molotov  to  be  uncommunicative, 
I  have  tried  in  my  dinner  conversations  with  Molotov  to  penetrate  a  little  his 
personal  relations  with  Malenkov...  I  must  confess  that  I  have  not  got  very 
far.  He  has  never  once  volunteered  a  reference  to  Malenkov  himself  and  when 
I  have  done  so,  though  perfectly  correct  in  his  comments,  he  has  shown  no 
particular  enthusiasm.  75 
Eden  suggested  this  might  merely  have  to  do  with  a  lack  of  personal  warmth  between 
the  two  Soviet  Statesmen,  though  this  did  not  tally  with  the  Moscow  Embassy's 
72  PRENI  11/664,  Telegram  from  Churchill,  London,  to  Eden,  Berlin,  27th  January,  1954.  The  main 
difference  between  the  two  men  was  in  their  attitude  towards  the  timing  of  conference  diplomacy. 
Churchill  made  the  following  comment  in  response  to  Eden's  reportage, 
I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  any  settlement  can  be  reached  about  Germany.  We  must  stand  by 
the  principle  of  a  German  continent  either  to  E.  D.  C.  or  amend  NATO.  This  alone  `!  fives  the 
West  the  chance  of  obtaining  the  necessary  strength  by  creating  a  European  or  internationalised 
German  army  but  not  a  national  one.  I  think  we  are  bound  in  good  faith  to  Adenauer  to  bring 
this  about  and  we  should  in  no  circumstances  agree  to  Germany  being,  reduced  to  a  neutralised, 
defenceless  hiatus  which  would  only  be  the  preliminary  to  another  Czechoslovakian  process.  I 
Lind  it  hard  to  believe  that  the  Soviets  will  relinquish  their  grip  on  Eastern  Germany  if  the 
above  is  true. 
,3  On  the  details  of  negotiations  and  for  Eden's  reports  on  Conference  meetings  and  his  own 
conversations  with  Molotov  see  PREM  11/664.  Also  Full  Circle  pp.  87-89. 
74  Descent  to  Suez.  P.  131. 
75  PREM  11,665,  Berlin  Telegram  No.  78,  Eden  to  Churchill,  3rd  February,  19  4.  Eden  went  on, 
with  blithe  disregard  for  the  rough  patch  in  Miolotov's  relationship  with  Stalin  ,  vhich  was  endured  in 
the  years  immediately  before  the  latter's  death. 
I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  by  this  that  his  relations  with  `lalenkov  are  ether  than  -,  ood,  but  it 
may  be  that  they  ýýtre  Ieýý  close  personal  friends  than  we  know  that  Molotov  and  Stalin  were. Chapter  2/  Pa2e  43 
reading  of  the  relationship.  76  An  alternative  explanation,  which  Havter  endorsed,  was 
that  Molotov  considered  foreign  affairs  to  be  his  exclusive  province  and  thus  resented 
Eden's  references  to  Malenkov.  Eden's  telegram  continued, 
He  clearly  has  a  very  free  hand  and  has  never  even  hinted  in  any  of  our  talks, 
public  or  private,  at  the  need  for  reference  home.  I  suppose  he  could  be 
regarded  now  as  the  elder  statesman  of  the  Kremlin. 
However,  there  was  no  apprehension,  on  the  part  of  Eden,  that  there  were  any  serious 
divisions  within  the  Soviet  leadership.  At  least  there  were  none  which  might  be 
inferred  from  the  pursed  lips  of  Molotov. 
Once  it  became  clear  that  the  British  Government's  lack  of  expectation  over  the 
Berlin  Conference  was  to  prove  entirely  justified,  Churchill's  main  concern  was  that 
his  hopes  of  summit  diplomacy  should  not  be  dealt  a  death  blow  by  a  complete 
breakdown  in  negotiations.  77  His  attitude  towards  talks  on  the  Far  East  was  dominated 
by  this  consideration.  He  advised  Eden  in  a  telegram  of  27th  January  that, 
The  great  thing  is  to  avoid  a  deadlock  with  all  the  disappointment  and  danger 
that  would  flow  from  it.  For  this  purpose  the  institution  of  a  Five  Power 
Conference,  as  defined,  could  do  no  harm  and  might  do  much  ýood.  78 
At  least  according  to  Evelyn  Shuckburgh's  diary,  Eden's  diplomacy  was  heavily 
laced  with  personal  vanity.  A  desire  to  cut  a  peace  brining  dash  contributed 
substantially  in  his  eagerness  to  achieve  some  "success"  from  a  conference  which  was 
clearly  deadlocked  over  Germany.  Hence  his  passion  for  talks  about  East  Asia. 
Shuckburgh  expressed  misgivings  regarding  the  effect  on  Dulles  of  this  potentially 
impolitic  enthusiasm.  79 
76  PREM  11/668,  Moscow  Telegram  No.  883,  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  November  28th,  1953.  Hayter  had 
enjoyed  the  first  official  call  of  any  non-communist  Ambassador  on  Mlalenkov.  Hayter  thought, 
"relations  between  Malenkov  and  Molotov  seemed  excellent". 
77  FO  371  111690  NS  1051/6,  Minute  by  F.  Roberts  to  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  Berlin,  January  29th, 
1954.  This  is  an  interesting  sideline  on  the  information  which  was  and  which  was  not  passed  onto 
Churchill  regarding  the  Soviet  attitude  to  him  personally.  It  would  seem  that  the  Foreign  Office 
was  not  prepared  to  challenge  comfortable  delusions  which  informed  Churchill's  search  for  a 
summit  despite  their  irritation  with  him. 
I  think  you  should  know  that  Molotov's  attitude  towards  the  prime  Minister  when  we  dined 
with  the  Secretary  of  State  on  January  27th  was  in  no  way  cordial.  He  was  of  course  perfectly 
polite  when  the  Secretary  of  State  gave  him  the  normal  `_reetin`s  from  the  Prime  Minister,  but 
he  immediately  went  on  to  say,  with  some  feeling,  that  Sir  Winston  Churchill  had  had  some 
very  hard  things  to  say  about  the  Soviet  Union  after  the  war,  as  any  reader  of  Volume  VI  of 
his  memoirs  could  see  for  himself...  The  Secretary  of  State  had  thought  of  passing  this 
information  on  to  Jock  Colville  but  decided  not  to  do  so.  We  thout-,  ht  however  that  you  should 
be  aware  or  it  and  that  it  should  be  on  the  record  in  the  Foreign  Office. 
78  ibid.  Churchill  went  on  in  this  telegram  to  insist  that  the  search  for  better  relations  with  the  Soviets 
was  not  incompatible  with  +  policy  of  increasim_  western  strength  and  unity. 
,9  Descent  to  Sue"  p.  133.  the  problem  was  essentially  the  visceral  attitude  of  the  Americans, 
domestically  as  much  as  __overn  mentally,  to  China, Chapter  2/  Pa`_;  44 
Indeed.  Eden  seems  to  have  spent  more  time  at  Berlin  smooth  talking  with 
Molotov  than  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  However,  it  would  be  wrong  to  make  too 
much  of  this  point.  Eden  was  well  aware  that  on  the  issue  of  a  conference  on  the  Far 
East  the  Americans  proved  as  ready  to  make  concessions  as  the  Soviets,  if  indeed  not 
more  so.  On  February  12th  he  reported  to  Churchill  on  the  issue, 
This  is  becoming  a  very  difficult  question.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Molotov 
has  gone  some  way  to  meet  us...  I  am  sure  that  Dulles  has  gone  as  far  as  he 
can  in  accepting  the  French  Text  [setting  out  the  basis  for  great  power  talks 
on  the  Far  East]  It  fully  meets  all  our  requirements  and  is  defensible  in  all 
respects.  I  was  much  heartened  when  Dulles  eventually  accepted  it.  If 
Molotov  will  do  the  same  all  will  be  well.  But  I  fear  that  he  will  not.  Then  I 
think  we  should  stand  with  Americans  on  French  text.  80 
Eden  clearly  conceived  his  role  in  regard  of  a  Far  East  Conference  as  that  of  a 
facilitator.  This  was  not  the  last  time  he  was,  flatteringly  enough,  to  see  himself  in  a 
bridging  role  between  the  Soviets  and  Americans.  81  Indeed  the  first  substantial 
meeting  of  east  and  west  since  the  break  down  of  the  post  war  Foreign  Minister's 
Conferences  ended  with  a  certain  chuminess  between  the  British  and  Soviet 
delegations.  Despite  Eden's  initial  impression  of  the  Soviet  party  as  "an  inhuman 
platoon",  by  the  end  of  the  conference  Soviet  affability  left  a  considerable  impression 
upon  the  British.  82  Shuckburgh  recorded, 
Tonight  the  conference  is  over,  and  no  feathers  lost,  to  my  great  surprise. 
Molotov  came  round  through  our  seats  at  the  head  of  all  his  gang,  and  shook 
us  all  by  the  hand.  It  must  be  admitted  that  after  being  shut  up  all  day  with 
these  people  for  nearly  a  month  one  has  a  sort  of  fellow-  feeling  for  them 
which  was  absent  before,  and  I  suppose  that  this  is  all  to  the  good.  83 
I  am  worried  about  A.  E.  's  attitude  towards  the  Far  Eastern  business.  He  is  so  keen  to  "Fet  a 
conference,  so  as  to  have  some  "success"  to  vo  home  with,  that  he  seems  to  forget  how  terribly 
danVgerous  this  topic  is  for  Dulles. 
Interestingly,  Eden,  no  doubt  with  a  scapegoat  for  Suez  already  in  mind,  delivers  some  home  truths 
re`warding  Dulles'  behaviour  in  his  account  of  the  Berlin  Conference,  Full  Circle,  pp.  62-64.  Also 
see  James  Cable,  The  Geneva  Conference  of  1954  on  Indochina.  pp.  43-44.  The  level  of  tension 
between  Eden  and  Dulles  was  not  as  high  as  Eden  might  have  liked  in  retrospect,  see  Full  Circle. 
80  PREM  111665,  Berlin  Telegram  No.  156,  from  Eden  to  Churchill,  12th  February,  1954.  The  key 
issue  was  the  status  of  Chinese  representation  at  such  a  conference.  The  Soviets  were  insisting  that 
the  Chinese  be  accorded  full  great  power  status;  the  Americans  were  not  prepared  to  afford  such 
prestige  to  the  "illetntimate"  People's  Republic.  A  Compromise  formula  courtesy  of  Molotov  was 
eventually  agreed  on. 
S1  Full  Circle.  p.  13ý. 
52  ibid.  p  . 
65. 
33  Descent  to  Sue;,  p.  13  3.  PRE  .1  I1j  664.  Churchill  and  Eden  expressed  this  in  their  own  inimitably 
precious  way  in  tele  rams  of  he  15th  and  16th  February  respectively.  On  the  best  atmosphere  in 
which  to  end  the  negotiations  at  Berlin  Churchill  su_'ggested.  "...  sd  au  revoir  not  good-bye.  "  Eden 
replied.  "1  think  this  %%ill  he  the  mood.  though  perhaps  do  ,  vidanie  . '.  ill  he  the  expression.  " Chapter  2/  Pave  45 
However,  despite  such  bonhomie,  Eden  reported  to  the  Cabinet  on  the  22nd  of 
February  that  the  Berlin  Conference  had  changed  nothing.  84  The  Soviet  attitude 
towards  Europe  and  Germany  had  been  one  of  "extreme  rigidity".  This  Eden  thought 
was  a  due  to  the  weakness  of  their  position,  they  could  not  afford  to  make  any 
concessions  even  over  Austria  because  they  feared  that  one  accommodation  would  lead 
inexorably  to  many  more.  All  in  all  the  future  did  not  hold  out  much  hope  of 
improvement,  although  due  to  the  lack  of  "bitterness"  the  discussions  had,  at  least,  not 
been  positively  harmful.  Eden  was  indeed  surprisingly  sanguine  about  the  Soviet 
attitude  towards  the  E.  D.  C.,  although  he  did  highlight  the  strength  of  the  French 
delegation  under  Bidault  in  resisting  "Russian  blandishments  and  bullying  ".  s'  Western 
unity  had  been  maintained  despite  Molotov's  efforts  at  "wedge  driving".  Soviet 
foreign  policy  offered  the  West  nothing  new  despite  its  apparently  greater  tlexibility.  86 
Molotov's  considered  comment  on  the  Berlin  Conference  after  his  return  to 
Moscow  offered  little  more  joy  to  the  British.  Sir  William  Hayter's  report  on  the 
Soviet  press  coverage  of  Molotov's  public  pronouncement's  on  Berlin  concluded  in 
the  following  vein.  87  The  Soviet  position  on  German  unification  had  been  maintained 
immutable  with  flourishes  contra  German  rearmament.  Furthermore, 
Molotov  tacitly  admits  that  aim  of  "Soviet  diplomacy  by  conference"  is  not  to 
reach  agreement  with  his  western  colleagues  but  gradually  to  influence 
Western  public  opinion.  "No  Ministers"  he  says  "can  reject  the  idea  of  the 
collective  security  of  the  peoples  of  Europe...  this  idea...  will  constantly  find 
new  paths  to  the  hearts  of  millions  of  people.  " 
This  facet  of  Soviet  diplomacy  was  for  Hayter  the  key  to  understanding  the 
barrage  of  Notes,  largel  y  concerned  with  European  problems,  which  the  Soviet 
84  CAB  128/27  Part  1,  [0th  Conclusions,  Minute  1,22nd  February,  1954. 
85  ibid.  He  commented, 
He  did  not  think,  however,  that  the  Russians  had  any  real  fear  of  the  Germans  in  the 
immediate  future  or  that  they  would  regard  the  ratification  of  the  European  Defence 
Community  as  a  serious  threat  demanding  any  form  of  military  counter  action.  It  was  even 
possible  that  M.  Molotov  had  recognised  that  the  E.  D.  C.  was  itself  an  insurance  against 
future  German  ag`gression. 
86  PREM1  11/649.  F.  O.  Telegram  No.  969  to  Washington  Embassy,  March  16th  1954.  On  the 
possibility  that  Molotov  might  see  fit  to  raise  the  issue  of  Germany  at  the  Geneva  Conference  Eden 
was  quite  adamant, 
There  is  in  .  ny  view  nothing  to  be  gained  by  reopening  the  exhaustive  Berlin  discussions  on 
Germany  and  Austria  unless  the  Russians  are  prepared  to  modify  their  position.  Of  this  there 
is  no  sign  whatever.  Indeed,  the  Russians  themselves  would  seem  to  have  no  interest  in 
resuming,  such  discussions  in  the  near  future.  since-  they  could  only  confirm  Western  public 
opinion  in  the  impression  left  by  the  Berlin  Conference  that  Soviet  policy  on  Germany  and 
. -\ustna  \.  as  entirely  rigid. 
S  PRE\t  11,6c)4,  Mýýýýo\ý  Trlr_rarn  No.  _09,  from  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  5th  larch,  1954. Chapter  ?/  Page  46 
Government  issued  during  the  rest  of  1954.  On  the  Note  of  27th  March,  1954.88  He 
commented, 
7Molotov 
presumably  has  no  serious  hope  that  his  proposals  will  be  accepted  by  the 
Governments  to  which  they  are  addressed.  Recent  personal  attacks  on  Dulles,  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  yourself  are  sufficient  evidence  of  this.  the  Note  is  clearly  addressed  to 
the  peoples  over  the  heads  of  their  Governments  and  is  designed  to  create  confusion  in 
the  latter's  foreign  policy.  It  has  also  of  course  an  eye  on  the  forthcoming  French 
debate  about  the  E.  D.  C.  It  is  in  fact  a  propaganda  document.  89 
This  commentary  set  the  tone  for  Britain's  reaction  to  Molotov's  Note  campaign 
throughout  1954.90  It  was  clearly  interpreted  by  the  Moscow  Embassy  in  the  terms  of 
a  traditional  socialist  appeal  above  the  heads  of  Governments  to  the  people  of  the 
West.  This  was  also  Eden's  explanation  of  the  emphasis  placed  by  the  Soviets  on  their 
European  Security  proposals  made  first  at  the  Berlin  Conference  itself.  91  Molotov  had, 
it  seemed,  his  fire  focused  upon  the  convoluted  process  of  ratification  which  the 
E.  D.  C.  treaty  was  undergoing  in  Western  parliaments,  particularly  and  successfully 
that  of  France.  927'  Little  wonder  then  that  the  British,  always  excepting  Churchill's 
personal  diplomacy,  increasingly  emphasised  the  need  for  tokens  of  Soviet  sincerity 
either  over  an  Austrian  treaty  or  Germany  before  a  Summit  conference  could  be 
contemplated. 
Ironically,  it  was  Molotov's  obsession  with  all  European  Conferences  which  let 
Churchill  of  the  hook  in  the  summer  of  1954.  Churchill's  attempt  to  single  handedly 
start  the  summit  process  while  returning  from  his  visit  to  Washington  of  late  June  and 
early  July  almost  proved  the  undoing  of  his  Government.  93  Eden's  complicity  in  the 
88  PREM  11/670,  Moscow  Telegram  No.  274,  from  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  27th  March,  1954.  Contrary  to 
Molotov's  reputation  for  greyness,  Hayter  reported  that, 
He  informed  me  with  a  cheerful  smile  that  the  Note  was  principally  concerned  with  American 
participation  in  his  proposed  European  Security  Treaty  and  Soviet  participation  in  NATO... 
LMolotov's  campaign  against  German  Rearmament  was  not  without  its  absurdist  moments. 
89  PREM  11/670,  Moscow  Telegram  No.  280,  from  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  Ist  April,  1954. 
90  For  Example,  PREM  11/670,  Eden's  Minute  to  Churchill  PM/54/115  of  30th  July,  1954;  Hayter's 
Telegram  No.  1030  of  October  ?  3rd,  1954;  Kirkpatrick's  Minute  to  Churchill  PLIiIK/54  143  of 
20th  August,  1954,  in  which  Kirkpatrick  reports  on  the  Tripartite  Drafting  group  which  had  been 
set  up  to  discuss  a  reply  to  one  of  many  Soviet  notes.  Interestingly.  Kirkpatrick  refers  to  Eden's 
instructions  to  push  for  an  inclusion  in  the  Western  response  of  reference  to  the  necessity  for  a  "sign 
of  good  faith"  on  the  part  of  the  "Russians",  either  an  Austrian  State  Treaty  or  agreement  to  free 
elections  in  Germany  before  unification.  Also  FRUS  1952-1954.  Vol.  VII;  pp.  1232-1235.  The 
American  opinion  was  very  much  in  accord  with  the  British. 
91  PRE`1  11'649,  F.  O.  Telegram  No.  969  to  Washington  Embassy,  16th  March,  1954. 
[TJhe  Russians  have  shown  some  desire  to  focus  increasing  public  attention  in  the  West  upon 
the  Soviet  European  Secunty  proposals  tabled  at  Berlin.  This  however  is  presumably  aimed  at 
Western  public  opinion  rather  than  Western  Governments  and  designed  to  encourage  French 
opponents  of  the  E.  D.  C. 
92  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  British  role  in  West  German  rearmament  see  Saki  Dokrill.  Britain's 
Policy  for  West  German  Rearmcunent  19.50-195-5. 
93  See  The  ForeiQ>i  Poiic  .  of  Churchill's  Peaceuime  Administration,  pp.  67-70  and  Never  Despair  pp. 
1012-1040. Chapter  2/  Page  47 
matter  had  more  to  do  with  his  hunger  to  succeed  Churchill  than  any  faith  in  the 
soundness  of  the  initiative.  The  Cabinet,  almost  to  a  man,  were  against  any  unilateral 
approach  to  Moscow.  Molotov's  Note  to  the  Western  Powers  of  24th  July  offered 
Churchill  the  means  to  escape  the  hole  into  which  he  had  willfully  jumped.  9`ý  In  a 
Telegram  of  July  26th  Churchill  informed  Molotov  that  the  Soviet  proposal  for  a 
formal  conference  to  discuss  European  Security  superseded  his  suggestion  of  an 
informal  meeting  of  Heads  of  Governments.  95  Churchill,  however,  did  not  go  on  to 
outline  the  domestic  political  considerations  which  disposed  him  so  favourably  to  this 
particular  twist  of  Soviet  diplomacy.  Molotov  was,  apparently,  too  set  upon  his  own 
path  to  notice  the  advantage  which  might  have  been  made  from  the  stumbling  of 
others. 
THE  1954  GENEVA  CONFERENCE 
East  West  relations  in  Europe  were  little  advantaged  by  the  absence  of  Stalin.  Indeed, 
if  anything  the  stalemate  became  even  more  arid  during  1954.  Nlalenkov's  comments 
in  1953  upon  the  efficacy  of  negotiation  were  beginning  to  ring  more  than  a  little 
hollow.  This  dismal  situation  was  to  stand  out  in  even  starker  contrast  against  the 
relative  success  of  negotiations  over  Indo-china. 
The  main  subject  on  the  agenda  of  the  Geneva  negotiations  which  opened  on  the 
26th  April,  1954  was  a  settlement  for  Korea.  96  However,  it  was  the  situation  in 
Vietnam  which  stole  the  limelight.  97  Not  only  was  the  French  position  in  the  war 
against  the  Vietnamese  Communists  becoming  critical,  but,  unlike  their  position  over 
Korea,  the  Soviets  were  willing  to  exert  their  influence  in  order  to  achieve  a 
settlement.  98  From  the  moment  the  Conference  began  to  consider  Indo-China  it 
became  apparent  to  the  British  delegation  that  Molotov  wanted  a  success.  99 
Eden's  approach  at  Geneva,  both  in  1954  and  1955  was  much  concerned  with 
what  might  be  termed  dinner-time  diplomacy.  On  the  evening  of  the  5th  of  May  Eden 
94  Anthony  Eder,  p.  381 
95  PREM  11/670.  Telegram  No.  987,  from  P.  M.  to  Molotov,  26th  July,  1954. 
96  For  a  detailed  examination  of  the  Geneva  Conference,  1954  and  the  role  played  by  Eden,  see  James 
Cable,  The  Geneva  Conference  of  1954  on  Indochina.  Cable  combines  the  advantage  of  access  to 
British  Government  records  with  his  personal  experience  as  a  member  of  the  British  delegation.  For 
a  more  American  view  see  Robert  F.  Randle,  Geneva,  1954.  Also  there  is  the  vast  accumulation  of 
American  documents  within  FRUS  1952-1954,  Vol.  XVI. 
97  Evelyn  Shuckburgh's  diary  provides  an  illuminating  and  critical  account  of  the  First  stau  of  the 
Conference.  He  accompanied  Eden  as  Private  Secretary,  leaving  on  the  14th  May  to  take  up 
another  Foreign  Office  position,  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  168-214. 
98  According  to  Khrushchev's  memoirs  it  was  the  French  who  were  doing  most  of  the  compromising. 
Khrushchev's  account  is,  however,  a  little  unclear.  Khrushchev  Remembers,  pp.  481-483. 
99  Although  from  the  start  Molotov  seems  to  have  turned  on  the  charm.  Evelyn  Shuckburgh  even  took 
to  referring  to  him  as  "Auntie  Mol"  in  the  privacy  of  his  diary, 
One  is  in  danger  of  thinking,  of  Molotov  as  a  sort  of  benevolent  middle-man  -  Auntie  -  he 
smiles  so  nicely  and  talks  so  __-tntly  to  us. 
Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  181-182. Chapter  2/  Page  4S 
had  one  of  his  most  successful  prandial  sessions  with  Molotov  and  choice  members  of 
the  Soviet  delegation,  including  Andrei  Gromyko.  On  the  following  day  Eden  sent  a 
report  back  to  the  Foreign  Office, 
M.  Molotov  dined  with  me  last  night...  We  had  a  friendly  and  useful  talk. 
ANI.  Molotov  was  in  an  unusually  relaxed  mood,  and  talked  freely  on  a  number 
of  subjects  unconnected  with  the  present  Conference...  On  matters 
concerning  the  Conference  itself  he  was  also  most  amenable.  I  do  not  think 
that  throughout  the  evening  he  disagreed  with  anything  that  I  said  in  the 
course  of  a  frank  discussion  of  our  problems  here,  nor  did  he  ever  seek  to 
make  a  merely  debating  point.  His  whole  attitude  was  in  contrast  to  our 
experience  of  him  in  Berlin.  He  seemed  genuinely  anxious  that  the 
Conference  should  succeed,  and  also  considerably  worried  over  the  situation 
in  Indo-China.  100 
Eden  went  on  to  conclude  that  although  such  amity  could  be  interpreted  as  another 
symptom  of  Molotov's  attempt  to  drive  "wedges"  between  the  Western  Powers,  no- 
one  from  the  British  delegation  who  was  present  at  the  dinner  thought  such  a  shallow 
motive  adequate  explanation  for  Molotov's  enthusiasm.  However,  this  was  not  the 
impression  that  Evelyn  Shuckburgh  recorded  in  his  diary.  Indeed  Shuckburgh  was 
concerned  that  the  success  of  Eden's  dinner  was  largely  due  to  overmuch  denigration 
of  the  Americans.  101  Eden  had  spent  much  of  his  time  with  the  Soviets  emphasising 
their  joint  role  as  moderating  influences,  the  British  on  the  Americans/French  and  the 
Soviets  on  the  Chinese/Vietnamese. 
Even  despite  the  positive  outlook  for  Indo-China  negotiations  the  Conference  was 
not  to  come  to  a  settlement  without  considerable  time  and  effort.  102  The  Soviet, 
Chinese  and  Vietnamese  delegations  required  all  the  tact  and  accommodation  which 
Eden  had  at  his  command.  However,  throughout  Eden  was  keenly  aware  that  success 
was  predicated  upon  the  attitude  of  both  the  Soviets  and  the  Chinese.  103  In  Eden's 
correspondence  with  London  throughout  the  Conference  up  to  its  closing  session  on  the 
21st  July,  1954,  the  fruitfulness  of  his  cooperation  with  Molotov  plays  a  fundamental 
100  FO  371  112060  DF  10711446G,  Geneva  Telegram  No.  161,  Eden  to  F.  0.,  6th  May,  1954. 
101  Shuckbur_h  was  not  actually  present,  his  opinion  was  based  on  an  impression  of  Eden's  "exalt6 
frame  of  mind"  immediately  after  the  Soviets  had  left  and  the  reportage  of  other  British  officials 
who  had  attended  the  dinner.  Not  everyone  was  as  convinced  as  Eden  of  the  benignity  of  Molotov. 
By  his  diary  entry  of  the  next  day  Shuckburgh  seems  to  have  been  more  sanguine  in  his  opinion  of 
Eden's  behaviour.  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  191-193. 
102  FO  371  112064  DF  1071i527D,  Geneva  Telegram  No.  271.  Eden  to  F.  0.,  13th  May,  1954. 
Despite  the  assertions  that  Khrushchev  makes  in  his  memoirs,  Eden  was  convinced  at  the  time  that 
serious  concessions  would  be  required  of  the  Communist  delegations  in  order  to  reach  an  agreement, 
particularly  over  Cambodia  and  Loas.  Separate  treatment  for  these  two  lesser  players  in  the  tragedy 
was  considered  an  important  gain  by  Eden.  Cab  1'-9/69,  C(54)207,22nd  June,  1954, 
Memorandum  by  the  Fore  _n  Secretary.  Also  see  Full  C,  rcle.  pp.  127-130. 
103  ibid.  In  Eden's  memo  of  the  22nd  June,  prepared  for  the  visit  of  Churchill  and  himself  to 
Washin`_ton.  he  considered  that  the  Soviets  and  the  Chinese  wanted  a  settlement,  "but  they  may 
have  difficulty  in  restraining  the  Vietminh  who  are  in  s  position  to  demand  a  high  price.  ' Chapter  2/  Pa, 
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part.  too  This  was  not  least  in  consequence  of  Molotov's  role  as  co-chairman  of  the 
Conference  in  tandem  with  Eden  himself.  Indeed  at  times  Eden  expressed  more 
exasperation  with  his  Western  Allies  than  towards  any  of  the  Communist  Powers.  105 
Yet,  the  success  of  proceedings  had,  eventually,  as  much  to  do  with  the  determination 
of  Mendes  France  to  end  France's  East  Asian  imbroglio  as  anything  else.  K6 
On  the  role  of  the  British  delegation  in  the  negotiations  James  Cable  comes  to  the 
following  wise  conclusion, 
Although  the  Geneva  Settlement  was  of  more  enduring  advantage  to  Britain 
than  the  other  diplomatic  achievements  of  Eden's  annus  mirabilis  in  1954...  it 
also  engendered  more  lasting  delusions  of  grandeur.  In  194  Britain  had 
indeed  outfaced  the  United  States  and  negotiated  on  equal  terms  with  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union  the  peaceful  resolution  of  a  major  international  dispute 
on  a  basis  first  conceived  in  London.  This  was  nevertheless  as  much  the 
result  of  a  fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances  as  of  greater  foresight  or 
superior  diplomatic  skill.  It  was  not  founded  on  any  balance  of  real 
power.  107 
Cable  goes  on  to  suggest  that  this  illusion  of  power  may  well  have  had  pernicious 
consequences  at  Suez.  Certainly  it  was  an  illusion  which  Eden's  diplomacy  in  1955 
and  early  1956  was  happy  to  play  upon,  as  shall  become  apparent.  Eden  tended  to  lay 
too  much  store  by  the  process  of  negotiation  itself,  rather  than  the  prior  interests  of 
parties  in  a  settlement. 
However,  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  think  that  Soviet  flexibility  in  Geneva  offered 
any  hope  for  Europe.  On  the  27th  June  an  analysis  of  the  most  recent  Soviet  Note 
concerning  European  Security  proposals  was  sent  to  the  British  delegation  to  the 
"tripartite  drafting  group"  in  Washington  who  were  cooking  up  the  Western  response. 
The  Foreign  Office  was  forthright  in  its  opinion, 
It  is  natural  that  the  Soviet  Government  should  try  to  profit  from  the  Geneva 
Conference  to  forward  their  policies  in  Europe.  There  is  however  no 
evidence  in  the  Soviet  Note  that  these  policies  have  changed  or  that  the 
Russians  are  now  more  tractable  on  any  major  European  questions  such  as 
Germany,  Austria  or  European  Security.  Indeed  the  language  of  the  Note  is 
so  sharp  and  combative  that  the  Soviet  Government  can  scarcely  entertain  any 
serious  hope  that  the  Western  Powers  will  accept  it  as  a  reasonable  basis  for 
104  Eden's  communications  are  held  in  the  Foreign  Office's  South  East  Asia  Department  records  at  FO 
371  11204  -11`087. 
105  FO  371  1  1207  3  DF  1071,715,  Geneva  Telegram  No.  27,  Eden  to  Churchill,  15th  June,  1954. 
106  The  Geneva  Conference,  p.  115. 
107  Ibid.  p.  14').  For  the  United  States'  irritation  over  Eden's  policy  at  Geneva  see  FRUS  1952-1954, 
Vý)J.  XVI,  pp.  6S0-698.204th  Meeting  of  the  National  Security  Council,  24th  June,  1954.  Harold 
Stassen  made  the  following  perceptive  Comment  at  the  very  end  of  the  discussion. 
Governor  Stassen  offered  the  philosophical  observation  that  we  must  expect  to 
-go 
through  a 
period  in  the  course  of  which  the  British  try  to  assert  their  tailing  world  leadership. 
Sadly,  over  the  issue  of  Vietnam  it  was  the  Americans  who  were  to  assert  their  strengthening  world 
leadership. Chaptzr  2/  Page  50 
negotiation...  The  conclusion  can  only  be  that  Soviet  policy  has  not 
changed...  The  agreement  on  Indo-China  at  Geneva  does  not  afford  a  parallel 
for  the  settlement  of  European  problems  and  of  the  disarmament 
question  ... 
108 
The  Geneva  Conference's  success  was  conceived  in  very  limited  terms  by  British 
officialdom.  All  in  all  both  Berlin  and  Geneva  seemed  little  to  have  changed  the 
British  view  of  the  Soviet  Union's  relationship  with  the  outside  world,  even  although 
Eden  gained  considerable  encouragement  from  Molotov's  apparent  reasonableness. 
TOWARD  THE  FALL  OF  NIALENKOV 
On  March  5th,  1954,  Sir  William  Hayter  sent  London  the  Moscow  Embassy's  opinion 
on  the  Soviet  Union  a  year  after  Stalin's  death.  109  He  laid  out  the  main  differences 
between  the  new  and  old  dispensations.  The  principle  of  "collective  or  committee" 
leadership  seemed  firmly  established,  particularly  after  Beria's  execution.  The 
extremes  of  Stalin's  self-deification  were  now  eschewed  for  a  more  rational,  but  still 
respectful,  attitude  to  the  dead  leader.  Moreover,  this  humility  extended  to 
agricultural  and  economic  policy.  The  vast  schemes  for  the  "transformation  of  nature" 
which  Stalin  had  developed  in  his  last  years  had  been  abandoned.  110  In  the  1954 
Budget  considerably  more  weight  was  given  to  the  production  of  consumer  goods.  111 
Altogether  the  demands  being  made  of  the  Soviet  citizen  were  becoming  more 
forgiving.  112  In  ideological  terms  the  trend  was  no  different,  Stalin's  opinions  were 
tempered,  but  not  discarded.  113  Hayter  went  on. 
108  PREM  11/670,  F.  O.  Telegram  No.  3687,  F.  O.  to  WashinLton,  ?  7th  July,  1954.  Sir  Roger 
Makins  replied  that  the  Americans  agreed  with  the  British  analysis,  Washington  Telegram  No. 
1612,  Makins  to  F.  0.,  27th  July,  1954. 
109  FO  371  111671  NS  1015/18A,  Moscow  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Eden,  5th  March,  1954. 
110  On  the  issue  of  agriculture  see  Martin  McCauley,  Khrushchev  and  the  Development  of  Soviet 
Agriculture,  pp.  40-75. 
111  FO  371  111708  NS  1102/9,  F.  O.  Memorandum,  "Soviet  Economic  Policy  since  Stalin's  Death", 
14th  April,  1954.  This  memo  have  an  assessment  of  both  economic  and  agricultural  policy.  Also  in 
same  file  at  /22 
, 
Moscow  Chancery  to  Northern  Department,  29th  July,  1955,  is  an  assessment  of 
the  Soviet  Government's  "Plan  results"  for  1954.  Hayter  did  not  think  that  this  new  emphasis  on 
consumerism  would  seriously  reduce  the  potential  of  either  Soviet  heavy  industry  or  military  mi2ht. 
There  is  a  Moscow  Embassy  analysis  of  the  1954  Budget  itself  at  FO  371  111711  NS  1111/2, 
Moscow  Despatch.  from  Hayter  to  Eden,  28th  April,  1954. 
11`'  However,  Hayter  did  not  consider  that  there  had  been  any  loosening  up  in  terms  of  the  right  to 
express  dissent  or  intellectual  freedom,  despite  the  Soviet  Government's  rhetoric.  On  this  issue  the 
Northern  and  Information  Research  Departments  took  considerable  exception  to  Isaac  Deutscher's 
san`_uine  opinions  which  were  carried  in  The  Times  of  17th,  18th  and  19th  November,  1954. 
Deutscher  talked  of  a  "ferment  of  ideas"  being  sanctioned  by  the  Malenkov  Government.  Violet 
Conolly  in  particular  thought  Deutscher's  journalism  inaccurate  and  pernicious.  The  Moscow 
Embassy  was  equally  unimpressed  by  the  articles.  FO  371  1116712  NS  1015'55,  Minutes  by  R.  H. 
Mason,  10th  January,  t955  and  V.  Conolly,  19th  January,  1955.  Deutscher  had  published  a 
hopeful  study  of  post-Stalin  Russia  in  ;  953,  entitled  enigmatically.  Russia  after  Stalin. 
113  FO  371  111775  NS  16701/1,  Foreign  Office  Research  Department  Memorandum,  25th  %larch, 
1954.  This  production  commented  upon  the  latest  (4th)  edition  of  the  Soviet  Short  Philosophical 
Dictionary  which  had  been  published  at  the  end  of  1953.  F.  O.  R.  D.  considered  it  an  important 
indicator  A.  orthodoxy.  Despite  ý,  uhstantial  revisions  they  came  to  the  following  conclusion, Chapter  2/  Page  51 
In  ideology  the  new  leaders  have  made  no  pronouncements  of  note.  They 
seem  content  to  adhere  to  the  established  doctrine,  not  rejecting  Stalin's 
additions  to  the  heritage  of  Lenin  but  showing  no  desire  to  make  additions  of 
their  own.  Their  chief  preoccupation  seems  to  be  the-practical  administration 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 
These  concerns  also  informed  foreign  policy.  Hayter  explained  the  Kremlin's  new 
found  affection  for  negotiation  and  pacific  pronouncements  as  follows, 
Their  aim,  it  seemed,  was  to  avoid  dangerous  international  complications  and 
to  make  it  possible  for  the  Government  to  deal  at  leisure  first  with  domestic 
questions  and  subsequently  with  those  questions  of  foreign  relations  which 
they  regarded  as  ripe  for  solution...  In  all  its  fundamental  concepts,  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  new  Soviet  Government  remained  indistinguishable  from 
that  of  Stalin. 
Even  after  Eden's  success  at  Geneva  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  think  that  very 
much  had  changed.  The  settlement  in  Vietnam  was  as  much  in  the  interest  of  the 
Soviet  Union  as  the  West  and,  furthermore,  afforded  considerable  leverage  in  the 
Soviet  attempt  to  prise  the  Western  alliance  apart.  It  was  in  this  context  that  H.  A.  F. 
Hohler  interpreted  the  comparatively  lenient  treatment  Britain  received  in  the  Soviet 
press  during  the  summer  months  of  1954.114  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  been  unremittingly  pilloried.  Hohler's  opinion  was  in  accord  with  his  Northern 
Department  colleagues, 
I  am  not  inclined  to  regard  the  "softer"  Soviet  policy  towards  this  country  as 
anything  more  than  a  tactical  and  probably  temporary  phenomenon... 
Indeed,  in  the  second  half  of  1954  "wedge  driving"  became  a  metaphorical 
commonplace  in  British  comment  on  the  Kremlin's  foreign  policy.  1  5  Until,  that  is, 
the  Soviet  temper  frayed  as  the  campaign  against  West  German  rearmament  reached  a 
screaming  pitch.  Molotov's  triumph  over  the  E.  D.  C.  was  shortlived  and  in  his 
desperation  to  forestall  West  Germany's  entrance  into  NATO,  the  fine  distinctions 
between  western  countries  drawn  by  Soviet  diplomacy  earlier  in  1954  began  to 
[N  ]o  fundamental  change  can  be  detected  in  the  ideological  approach  of  the  new  dictionary. 
The  ý_eneral  outlook  is  more  moderate  and  reasonable  than  in  Stalin's  day,  but  certain  hostile 
trends  have  grown  stronger,  notably  towards  patriotic  national  exclusiveness  and  towards 
vit-ilance. 
114  FO  31  111672  NS  1015140,  `linute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  of  22nd  July,  1955.  Hayter's  Quarterly 
Report.  a  copy  of  which  remains  with  Hohler's  minutinýg,  was  berated  for  not  making  sufficiently 
clear  the  contrast  between  British  and  American  treatment  in  the  Soviet  press.  Hohler  also  pointed 
out  that  the  Soviets  had  made  specific,  if  minor,  concessions  to  butter  up  the  British.  one  of  which 
was  the  extension  of  the  . an;  lo-Soviet  fisheries  agreement  for  another  year. 
115  For  example,  FO  3-1  1116-2  NS  1015/40,  Moscow  Embassy  Quarterly  Report,  7th  October, 
1954,  and  Northern  Department  minutes  thereon,  or  Violet  Conolly's  mordent  criticism  of  a  rosy 
Pravda  article  of  '27th  July,  195-1,  on  Churchill's  attitude  to  peaceful  coexistence  at  FO  371  111706 
NS  1073/12.  Minute  by  V.  Conolly,  30th  July,  1954. Chapter  2/  Page  52 
blur.  116  Blustering  threats  of  retaliation  against  any  and  all  of  the  nations  associating 
themselves  with  the  creation  of  a  \Vest  German  army  were  at  this  point  the  meat  of  the 
Soviet's  international  discourse. 
A  sceptical  attitude  also  informed  the  Foreign  Office's  interpretation  of  the  vogue 
expression,  "peaceful  coexistence".  In  the  wave  of  euphoria  which  his  experience  at 
Geneva  created,  Eden  had  himself  made  so  bold  as  to  suggest  that  it  might  be  possible 
to  come  to  a  modus  vivendi  between  East  and  West.  117  The  limitations  of  Soviet 
enthusiasm  for  such  a  project  were  quickly  apparent.  R.  A.  Hibbert  of  the  Northern 
Department  summed  up  the  Soviet  interpretation  of  "peaceful  coexistence",  in  a  minute 
of  the  6th  November,  1954,  in  four  points, 
a)  The  avoidance  of  major  adventures  (such  as  the  Korean  War)  b)  The  moral 
and  physical  disarmament  of  the  West.  c)  The  maintenance  of  Soviet  and 
Communist  pressure  on  and  in  Western  countries.  d)  The  wooing  of  Asia. 
This  is  not  a  policy  which  the  West  can  view  with  any  gratification:  but  it 
does  mark  some  progress  compared  with  the  more  violent  Soviet  attitude 
which  led  to  the  Korean  War.  It  is  essentially  "hostile  co-existence"  and  not 
an  acceptable  form  of  international  amity.  118 
In  fact  Soviet  Doctrine  and  practice  was  not  considered  to  be  fundamentally  different 
from  that  of  Stalin.  119 
116  FO  371  111672  NS  1015/59,  Moscow  Embassy  Quarterly  Report,  21st  December,  1954.  The 
report  began, 
During  this  quarter  Soviet  diplomacy  was  obsessed  by  one  idea  -  to  torpedo  the  ratification  of 
the  London  and  Paris  agreements.  This  overshadowed  all  their  other  preoccupations...  France, 
as  the  weak  link  in  the  Western  chain,  received  the  hardest  battering,  which  culminated  in  the 
Soviet  threat  to  annul  the  Franco-Soviet  Treaty  if  the  Treaties  were  ratified.  A  similar  threat 
was  subsequently  directed  at  the  United  Kingdom. 
117  Hansard  Vol.  529;  cols.  428-441.  Also  Foreign  Office  Intel  on  peaceful  coexistence  at  FO  371 
111706  NS  1073/35,  Covering  Minute  by  Lord  Jellicoe,  16th  December,  1954.  By  November 
Eden  was  quite  clear  in  his  public  pronouncements  that  the  Soviet  line  was,  in  fact,  little  different  to 
that  held  under  Stalin,  see  above  Intel. 
118  FO  371  111706  NS  1073/22,  Minute  by  R.  A.  Hibbert,  6th  November,  1954.  Hibbert  wrote  by 
way  of  commentary  on  a  lengthy  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch  on  the  same  theme  of  26th  October. 
The  Embassy  was,  if  anything  even  less  sanguine  in  its  appreciation  of  the  new  Soviet  position.  Sir 
William  Hayter  concluded. 
I  believe  that  the  Soviet  Government  propagates  the  policy  of  "peaceful  coexistence"  for  no 
better  reason  than  because  it  no  longer  sees  any  advantage  in  pursuing  V  an  adventurous  or 
dynamic  foreign  policy,  where  all  its  gains  mit-,  ht  be  hazarded,  and  prefers  a  more  static  policy 
which  may  in  the  end  secure  it  the  gains  it  need  without  exposing  it  to  the  attendant  risks. 
The  Americans  developed  a  similar  interpretation,  FRUS  19522-  1954.  Vol.  11.  p.  71?,  Paper  by  State 
Department,  15th  November,  1954. 
119  The  Intel  referred  to  at  footnote  122  made  much  of  Soviet  effort;  to  "brush  up"  the  theory  of 
peaceful  coexistence  "to  serve  the  ends  of  Communist  propaganda"  without  any  fundamental 
reappraisal.  The  Stalinist  line,  for  example,  regarding  the  two  camps  was  ;  till  a  very  living 
orthodoxy.  This  as  an  anale:;;  shared  by  in  the  U.  S.  State  Department.  expressed  if  anything  in 
even  starker  terms,  see  FRUS  1952-1954  Vol.  II,  p.  7;  ';  Paper  by  State  Department,  15th 
November,  10-54. Chapter  2/  Page  53 
There  were,  though,  some  areas  in  which  the  British  Government  did  consider  that 
a  new  work  was  being  done  by  the  Malenkov  Government,  in  particular  the  emphasis 
which  Soviet  foreign  policy  was  increasingly  giving  to  Asia.  Eden  himself  was  well 
aware  that  the  focus  of  the  Cold  War  was  beginning  to  shift  away  from  a  stalemated 
Europe.  In  a  statement  of  British  policy  at  Geneva,  he  commented,  "...  our  aim  should 
be  to  draw  a  line  and  create  a  modus  vivendi  in  Asia  of  the  kind  already  created  in 
Europe--.  120  However,  the  means  by  which  the  Soviet  lion  was  seeking  to  exert 
influence  into  this  new  battleground  were  familiar  ones,  infiltration,  subversion  and  the 
support  of  Communist  insurrection.  121  There  was  no  hint  of  the  kind  of  revisionism 
which  Khrushchev  was  to  introduce  into  Soviet  diplomacy  during  the  following  year. 
Molotov  was  not  prepared  to  recognise  non-Communist  regimes  in  the  "under- 
developed  world"  as  brothers  in  arms,  there  were  still  only  two  camps.  The  Soviet 
interest  lay  in  gathering  as  many  nations  as  possible  into  their  side  of  the  great 
divide.  122 
Another  profound  change  of  1955  which  was  foreshadowed  in  1954  was  the  Soviet 
response  to  the  development  of  thermonuclear  weapons.  Malenkov's  12th  March, 
1954  speech  to  the  Soviet  electors  was  the  most  important  indication  that  something 
was  stirring  in  this  respect,  even  although  he  was  later  forced  to  retract  his  heterodox 
speculation  that  all,  not  just  the  capitalists,  would  be  consumed  by  a  war  which  used 
the  latest  weaponry.  123 
However,  in  its  analysis  of  this  development,  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  come  to 
any  clear  conclusion.  The  novelty  of  Malenkov's  admission  of  Communist 
vulnerability  was  commented  upon,  but  it  was  at  best  placed  in  the  context  of  the 
"soft"  foreign  policy  which  the  Soviet  Government  had  been  following  since  Stalin's 
death.  124  At  worst  Foreign  Office  officials  overlooked  it  almost  altogether.  125  Sir 
120  PREM  11/649,  Geneva  Telegram  No.  415,  Eden  to  F.  0.,  22nd  May,  1954.  Eden  was  concerned 
about  the  political  pressure  which  non-communist  regimes  in  the  area  would  face  post  Geneva.  It 
was  in  this  context  that  he  viewed  the  importance  of  setting  up  a  treaty  organisation  in  South  East 
Asia,  PREM  11/650,  Geneva  Telegram  No.  899,  Eden  to  F.  0.,  12th  July,  1954. 
121  FO  371  111706  NS  1073/35,  Covering  Minute  by  Lord  Jellicoe,  16th  December,  1954.  It  advised 
that, 
There  are  no  sins  that  the  Communist  leaders  have  abandoned  their  ambition  of  absorbing  the 
non-Communist  world  piece-meal  into  the  Communist  orbit...  The  proof  of  the  pudding  lies  in 
the  fact  that  recently  there  has  been  an  increase  in  Communist  propaganda  directed  towards  the 
undeveloped  and  "colonial"  countries;  there  has  been  a  reversion  to  the  technique  of  appealing 
to  peoples  over  the  Heads  of  Governments  and  no  sign  of  any  weakening  of  Communist 
support  for  political  subversion,  especially  in  Asia...  they  would  like  the  West  to  curtail  all 
forms  of  political  warfare,  while  they  were  free  to  pursue  their  aims  by  all  means  short  of  war. 
122  The  Americans  agreed,  see  for  example,  FRUS  1952-1954  Vol.  II;  Paper  by  Allen  Dulles,  18th 
November,  1954. 
123  See  Robert  Conquest,  Power  and  Policy  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  pp.  22  S-262. 
124  FO  371  111671  NS  1015/21,  Minute  by  Lord  Jellicoe,  15th  March,  1954.  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  even 
wondered  if  Malenkov's  reference  to  the  "destruction  of  world  civilisation"  was  not  part  of  an 
attempt  to  resuscitate  the  Peace  Campaign  of  the  very  early  fifties.  He  did  though  recognise  that 
Malenkov's  was  the  "frankest  allusion  to  the  horrors  of  atomic  war  by  a  Soviet  leader  which  I  have 
noticed.  "  NS  1015/28,  Minute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  23rd  March,  1954. Chapter  ?/Pi  54 
William  Havter  in  a  despatch  of  the  26th  October,  1954  on  peaceful  coexistence,  did 
go  so  far  as  to  suggest  that, 
Whereas  in  Communist  doctrine  wars  of  all  kinds  were  regarded  as  likely  to 
weaken  and  eventually  destroy  the  capitalist  system...  the  development  of  the 
hydrogen  bomb  may  well  have  made  the  Soviet  leaders  of  today  doubtful  of 
the  validity  of  these  arguments;  in  a  thermo-nuclear  age,  conflict  between  the 
two  worlds  might  well  lead  to  the  extinction  not  merely  of  capitalism  but  of 
communism  too,  and  in  such  a  hypothesis  there  could  be  no  alternative  to  a 
policy  of  "peaceful  coexistence".  '26 
But,  this  perceptive  comment  was  buried  at  the  end  of  a  list  of  other  reasons  for  the 
Soviet's  enthusiasm  for  peaceful  coexistence  and  it  was  offered  only  as  a  tentative 
suggestion.  The  despatch  itself,  although  considered  "interesting",  was  not  deemed  by 
the  Northern  Department  of  sufficient  importance  to  merit  a  very  wide  circulation 
within  Whitehall.  127  The  impact  of  the  ghastly  possibilities  of  thermonuclear  war  was 
to  have  dramatic  effects  on  Soviet  foreign  policy  in  1955.  During  1954  these  changes 
were  still  embryonic  and  largely  passed  over  by  British  observers. 
The  most  embarrassing  interpretative  error  committed  by  the  British  Government 
was  in  its  assessment  of  rivalry  within  the  Kremlin.  Even  after  the  "liquidation"  of 
Beria,  it  was  clear  that  there  remained  frictions  underneath  the  facade  of  collective 
leadership.  Indeed  in  memorandum  of  the  18th  December  1953,  F.  0.  R.  D. 
attempted  to  explain  the  contradictory  nature  of  Soviet  foreign  policy,  in  particular  its 
hot  and  cold  rhetoric  on  summit  talks,  by  reference  to  splits  at  the  top.  128  However, 
this  line  of  analysis  was  less  popular  with  the  Northern  Department  and  the  Moscow 
Embassy.  1'-9 
Disharmony  became  even  more  apparent  in  1954,  particularly,  as  far  as  British 
observers  were  concerned,  over  Khrushchev's  "Virgin  Lands  Scheme".  130  Yet, 
125  FO  371  111672  NS  1015/41,  Minute  by  V.  Conolly,  13th  July  1954.  This  chronology  of  principle 
events  in  the  Soviet  Union  drawn  up  by  F.  O.  R.  D.  makes  no  special  mention  of  Malenkov  speech 
at  all,  merely  listing  it  with  all  the  other  election  speeches. 
126  FO  371  111706  NS  1073/??,  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Eden.  26th  October,  1954. 
Hayter  went  on, 
\lalenkov  recognised  this  when  he  said  in  his  speech  of  March  12,1954,  that  another  war 
would  mean  the  end  of  civilisation,  though  a  month  later  he  reverted  to  the  older  formula  that 
it  would  mean  the  end  of  capitalism. 
I.  7  FO  3711  11706  NS  1073/22,  Minute  by  R.  A.  Hibbert,  6th  November,  1954. 
128  FO  37  1/111675  NS  1015/1,  F.  O.  R.  D.  Minute,  18th  December,  1953.  This  is  a  precocious  piece 
which  is  suggestive  of  J.  Richter',  Doctoral  thesis,  "Action  and  Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign 
Policy".  However,  unlike  Richter,  throughout  1954  and  early  1955  the  Foreign  Office  did  not 
think  that  foreign  policy  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  course  or  events.  The  British  Government 
thought  that  domestic  policy  debates  informed  the  substance  of  political  divisions.  See  Richter  pp. 
103-166. 
129  FO  3,1  111675  NS  l0  I  S'  l.  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Chancery  to  Northern  Department,  3rd 
February,  1954. 
130  FO  371  111.34  NS  list,,,  Minute  by  J.  A.  Dobbs.  11th  March,  1954.  See  Khrushchev  and  the 
Development  of  Soviet 
. -4''r  tculture,  pp.  4-4-,  5. Chapter  2/  Page  55 
although  the  political  implications  of  policy  disagreements  were  not  altogether 
overlooked  the  tendency  was  to  interpret  such  differences  within  the  context  of  the 
collective,  rather  than  as  an  attempt  to  undermine  it.  131 
Even  at  the  end  of  1954  and  the  very  beginning  of  1955,  the  British  failed  to  draw 
conclusions  which  became  all  to  obvious  in  retrospect.  In  a  despatch  of  the  22nd 
December,  1954,  Sir  William  Hayter  pointed  out  that  a  change  in  Soviet  industrial 
policy  seemed  once  more  in  the  air.  The  emphasis  upon  the  production  of  consumer 
goods  which  had  played  such  a  prominent  role  in  1953  and  much  of  1954  now  seemed 
to  be  called  into  question, 
I  have  the  honour  to  draw  your  attention  to  certain  signs  of  a  possible  change 
in  the  Soviet  internal  line.  It  looks  as  if  the  Party  may  once  again  be  insisting 
on  the  supreme  importance  of  developing  heavy  industry  for  the  sake  of 
strengthening  Soviet  defences.  132 
He  then  went  onto  comment  that  the  most  important  indication  of  this  change  was  in 
an  article  in  Pravda  of  21st  December,  by  a  V.  S.  Kruzhkov,  a  deputy  head  of  the 
Central  Committee  Department  of  Propaganda.  Hayter  also  pointed  out  that  articles  in 
lzvestiya,  which  was  of  course  significantly  the  State  as  averse  too  Party  organ, 
remained  more  loyal  to  Malenkov's  consumerist  policy.  The  Embassy  was  well  aware 
of  the  possible  political  implications  of  such  divided  Council.  133  However,  by  the  28th 
December,  Hayter  was  "inclined"  towards  the  view  that  the  debate  was  anyway  of 
little  importance  and  certainly  no  precursor  of  a  significant  rupture  within  the 
leadership.  134  Indeed,  the  Supreme  Soviet  meeting  on  the  8th  February,  1955,  at 
which  Malenkov  would  be  forced  to  resign  from  the  Premiership,  was  thought  by  the 
Embassy  to  have  been  called  in  order  further  to  debate  the  relationship  between  heavy 
and  consumer  based  industries  within  the  Soviet  economy. 
The  increase  in  Khrushchev's  public  prominence  through  1954  was  noted,  but 
misinterpreted.  The  Embassy  was  well  aware  that  this  development  was  at  odds  with 
131  For  example,  FO  371  111789  NS  1751/19,  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  19th  November,  1954.  In 
this  despatch  Sir  William  Hayter  examined  the  publication  of  a  Central  Committee  decree  "on 
mistakes  in  the  carrying  out  of  scientific-atheistic  propaganda  among  the  population.  "  It  was 
noteworthy  not  only  because  it  propounded  a  more  moderate  line  on  religion,  but  also  because  it 
was  signed  by  Khrushchev  alone  and  not  by  the  collective  as  a  whole.  Hayter  explained  this  as 
follows, 
I  do  not  suggest  that  this  is  necessarily  an  indication  of  Khrushchev's  personal  ambition.  It 
seems  to  me  rather  to  be  a  sign  of  his  own  interest  in  and  personal  responsibility  for  the  public 
relations  side  of  the  present  regime. 
132  FO  371  111710  NS  1104/2,  Moscow  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Eden,  22nd  December,  1954. 
133  ibid.  Hayter  commented, 
The  difference  between  the  approach  of  Pravda  and  Isvesriya  to  this  question  has  `iven  rise  to 
some  speculation  here;  it  is  even  being  suggested  that  it  reflects  a  divergence  of  views  at  the 
top  level. 
134  FO  371  11710  NS  1104/2_  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  28th  December,  1954. Chapter  ?/  Pa`_t  56 
Malenkov's  supposed  eminence  as  Premier.  Hayter,  in  a  communication  of  5th 
January,  1955,  cleverly  explained  the  conundrum  thus, 
In  normal  countries  it  might  well  be  supposed  that  this  contrast  indicated  some 
kind  of  competition  between  the  two  men.  But  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  not  a  normal 
country;  competitions  for  power  are  not  conducted  in  the  open,  and  if  one 
were  going  on  we  should  paradoxically  hear  much  less  of  it  than  we  hear  of 
Khrushchev's  movements.  Though  a  competition  of  this  kind  cannot  be 
excluded  as  a  future  development,  I  should  be  much  surprised  if  anything  of 
the  kind  were  going  on  now.  135 
The  Embassy  was,  small  wonder,  caught  quite  unawares  when  `falenkov  delivered  his 
resignation  speech  to  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  on  the  8th  February,  1955.  In  a 
telegram  of  the  same  day  Hayter  expressed  his  astonishment,  "the  change  in 
government  has  been  as  much  of  a  surprise  to  all  my  colleagues  as  it  was  to  me.  None 
of  us  could  believe  our  ears  when  we  heard  it  announced".  136  Britain's  Soviet  experts 
had  triumphantly  misread  the  tea  leaves. 
*X* 
The  British  Government  witnessed  considerable  change  in  the  Soviet  Union's  approach 
to  internal  and  external  policy  between  the  5th  March,  1953  and  the  8th  February, 
1955.  The  new  regime  introduced  a  refreshing  concern  for  the  individual  Soviet 
citizen,  both  economically  and  socially.  In  foreign  policy  the  Kremlin  began  to 
proclaim  its  concern  for  the  "under-developed  world"  and  the  importance  of  economic 
competition.  Moreover,  it  seemed  aware  that  the  bristling  hostility  of  Stalin  was  no 
longer  an  advantage  in  the  prosecution  of  their  diplomacy.  Molotov  in  particular  cut  a 
refreshingly  reasonable  dash  at  the  Berlin  and  Geneva  Conferences  of  1954.  This 
made  a  considerable  impression  upon  Eden. 
However,  the  limitations  of  these  developments  were  equally  apparent. 
Malenkov,  in  the  British  view,  was  presiding  over  a  period  of  retrenchment  which  was 
intended  to  purge  the  excesses,  but  not  the  fundamentals,  of  Stalinism.  There  was 
nothing  sufficiently  radical  in  Soviet  domestic  or  foreign  policy  to  cause  very  much  by 
way  of  surprise.  The  years  1953  and  1954  had  the  character  of  a  breathing  space  for 
the  Soviet  Government  and  people.  137  There  was  little  that  fundamentally  challenged 
the  assumptions  about  Soviet  foreign  policy  on  which  Britain's  view  of  the  Cold  War 
135  FO  371  116631  NS  101511,  Moscow  Embassy  Despatch,  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  5th  January,  1955.  Also 
minuting  at  NS  1015/5. 
136  FO  371  116631  NS  1015/11:  Moscow  Telegram  No.  30,  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  8th  February,  1955. 
Further  to  this  Telegram  in  a  letter  to  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  of  the  9th  February,  1955,  Hayter 
likened  the  interpretation  of  Soviet  politic,  to  the  unravelling  of  an  Agatha  Christie  plot.  He  was 
adamant  that  none  of  the  other  Embassies  in  Moscow  had  been  any  better  at  second  ýuessinýý  Soviet 
politics. 
137  Or  interregnum  as  ogee  and  Donaldson  put  it,  Soviet  Foreic',  i  Policy  since  World  Wear  II,  p.  88. Chapter  2/  Page  57 
was  based.  It  was  only  during  1955  that  novelty  in  Soviet  external  relations  began  to 
take  on  proportions  at  once  exhilarating  and  profoundly  disturbing  to  the  British. Chapter  3 
The  Austrian  State  Treaty  and  the  Soviet  Diplomatic  Thaw 
Vienna,  Warsaw  and  Belgrade 
"[I]n  my  opinion  they  [the  Soviets]  are  now  more  likely  to  come  to  an  agreement  with 
us  than  they  have  been  for  many  years  past,  no  doubt  largely  owing  to  the  success  of 
our  recent  policies  and  perhaps  also  because  they  have  at  last,  in  spite  of  their  brave 
words,  begun  to  realise  what  the  hydrogen  bomb  means  to  them"  . 
Sir  William  Hayter. 
It  is  one  of  the  great  ironies  of  Churchill's  later  career  that  he  should  have 
resigned  in  April  1955  just  before  the  realisation  of  his  hopes  for  a  meeting  of  the  great 
powers.  I  Indeed  so  closely  did  Eden's  conversion  to  the  cause  of  summitry  follow  his 
appointment  as  Prime  Minister  that  it  is  tempting  to  see  it  as  a  conviction  born  of 
superficialities.  Seduced  by  the  glamour  of  his  long  coveted  Premiership  and  mindful 
of  the  necessity  of  re-election,  Eden,  in  this  view,  found  it  easy  to  forget  his  opposition 
to  Churchill's  own  abortive  Conference  diplomacy.  -'  However  the  burden  of  the 
following  chapter  is  that  to  accept  this  interpretation  of  events  would  be  to 
underestimate  the  complexity  of  both  Eden  and  the  British  Government's  perceptions 
of  what  was  happening  in  the  Soviet  Union  itself. 
It  is  important  to  understand  that  in  early  March  1955  it  was  the  Americans 
who  provided  Churchill  with  the  last  glimmer  of  hope  that  his  proposals  for  great 
power  talks  might  yet  succeed.  On  the  10th  March  Sir  Roger  Makins  reported  from 
Washington  that  Dulles  had  mooted  that  Eisenhower  should  visit  Germany  in  May 
1955  for  the  forthcoming  ratification  of  the  Paris  Accords  and  the  establishment  of  the 
new  fully  independent  state  of  West  Germany.  '  Dulles  thought  that  this  would  be  an 
ideal  opportunity  to  discuss  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  approach  the  Soviets  over 
Summit  Talks.  4  Churchill's  desperate  expectations  were,  however,  soon  disappointed. 
Indeed  Eden  had  already  communicated  his  reservations  over  Dulles'  suggestion  in  a 
1  See  Never  Despair,  pp.  1117-2 
2  Eisenhower  in  particular  rather  sneeringly  canvasses  this  view  in  his  memoirs,  Mandate  for  Change, 
p.  505, 
On  April  5,1955,  Anthony  Eden  replaced  Mr.  Churchill  as  Prime  Minister.  For  some  reason, 
whether  because  of  the  political  exigencies  of  his  new  position  or  the  turn  of  events  in  the 
world,  Anthony  had  now  reversed  his  former  opposition  to  a  meeting  at  the  Summit.  In  the 
campaign  for  the  general  election  in  May  he  announced  that  he  was  now  in  favour. 
Churchill  in  his  retirement  commented  to  Macmillan.  "How  much  more  attractive  a  top  level 
meeting  seems  when  one  has  reached  the  top.  "  Tides  of  Fortune,  pp.  586-587. 
3  PREM  11/893.  Telegram  No.  539  from  Sir  Rower  Makins,  Washington  to  F.  0.,  10th  March, 
1955.  Eden's  minute  on  the  tele`_ram  for  the  Prime  Minister  of  March  11th  1955.  Eden  ended  with 
the  following,  rather  plaintive  suggestion  regarding  the  response  which  they  should  make  to  Dulles, 
"I  would  also  like  to  mention  that  in  May  there  is  the  possibility  of  our  own  domestic  affairs 
reaching  a  :  ntical  phase  and  that  our  international  activities  may  well  be  hampered  just  then  by 
developments  at  home.  " 
4  ibid..  Eden.  in  his  1  Ith  March  minute  for  Churchill,  did  not  think  much  of  Dulles'  proposal. s 
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telegram  of  %larch  15.5  By  the  end  of  March  the  Americans  had  made  clear  that  they 
did  not  have  a  direct  invitation  to  the  Soviet  leaders  in  mind  at  all;  merely  Western 
discussions  on  a  similar  level  to  those  of  Bermuda  in  195-3.6  There  was  no  indication 
at  this  point  that  a  change  in  Soviet  policy  might  require  a  reconsideration  of  the 
Western  stance  on  talks.  As  far  as  either  the  British  or  Americans  were  concerned 
there  had  been  no  substantial  change  in  Soviet  policy,  Churchill's  hopes  were  fuelled 
by  what  briefly  appeared  to  be  new  thinking  in  the  White  Novse  and  not  the  Kremlin. 
However,  despite  the  apparently  unpromising  position  in  early  1955,  the  British 
analysis  of  Soviet  policy  was  shortly  to  undergo  fundamental  change.  Between  the 
months  of  March  and  June  1955  the  first  indications  of  a  far  reaching  re-thinking  in  the 
Kremlin  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  became  apparent  to  British  observers.  This  shift  is 
clear  from  the  sharp  contrast  in  British  attitudes  between  April  and  June  1955  to  the 
substance  of  Soviet  policy.  At  the  start  of  1955  tentative  Soviet  moves  to  come  to  an 
agreement  over  the  Austrian  State  Treaty  were  interpreted  almost  exclusively  as  one 
more  diplomatic  tactic  in  a  long  standing  engagement.  Equally  the  British  espousal  of 
Conference  diplomacy  in  the  March  of  1955  was  conceived  largely,  at  least  by  Eden 
and  the  Foreign  Office,  as  an  endeavour  unlikely  to  succeed,  but  necessary  in  respect 
of  Western  public  opinion.  It  was  a  policy  which  the  British  recommended  to  the 
Americans  in  March  1955  regardless  of  the  attitude  of  the  Soviet  Union.  By  the  Soviet 
disarmament  proposals  of  the  10th  May,  and  even  more  so  after  Bulganin  and 
Khrushchev's  visit  to  Yugoslavia,  it  was  clear  that  the  Soviets  sincerely  wanted  a 
reduction  in  international  tension  for  its  own  sake.  By  the  July  of  1955  Eden  himself 
was  sufficiently  impressed  by  this  change  in  Soviet  behaviour  to  express  considerable 
hope  for  the  outcome  of  the  meeting  which  had  by  then  been  arranged  at  Geneva.  In 
the  first  half  of  1955  the  British  and  Soviet  Governments  were  moving  towards  a 
summit  meeting  both  simultaneously  and  independently. 
By  June  1955  the  causes  of  Soviet  candour  had  also  become  substantially  clear 
to  British  observers.  In  the  opinion  of  both  the  British  Embassy  in  Moscow  and  the 
Foreign  Office  this  novel  situation  was  largely  the  result  of  the  Kremlin's  growing 
awareness  of  the  hydrogen  bomb's  destructive  capacity.  This  was  an  appreciation 
which  the  July  Summit  in  Geneva  was  to  confirm  emphatically  in  the  minds  of  both  the 
Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Secretary.  These  are  issues  which  will  be  dealt  with  more 
PRE  M1  I1S9  3,  Telegram  No.  1057,  From  F.  O.  to  Makins,  15  March  1955.  The  Telegram 
contained  a  polite  rebuff  to  Dulles  which  lvtakins  was  asked  to  pass  on.  In  his  l1th  May  minute  to 
Churchill  Eden  had  at  least  emphasised  that  the  Americans  should  not  be  discouraged  from  an 
attitude  which  was  more  favourable  to  the  Soviets  by  harsh  words  about  the  inappropriateness  of 
specific  proposals. 
6  See  Never  Despair,  pp.  1102-16.  In  a  further  note  sent  via  the  U.  S.  Ambassador  in  London,  PREM 
I1  %S9  3,  March  17  1955,  Dulles  emphasised  that  it  was  not  envisaged  that  the  Soviets  should  be 
invited  to  take  part  in  talks  during  Eisenhower's  visit  to  Europe,  nor  indeed  that  an  invitation  to 
talks  at  a  later  date  would  arise  out  of  Western  conversations.  The  Americans  merely  wanted  to  talk 
things  over  with  their  Western  allies.  On  Churchill's  final  attempt  to  cling  on  to  power  see  also 
.  ,  4,  rrnoniv  Eden,  pp.  400-03 Chapter  3/  Page  60 
fully  in  the  following  two  chapters.  However,  this  chapter  will  make  clear  that  the  six 
months  leading  up  to  the  Geneva  Conference  were  an  important  period  of  flux  in 
Anglo-Soviet  relations.  For  the  first  time  since  the  early  post-war  period  the  British 
found  themselves  reacting  to  what  they  saw  as  radically  new  Soviet  policies.?  This 
was  the  beginning  of  a  process  which  by  the  end  of  1955  was  to  leave  the  British 
Government  pondering  its  strategy  in  a  novel  kind  of  cold  war. 
It  should  be  stressed  that  Eden's  proposals  for  top  level  meetings  with  the 
Soviets  preceded  the  resignation  of  Churchill.  Indeed  they  grew  quite  reasonably  out 
of  the  diplomacy  which  he  had  undertaken  in  Europe  from  1952  in  order  to  pave  the 
way  for  the  rearmament  of  Germany.  8  Britain's  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Cold  War  in  early  1955  continued  that  of  the  previous  three  years.  The  premise  of 
Eden's  opposition  to  Churchill's  approach  to  the  Soviets  was  that  such  an  attempt 
should  only  be  made  when  the  west  was  united  and  fully  re-armed.  Talks  had  to  come 
after  West  German  had  been  allowed  to  play  its  crucial  role  in  strengthening  western 
defences  and  not  before;  Eden's  "conversion"  to  conference  diplomacy  was  a  matter 
of  logic,  rather  than  a  leap  of  faith.  9  Ironically  it  was  to  one  of  the  last  cabinets  of 
Churchill's  government  that  Eden  outlined  the  reasons  why  it  now  seemed  wise  to 
make  attempt  to  start  talks  with  the  Soviets.  In  a  Minute  of  the  26th  March,  1955  he 
began  by  making  reference  to  previous  Foreign  Office  studies  of  Soviet  policy,  carried 
out  in  1952,  which  had  concluded  that  the  West  should  talk  to  the  Soviets  only  once  a 
position  of  equilibrium  between  east  and  west  had  been  achieved, 
We  are  this  year  as  close  to  "terms  of  equality"  with  the  Soviet  leaders  as  we 
are  likely  to  be  in  the  foreseeable  future.  It  seems  unlikely  that  with  the 
passage  of  time  our  relative  position  will  improve.  On  the  contrary,  once 
"saturation"  in  thermo-nuclear  weapons  is  reached,  our  relative  military 
strength  declines  even  though  we  may  improve  our  position  in  conventional 
weapons.  The  ratification  of  the  Paris  Agreements  may  represent  a  high  point 
of  Western.  political  cohesion  [my  italics].  10 
It  is  important  to  understand  that  this  meeting  was  considered  desirable  by  the 
Foreign  Office  because  of  the  political  advantage  which  might  be  accrued  thereby 
FO  371  118025  RY  10338/4,  Telegram  No.  89,  from  Sir  Frank  Roberts,  BelLrade  to  F.  0.,  22nd 
February,  1955.  Roberts  -,  ave  the  \lalenkov  regime  the  following  epitaph,  "what  concessions  did 
the  Soviet  regime  in  fact  offer  to  the  West  during  Mlalenkov's  period  apart  from  smoother  talk  about 
co-existence  and  minor  gestures  of  no  political  significance". 
See  Full  Circle,  pp.  2S8-_'S9,  where  Eden  paraphrases  his  Cabinet  submission. 
9  See  John  W.  Young,  "Cold  War  and  Detente  with  Moscow",  in  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Churchill's 
Peacetime  Administration. 
10  CAB  12y,  Vol.  74.  Ck5  ),  20th  \larch,  1955,  "Talks  with  the  Soviets",  note  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The  substance  of  this  Cabinet  Minute  was  passed  on  to  the  americans  via 
`lakins  in  Washington  on  the  same  day;  PRE%l  11/893.  Telegram  No.  1246,26th  March,  1955.  It 
as  evidently  regarded  h%,  Eden  as  a  statement  of  intent  to  the  other  Western  Powers.  In  a  covering 
note  of  telegram  no.  1247,  Eden  made  clear  that  the  information  was  also  to  be  sent  to  the  French 
and  the  Germans.  The  latter  he  thought  should  now  he  consulted  as  an  independent  entity. Chapter  3/  Pa,  jz:  61 
rather  than  because  of  any  reasonable  hope  of  coming  to  agreement  with  the  Soviets. 
Eden  continued  to  explain  under  the  subtitle,  "The  Dangers  of  Our  Present  Position", 
Apart  from  the  probability  that  our  relative  military  strength  will  not  increase, 
we  may  have  to  reckon  with  a  further  expansion  of  Communism  in  the  Far 
East.  Nor  can  we  regard  as  anything  but  dangerous  the  present  situation  in 
Europe,  particularly  in  Germany.  Although  the  division  of  Germany,  to 
which  all  the  powers  have  now  grown  accustomed,  is  not  without  its 
advantages  to  all  of  us,  even  to  Soviet  Russia,  the  Russians  hold  as  hostage 
the  town  of  Berlin,  where  a  conflagration  may  flare  up  at  any  moment. 
Furthermore,  they  have  German  unity  in  their  gift  at  any  time,  and,  if  they 
wished,  could  offer  it  to  the  Germans  on  tempting  terms  to-morrow.  Unless 
we  make  a  serious  effort  to  re-unify  Germany,  which  the  Germans  will  regard 
as  serious,  they  will  be  restive,  and  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  resist  Russian 
blandishments.  So  long  as  Germany  is  divided  the  attachment  of  Western 
Germany  to  the  Western  Group  will  be  precarious. 
Eden  concluded  by  reminding  the  Cabinet  of  the  imperative  of  Western  rhetoric, 
The  Western  Powers  have  all  repeatedly  declared  their  desire  to  talk  to  Soviet 
Russia  once  the  Paris  Agreements  are  ratified.  It  follows  from  the  foregoing 
arguments  that  we  should  at  talks  seriously  intended  to  bring  results  even  of  a 
limited  character  rather  than  talks  which  would  be  no  more  then  a  propaganda 
exercise.  Nevertheless,  serious  talks  ought  to  be  so  in  that,  if  they  break 
down,  Soviet  Russia  may  be  shown  to  be  at  fault. 
The  crucial  point  here  is  that  negotiations  were  important  to  Eden  in  respect  of  both 
public  opinion  and,  in  the  case  of  West  Germany,  the  opinion  of  politicians.  He  did 
not  view  conference  diplomacy  with  Churchill's  perfervid  hope  of  success.  Eden  was 
not  so  much  concerned  that  the  West  should  talk  to  the  Soviets  but  that  she  should  be 
seen  to  be  so  doing.  Whereas  it  would  seem  over  cynical  to  suggest  that  Eden  was  not 
prepared  to  make  considerable  effort  to  come  to  a  compromise  with  the  Soviets  over 
Germany;  his  attitude  was  that  of  a  pragmatic  diplomat.  There  is  nothing  of 
Churchill's  confidence  in  a  leap  of  understanding  between  protagonists  developed 
through  personal  contact.  Indeed  talks  in  Eden's  appreciation  of  the  situation  were 
little  more  than  part  of  an  on-going  diplomatic  engagement. 
The  need  to  keep  Western  public  opinion  content  and  the  western  powers  united 
in  the  aftermath  of  the  Paris  agreements  was  further  emphasised  by  Eden  in  a  telegram 
to  Washington  of  the  28th  `-larch  1955.  Bulganin  had  on  the  same  day  issued  a  public 
statement  favourable  towards  great  Power  Talks.  11  Eden  asserted, 
11  Reportes!  on  for  London  by  the  British  Embassy  in  Moscow  on  the  same  day.  PREM  11193, 
Telegram  No.  300,  from  Hater  to  F.  0.;  28th  March,  1955.  Hayter  also  continued  to  interpret 
Soviet  foreign  policy  in  terms  of  the  usual  diplomatic  rough  and  tumble, 
Timing  of  Bulganin':  statement  on  the  Great  Power  talks  suggests  anxiety  to  cover  up,  with  a 
new  Soviet  initiative.  the  Soviet  diplomatic  defeat  involved  in  French  ratification  of  the  Paris 
. 
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Now  that  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Paris  Agreements  seems  assured,  we 
cannot  afford  to  give  any  appearance  of  dragging  our  feet  in  seeking  talks 
with  Russia.  Moreover,  it  may  be  that  the  Soviet  Government  are  aiming  to 
inveigle  us  into  talks  on  Austria  with  a  view  to  then  refusing  to  talk  about 
Germany.  It  is  urgent  to  established  an  agreed  position  on  these  questions.  l' 
There  are  those  who  explain  Eden's  Soviet  diplomacy  in  the  first  part  of  1955 
almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  domestic  politics.  13  There  are  two  points  in  particular 
raised  by  the  above  discussion  which  this  monocausal  analysis  overlooks.  Firstly, 
Eden  was  concerned  with  Western  public  opinion  as  a  whole,  as  much  as  British. 
Secondly,  the  policy  which  Eden  was  developing  was  no  spur  of  the  moment 
electioneering  convenience.  Although  Summit  diplomacy  may  have  had  very 
important  implications  for  the  way  the  May  1955  election  was  to  be  fought,  not  least 
providing  the  Conservatives  with  their  pithy  campaign  slogan  "working  for  peace", 
Eden's  attitude  was  clearly  informed  by  the  long  term  sweep  of  his  diplomacy. 
However,  in  the  more  limited  terms  of  the  British  perception  of  Soviet  policy, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Eden  was  in  the  beginning  of  1955  carrying  on  with  the  cold  war 
as  normal.  As  far  as  the  British  could  see  there  was  no  indication  from  the  Soviet  side 
that  there  had  been  any  change  at  all.  Eden's  diplomacy,  as  much  as  Soviet,  was 
formulated  in  early  1955  with  a  keen  regard  for  cold  war  point  scoring.  His  eagerness 
to  press  for  a  Western  proposal  for  Summit  talks  with  the  Soviets  were  justified  to  the 
Cabinet  in  terms  of  diplomatic  advantage.  In  his  reasoning  he  did  not  betray  any 
serious  hope  that  the  Soviets  might  by  that  point  have  been  sincere  in  their  desire  to 
reduce  international  tensions.  There  was  no  insistence,  as  with  the  Americans,  on 
Soviet  achievement  of  certain  conditions,  or  "hurdles"  before  negotiation  could  begin. 
In  contrast  to  the  British  the  Americans  were  very  sceptical  as  to  the  value  of  Summit 
diplomacy.  14  Yet  where  the  British  differed  with  the  Americans  was  not  whether 
talking  itself  would  lead  to  any  kind  of  settlement  between  East  and  West,  but  rather 
over  the  publicity  value  of  talks  themselves. 
12  PREM  11/893,  Telegram  No.  1294.  To  British  Embassy  Washington  from  Foreign  Secretary, 
`larch  28th  1955. 
13  The  Failure  of  the  Eden  Government,  p.  10.  Lamb  even  goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  Americans 
colluded  in  the  electoral  interests  of  the  Conservative  Party  by  a`treein`T  to  Summit  Talks  in  time  to 
take  the  wind  out  of  Labour  accusations  that  the  Conservatives  were  stalling  them.  That  this  issue 
played  a  very  important  part  in  the  election  campaign  and  was  a  consideration  in  Conservative 
foreign  policy  up  to  the  election  there  can  be  no  doubt.  However  it  seems  a  little  simplistic,  not  to 
say  unfairly  cynical,  to  su`--,  est  that  getting  elected  was  Eden's  only  reason  for  supporting  talks  with 
the  Soviets. 
14  See  Mandate  for  Change,  pp.  505-06  and  also  Eisenhower,  The  President,  pp.  248-49.  Eisenhower 
emphasises  that  there  were  two  developments  at  work  in  the  lead  up  to  the  Geneva  Summit; 
changing  views  on  the  Western  side  and  concrete  action  on  the  Soviet  over  the  Austrian  State 
Treaty,  It  is  to  the  latter  that  he  gives  the  most  importance  on  p.  506, 
Because  of  the  Soviet's  action  (the  Austrian  State  Treaty],  and  not  wishing,  to  appear 
senselessly  stubborn  in  my  ,  attitude  towards  a  Summit  meeting  -  so  hopefully  desired  by  so 
many  -I  instructed  Dulles  to  let  it  be  known  through  Diplomatic  channels,  that  if  the  powers 
were  genuinely  interested  in  such  a  meeting  we  were  ready  to  listen  to  their  reasonin_. Chapc.  r  3/  Pace  63 
Eden  made  clear  this  divergence  in  British  and  American  view  points  in  his 
annotations  on  a  telegram  from  Sir  Gladw`  n  Jebb,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris,  of 
8th  April.  15  Jebb  reported  French  fears  that  the  Americans  had  merely  used  the 
promise  of  considering  an  approach  to  the  Soviets  after  the  rearmament  of  Germany  as 
a  carrot  which  now  the  French  Assembly  had  ratified  the  Paris  Agreements  would  be 
withdrawn.  Jebb  commented, 
When  I  was  in  London  recently  the  Prime  Minister  impressed  upon  me  the 
strong  desirability  from  the  point  of  view  of  public  opinion  of  our  organizing 
preparatory  four  power  talks  with  the  maximum  speed  ["Yes  I  did,  A.  E.  " 
scribbled  in  the  margin].  I  must  say  I  have  not  detected  any  note  of  urgency, 
still  less  enthusiasm,  in  Mr.  Dulles  communications  on  this  subject  to  Mr 
Dillon  [the  United  States  Ambassador  in  Paris].  Is  it  not  possible.  therefore, 
that  on  this  particular  point  our  position  is  rather  nearer  the  French  than  the 
American  ["Yes,  A.  E.  "]. 
This  outlook  on  Anglo-Soviet  relations  is  further  illustrated  by  the  British 
Government's  react  ion  to  what  in  retrospect  was  the  first  concrete  sign  that  Soviet 
foreign  policy  was  undergoing  a  process  of  very  radical  change.  In  early  1955  the 
Soviets  gave  notice  that  for  the  First  time  since  the  war  they  were  prepared  to  give 
serious  attention  to  ending  the  occupation  of  Austria  by  t  he  victorious  powers.  t6  By 
March  the  Soviets  had  gone  so  far  as  to  invite  the  Austrians  to  Moscow  for 
consultations  on  a  Treaty. 
A  brief  on  Soviet  policy  towards  Austria,  signed  by  Sir  Geoffrey  Harrison  of 
the  Southern  Department,  was  prepared  for  Eden  on  the  '25th  March.  17  Harrison  made 
clear  that  a  change  in  the  Soviet  attitude  had  been  apparent  from  Molotov's  8th 
February  speech  to  the  Supreme  Soviet.  However  this  new  Soviet  line  was  considered 
to  be  little  more  than  an  attempt  to  manoeuvre  the  western  powers  into  an  unflattering 
position  by  landing  them  with  the  blame  for  failing  to  agree  to  an  Austrian 
settlement.  18  Harrison  commented, 
15  PREM  11/893,  Telegram  No.  138,  Secret,  from  Sir  Gladwyn  Jehb,  Paris  to  F.  0.,  8th  April  1955. 
16  See  Sven  Allard,  Russia  and  the  Austrian  Stare  Treaty,  A  Case  Study  of  Soviet  Policy  in  Europe  for 
a  detailed  study  of  Soviet  policy  over  Austria  in  1955.  Allard  was  the  Swedish  Ambassador  in 
Vienna  during=  the  negotiations. 
17  FO  371  117787  RR  1071172,  Minute  by  Sir  Geoffrey  Harrison  for  The  Secretary  of  State,  25th 
March  1955. 
18  ibid.,  Harrison  gave  the  following  rational  for  the  Soviet  moves  which  were  clearly  considered  to  be 
little  more  than  political  manoeuvring, 
It  is  arguable  that  the  Russians  are  no  more  ready  now  than  in  the  past  to  conclude  a  Treaty, 
that  they  are  merely 
}ýiaýºn 
up  the  question  of  `_uarantees  against  an  Anschluss  as  a  successor 
to  the  Trieste  and  other  issues  on  which  they  have  so  long  held  up  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
[Allied  Military  Government  of  Trieste  had  come  to  an  end  on  the  26th  October,  1954,  see 
Full  Circle.  pp.  175-188.  Harrison  continued  to  explain  that  the  Soviets  considered  a  German 
Treaty  prerequisite  to  an  Austrian]  Such  a  Treaty  [the  German]  is,  however,  being  rendered 
impossible  by  the  Western  decision  to  re-arm  Germany,  which  will  itself  threaten  Austrian 
independence.  They  [the  Soviets]  rrught  thus  hope  to  establish  that  it  is  the  Western  decision  to 
re-arm  Germany  and  not  Soviet  intransigence  that  is  holding  up  the  Treaty,  leaving  the  onus  on Chapter  ,/  Page  64 
It  is  tempting  to  refuse  to  chase  yet  another  Russian  hare.  In  the  past  year,  we 
have  accepted  the  disadvantageous  disagreed  Articles  of  the  Draft  Treaty  and 
the  Austrians  have  agreed  to  military  neutralisation,  yet  we  are  no  nearer  a 
Treaty.  Now  we  are  being  asked  to  guarantee  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  Austria.  Even  if  we  do  so,  we  have  no  certainty  that  a  new  hare  won't  be 
started. 
Dr.  Schwarzenberg,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  to  London,  had  called  on  the  25th 
March,  1955  to  consult  with  Harrison  regarding  the  British  attitude  towards  the  latest 
Soviet  moves  and  what  the  Austrian  reaction  ought  to  be.  After  expressing  the  deep 
suspicion  that  the  Foreign  Office  had  for  Molotov's  motives,  Harrison  went  on  to  say 
that  it  was,  afterall,  a  matter  on  which  the  Austrians  would  have  to  d  ecide  for 
themselves.  This  does  not  seem  to  have  satisfied  Eden,  who  in  his  wanton  manner 
scribbled  at  the  end  of  the  minute  in  red  ink  the  following  rather  condescending  note, 
I  am  sorry  that  the  Austrians  were  not  warned  more  firmly  against  Russia's 
wiles.  I  hope  we  shall  not  wake  up  some  morning  soon  and  find  Raab  [the 
Austrian  Chancellor]  in  Moscow.  A.  E.  March  26th. 
Quite  clearly  the  British  Government,  and  in  particular  Eden,  did  not  in  March  see 
Soviet  moves  over  Austria  as  indicative  of  any  fundamental  change  in  Soviet  foreign 
policy.  Rather,  Soviet  blandishments  towards  the  Austrians  were  explained  in  the 
limited  context  of  cold  war  one-up-manship. 
Even  those  observers  who  tended  to  take  the  Soviet  move  as  a  more  serious 
one,  went  on  to  explain  it  in  terms  of  the  tactical  advantage  which  the  Kremlin  hoped 
to  accrue  thereby.  On  the  22nd  March  the  British  Ambassador  in  Vienna  Sir  Godfrey 
Wallinger  had  already  reported  to  London  on  more  or  less  these  lines.  19  He 
emphasised  in  particular  the  Soviet  desire  to  ensure  that  Western  Austria  was  not 
drawn,  as  Western  Germany  was  about  to  be,  into  NATO.  Yet  on  one  further  point 
Wallinger  pointed  to  a  development  which  was  to  become  ever  more  emphasised  in 
British  reporting  on  the  Soviet  Union  as  1955  wore  on.  He  suggested  that  there  might 
be  a  similarity  between  the  Soviet  line  over  Yugoslavia  and  that  over  Austria, 
the  West  to  think  up  "effective"  guarantees  against  the  allegedly  increased  danger  of  an 
Anschluss  resultin_  from  the  re-armament  of  Germans'. 
19  FO  371  117757  RR  1071/83.  Confidential,  From  Sir  Godfrey  `Vallinger,  Vienna  to  Sir  Geoffrey 
Harrison,  London:  March  22nd  1955.  Walliný_er  commented, 
My  first  thought  is  that  I  find  myself  in  a  measure  of  agreement  with  the  Austrians  in  thinking 
that  there  has  been  some  shift  in  the  Soviet  position,  due  possibly  to  the  realism  of  the  Soviet 
leaders  in  accepting  situations  of  fact  and  specifically  to  their  acceptance  of  the  inevitability  of 
the  ratification  of  the  Pans  Treaties.  It  would  therefore  seem  logical  that  it  should  now 
become  a  Soviet  objective  to  ensure,  if  that  is  it  ill  possible.  that  Austria  itself  should  never  be 
incorporated  in  the  Western  European  Union. Ch--r  r3/  Paz-  65 
It  looks  from  here  as  if  the  development  of  Yugoslav  "neutralism"  has  not 
been  unpleasing  to  Moscow  and  that  Austrian  "neutralism"  might  at  some  time 
become  acceptable. 
However,  Eden's  concern  that  the  Austrians  should  not  be  taken  in  by  Soviet 
blandishments  was  further  emphasised  to  the  Austrian  Chancellor  by  Wallinger  in 
Vienna  on  April  5th  1955.20  Although  the  Austrians  accepted  British  rese-ovations  they 
felt,  not  surprisingly,  that  they  were  best  placed  to  decide  were  , -\ustria's  interest  lay. 
Raab  seemed  set  on  taking  up  Moscow's  offer  regardless  of  Eden's  conce--;.  As  to  any 
further  indication  of  what  Soviet  motives  might  be  \Vallinger  was  still  unsure.  '  1  Even 
supposing  that  their  interest  were  sincere  Wallinger  thought,  as  he  had  on  March  22nd, 
that  their  interest  most  probably  lay  in  establishing  an  independent  and  neutral  Austria 
compatible  with  Soviet  security  interests. 
The  British  continued  to  be  highly  suspicious  of  Soviet  motives  even  as  the 
Austrian  delegation  enjoyed  conspicuous  success  during  their  visit  to  Moscow  between 
the  11th  and  the  15th  April  1955.  It  quickly  became  evident  to  Sir  William  Hayter,  as 
the  Austrian  delegation  indicated  the  progress  which  the  talks  were  making  over  detail, 
that  for  the  first  time  the  Soviets  themselves  wanted  to  come  to  an  agreement.  "  By  the 
15th  April  and  the  Austrians'  departure,  all  the  Western  missions  in  Moscow, 
according  to  Hayter,  concurred  that  the  Soviets  had  set  their  hearts  on  an  unoccupied 
and  neutralised  Austria  following  the  Swiss  model.  23  However,  in  a  despatch  sent  to 
London  on  the  15th  April,  Hayter  drew  the  following  conclusions  about  the  motives 
behind  these  apparently  good  intentions, 
I  have  no  doubt  that  the  main  Soviet  motive  is  their  desire  to  prevent  the 
absorption  of  Austria,  or  at  least  of  Western  Austria,  into  the  western  defence 
system.  Subsidiary  Soviet  motives  are  probably  the  elimination  of  a  question 
in  which  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  a  bad  international  posture  and  which  has  now 
ceased  to  serve  any  vital  Soviet  interest.  the  desire  to  present  Germany  with  a 
useful  pattern  to  follow,  and  conceivably  the  wish  to  demonstrate  Soviet 
?0  FO  371  117789  RR  1071/130,  Despatch  from  British  Embassy,  Vienna  to  London,  6th  April,  1955; 
Sir  G.  Wallinder  to  Sir  G.  Harrison. 
21  ibid.,  Wallinder  thought, 
As  is  always  the  case  with  a  Russian  initiative  -  and  I  think  we  may  take  it  that  Molotov's 
words  on  Austria  in  his  speech  of  February  8  was  an  initiative  -  the  first  problem  with  which 
one  is  faced  is  the  attempt  to  analyse  from  the  very  caLev  words  used  what  may  be  the  Russian 
intention.  In  the  present  instance,  it  seems  to  me  that  only  one  point,  and  that  a  very 
subsidiary  one.  is  reasonably  clear.  The  Soviet  Government  intend,  if  they  possibly  can,  to 
divest  themselves  of  the  onus  tor  the  delay  on  the  Austrian  Treaty  which  was  firmly  laid  on 
their  shoulders  at  Berlin. 
FO  371  11  S'  RR  1071/128.  Telegram  No.  352,  From  Hav'ter,  Moscow  to  F.  0.,  13th  April. 
1955.  The  Soviets  ',  \,  ere  prepared  to  compromise  to  an  extent  over  the  quantity  of  oil  that  Austria 
was  to  he  obliged  to  continue  supplyin  ,  them  and  payment  by  Austria  for  : its  of  the  Danube 
Navtcation  Contranvv. 
-3  FO  371  11  :  ';  89  RR  107  1/1_8.  Despatch  from  Havter,  `1o  cow  to  F.  0..  15th  April.  1955. Chaptzr  3/  Pa_e  66 
willingness  to  settle  outstanding  questions  as  a  preliminary  to  wider  great 
power  negotiations.  '-4 
Eden  added  his  own  comment:  underlining  the  phrase,  "the  Soviet  Union  is  in  a  bad 
international  posture",  he  asserted  that,  "This  seems  good  advice.  "25 
Only  at  the  very  end  of  Hayter's  list  of  "subsidiary"  motives  is  it  admitted  that 
the  Soviets  might  "conceivably"  be  clearing  the  ground  for  an  attempt  to  get 
international  negotiations  of  the  ground.  Clearly  at  this  point  the  British  were  not 
interpreting  Soviet  foreign  policy  in  any  substantially  new  light.  Once  more,  as  in 
Eden's  policy  presentation  to  the  Cabinet  of  26th  March.  1955,  the  emphasis  was 
firmly  on  playing  for  the  advantage.  Yet  despite  these  reservations  as  to  the  Kremlin's 
intentions  no  one  on  the  British  side  thought  that  they  ought  not  to  ride  along  with 
Soviet  good  will,  so  far  as  it  went. 
However,  from  this  point  onwards  it  became  increasingly  apparent  that 
something  altogether  more  profound  was  happening.  The  Soviet  moves  over  Austria 
presaged  a  flood  of  concrete  gestures  towards  improving  the  international  atmosphere, 
which  by  June  1955  left  Eden  quite  hopeful  that  a  Summit  meeting  stood  a  chance  of 
leading  to  serious  results. 
On  the  19th  April  1955  the  Soviet  Government  issued  a  formal  note  proposing 
that  a  Four  Power  Ministerial  Conference  should  be  held  to  discuss  the  issue  of 
Austria.  In  a  Foreign  Office  brief  of  April  20th,  Sir  Geoffrey  Harrison  considered  that 
given  the  hopes  this  initiative  had  kindled  at  a  popular  level  in  Austria  the  West  would 
have  little  option  but  to  react  positively  to  the  Soviet  suggestion.  1-6  This  was  despite 
his  expressed  concern  that  the  Soviets  move  was  intended, 
[T]o  impede  the  re-armament  of  Western  Germany...  by  raising  in  Western 
Germany  the  hope  that  Germany  could  be  re-united  if  a  settlement  on  the 
Austrian  lines  were  accepted.  27 
Harrison  did  not  think  that  the  West  should  be  diplomatically  wrong  footed  by  the 
Soviets  and  cast  in  the  role  of  the  obdurate  one.  He  suggested  that  a  Western  reply 
agreed  to  by  Britain,  France  and  America  should  welcome  the  Soviet  note,  but  he 
thought  that  although  the  Foreign  Ministers  should  meet  to  sign  a  Treaty  in  the  event 
of  success,  the  "preparatory"  work  should  be  done  by  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Four 
Powers  resident  in  Vienna.  Talks  might  be  started  for  that  purpose  from  around  the 
2nd  May. 
This  was  very  much  the  approach  which  Macmillan,  now  Foreign  Secretary, 
put  to  the  Cabinet  in  a  Memorandum  of  the  26th  April  1955.  By  this  time  preparatory 
meetings  between  the  three  western  powers  to  discuss  the  form  of  a  response  to  the 
24  ibiJ. 
25  FO  ',  71  l1  :S  RR  1071/12S,  Prime  Minister  :  Minute,  P.  De  Zeluta,  16th  April  1955. 
26  FO  3-1  11  791  RR  071/191,  F.  O.  Minute  by  Sir  G.  Harrison.  April  20th,  1955. 
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Soviet  proposal  had  already  been  agreed.  '-'  Macmillan's  emphasis  was  once  more 
upon  the  shadow  Austrian  neutralisation  might  throw  over  West  German  politics.  29 
However,  in  terms  of  fundamental  principles  the  British  could  have  no  real  objection  to 
the  neutralisation  of  Austria.  30  Macmillan  commented, 
It  must  obviously  be  our  aim  to  retain  for  Austria  the  maximum  possible 
freedom  to  determine  her  own  policy  in  the  political  and  economic  fields. 
provided  this  purpose  can,  within  reasonable  limits,  be  achieved,  I  do  not  see 
any  serious  objection  to  recognising  Austrian  neutrality.  3 
In  a  meeting  on  the  27th  April,  the  Cabinet,  in  the  anodyne  words  of  the  minute 
takers,  "approved  generally  "  the  proposals  which  had  been  put  forward.  " 
THE  AUSTRIAN  STATE  TREATY 
So  it  was  on  the  2nd  May  1955  that  the  Ambassadors  of  the  four  occupying  powers 
met  in  Vienna  to  begin  detailed  negotiations.  33  It  was  from  this  point  onwards  that  the 
British  began  to  comment  on  the  very  marked  change  in  the  Soviet  attitude  in  terms 
which  went  substantially  beyond  realpolitik.  Before  the  talks  began  Sir  Geoffrey 
Harrison,  in  a  minute  of  the  30th  April,  saw  two  articles  of  the  Soviet  draft  of  the 
28  CAB  129,  Vol.  75,  CP(55)12,  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  26th 
April,  1955.  On  the  15th  April,  1955,  Harold  Caccia  had  been  informed  by  the  United  States 
Minister  at  the  Embassy  in  London  that  on  all  important  points  American  thinking  on  Austrian 
"neutralisation"  was  very  much  the  same  as  the  British.  Given  the  Soviet  lead  it  would  be 
impossible  not  to  jTo  along  with  negotiations;  FO  371  117789  RR  1071/129,  Telegram  No.  1705, 
from  Caccia,  F.  0.,  to  Makins  Washington,  15th  April,  1955. 
29  ibid.,  the  memorandum  made  the  following  estimation  of  Soviet  motives,  essentially  a  rejinking  of 
Hayter's  original, 
Soviet  motives  are  no  doubt  mixed.  they  may  have  been  embarrassed  by  the  bad  international 
posture  in  which  they  found  themselves  on  the  Austrian  question;  they  may  wish  to 
demonstrate  their  willingness  to  settle  this  outstanding  question  as  a  preliminary  to  wider  great 
power  negotiations;  they  may  feel  that,  by  the  further  condition  regarding  neutrality  which 
they  have  imposed  on  the  Austrian  Ministers,  they  will  have  been  successful  in  preventing  the 
absorption  of  Austria  into  the  Western  defence  system.  But  I  have  little  doubt  that  their  main 
purpose  is  to  unsettle  opinion  in  Western  Germany  by  holding"  out  the  prospect  of  the  re- 
unification  of  Germany  on  condition  of  neutralisation. 
30  R.  A.  Hibbert  of  the  Northern  Department  in  a  minute  at  FO  371  117787  RR  1071/78,  of  the  8th 
April  1955  made  the  point,  with  which  the  Southern  Department  did  not  alto`_  ether  area,  that  it  was 
the  Soviet  Union  that  had  most  to  lose  by  the  neutralisation  of  Austria.  They  controlled  the 
industrially  most  advanced  parts  of  the  country  and  such  communications  routes  which  might  be 
valuable  to  NATO  through  the  western  zones  could  easily  he  secured  in  time  of  war. 
31  CAB  129,  Vol.  '5,  CP(55)12,  Macmillan  continued  to  point  out  that  an  international  guarantee  of 
the  territorial  integrity  of  Austria  was  in  the  interest  of  Britian  as  much  as  the  Soviet  Union.  On  the 
rd  March  Geoffrey  Harrison  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  "probably"  illogical  to  think  of 
any  other  solution  to  the  Austrian  problem  than  complete  neutralization,  FO  '37  1  117787  RR 
1071/72;  F.  O.  Minute  by  qtr  G.  Harrison,  23rd  March.  1955. 
32  CAB  l'ý.  Vol.  '19,  CM1(55)  'th  Conclusions,  Minute  3,27th  April,  1955. 
31  There  is  a  substantial  American  record  of  these  discussions  at  FRUS  1955-195  7,  Vol.  V,  pp.  66- 
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Treaty  in  particular  which  the  British  should  make  a  serious  attempt  to  excise.  34  These 
were  numbers  16  and  35,  on  "Displaced  Persons"  and  "German  Assets  in  Austria" 
respectively.  They  were  felt  to  provide  possible  avenues  for  future  Soviet  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  a  united  Austria.  35  However.  Harrison  thought  that  the  Soviets  would 
probably  use  the  fund  of  international  goodwill  which  they  had  built  up  thus  far  over 
Austria  to  push  through  their  version  of  the  treaty  intact.  Wallinger  was  instructed  to 
make  his  stand  against  them  even  though  it  might  open  up  the  British  to  Soviet 
accusations  of  obduracy.  36  Harrison  did  not  hold  out  any  great  hope  for  the 
Ambassadorial  talks  coming  to  a  resolution  of  these  issues. 
However  it  was  not  long  before  Sir  Geoffrey  Wallinger  was  able  to  inform 
London  that  the  Soviets  were  being  quite  remarkably  obliging.  In  a  telegram  of  the 
4th  May,  1955  Wallinger  reported, 
Sudden  Soviet  concessions  on  Article  16  took  the  whole  conference  by 
surprise  and  confounded  our  prediction  that  on  no  major  issue  would  progress 
be  achieved  before  the  meeting  of  Ministers.  It  is,  of  course,  a  measure  of 
the  Soviet  eagerness  to  get  the  Austrian  Treaty  out  of  the  way  and  my  Soviet 
colleague  is  piling  on  pressure  for  speed.  37 
The  Soviets  were  less  eager  to  move  over  article  35.38  Even  so  by  the  6th  May,  1955 
sufficient  progress  had  been  made  for  the  Ambassadors  seriously  to  consider  a  date 
which  might  be  convenient  for  all  the  Foreign  Secretaries  to  sign  the  Treaty.  39 
34  FO  371  117793  RR  1071/255,  F.  O.  Minute  by  Sir  G.  Harrison,  30th  April,  1955.  Harrison's 
minute  was  approved  by  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick.  Article  16  would  have  prohibited  the  Austrian 
Government  from  helping  any  persons  who  had  fought  against  the  "Allied  and  Associated  powers". 
Article  35  concerned  Soviet  economic  rights  within  Austria.  Here  the  problem  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  Soviets  had  already  unilaterally  agreed  with  the  Austrian  Government  that  a  fixed  amount  of 
compensation  should  be  paid  in  their  stead,  the  Soviet  draft  of  the  Treaty  did  not  take  this  change 
into  account,  thus  creating  an  anomaly.  It  perhaps  says  more  about  Western  suspicion  of  Soviet 
motives  than  Soviet  cunning,  that  such  a  comparatively  minor  quibble  should  have  caused  so  much 
difficulty. 
35  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  V,  p.  43,  Telegram  Delegation  at  Vienna  Ambassadors  Conference  to 
Department  of  State,  3rd  May,  1955.  The  Americans  were  equally  concerned  about  this  issue, 
summing  up  their  discomfort  as  follows,  "[U]nder  present  [article]  35  Soviets  retained  30  years  right 
intervention...  if  Soviets  felt  violation  had  occurred  they  might  reoccupy  oil  fields  and  leave  the 
West  no  legal  basis  to  object". 
36  FO  371  117793  RR  1071/260.  The  Austrians  were  prepared  to  accept  the  confusion  over  article  35 
in  order  to  secure  an  agreement.  On  the  2nd  May,  1955  Wallin`  _er  reported  from  Vienna  in 
telegram  no.  150  on  a  joint  western  "demarchý"  with  the  Austrians  over  the  issue, 
It  was  pointed  out  to  these  [Austrian]  officials  that  even  it  the  text  of  Art.  35  was  signed  in  the 
present  form  (which  God  forbid)  there  was  still  ratification  to  come,  and  that  our  parliaments 
would  become  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  Austrians  would  have  sacrificed  not  only  their  friends 
but  their  reputation  for  a  Soviet  mess  of  pottage. 
37  FO  371  117794  RR  10;  1,  '9'-,  Telegram  No.  175,  Wallin_,  er  to  F.  0.,  4th  May,  1955  and  FO  371 
117796  RR  1071/339,  Telegram  No.  443,  from  Hayter  to  F.  O.,  5th  May  1955.  In  this  latter 
telegram  Hayter  reported  from  Moscow  that  Molotov  had  said  he  now  thought  that  the  Ambassadors 
in  Vienna  to  come  to  an  agreement  covering  all  the  main  points  for  the  Foreign  Ministers  to  sign. 
38  FO  371  1  l,:  'ýý5  RR  1071/306,  Telegram  No.  1S7.  Wallin  ,  er  to  F.  0..  5th  May,  1955. 
39  FO  371  11,505  RR  1071/3'0,  Telegram  No.  199,  Wallim_er  to  F.  O.,  6th  May,  1955.  May  16th 
as  bad  for  Dulles.  \1:  +v  14th  was  had  for  M1oloto%  and  Fnd.  i'  13th  \la'  was  felt  by  all  to  be Chapter  3/  Pa, 
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The  argument  over  article  35  proved,  however,  to  have  one  last  kick  left.  On 
the  9th  May  it  seemed  that  the  Ambassadorial  talks  might  yet  be  about  to  founder  on 
the  Soviet  insistence  that  their  original  draft  should  not  be  altered.  Wallinger  thought 
that  the  Soviets  were  eager  to  leave  at  least  one  "back  door"  for  use  in  the  future.  The 
Americans  were  adamant  that  they  would  not  sign  a  Treaty  with  the  offending  article 
intact.  Wallin;  er  thought  the  Soviet  Ambassador  "shaken"  when  the  Americans  had 
made  clear  their  position.  40  By  the  11th  May,  however,  the  Soviets  capitulated  with 
remarkable  grace  rather  than  risk  calling  the  Americans'  bluff.  41  This  came  as  a 
further  pleasant  surprise  to  the  Western  delegations.  By  the  time  the  Foreign  Ministers 
arrived  for  the  state  signing  their  was  little  left  for  them  to  discuss  but  the  possible  time 
and  place  for  a  future  summit  meeting  of  the  four  powers.  4  The  Americans  had  come 
round  to  accepting  the  wisdom  of  an  approach  to  the  Soviets  on  the  issue  with 
reluctance  and  largely  at  British  insistence. 
This  was  for  Macmillan  his  First  meeting  with  Molotov  whom  he  describes  in 
his  memoirs.  It  seemed  to  Macmillan  that  the  years  had  not  been  kind, 
He  seemed  smaller  to  me  than  I  had  supposed  and  older  (we  are  all  older!  ). 
He  is  grey,  not  black  anymore;  a  very  pale  pasty  face;  a  large  forehead; 
closely  cut  grey  hair.  He  wore  a  very  respectable  black  suit  -  and  looked 
rather  like  a  head  gardener  in  his  Sunday  clothes.  43 
Eden  had  made  a  formal  expression  of  the  British  position  on  the  issue  of  starting 
a  top  level  dialogue  in  a  telegram  to  Eisenhower  of  the  5th  May,  1955  which  was 
passed  through  the  Embassy  in  Washington.  44  The  British  wanted  to  make  a  specific 
proposal  for  a  meeting  to  the  Soviets  as  soon  as  possible,  although  in  his  message  to 
Eisenhower,  Eden  was  at  pains  to  point  out  that  he  regarded  the  proposed  conference 
as  a  prelude  to  further  negotiations,  rather  than  an  end  in  itself.  45  It  took  more  than  a 
"unpropitious".  The  date  agreeable,  Sunday  15th  May,  was  however  considered  even  more 
unpropitious  by  the  Synod  of  the  Free  Presbyterian  Church  of  Scotland  who  sent  a  letter  to 
Macmillan  on  the  6th  June,  1955.  They  complained  of  Her  Majesty's  Government's  complicity 
with  Sabbath  breakers  and  asserted  that  the  Austrian  State  Treaty  was  "struck  thereby".  FO  371 
117804  RR  1071/504. 
40  FO 
-3)t 
117797  RR  107L-347,  Tele_,  ram  No.  215.  Wallindºer  to  F.  0.,  9th  May,  1955. 
41  FO  371  117800  RR  1071;  -412,  Despatch  from  Wallinger  to  F.  0.,  16th  May,  1955  in  which 
Wallinger  outlined  the  last  days  of  the  talks. 
42  Tides  of  Fortune,  pp.  598-602  and  Full  Circle,  pp.  290-29  1. 
43  Tides  of  Fortune,  p.  599. 
44  PRENI  11  89-3.  TeIeý_ram  No.  2139  from  F.  O.  to  Washington,  from  Prime  Minister  to  President, 
5th  May,  195.  Indication  had  already  been  iven  by  British  officials  to  their  American 
counterparts  during  bilateral  talks  held  a  few  days  previously  in  London. 
45  FO  371  116700  NS  1071/15,  \,  linute  by  Sir  1.  Kirkpatrick.  6th  May,  1955,  and  also  Tides  of 
Fortune,  pp.  584-5S7.  This  seems  initially  to  have  been  %lacmillan's  idea,  although  it  was 
expressed  in  the  press  by  the  Economist  of  the  6th  May  1955.  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  brought  the 
opinion  of  the  Eco,  i  '  rear  to  \lacmillan's  attention  in  a  minute  ot  the  same  day,  commenting, 
It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  :i  lot  or  sense  in  the  views  expressed.  And  it  confirms  your  thesis 
that  what  wwe  hay  c  to  cater  for  is  a  Tong  round  of  ne`_otiation  rather  than  a  short,  sharp  meeting 
followed  by  either  success  or  irrevocable  failure. Chapter  3/  Page  70 
little  gentle  urging  on  the  part  of  the  British  immediately  before  the  Foreign  Ministers 
were  due  to  meet  in  Vienna  to  persuade  the  Americans  of  the  desirability  of  such  a 
summit.  Macmillan  himself  met  Dulles  in  Paris  on  the  7th  May  and  canvassed  his 
(and  the  British  Government's)  conception  of  a  series  of  conferences  designed  to  deal 
with  specific  problems  over  a  long  period  of  time,  rather  than  a  one  off  as  at  Yalta. 
The  Americans  were  most  anxious  not  to  repeat  what  they  saw  as  a  baleful 
precedent.  46  Eisenhower's  election  in  1952  had  involved  considerable  denunciation  of 
the  supposed  betrayals  which  Roosevelt  had  presided  over  in  secret  in  the  Crimea.  47 
Macmillan  was  hard  put  to  persuade  Dulles  of  the  value  of  the  British  proposal.  He 
reported  back  to  London  in  a  telegram  of  the  following  day  that, 
In  my  private  talks  with  Mr.  Dulles  yesterday,  I  used  every  argument  I  could 
think  of  in  favour  of  the  "top  level"  meeting,  on  its  mnerits,  apart  from  any 
convenience  which  it  might  have  in  satisfying  British  and  French  public 
opinion  [my  italics].  48 
Britain's  eagerness  to  talk  with  th  enemy  was  clearly  at  least  partly  informed  by 
electoral  considerations.  49  There  is  indeed  a  strong  emphasis  in  the  American  side  to 
the  correspondence  on  the  assistance  that  Summit  diplomacy  might  afford  the 
Conservative  Government  in  its  re-election.  Yet  the  Conservative  Government  was  not 
merely  seeking  another  term  of  office  in  the  becoming  clothes  of  peacemaker. 
Macmillan's  diplomacy  in  May  1955  was  following  a  long  established  pattern.  50  The 
British  attitude  towards  the  Soviet  Union,  possibly  influenced  by  her  propinquity,  had 
a  more  pragmatic  air  than  the  American.  Dulles  still  seemed  more  concerned  that  a 
willingness  to  talk  with  the  Soviet  devil  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an  acceptance  of 
his  works  in  Eastern  Europe,  than  he  was  willing  to  start  talks  in  the  first  place.  51 
46  PRE;  `-1  11/893,  Telegram  No.  80,  from  U.  K.  Permanent  Delegation  to  NATO.,  Paris  to  F.  0., 
from  Foreign  Secretary  to  Prime  Minister,  8th  May,  1955.  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  Macmillan 
thought  the  most  effective  argument  he  employed  was  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  unlikely  to 
make  trouble  over  either  the  Offshore  Islands  or  Formosa  in  the  lead  up  to  and  duration  of  Great 
Power  talks.  Formosa  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  were  to  play  a  large  part  in  the  substance 
of  neý,  otiations  at  Geneva  in  July. 
47  Eisenhower.  The  President,  pp.  269-274. 
48  ibid. 
49  The  language  used  by  both  parties  `_ives  thinly  veiled  indication  of  the  way  in  which  British 
domestic  politics  impinged  upon  Anglo-American  diplomacy  in  Mav  1955.  In  his  Telegram  of  5th 
May  Eden  added  to  a  list  of  considerations  a  less  than  convincing  denial  of  party  political  expedient, 
"I  must  also  tell  you  that  much  in  our  country  depends  upon  it  [a  conference];  this  is  not  a  party 
question  here,  but  responds  to  a  deep  desire  of  our  whole  people".  Eisenhower  perceptively  put  this 
issue  to  the  top  of  the  at-,  enda  in  his  reply  to  Eden  of  6th  May  1955,  "We  appreciate  the  importance 
to  you  of  this  project  under  existing  circumstances,  and  are  naturally  disposed  to  do  everything  we 
can  to  further  it".  Eden  did  not  attempt  to  correct  this  more  candid  analysis  in  further 
correspondence. 
50  Consider  Eden's  submission  to  the  Cabinet  of  the  26th  ; March,  1955  discussed  above. 
51  PRENI  1  11893,  Telegram  No.  1073,  from  Makins,  Washiný.,  ton  to  F.  0.,  6th  May,  1955.  In  a 
private  conversation  \  ith  Sir  Rodger  Makins  after  handing  over  Eisenhower's  response  to  Eden  on 
the  6th  May.  Dulles  expressed  . 
American  reservations  regarding  the  proposed  summit.  After 
insisting  that  China  should  not  he  brou`_ht  in  and  complaining  of  the  lack  of  co-ordination  of 
Western  \  lews  on  certain  key  areas,  he  \\,  ent  on  to  ,  av, Chapter  3/  Page  71 
However,  the  Americans  were  reluctantly  prepared  to  make  an  approach  to  the  Soviets 
on  the  condition  that  the  Foreign  Ministers  should  try  the  waters  first.  52  The  conclave 
of  Foreign  Ministers  on  the  15th  May  in  Vienna  seemed  to  both  the  Americans  and  the 
British  a  most  convenient  time  to  get  the  process  underway.  This  proviso  was 
contained  in  the  formal  invitation  to  talks  which  was  sent  jointly  to  the  Soviets  by  the 
Governments  of  Britain.  France  and  the  United  States  on  the  10th  May.  1955.53 
Once  the  Foreign  Ministers  meet  in  Vienna  the  process  of  sounding  out  went 
smoothly.  Macmillan  reported  back  on  his  conversations  of  the  15th  May  with  his 
counterpart  as  follows, 
Although  we  do  not  expect  the  formal  reply  to  the  invitation  for  some  days, 
Mr  Molotov  made  it  quite  clear  that  he  is  very  keen  on  having  the  White 
House,  and  at  a  top  level  [Macmillan's  way  of  refering  to  Eisenhower].  He 
appeared  to  approve  the  general  scheme  set  out  in  the  invitation  and  said  that 
it  conformed  with  his  ideas,  viz,  that  a  top  level  conference  should  be  the 
beginning  of  a  process  of  negotiation  which  must  necessarily  be  prolonged. 
He  agreed  that  any  other  suggestion  would  lead  to  disillusionment  in  all  our 
countries.  '4 
The  only  real  area  of  disputation  was  the  place  in  which  talks  were  to  be  held.  " 
Molotov's  preferred  location  was  Vienna.  Both  Macmillan  and  Dulles  did  not  agree  as 
it  would  have  meant  meeting  in  a  city  still  under  an  occupation  regime.  The  "Allied" 
forces  were  not  due  to  withdraw  from  Austria  completely  until  1956  and  a  Swiss  city 
was  the  option  preferred  by  the  west.  However,  Molotov  gave  indication  that  the 
Soviets  might  well  be  willing  to  bend  to  western  pressure  on  the  issue.  The  question 
of  the  agenda,  often  the  sticking  point  in  previous  talks  about  talks,  was  sketched  out 
more  or  less  to  the  satisfaction  of  all. 
The  main  public  function  of  the  visit  by  so  many  foreign  politicians  to  Vienna 
was  carried  off  in  some  style.  The  Austrian  State  Treaty.  bound  in  green  Morocco 
(That  it  was  possible  to  take  the  view  that  something  like.  an  equilibrium  had  now  been 
achieved  in  Europe  and  that  there  might  be  some  prospect  of  scaling  down  the  forces  arrayed 
on  each  side  in  this  area.  But  there  were  great  difficulties  here  also  since  the  US.  certainly  did 
not  want  to  Live  any  colour  of  sanction  to  the  Soviet  position  in  the  Satellite  countries  or  to  the 
Eastern  European  "N.  A.  T. O.  -type"  organisation  which  they  seemed  to  be  in  the  process  of 
setting  up. 
S2  PREM  11/893;  Telegram  No.  190,  From  Sir  G.  Jebb  to  F.  0.,  From  Foreign  Secretary  to  Prime 
Minister,  8th  May,  1955.  Dulles  was  still  expressing  his  doubts  to  Macmillan  in  Paris  on  the  8th 
May.  At  this  point  his  main  concern  seems  to  hay  e  been  the  unpopularity  of  summit  diplomacy  with 
the  right  wing  of  the  Republican  Party. 
S3  PREM  11/893,  Text  of  Statement  contained  in  Telegram  No.  202.  from  Sir  G.  Jebb.  Paris  to  F.  0., 
10th  May,  1')55. 
54  PRE\1  11/893.  Telegram  No.  201,  Sir  G.  Wailin`_er  to  F.  0.,  from  Foreign  Secretary  for  Prime 
Minister,  15th  May.  1955.  As  so  many  of  'AacmiIlan's  negotiations,  this  one  bean  "after  an 
º,  reeable  dinner".  Food  play,  a  large  part  in  Macmillan's  diplomatic  memorabilia,  see  Tides  of 
Fortune,  pp.  -582-697. 
55  PREM  11'S03,  Telegram  No.  51  3,  from  Sir  W.  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  26th  May,  1955.  A  very  positive 
official  response  to  the  Western  invitation  of  the  10th  may  'gas  not  issued  by  the  Soviets  until  the 
'6th  May. Chapter  3/  Pace  72 
leather  by  the  same  Firm  which  had  bound  the  Vienna  Treaty  of  1815,  was  signed  with 
due  pomp  and  ceremony  in  the  Belvedere  palace  on  the  15th  May.  1955.56  Macmillan 
records  in  his  memoirs  that  the  Viennese  crowds  and.  less  predictably,  the  weather 
were  agreeably  festal  in  aspect.  57 
SNOWDROPS  AND  CROCUSES 
By  this  point  there  had  been  even  further  indication  that  the  Soviet  policy  towards 
summitry  was  becoming  ever  more  positive.  On  the  10th  May  the  Soviet  Government 
lodged  with  the  United  Nations  proposals  for  disarmament  which,  as  the  British 
considered  them,  were  much  more  credible  than  any  previous  Soviet  position  on  the 
issue.  58  Furthermore  the  manner  in  which  the  Soviets  conducted  the  founding  of  their 
own  "N.  A.  T.  O.  "  in  Warsaw  from  the  11th  to  14th  May,  1955  was  interpreted,  rather 
ironically,  by  British  observers  as  another  indication  of  the  way  in  which  the  Soviets 
were  softening  towards  the  West.  59  It  also  gave  one  of  the  tust  clear  hints  to  the 
British  that  the  prospect  of  thermonuclear  war  might  be  the  one  of  the  main  factors 
prompting  Soviet  foreign  policy  to  change. 
In  a  despatch  of  the  1  1th  May  Sir  William  Hayter  reported  on  the  detail  of  the 
Soviet  Disarmament  proposals  of  the  previous  day.  He  drew  the  following  conclusions 
from  what  seemed  a  clear  indication  of  movement  on  the  issue, 
Soviet  Government  at  present  genuinely  desire  a  measure  of  disarmament, 
partly  for  internal  economic  reasons  and  partly  because  the  present  state  of 
international  armaments  seems  to  them  menacing.  To  achieve  this  they  are 
prepared  for  quite  far-reaching  sacrifices,  including  the  loss  of  their  present 
superiority  in  conventional  armaments  and  the  acceptance  of  a  degree  of 
foreign  control  activity  [for  the  purpose  of  verification]  in  this  country  which 
is  utterly  alien  to  their  tradition.  60 
Hayter  considered  that  this  desire  to  be  pleasant  to  the  West  has  as  much  to  do 
with  the  internal  weakness  of  the  regime  and  the  economic  stress  of  rearmament  than 
anything  else.  61  It  all  fitted  into  a  pattern  which  had  begun  with  the  opening  of 
56  FO  371  117801  RR  1071/433,  Wallin`;  er  described  the  circumstance  Surrounding  the  signature  in  a 
Despatch  to  the  Foreign  Office  on  the  19th  May.  1955.  The  full  text  of  the  Treaty  is  held  at  FO 
31  117799  RR  107  1/401. 
57  Tides  of  Fortune,  p.  598. 
58  Hayter  expressed  his  approval  in  a  despatch  of  Ist  June,  1955,  FO  371  116652  NS  1021/38,  Hayter 
to  Macmillan.  The  Americans  were  however  less  san`_uine  in  their  appreciation.  FRUS  1955-1957, 
Vol.  V,  p.  1821,  Memorandum  of  a  Discussion  at  the  249th  Meeting  of  the  NSC,  19th  May,  1955. 
59  For  a  brief  study  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  see  M.  Mackintosh.  "The  Warsaw  Treaty  Organisation:  A 
History"  in  D.  Holloway  and  J.  M.  O.  Sharp  (eds.  ),  The  .  Varsativ  Pact,  Alliance  in  Transition. 
60  FO  371  11652  `S  102-1/34,  T,  -1e,  -,  ram  No.  464.  form  Sir  W.  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  11th  May,  1955. 
Hayter  also  thought  that  the  Soviet  proposals  might  have  been  designed  to  advance  the  closure  of 
American  bases  in  Europe. 
61  ibid..  Havter  continued. 
Soviet  leaders  do  not  appear  to  be  in  the  tough  or  a_-`_res.  ive  mood  that  .  tie  expected  when 
Nialenkov  ;  ell.  On  he  contrary,  perhaps  because  of  their  undoubted  internal  weaknesses  and Chaptcr  3/  Page  73 
negotiations  for  the  Austrian  State  Treaty  and  which  had  been  further  developed  by  the 
Soviet  disarmament  proposals  Only  at  the  very  end  of  his  despatch  did  he  speculate 
that, 
[I]n  my  opinion  they  are  now  more  likely  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  us 
than  they  have  been  for  many  years  past,  no  doubt  largely  owing  to  the 
success  of  our  recent  policies  and  perhaps  also  because  they  have  at  last,  in 
spite  of  their  brave  words,  begun  to  realise  what  the  hydrogen  bomb  means  to 
thcin[my  italics]. 
Hayter  may  well  have  been  referring  to  the  brave  words  which  Khrushchev  had 
publicly  declared  as  recently  as  the  20th  April,  1955.  In  a  speech  delivered  in  Warsaw 
on  that  day,  in  commemoration  of  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Soviet-Polish  alliance, 
Khrushchev  had  re-affirmed  the  orthodoxy  on  nuclear  war  which  had  been  established 
against  Malenkov  in  1954;  and  placed  his  emphasis  firmly  upon  the  inevitability  of 
Soviet  victory  in  the  event  of  world  war.  '  Although  he  had  also  pointed  to  the 
necessity  of  peaceful  co-existence,  Hayter  thought  the  speech  bore  Khrushchev's 
"personal  stamp  with  its  truculent,  over-simplified  approach  to  foreign  affairs".  63  In 
his  report  (telegram  no  464,  referred  to  below)  Hayter  pointed  out,  "Soviet  atomic 
superiority  is  not  referred  to,  but  third  world  war  is  described  as  undoubtedly  leading 
to  the  destruction  of  capitalist  countries".  64 
Hayter's  speculation  of  the  11th  May,  1955  on  the  possibility  of  a  change  in  this 
Soviet  attitude  was  to  be  confirmed  in  substance  by  the  tenor  of  the  Soviet  delegation's 
speechifying  at  the  Warsaw  Conference,  held  from  the  11th  to  the  14th  of  the  same 
month.  In  a  telegram  of  the  12th  May  commenting  on  a  speech  by  Bulganin  in 
Warsaw  of  the  previous  day,  Cecil  Parrott,  the  Minister  at  the  British  Embassy  in 
Moscow,  developed  Hayter's  line  of  reasoning, 
[H]is  [Bulganin's]  lengthy  passage  on  disarmament  proposals  underlines  their 
importance  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view.  Like  Zhukov  he  refers  more  than 
once  to  the  calamity  of  an  atomic  war  without  referring  to  the  possibility  of 
uncertainties,  they  seem  to  me  now  to  be  anxious  for  a  relaxation  of  tension  and  even  perhaps 
for  some  kind  of  genuine  settlement  with  the  West.  It  is  not  that  they  have  given  up  their 
ultimate  objective;  it  is  clear  enough  that  all  of  them,  Zhukov  and  the  Marshals  as  well  as 
Khrushchev  and  Bulganin,  still  think  that  Communism  will  ultimately  prevail...  But  it  seems  to 
me  that  they  are  beginning  to  feel  that  the  best  way  of  achieving  this  is  not  by  threats  and 
menaces  but  by  conciliation  and  appeasement  and  by  sufficiently  reducing,  through 
disarmament,  the  strains  on  their  own  economy  to  enable  them  to  compete  with  capitalist 
standards  of  living. 
62  Nlalenkov  had  made  his  "wobbly  '  speech  on  the  issue  of  mutual  destruction  on  March  12th,  1954 
only  to  publicly  "yualitý  "  it  in  a  turther  speech  of  the  26th  April,  1954.  Molotov's  keynote  speech 
of  8th  February.  1955  was  seen  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  an  emphatic  declaration  of  the  old  view 
that  under  the  conditions  of  wordd  war  only  capitalism  would  be  destroyed  and  the  Soviet  Union 
would  he  victorious.  See  aho'e,  SoOet  Forei(,,  º:  Police  Since  WVorlel  Wcºr  11,  pp.  88-95  and  FO  3,1 
116650  NS  1021/IS. 
63  FO 
-371 
1  166  2  NS  10-23/`-S.  Telegram  No.  3S7.  from  Sir  W.  Hayter,  Moscow,  to  F.  0.,  21st 
, -April,  1955. 
64  Ibid. Chapter 
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Communist  victory.  This  again  supports  the  supposition  that  the  Soviet 
leaders  are  really  anxious  about  the  effect  of  the  hydrogen  bomb  (see  our 
telegram  No.  464).  65 
The  importance  of  thermonuclear  weaponry  in  the  Soviet  Government's  foreign  policy 
calculations  was  to  become  increasingly  obvious  as  the  Geneva  Conference  drew 
closer.  Parrotrwent  on  to  comment  that  Bulganin's  speech  had  also  contained  a 
number  of  conciliatory  touches  and  was,  "{v]ery  different  from  the  normal  run  of 
Soviet  speeches,  and  the  passages  in  which  he  spoke  of  the  need  for  establishing 
confidence  as  a  first  step  towards  agreement  and  cited  Austria  as  an  example  that 
problems  could  be  solved  piece-meal  had  a  western  ring  about  them". 
Perversely  enough,  the  British  saw  the  Warsaw  Conference  as  a  further  indication 
of  the  Kremlin's  new  eagerness  for  sunlnlitry.  The  formation  of  a  Soviet  military  pact 
was  largely  dismissed  by  the  Foreign  Office  merely  as  a  recognition  of  long  established 
fact.  E.  F.  Given  of  the  Northern  Department  put  it  thus,  "it  [the  Warsaw  Pact]  is,  of 
course,  a  facade  erected  on  an  existing  edifice,  and  will  no  doubt  be  used  as  a 
bargaining  counter  in  four  power  talks".  66  The  British  Ambassador  in  Warsaw,  Sir 
Andrew  Noble,  sent  his  Slllllllling  up  of  the  Conference's  significance  to  London  on  the 
17th  May,  1955.67  Once  more  comment  was  made  of  the  surprisingly  "mild"  tone  of 
the  proceedings,  particularly  in  contrast  to  the  "violent  language"  which  had  so 
recently  been  used  in  condemnation  of  the  Paris  Agreements.  Bulganin's  speech  of  the 
11th  May  was  singalled  out  as  a  good  example  of  this  trend.  However,  Noble,  looking 
for  an  ulterior  motive,  suggested  that, 
Blustering  tactics  having  failed  to  intimidate  the  Western  parliaments,  the 
Soviet  Government  apparently  decided  to  assume  a  disposition  of  disarming 
reasonableness,  calculated  perhaps  to  appeal  to  uncommitted  countries  and 
opinion  "68 
However  suspicious  of  Soviet  intentions  the  Foreign  Office  staff  may  have 
remained,  there  was  an  impressive  list  of  Soviet  goodwill  gestures  towards  the  west 
building  up.  These  were  soon  to  be  followed  by  further  startling  changes  in  Soviet 
foreign  policy.  At  the  end  of  May,  1955  in  the  aftermath  of  the  signing  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact,  Khrushchev  himself  was  to  make  an  attempt  to  soft-talk  another  formerly 
implacable  foe,  Tito.  69  Khrushchev  and  the  accompanying  Soviet  delegation, 
65  FO  371  1161  18  N  1074/8,  Telegram  No.  469,  from  C.  Parrot,  Moscow  to  F.  O.,  12th  May,  1955. 
66  FO  371  1161  IS  N  1074/9,  Minute  by  E.  F.  Given  of  18th  May,  1955. 
67  FO  371  1161ISN  1074/19,  Despatch  from  Sir  A.  Noble,  Warsaw  to  F.  0.,  17th  May,  1955. 
68  ibid.,  Noble  also  made  clear  that  the  East  German  Government's  statement,  clearing  a  future  united 
Germany  from  any  obligation  undertaken  by  the  existing  regime,  left  "the  diplomatic  doors... 
,  ostentatiously  open'.  The  So%  iet  Union  was  keeping  a  careful  eye  on  its  freedom  of  manoeuvre. 
69  FO  3-1  118'0%  R'Y"  10  338/74,  Despatch  from  Sir  F.  Roberts,  Belgrade  to  F.  0.,  ý'  Ist  May,  1955. 
Both  the  Yu,  _osiaý  s  and  the  British  were  concerned  from  the  ,  tart  that  the  Soviets  might  have 
ulterior  motives  in  wanting  to  visit.  Publicly  the  Yu:,  oslav,  ý  hailed  Khrushchev's  visit  as  a  great 
vindication  of  their  polic\  singe  1948,  pnvatel`  they  w  ere  ICs  assured  as  Roberts  reported  in  the Chapter  3/  Page  75 
conspicuously  lacking  ýtiiolotov,  arrived  in  Yugoslavia  on  the  26th  May,  1955.70  This 
was  the  same  day  as  the  British  elections  in  which  Eden  was  to  be  victorious.  7'  It  was 
also  the  day  on  which  the  Soviets  made  a  positive  formal  reply  to  the  Western  proposal 
of  the  10th  May  for  a  Summit  meeting. 
The  British  had  entertained  the  hope  after  Tito's  break  with  Stalin  in  1948  that 
it  might  be  possible  to  increase  western  influence  in  the  country  to  the  point  at  which  it 
leant  decisively  towards  the  west.  However,  by  April  1955  it  had  become  apparent 
that  Tito  had  not  fallen  out  of  one  camp  merely  to  fall  into  another.  72  The  Khrushchev 
visit  was  taken  by  the  British  Government  as  confirmation  that  Tito  had  gone  "Indian". 
It  was  also  adduced  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  one  more  example  of  the  new  conciliatory 
look  which  Soviet  policy  had  been  developing  since  their  first  moves  towards  the 
Austrian  State  Treaty,  although  this  did  not  mean  that  all  had  necessarily  gone 
smoothly  between  the  Soviets  and  their  hosts. 
Indeed,  the  Yugoslav  reaction  to  Khrushchex,  ''s  first  speech  of  the  26th  May, 
1955,  delivered  at  the  airport  on  his  arrival  in  Belgrade,  was  far  from  positive. 
Khrushchev  delivered  a  number  of  gaffes  including  reference  to  the  supposedly 
unassisted  role  played  by  the  Red  Army  in  Yugoslavia's  liberation  from  Germany.  On 
the  27th  May,  1955  Sir  William  Havter  delivered  the  following  judgement  on 
Khrushchev's  bravura  performance,  "the  whole  pleading,  apologetic,  clumsy  tone  of 
this  speech  is  surprising,  or  would  be  surprising  if  we  did  not  know  that  Khrushchev  is 
like  that".  73  Hayter  also  pointed  out  an  interesting  straw  in  a  wind  which  was  soon  to 
increase  to  gale  force  proportions, 
above  despatch.  Hayter  expressed  Britain's  concern  in  a  letter  of  the  27th  May,  1955  to  the  F.  O. 
(FO  371  118027  RY  1033/97)  as  follows, 
It  is  of  course  obvious  enough  that  this  high  powered  Soviet  delegation  have  not  -one  to 
BelL,  rade  with  the  sole  purpose  of  saying  mea  culpa.  They  must  have  something  serious  and 
possibly  (from  out  point  of  view)  sinister  to  propose.  I  cannot  imagine  what  this  will  be, 
though  the  composition  of  the  Soviet  Delegation  suggests  that  it  will  have  an  economic  element 
[the  delegation  included  Mikoyan].  One  can  only  hope  that  the  Yugoslavs  dispose  of  a  very, 
very  long  spoon. 
10  Perhaps  because  of  his  unfortunate  association  with  Stalin's  foreign  policy  and  perhaps  also  because 
of  his  increasing  disagreement  with  Khrushchev  over  the  basic  tenor  of  policy  post  Stalin. 
71  Full  Circle,  pp.  ?  76-287  and  Tides  of  Fortune,  pp.  602-604. 
72  FO  371  115025  RY  10338/25,  Telegram  No.  26,  from  Sir  F.  Roberts,  Belgrade  to  F.  0.,  8th  April, 
1955  and  Minute  by  H.  B.  Mckenzie  Johnston,  13th  April,  1955.  Mckenzie  Johnston  commented 
as  follows  on  the  telegram  which  was  an  assessment  by  Roberts  of  the  Yutoslavian  attitude  towards 
defence, 
There  is  really  nothing  in  this  to  modify  recent  assessments  by  Bel`!  rade  of  present  Yugoslav 
policy...  If  anything  it 
`_ives 
further  indication  of  Yu__o>slavia  "`_oinv-y  Indian"  (in  the  sense, 
presumably.  of  Nehru's  neutralism]. 
73  FO  3371  1  1S02ý  RY  1033897,  Letter  from  Sir  \Villiam  Hayter  to  F.  0.,  27th  May,  1955.  Hayter 
made  the  following  report  on  the  substance  of  the  airport  mech. 
Khrushchev's  speech  is  very  peculiar,  and  also  very  typically  Khrushchev.  It  is  full  of  his 
characteristics  of  blurting  out  surprising  truths  and  also  determined  and  narrow  minded 
conformity  to  the  Marxist  line.  From  our  point  of  view  the  most  interesting  feature  is  the 
suý_gestion  that  the  responsibility  for  the  breach  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Yugoslavia  was Chapter  3/  Page  76 
It  is  also  noticeable  that  Khrushchev  is  anxious  to  advertise  himself  as  leader 
of  the  Party  founded  by  Lenin,  exploiting  in  a  rather  clumsy  way  the  fidelity 
of  the  Yugoslav  communists  to  Lenin.  Stalin  is  not  mentioned  anywhere  in 
the  speech.  The  emphasis  on  the  cooperation  of  the  two  Marxist-Leninist" 
parties  is  laboriously  obvious. 
Khrushchev's  airport  speech  was  not  the  only  outpouring  which  caused  the 
Yugoslavs  to  wince.  74  But,  despite  the  apparent  coolness  of  the  Yugoslavs  towards  the 
Soviets  throughout  their  stay,  the  visit  soon  recovered,  and  by  the  time  of  the  Soviets' 
departure  was  credited  to  them  as  at  least  a  partial  success.  75  On  this  point  the 
Americans  seem  to  have  taken  a  marginally  more  negative  view  than  the  British.  76 
Although  there  was  trans-Atlantic  agreement  that  there  had  been  successes  for  both  the 
Soviets  and  the  Yugoslavs,  the  fear  that  in  the  long  term  this  new  cordiality  between 
Moscow  and  Belgrade  would  pull  Yugoslavia  increasingly  back  towards  the  Soviet 
the  supply  by  Bcria,  Ahakumov  and  other  of  false  material  about  the  Yu  goslavv  leaders.  It  is 
hard  to  imagine  that  the  Yuvoslavs  could  take  this  apology  seriously...  the  most  wounding 
accusation  of  all  was  that  almost  the  sole  part  in  the  liberation  of  Yugoslavia  had  been  played 
by  the  Soviet  army... 
74  FO  371  118028  RY  10338/125,  Roberts  reported  in  his  summary  despatch  of  June  11th,  1955  that 
Khrushchev  had,  allegedly,  further  alarmed  Tito  in  his  private  conversations  with  him  at  Brioni  by  a 
renewed  emphasis  on  the  ability  of  the  communist  world  to  survive  it  Third  World  War  victorious. 
75  FO  371  118027  RY  10338/98,  Despatch  from  Sir  F.  Roberts,  Belgrade  to  F.  0.,  May  29th,  1955. 
Roberts  reported  that, 
[Tihe  atmosphere  improved  yesterday,  so  far  as  the  substance  of  the  talks  is  concerned.  But 
the  gulf  between  hosts  and  guests  `rows  deeper  with  each  social  gathering.  This  was 
particularly  noticeable  at  Tito's  major  reception  last  night.  Many  of  my  Yugoslav  contacts, 
high  and  medium,  commented  on  this.  One  told  me  that  after  the  passage  of  seven  years  the 
Russians  and  the  Yugoslavs  no  longer  even  spoke  the  same  lan`juage,  adding  that  he  now  found 
it  impossible  to  understand  how  they  had  ever  done  so.  even  during  the  honey-moon  period 
between  1945  and  1947...  I  could  not  avoid  the  impression  myself  last  night  that  the  Russians 
found  themselves  rather  more  at  home  in  the  four  power  company  of  ourselves,  the  Americans 
and  the  French  than  of  their  former  Yugoslav  comrades. 
Roberts  ended  his  despatch  with  an  expression  of  western  satisfaction  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  visit, 
So  far  I  think  we  have  every  reason  to  congratulate  ourselves  on  the  Soviet  visit  to  Belgrade, 
although  I  naturally  keep  my  fingers  crossed  until  it  is  all  over.  As  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Croatia  put  it  in  a  special  article  on  Tito's  birthday,  "If  the  Yugoslavs  have  to  choose  between 
the  two  blocs,  they  know  perfectly  well  which  from  their  point  of  view  is  the  lesser  evil. 
76  FO  371  11802S  RY  103338/109,  Letter  from  Mr.  Wilkinson,  British  Embassy  Washington  to  Mlr  W. 
H.  Yount,.  Southern  Department,  7th  June  1955.  Also  at  the  same  reference  minutes  by  Northern 
Department;  R.  A.  Hibbert  of  16th  June,  1955  and  H.  Mackenzie-Johnston  of  11th  June,  1955. 
The  State  Department  had  reported  their  view  of  developments  to  the  British  Embassy.  Wilkinson 
described  the  American  view  of  events  as  "slightly  less  optimistic"  than  the  British.  If,  as  seemed 
likely  to  the  Americans,  the  Soviets  had  not  been  aiming  for  it  complete  reconciliation  with 
Yugoslavia,  but  rather  a  half-%\,  ay  agreement  then,  "in  these  circumstances,  a  perfectly  adequate 
accommodation  seemed  to  have  been  reached  in  Belgrade  and  Chip  Bohlen  had  commented  from 
\losco  that  he  thought  there  had  been  a  victory  for  both  sides".  Also  FRUS  1955-5  7,  Vol.  X,  p. 
13-15.  Summary  of  Discussions  of  Le__islatt\ve  Leadership  Meeting.  Washington,  28th  June,  1955. 
. ->t  this  meeting  with  Senators  Dulles  was  very  ea_er  that  US.  economic  aid  to  Yugoslavia  should 
not  he  reduced  or  refused  by  the  legislature  as.  "Russia  seemed  to  have  raten  humble  pie  at 
Belgrade,  he  (Dulles]  said,  and  we  should  not  take  any  action  that  would  tend  to  drive  the 
Yugoslavs  back  to  their  Russian  connection". Chapter  3/  Pace  77 
camp  was  not  as  strong  in  Britain  as  in  the  United  States.  77  Indeed  Sir  Frank  Roberts' 
estimation  of  Yugoslavia's  preference,  in  extremis,  for  the  west  remained  bullish;  the 
opinion  of  the  Foreign  Office  as  a  whole  was  rather  less  robust.  8 
However,  one  of  the  most  important  impressions  of  their  visitors  which  the 
Yugoslavs  were  so  obliging  as  to  communicate  to  the  British  was,  once  more,  the 
Soviet  eagerness  to  do  business  with  the  West.  Sir  Frank  Roberts  reported  back  to 
London  on  his  conversation  with  Edvard  Kardelj,  a  member  of  the  Yugoslav  Politburo, 
during  a  diplomatic  reception  held  for  the  Soviet  visitors  on  the  28th  May,  1955.19 
Kardelj  made  comment  that  the  Soviets  had  proved  willing  to  compromise  with  the 
Yugoslav  view  of  inter-communist  relations  by  including  a  reference  to  "different 
roads  to  socialism"  in  the  final  communique.  The  Foreign  Office's  first  reaction  was 
to  play  down  both  the  novelty  of  such  a  concession  and  even  more  the  effect  which  it 
might  have  on  the  rest  of  Eastern  Europe.  80  Of  more  direct  importance  to  the  West 
was  the  following  information, 
[H]e  [Kardelj]  now  thought  positive  results  would  flow  from  the  Belgrade 
meeting.  The  Soviet  attitude  had  convinced  him  that  the  Russians  genuinely 
77  FO  371  116652  NS  1021/40,  Despatch  from  Sir  W.  Hayter,  ; Moscow  to  F.  0.,  10th  June,  1955. 
Hayter  thought  that,  "As  seen  from  Moscow  the  Belgrade  talks  look  remarkably  like  a  defeat  for  the 
Soviet  Government.  and  a  personal  defeat  for  Khrushchev.  "  However  Hayter  continued  to  reason 
that  although  Khrushchev  may  have  hoped  tu  persuade  the  Yugoslavs  to  wive  emphatic  support  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  he  was  enough  of  a  realist  to  expect  somethin`!  rather  less.  To  the  Soviets'  credit 
it  could  be  argued  that  the  visit  had  confirmed  "neutralist"  tendencies  which  had  already  become 
apparent  in  Yugoslav  foreign  policy.  Hayter  did  not  think  that  the  Soviet  success  could  be  put  in 
any  stronger  terms.  Given  the  overall  trend  in  Soviet  policy,  neutralism  was  probably  good  enough. 
78  FO  371  118028  RY  10338/125,  Despatch  from  Sir  F.  Roberts,  Belgrade  to  F.  0.,  1  lth  June,  1955. 
In  his  summing  up  of  the  Soviet  visit  in  the  above  despatch,  Roberts  went  so  far  as  to  su`gest  that 
the  Yugoslavs  felt  "western",  particularly  in  reaction  to  the  rather  brutish  and  "uncouth" 
performance  of  Khrushchev  and  entourage.  This  Soviet  display  had  gone  some  way  to  "dissipate 
some  of  'Marshal  Tito's  airy  confidence  in  a  complete  Soviet  change  of  heart.  "  Amongst  other 
Foreign  Office  minuters  questioning,  the  basis  of  Roberts'  confidence.  Miss  V.  Conolly  of  the 
Research  Department  played  down  the  element  of  novelty  in  the  proceedings,  commenting  in  a  note 
of  the  17th  August  that, 
I  should  not  personally  attach  over  much  importance  to  the  Soviet  admission  that  there  is  more 
than  one  road  to  socialism,  nor  regard  it  as  a  landmark  in  Soviet  thou,  -, 
ht  on  revolution  and 
violence.  . Attar-all,  the  Lenin-Stalin  doctrine  of  by-passing  capitalism  amounts  to  an  admission 
of  the  same  order  though  not  couched  in  the  same  terms. 
/9  FO  371  118027  RY  10338,  '81,  Telegram  No.  391,  from  Sir  F.  Roberts,  Belgrade  to  F.  0.,  29th  7 
\lav,  1955.  Kardelj  was  the  Yugoslav  Foreign  Minister  from  1948-53. 
80  See  footnote  no.  70  and  FO  3^1  116652  NS  1021/-40,  Despatch  from  Sir  W.  Hayter,  Moscow  to  F. 
0.,  10th  June,  1955.  Har  ter  thought  that  although  neutralism  in  the  non-communist  world  was 
becoming  increasingly  favoured  of  Moscow,  the  Soviet  leaders  would  have  made  it  clear  that  this 
did  not  apply  to  the  communist  world.  Indeed  he  felt  that. 
Soviet  condonation  of  Titoism  i,,  probably  it  measure  of  their  confidence  in  the  docility  of  the 
satellites  and  not  a  prelude  to  any  relaxation  of  the  Kremlin's  control  over  its  empire.  It  is 
conceivable  that  the  Soviets  may  he  prepared  to  trade  it  withdrawal  of  their  troops  from  one  or 
more  of  the  satellites  for  e.  _.  a  withdrawal  of  American  forces  form  Europe.  But  I  see  no 
prospect  of  the  Sov  iet  Government  entertainin_,  the  idea  of  free  elections  in  any  satellite.  On 
the  contrary,  any  withdrawal  of  American  forces  ýoulcl  probably  be  preceded  by  a 
streng  then  in_  of  Communist  control  over  the  State  apparatus  in  the  country  concerned. Chapter  3/  Page  78 
wanted  peace  and  an  international  detente  and  that  there  were  real  prospects 
for  big-Power  negotiations  although  the  road  would  be  long  and  difficult  and 
Soviet  concessions  hardly  won. 
This  was  the  main  lesson  from  Khrushchev's  sojourn  in  Yugoslavia  which  Macmillan 
took  with  him  in  his  briefing  material  when  he  left  in  early  June,  1955  to  begin 
detailed  negotiations  with  the  other  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Great  Powers  at  San 
Francisco.  In  a  minute  of  the  10th  June  the  Southern  Department  made  the  following 
summation  for  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  the  Yugoslavs'  understanding  of  where  the 
general  trend  in  Soviet  policy  was  going, 
The  Yugoslavs  are  confirmed  in  their  view  that  a  very  important  change  is 
taking  place  in  the  Soviet  attitude  towards  international  relations  and  co- 
operation  with  other  countries.  The  Russians  had  been  very  critical  of  their 
own  past  persuasions  and  in  particular  of  their  original  disarmament 
proposal...  Nevertheless,  they  still  seemed  to  cherish  many  of  their  old 
conceptions  and  illusions,  more  especially  concerning  Yugoslavia.  8' 
The  Yugoslavs  thought.  at  least  in  so  far  as  they  communicated  their  opinions  to  the 
British,  that  there  was  a  real  possibility  the  Soviets  might  be  willing  to  compromise  in 
international  negotiations. 
XXX 
It  is  important  to  stress  that  through  the  first  half  of  1955  the  British  were  making  their 
own  foreign  policy,  as  much  as  reacting  to  that  of  the  Soviets.  The  line  followed  by 
the  Conservative  Government  in  Germany  and  Europe  since  1952  developed  naturally, 
once  it  had  met  with  success  over  West  German  re-armament,  into  Eden's  attempt  to 
start  top-level  talks  with  the  Soviets.  There  was  no  "U"  turn  or  contradiction  in  the 
British  Government's  thinking.  Yet  in  following  this  straight  line,  Eden  had  to 
overcome  the  deep-seated  doubts  of  the  Eisenhower  Administration.  He  was  partly 
assisted  in  this  task,  it  seems,  by  the  Americans'  willingness  to  connive  in  the  re- 
election  of  a  British  Conservative  Government.  This  factor,  however,  in  no  way 
detracts  from  the  logical  force  of  Eden  and  Macmillan's  policy,  not  least  as  it  was 
decided  without  prior  reference  to  the  Americans.  The  British  attitude  towards  the 
Soviet  Union  was  intormed  by  a  pragmatism  which  the  Americans,  it  seems,  did  not 
share.  More  startlingly  the  likelihood  of  Britain  achieving  the  consummation  of  that 
policy  was  very  substantially  increased  by  profound  change  in  the  Soviet  attitude 
towards  the  west.  The  Soviet  Union,  not  Great  Britain,  was  the  country  which 
committed  something  of  an  "U"  turn  in  early  1955. 
3l  FO  371  116652  NS  1021  42.  Minute  by  Southern  Department  of  10th  June,  1955.  This  minute, 
which  summed  lip  the  wisdom  of  the  British  Embassy  in  Belgrade's  commentary  on  the  Soviet  visit, 
was  expressly  asked  for  by  Macmillan. Chapter  3/  Pack  79 
By  the  end  of  May,  1955  the  Kremlin  had  gone  a  very  long  way  in  changing  its 
relations  with  the  external  world.  The  Foreign  Office  was  quite  aware  of  the 
importance  of  what  seemed  to  be  happening.  It  was  not  however  completely  apparent 
in  Whitehall  why  the  Soviets  had  become  so  pleasantly  reasonable  in  their  relations 
with  the  west.  Much  of  the  emphasis  in  their  explanations  revolved  around  the  Soviet 
search  for  diplomatic  advantage.  However,  the  weight  of  Soviet  good-will  had,  by 
Khrushchev's  visit  to  Yugoslavia,  become  so  heavy  as  strongly  to  suggest  that  what 
motivated  them  was  not  merely  realpolitik.  The  British  Embassy  in  Moscow  began  to 
notice  indications  that  the  nature  of  thermo-nuclear  war.  already  recognised  in  its  full 
horror  by  the  British,  was  causing  profound  concern  within  the  Soviet  Government. 
These  indications  were  still  confusing  and  unclear,  but  they  were  soon  to  crystallise. 
What  could  not  be  ignored  was  that  Soviet  foreign  policy  was  undergoing  a  change 
much  more  profound  than  anything  initiated  under  Malenkov.  As  Churchill's  great 
hope  for  a  Summit  grew  closer  to  its  epiphany,  this  impression  was  further 
strengthened  in  the  Foreign  Office.  The  expectations  raised  by  this  new  Soviet 
approach  to  the  outside  world  formed  the  background  to  the  Geneva  summit  itself. 
And  so  we  move  on  to  the  next  chapter. Chapter  4 
Prelude  to  the  Geneva  Summit,  1955 
Canute  and  the  Rising  Tide  of'  Soviet  Amity 
"I  think  we  have  been  right  to  emphasise  the  diplomatic  and  tactical  advantages  which 
the  Russians  see  in  reducing  tension  at  present...  On  the  other  hand,  I  also  agree  with 
Sir  William  Hayter  that  this  policy  stems  also  from  a  "truer  appreciation  of  the  nature 
of  modern  war'  . 
H.  A.  F.  Hohler. 
Because  of  the  July  1955  Geneva  Summit's  apparent  lack  of  fundamental  achievement 
it  tends  to  be  discounted  as  a  matter  of  no  importance  in  a  longer  view  of  East  West 
rivalry.  This,  arguably,  stems  from  a  misconception  as  to  where  the  Geneva  Meeting 
fitted  into  the  development  of  Soviet  policy  and  consequently  the  way  the  West  viewed 
and  fought  the  Cold  War.  Historiographically  the  Geneva  Summit  has  been  considered 
worthy  of  very  little  attention.  In  his  recent  work  on  the  Eden  government  Mr. 
Richard  Lamb  discussed  the  significance  of  the  Summit  in  a  few  short  paragraphs 
inserted  at  the  end  of  a  chapter  on  "The  Far  East  1954-56".  He  summed  up  its  place 
in  history  as  follows, 
The  1955  Geneva  four  power  summit  aroused  great  expectations  all  over  the 
world  because  it  was  the  First  gathering  since  the  end  of  the  war  of  the 
Communists  and  the  free  nations.  With  Stalin  dead  and  new  Soviet  leaders  in 
charge  there  were  high  hopes  of  a  new  atmosphere  of  conciliation.  These 
were  not  fulfilled,  although  during  the  six  days  of  proceedings  the  Russians 
gut  AJ  a  certain  amiability  which  became  known  as  "the  Geneva 
atmosphere".  I 
Equally  Lord  Blake,  in  his  survey  of  Britain's  twentieth  century  decline,  accords  a  slip 
of  a  paffe  to  the  summit  in  the  beginning  of  his  chapter  on  the  Suez  Crisis.  His 
treatment  is  no  less  dismissive  than  Lamb's.  '  Indeed  on  the  issue  of  Eden's  proposals 
for  the  unification  of  Germany  Lamb  does  Blake  the  honour  of  approving  quotation. 
This  view  is  also  very  much  that  of  Eden's  biographers,  the  summit  meeting  was 
conspicuous  by  its  lack  of  achievement.  They  accord  it  a  minimum  of  space  and  by 
implication,  as  much  as  by  direct  comment.  a  minimum  of  importance.  '  Macmillan's 
I  Richard  Lamb.  The  Failure  Of  the  Eden  Government,  p.  126.  The  Summit  meeting  is  dealt  with 
over  pp.  125-12-8. 
2  See  Robert  Blak..  The  Decline  uJ'Poitei-,  p.  359.  Blakt  Jisnit  es  it  with  the  follov.  win_  words,  now 
rather  dated. 
The  conference  came  to  nothinv.  Re-unification  of  Germany,  one  of  its  objectives,  was  and 
remains  unattainable...  Disarmament 
.  ,  he  other  ohjective.  was  too  closely  connected  with 
Germany  to  be  separately  soluble.  The  "Eisenhower  plan"  and  the  "Eden  plan"  are  part  of  the 
debris  of 
The  toollowin,  --  ununarise  the  treatment  to  it  h,.  Eden',  most  recent  hiw-zraphers.  D.  Carlton 
deal,  %%  ith  it  on  pp.  car  hi:.  -mntholt  E;  ic"n.  in  ww  hich  he  'onc  ntrates  on  the  inter-Istin-,  issue  of Chapter  4/  Pz+`,  --  SI 
official  biographer  is  no  more  spacious  in  his  treatment  of  the  Foreign  Secretary's  side 
to  the  first  "full-dress"  meeting  of  the  great  powers  since  Potsdam.  4  The  consignment 
of  the  Geneva  conference  to  the  status  of  irrelevant,  if  harmless,  side-show,  may  be 
taken  as  the  orthodox  line.  Perhaps  the  best  summary  of  this  assessment  being  Blake's 
grudging  last  words  on  the  issue,  "However  no  positive  ill  will  was  created  -  and  that 
was  something.  5 
Yet  this  compares  unfavourably  to  the  place  accorded  to  the  proceedings  in  the 
memoirs  of  both  Eden  and  Macmillan.  Eden  effectively  devotes  two  chapters  in  his 
memoirs,  to  the  diplomatic  build  up  and  the  actual  meeting  itself,  although  the  former 
is  hardly  extensive.  6  Macmillan  also  devotes  a  substantial  chapter  to  it,  perhaps 
unsurprisingly  given  that  this  was  one  of  the  most  dramatic  events  to  occur  during  his 
short  period  as  Foreign  Secretary.  However  the  point  is  that  they  both  attached 
considerable  importance  to  the  Geneva  Summit.  much  more  than  might  be  expected  if 
we  were  to  accept  Blake's  damnation  by  faint  praise.  In  his  memoirs  Eden  considered 
that  despite  the  lack  of  concrete  results,  "[T]he  Geneva  Conference  taught  some 
lessons,  which  were  powerfully  to  affect  the  course  of  events  in  the  next  few  years".  7 
Macmillan's  post  facto  account  also  places  emphasis  on  the  influence  that  his 
impression  of  Geneva  had  in  the  future  development  of  policy  towards  the  Soviet 
Union.  He  asserted,  "my  experience  at  Geneva  supported  me  in  the  efforts  I  was 
subsequently  to  make  as  Prime  Minister  towards  a  detente  with  Russia".  8 
There  seems  therefore  to  be  a  dichotomy  between  the  opinions  of  historians  and 
those  British  politicians  who  actually  took  part  at  the  time.  The  following  two  chapters 
are  largely  concerned  with  arguing  that  Eden  and  particularly  Macmillan  were  much 
more  perceptive  in  insight  than  their  late  twentieth  century  chroniclers.  The  Geneva 
summit  deserves  rather  more  than  the  fag  end  pages  to  which  it  has  tended 
retrospectively  to  be  consigned. 
If  as  Eden  and  Macmillan  we  look  at  the  summit  in  the  context  of  relations  with 
Russia,  rather  than  in  a  sweeping  narrative  of  British  policy,  for  two  reasons  Geneva 
becomes  a  significant  landmark.  It  can  be  seen  on  the  one  hand  as  a  culminating  point 
in  western  and  British  policy  which  started  with  Ernest  Bevin's  attempt  to  provide 
British  prestige  vis-a-vis  the  "super  powers".  R.  Rhodes-James  in  his  Anthony  Eden  on  pp.  417-18 
gives  it  still  less  space,  hardly  even  stopping  to  verbalise  its  inconsequence.  Ironically  for  one  so 
critical  of  the  taint  that  the  Suez  Crisis  has  _iven  to  much  of  what  has  been  written  about  Eden,  he 
spends  an  intemperate  amount  of  time  on  it  himself.  Indeed  to  this  extent  his  treatment  of  Eden's 
prime-ministership  up  to  July  1956  might  be  likened  to  the  hurried  overture  of  a  grand  opera. 
4  A.  Horne.  Afacmillan  1894-1956,  p.  361.  The  Summit  and  the  following  autumn's  Foreign 
Minister's  conference  are  squeezed  into  a  mere  two  paýges.  He  sums  up  Macmillan's  opinion  of  the 
meeting  as  follows,  "he...  was  left  with  a  strong  teelin_  that  they  really  wanted  detente  with  the 
West  not  war".  Home  however  does  not  give  the  slightest  indication  why  Macmillan  might  have 
thought  that  thy,  as  the  Nor  JoeS  he  spend  any  time  on  the  importance  such  a  conclusion 
have  had  in  the  eVUIutie)n  of-subsequent  thinkin`,  re  ardin`,  the  Soviet  Union  and  defence. 
5  The  Decline  of  P;  )\/er,  1).  359 
6  Full  Circle.  pp.  -2S8-3 
11.  Tides  ()Fortune  1945-55.  pp.  582-628. 
Full  Circle.  p.  306. 
8  Tales  cy'Fortune.  p.  o'-5. Chapter  4/  Pa, 
-,  e  82 
Europe  with  a  defence  against  the  Soviet  continental  threat.  At  Geneva  the  effective 
division  of  Europe  into  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  NATO  was,  de  facto,  accepted.  This 
was  signified  by  a  tacit  agreement  to  differ  over  the  reunification  of  Germany.  The 
second  point  has  as  much  to  do  with  the  way  in  which  negotiations  were  conducted 
rather  than  what  they  actually  achieved.  In  their  eagerness  to  persuade  the  West  that 
they  no  longer  harboured  any  illusions  as  to  the  destructive  capacity  of  thermonuclear 
weapons,  the  Soviets  implemented  changes  in  their  foreign  policy  which  were  by  the 
end  of  1955  to  lead  to  a  new  phase  in  the  cold  war.  If  measured  in  terms  of  concrete 
agreements  then  there  can  be  no  debating  that  Geneva  was  not  a  success.  for  there 
were  none.  And  this  despite  the  hopes  raised  in  the  west  and  the  involved  preparations 
of  all  three  western  parties.  But  the  burden  of  the  following  argument  is  that  such  an 
accounting  is  misconceived  in  its  premise. 
In  relation  to  how  the  cold  war  was  changing  the  Summit  might  be  taken  as  an 
interesting  example  of  Oscar  Wilde's  dictum  that  one  should  always  judge  by 
appearances.  What  seemed  important  to  Eden  and  Macmillan  was  that  the  Soviets 
were  keen  to  persuade  the  west  that  they  did  not  want  war.  Their  attitude  was  entirely 
pacific.  That  no  agreement  on  concrete  matters  was  achieved  was  in  that  sense 
immaterial.  Geneva  was  taken  by  the  British  as  the  first  irrefutable  indication  that  the 
Soviet  Union  shared  the  west's  appreciation  of  the  utter  destruction  which  a  nuclear 
exchange  would  cause.  The  British  concluded  from  the  Soviets  new  found  love  of 
amiable  atmospherics  that  deterrence  was  a  viable  policy  of  defence.  9  This  is  the 
kernel  of  the  meeting's  importance  in  the  metamorphosis  of  the  cold  war.  However 
detailed  the  diplomatic  proposals  may  have  been.  they  are  basically  subsidiary  to  the 
symbolic  importance  of  the  Summit  Meeting. 
However,  before  fleshing  out  these  conclusions  as  to  the  Summit's  real  place  in 
the  development  of  Britain's  understanding  of  Soviet  foreign  policy,  some  account 
must  be  taken  of  the  events  that  lead  up  to,  and  those  that  took  place  during,  the 
Summit.  This  is  not  least  because  whatever  Britain's  post-summit  conclusions  were  to 
be,  they  prepared  for  the  meeting  in  the  serious  hope  of  arriving  at  settlements,  most 
crucially  over  Germany.  In  this  their  emphasis  differed  slightly  from  the  American. 
9  See  Alistair  Home.  Macmillan,  195,7-1986,  pp.  45-55,  for  a  discussion  of  Macmillan's  approach  to 
deterrence  and  defence  reductions  as  Prime  Minister.  From  1955  Vlacmillan's  thinking  was  based 
upon  the  presumption  that  neither  side  in  the  Cold  War  was  prepared  to  resolve  their  rivalry  by  an 
all-out  .  kar  which  would  inevitably  use  thenno-nuclear  weaponry.  For  a  recent  examination  of 
British  defence  policy  'oncentratin`_  on  the  development  and  implications  of  deterrence  see  Martin 
S.  Navias.  Nuclear  ýý'ett,  ons"  and  British  Strureýrc  Planning,  1955-58.  Navias  concentrates  on  the 
SandyS'  \Vhite  Paper  at  1957  and  its  ancestr  .  although  he  does  not  seem  to  brines  into  account  the 
change,,  which  the  British  Government  perceived  in  Soviet  foreign  policy  between  1952  and  1956. 
In  order  to  make  'hermonuclear  deterrence  the  corner  'tone  of  defence  policy  it  would  seem 
essential  to  he  sure  that  the  enemy  %,,:  º.  indeed  liable  to  he  deterred.  lt 
.,  -as  only  in  1955  that  the 
British  became  convinced  that  the  Soviet  leadership  believed  global  nuclear  war  to  be  a  grotesque 
futility. Chapter  4/  Page  83 
An  agreement  on  German  unirication  remained  the  single  most  important  issue  for 
the  British  in  "parleying"  vv  ith  the  Soviets  until  the  September  of  1955.10  On  this 
issue  the  British  government  seems  to  have  been  quite  sincere  in  its  laboured  attempts 
to  come  up  With  some  answer  to  the  conundrum.  Furthermore  it  was  an  issue  which 
they  were  to  put  before  disarmament  as  the  prerequisite  to  any  solid  progress  on  a 
wider  East  West  agreement.  Indeed  despite  Macmillan's  conception  of  the  summit  as 
a  generalised  discussion  preliminary  to  further  specific  talks,  rather  than  a  Yaltaesque 
end  in  itself,  the  British  were  to  put  together  very  detailed  proposals  on  German 
unification.  It  was  only  because  of  American  opposition  that  Britain's  specific  plans 
were  not  actually  tabled.  During  the  pre-conference  discussions  with  the  Americans  it 
was  to  become  apparent  that  the  American  view  was  not  synonymous  with  that  of  the 
British. 
Geneva  came  as  the  happy  contluence  of  developments  in  a  number  of  countries. 
On  the  American  side,  for  somewhat  similar  reasons  as  the  British,  the  situation 
increasingly  seemed  to  favour  the  calling  of  a  summit.  In  Eisenhower's  words,, 
Some  two  years  [from  the  death  of  Stalin]  went  by  with  no  positive  results  in 
developing  a  promising  basis  for  high-level  negotiation  in  spite  of  some  new 
and,  we  thought,  reasonable  proposals  concerning  disarmament  and  atoms- 
for-peace.  Then,  in  early  spring,  1955,  there  seemed  to  arise  a  new  wave  of 
interest.  The  Western  European  Union  was  now  a  fact.  More  and  more  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  influential  voices  joined  in  the  chorus...  11 
According  to  Eisenhower's  biographer  the  crucial  factor  was  the  startling  change  in  the 
Soviet  attitude  to  a  number  of  international  problems  and  in  particular  Austria.  12  On 
23rd  November,  1954,  Eisenhower  had  stated  that  he  was  prepared  to  enter  into 
summit  talks  with  the  Soviets  once  they  had  demonstrated  their  good  faith  in  the  shape 
of  an  Austrian  treaty  agreeable  to  the  West.  l'  After  this  came  to  pass  in  the  May  of 
1955  the  way  to  Geneva  inevitably  opened  up. 
In  all  of  this  the  western  powers  played  an  essentially  reactive  part.  The  greatest 
dynamic  force  in  international  politics  in  1955  was  the  Soviet  Union.  It  was  after  all 
they  who  met  the  "tests"  as  set  out  by  the  Americans  and  British.  All  of  which  lead  to 
the  question,  what  where  the  Soviets  trying  to  achieve? 
10  See  below  on  the  actual  substance  of  the  Geneva  negotiations.  In  his  26th  March 
, 
1955,  Note  to 
the  Cabinet  (see  beginning  of  Chapter  Three),  Eden  made  the  followim-,  observation  on  the  chances 
of  an  agreement  on  disarmament, 
Dis-armament  and  the  Hydrogen  Bomb  -  The  prospect  of  any  a`reement  is  so  remote  that 
discussion  on  these  lines  would  he  better  avoided  for  the  time  hein_.  But  since  these  issues  are 
so  fundamental  to  the  relax.  ition  of  tension,  we  should  hope.  by  achieving  settlements  on  other 
and  narrower  issues  to  prepare  the  `.  round  for  a  subsequent  accommodation. 
The,  last  sentence  is  very  much  .º 
key  note  in  Eden',  diplomacy,  see  Full  Circle  p.  9. 
11  Munclatefor  Chanw,  p.  505. 
12  Eisenhoº.  ver.  The  President,  pp.  247-249. 
13  ibid..  p.  246. Charter  4/  Pa`,  e  84 
THE  FOREIGN  OFFICE  EXPLANATION 
After  the  Soviet  disarmament  proposals  of  the  10th  May  the  way  to  a  Summit  meeting 
appeared  clear  to  the  British.  t4  Once  the  inevitable  diplomatic  "footsie"  over  dates 
and  places  was  over  the  Soviets  sent  their  final  note  of  13th  June  concurring  in  the 
calling  of  the  summit  on  the  18th  July  in  Geneva.  15  In  this  note  the  Soviets  made  it 
quite  clear  what  they  considered  Geneva  to  be  all  about, 
In  the  present  circumstances  the  efforts  of  the  governments  of  all  the  four 
participating  Powers  in  the  conference  must  be  directed  above  all  to  ensure 
the  achievement  of  the  basic  task  of  the  meeting  -  the  relaxation  of  tension  in 
international  affairs. 
The  first  round  of  extensive  bilateral  discussions  between  the  British  and 
Americans  regarding  their  policy  at  the  summit  had  already  begun  on  the  2nd  June.  t6 
At  this  meeting,  according  to  Sir  Rodger  Nlakins'  report,  the  British  submitted  a 
Foreign  Office  paper  which  outlined  their  attitude  towards  Geneva.  The  Western  aims 
were  set  out  on  very  much  the  same  lines  is  Eden's  note  to  the  Cabinet  of  26th  March. 
As  the  West  was  considered  to  be  at  a  high  point  of  strength  and  unity  which  might  not 
last,  the  time  was  right,  according  to  the  paper,  for  negotiations  with  the  Soviets. 
Disarmament,  rather  than  German  reunification,  was  given  centre  stage  as  the 
summit's  most  important  task.  17  Although  the  Foreign  Office  did  stress  the 
importance  of  making  a  serious  attempt  to  solve  the  German  problem,  lest  the  West 
Germans  become  disillusioned  and  prey  to  Soviet  blandishments.  18  The  Americans, 
Makins  reported,  were  in  agreement  with  most  of  the  above  Foreign  Office 
assessment.  However  matters  were  not  to  rest  on  this  convenient  point.  In  particular, 
Eden  quickly  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  key  issue  of  the  conference  ought  to  be 
14  These  proposals  were  regarded  with  considerably  less  enthusiasm  by  the  Americans.  This  Dulles 
explained  as  a  consequence  of  differences  between  the  American  and  the  British  and  French  views 
on  disarmament.  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol.  V,  p.  182:  Memo  of  discussion  at  249th  Meeting  of  the 
National  Security  Council,  19th  May,  1955. 
15  PREM  11/894,  Tele,:  ram  No.  573,13th  June  1955,  from  Havter.  Moscow  to  F.  0. 
16  PREN1  11/894,  Telegram.  2nd  June  1955,  from  Makins.  Washington  to  F.  0. 
17  PREM  11/894,  Tele  ram,  2nd  June  1955,  from  Niakins  to  F.  0.. 
The  entry  into  force  of  the  Paris 
. 
A`reements  has  created  a  new  situation  in  that  Western 
stren_,  th  and  cohesion  relative  to  the  Soviet  Union  has  reached  a  point  unlikely  to  he  exceeded 
in  the  foreseeable  future.  Indeed,  the  further  development  of  thereto-nuclear  weapons,  perhaps 
resulting  in  "saturation",  could  conceivably  alter  the  position  in  a  few  years  to  our 
Jisadvanta_,  e.  Havin,,  at  the  moment  a  comparatively  firm  position  ,  we  are  interested  in 
making  firm  pro,,  ress  towards  a  really  effective  disarmament  plan  ... 
In  addition  we  seek  the 
reunification  or  Germany  on  acceptable  terms  ... 
In  a  letter  of  the  13th  June,  155,  Dulles  was  to  make  a  similar  point  about  the  impact  of  Western 
solidarity  upon  Soviet  foreign  policy  to  Adenauer.  FRCS  1955-57,  Vol.  V,  p.  79. 
IS  This  follows  almost  exactly  alon`_  the  lines  of  Eden'>  analysis  of  the  German  situation  in  his  note  to 
the  Cabinet  of  the  26th  March.  This  is  though  hardly  surprisin_-.  _given  that  both  were  --ssentially 
the  creation  of  the  Foreign  Ottice.  See  chapter  t\%,  o. Chapter  4/  Pave  85 
German  reunitication,  there  being  very  little  hope  that  discussions  over  disarmament 
might  lead  to  any  success. 
More  interesting  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  was  the  Foreign  office's  summation 
of  why  the  Soviets  had  become  converted  to  summit  diplomacy.  19  The  paper  set  out 
the  following  "assumptions"  on  Soviet  policy, 
We  assume  that  the  long  term  Soviet  aims  have  remained  unchanged.  The 
greater  flexibility  which  Soviet  policy  has  recently  shown  nii2ht  be  ascribed 
merely  to  a  desire  to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  Paris  Agreements.  which  is 
now  the  major  immediate  objective  of  Soviet  policy  in  Europe.  On  the  other 
hand,  this  greater  flexibility  may  have  other  causes.  The  Soviet  Union  is 
faced  with  internal  and  external  difficulties.  The  internal  struggle  for  power 
may  be  unresolved;  we  know  that  the  Soviet  economy  is  over-strained  and 
unbalanced  and  the  Soviet  Government  may  be  genuinely  concerned  at  the 
added  burden  laid  on  the  economy  by  the  exorbitant  cost  of  modern  weapons. 
The  Russians  may  also  find  the  Chinese  hard  to  handle.  In  addition  while  the 
Soviet  leaders  may  seek  a  relaxation  of  international  tension  mainly  with  a 
view  to  getting  the  West  to  drop  its  guard,  it  is  probable  that  they  are  also 
genuinely  alarmed  about  thermo-nuclear  war.  But,  since  the  Soviet 
government  still  assume  that  Communism  will  eventually  win  the  world,  they 
believe  that  time  is  on  their  side  and  wish,  at  the  moment,  to  buy  time. 
Apart  from  the  suspicion  of  Soviet  motives,  in  particular  the  old  chestnut  which  had 
been  used  against  Churchill  that  the  Soviets  would  merely  use  summitry  as  one  more 
weapon  in  the  cold  war,  the  above  is  an  interesting  indicator  as  to  the  British  position 
on  thermo-nuclear  deterrence.  The  view  on  Soviet  attitudes  towards  global  war  were 
very  much  the  same  as  those  expressed  in  1952.20  The  Foreign  Office  concluded  that 
as  Soviet  ideology  remained  inflexible  on  the  issue  of  its  inexorable  march  to  global 
triumph,  there  could  be  no  fundamental  change  in  its  policy.  The  Soviet  interest  was 
in  delaying  the  inevitable  hour  until  a  more  propitious  time  of  western  weakness.  This 
was  a  view  which  the  Moscow  Embassy  itself  and  crucially  Macmillan  were 
increasingly  calling  into  question.  '-1  It  was  also  an  orthodoxy  which  as  a  result  of  their 
experiences  at  Geneva  the  British  Government  was  to  discard  with  very  far  reaching 
implications  for  future  policy. 
The  Moscow  Embassy  had  already  contributed  a  report  on  the  ist  June  outlining 
its  view  of  developments  in  Soviet  policy  for  the  coming  Summit.  -  This  report  should 
be  seen  as  a  harbinger  and  consequently  deserves  close  attention.  After  remarking  on 
19  It  is  little  wonder  that  the  American  and  British  officials  in  Washington  should  have  been  in  concord 
as  American  intelligence  estimations  of  Soviet  policy  were  more  or  less  the  same  as  that  set  out  by 
Makins'  paper.  See  FR  US  1955  -57,  Vol.  V,  p.  ?  47;  Memo  from  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
to  the  Executive  Secretary  of  the  National  Security  Council,  Ist  July,  1955. 
20  See  chapter  two  above  on  the  Foreign  Office's  interpretation  of  late  Stalinism  attitude  to  "frightful 
collisions". 
21  For  Example  Hayter's  comments  on  the,  Tripartite  Workini  Partys  conclusions  on  the  issue  of  the 
Conterence's  opening  statements,  PREI  11/894,  TelC,  ram  No.  5  76.  June  15th  1955;  from  Hayter, 
Moscow  to  F.  0. 
'ý  PRE,  %1  1111015,  Despatch,  June  ist  1955:  Hcty  tur.  M'I005c0  w  to  Macmillan. Chapter  4/  Pa, 
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the  change  which  the  "Khrushchev-Bul;  anin  era"  had  brought  to  Soviet  foreign  policy 
-  matching  Malenkov's  peaceful  words,  but  quite  surpassing  him  in  putting  them  into 
action  -  Hayter  emphasised  the  novelty  of  what  %ýas  happening, 
[T]he  Russians  have  now  met  all  these  "tests",  almost  it  seems  of  set  purpose 
to  demonstrate  their  willingness  to  negotiate  (though  of  course  action  they 
have  taken  in  each  case  can  be  justified  on  the  grounds  of  Soviet  interests). 
Austria  is  settled...  Disarmament  proposals  have  been  made  which,  whatever 
we  may  think  of  them,  are  at  least  a  major  advance  on  previous  Soviet 
positions  and  look  plausible...  they  have  accepted  without  any  skulking  and 
even  with  surprising  meekness  (very  unlike  their  argumentative  recalcitrance 
in  the  period  preceding  last  years  Berlin  Conference)  the  general  outline  of 
our  proposals  for  a  Four-Power  meeting.  There  is  another  remarkable  change 
in  their  general  attitude.  Even  during  the  Malenkov  period  the  Soviet 
Government  never  admitted  that  neutrals  could  exist...  All  this  has  changed. 
Not  only  are  existing  neutrals  recognised  as  such,  but  new  ones  are  anxiously 
created. 
Despite  what  Hayter  referred  to  as  Soviet  "doublethink,  or  even  treble-think"  in 
maintaining  that  their  policy  had  not  in  fact  changed,  it  was  indisputable  that  there  had 
been  a  fundamental  shift.  Not  that  this  meant  that  the  Soviets  had  relinquished  their 
designs  for  World  Socialism,  but  that, 
The  truth  is  perhaps  that  there  has  been  a  change  in  the  methods  of  reaching 
that  objective,  a  change  brought  about  by  a  more  realistic  appreciation  of  the 
world  situation.  The  Communist  leaders,  viewing  the  world  as  it  is  and  not  as 
it  was  distorted  by  Stalin's  senile  megalomania,  Must  realise  that  methods  of 
menace  and  violence  will  not  now  succeed.  Not  only  has  the  West  managed 
to  consolidate  and  strengthen  itself,  but  the  level  and  still  more  the  character 
of  modern  armaments  are  such  that  forcible  action  has  no  future,  the  Soviet 
Government  never  probably  contemplated  initiating  forcible  action.  But  they 
could  regard  it  with  a  certain  equanimity  which  has  now  gone.  In  these 
circumstances  they  must  obviously  re-think  their  whole  political  strategy.  We 
can  only  guess  where  this  re-thinking  will  have  lead  them,  since  unlike  the 
leaders  of  free  countries  they  are  not  obliged  to  announce  and  justify  their 
policies  to  the  public. 
Hayter  continued  despite  the  last  sentence  above  to  lay  out  his  prognosis  of  Soviet 
policy.  He  ended  by  emphasising  that  though  Soviet  tactics  might  have  changed  the 
fundamental  purpose  was  the  same.  conclusion  which  was  summed  up  in  the 
following  vaguely  condescending  way, 
They  are  intelligent  enough  to  want  international  peace  and  to  realise  that  a 
price  must  be  paid  for  it.  But  fundamentally  they  remain  convinced 
communists  and  believers  in  the  necessity  for  world  communism. Chapter  4/  Pa, 
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Following  on  from  this  in  a  telegram  of  the  13th  June,  1955,  Hayter  reported  on  a 
conversation  which  the  American  Ambassador,  Charles  Bohlen  had  had  with  Marshal 
Zhukov  and,  in  particular,  on  an  article  that  Zhukov  had  contributed  to  Pravda  on  the 
8th  May.  23  Both  of  these  dealt  with  the  issue  of  thermonuclear  war.  In  his  article,  the 
Embassy  reported.  Zhukov  had  made  the  following  startling  assertion, 
It  is  surprising  how  the  leading  experts,  and  especially  those  of  Britain,  can 
adopt  such  an  irresponsible  attitude  to  the  problem  of  atomic  and  hydrogen 
warfare.  We  military  men  realise  more  clearly  than  anyone  else  the  utterly 
devastating  nature  of  such  a  war.  One  need  but  imagine  what  would  happen. 
[Foreign  Office  underlining] 
Hayter  also  pointed  out  that  some  of  Zhukov's  Pravda  comment  had  actually  been 
suppressed,  he  thought  that  it  was  probable  Zhukov  had  ;  one  on  to  make  even  more 
explicit  the  true  horror  of  thermonuclear  war.  Zhukov's  conversation  with  Bohlen 
supported  what  he  had  said  in  his  article.  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  wrote  an  acute  minute  of 
16th  June  in  which  he  posed  questions  leading  on  from  the  Embassy's  report  of 
Zhukov's  written  and  spoken  opinions.  24  After  discussing  the  political  leadership's 
possible  position  on  the  matter,  Hohler  came  to  the  following  conclusions, 
I  am,  therefore,  inclined  to  feel  that,  although  the  Party  leaders  may  not  know 
quite  as  much  about  fall-out  as  Zhukov,  they  have  a  pretty  shrewd  idea  of 
what  nuclear  war  would  involve.  But  they  may  not  wish  to  say  so  publicly 
since:  -  (i)  they  fear  the  effect  of  the  truth  on  Soviet  morale,  especially  given 
the  fatalistic  streak  in  the  Russian  character;  (ii)  The  theory  that  another  war 
would  mean  the  end  of  civilisation  makes  nonsense  of  the  dialectic.  It  is 
difficult  for  them  publicly  to  subscribe  to  a  doctrine  which  would  undermine 
the  foundations  of  Marxist-Leninism. 
Hohler  ended  his  minute  tentatively, 
All  this  is  of  course  very  speculative.  I  think  we  have  been  right  to  emphasise 
the  diplomatic  and  tactical  advantages  which  the  Russians  see  in  reducing 
tension  at  present.  These  are,  briefly,  that  it  will  cause  the  West  to  drop  its 
guard  and  may  contribute  to  the  non-execution  of  the  Paris-Agreements  and 
the  eventual  withdrawal  of  United  States  forces  from  Europe.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  also  agree  with  Sir  William  Hayter  that  this  policy  stems  also  from  a 
"truer  appreciation  of  the  nature  of  modern  war".  15 
23  FO  371  116742  NS  1242/15G,  Telegram  No  569,13th  June  1955;  from  Hayter  Moscow  to 
CANUTE.  The  G.  suffix  denotes  a  oreen  guard  tilg  used  for  matters  top  secret. 
24  FO  371  116742  NS  1242/15G,  Nl  inute  of  16th  June  1955  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler. 
25  ibid.,  Hohler's  reasoning  went  as  follows, 
Among  the  questions  which  Marshal  Zhukov's  statement  poses  are:  -  (a)  Is  there  a  division  of 
Opinion  between  hirn  and  the  Parry  leaders  about  the  implications  of  nuclear  war.  On  the  face 
of  it  there  would  appear  to  he.  Malenkov  said  a  year  ago  that  a  new  world  war  would  mean 
the  end  of  civilisation.  Zhukov's  remarks  suggest  that  he  may  think  the  same.  But  this  view 
has  become  unfashionable,  even  heretical  of  late  and  Molotov  and  the  others  have  been  striking 
the  note  that  another  war  would  rather  mean  the  downfall  of  capitalism.  However:  -  (i) Chapter  4/  Page  88 
It  was  becomin`,  apparent  to  the  Northern  Department,  as  well  as  the  Moscow 
Embassy,  that  a  process  of  reappraisal  was  underway  in  Soviet  foreign  policy.  Their 
reaction  to  the  destructive  capacity  which  science  had  recently  unleashed  was 
influencing  a  fundamental  change  in  their  attitude  towards  the  cold  war.  It  was  no 
longer  sufficient  to  explain  Soviet  policy  merely  by  reference  to  the  increasing  strength 
of  Western  organisation  or  weaknesses  in  Soviet  economy  and  society.  Hohler  in  his 
minute  pin-pointed  the  contradictions  which  Khrushchev  was  finally  to  grapple  with 
head  on,  regardless  of  "Russian  fatalism",  at  the  20th  party  Congress  in  the  February 
of  1956.  In  June  1955  the  conclusions  which  Hayter  and  Hohler  expressed  were  still 
couched  in  cautious  terms,  which  is  in  itself  indicative  of  the  radical  nature  of  the 
change  which  they  were  commenting  upon.  The  Soviets  were  themselves  quite  blunt 
about  their  hopes  for  the  summit.  The  British  conviction  that  the  Soviets  had  at  last 
accepted  the  awful  equation  that  war  equalled  mutual  devastation  was  to  be  further 
reinforced  by  the  proceedings  at  Geneva. 
THE  BRITISH  PREPARE  FOR  THE  SUMMIT 
In  true  cabinet  tradition  a  committee  had  been  set  up  consisting  of  the  principal 
members  of  the  government  to  deal  with  planning  and  preparation  for  Geneva.  It  held 
its  first  meeting  on  the  lath  June,  1955,  in  the  Prime  , Minister's  room  in  the  House  of 
Commons  and  was  called  rather  appropriately  CANUTE.  Whether  this  was  intentional 
irony  is  not  clear,  the  name  did  though  prove  singularly  prescient.  However  there  is 
very  little  information  available  on  its  actual  proceedings.  26  The  reverse  is  true  of  the 
planning  papers  which  it  spawned.  Preparations  for  Geneva  had  begun  in  earnest. 
Eden  was  himself  quite  clear  what  was  of  crucial  importance  to  the  summit's 
work.  He  made  his  opinions  known  to  Macmillan  melodramatically  in  comments  on 
the  jointly  agreed  recommendations  for  the  content  of  Eden's,  Eisenhower's  and 
Faure's  opening  addresses  to  the  conference.  The  recommendations  were  relayed  from 
Khrushchev,  Buh-,  anin  and  Molotov  have  all  been  identified  with  the  current,  more  flexible, 
Soviet  policies;  (ii)  The  Yugoslavs  `_ot  the  impression  at  Bel__rade,  presumably  from 
Khrushchev,  Bulv,  anin  or  \likoyan,  that  the  Russians  might  he  prepared  to  compromise  on 
disarmament  (para.  6  of  Bel-,  rade  Telegram  No.  421);  (iii)  dir.  \ialik,  who  is  a  member  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party,  suz«ested  in  a  recent  conversation  with  the 
Permanent  Under  Secretary  that  he  too  subscribed  to  the  bourgeois  theory  that  war  might  spell 
the  doom  of  civilisation. 
26  In  the  PRENI  Il  tiles  on  the  Geneva  Summit  meeting.  nlOst  of  the  minutes  of  the  proceedings  of 
CANUTE  have  been  1Cstrovzcl,  :  avin,  the  last  one.  This  '  as  usual  policy  for  copies  of  cabinet 
papers  tiled  in  non-cabinet:  tiles  and  it  is  a  little  stranl-lc  that  one  should  have  escaped  the  attentions 
of  the  weeders.  Ho  ever  in  the  Cabinet  papers,  where  the  ori,  -, 
inals  should  he  lodged.  I  have  not 
been  able  to  locate  the  minutes  either.  It  seems  therefore  reamonahle  to  presume  that  they  have  not 
vet  been  opened  ;o  public  inspection.  There  is  in  the  PREM  II  riles  an  apparently  almost  complete 
record  of  the  telegrams.  reports.  notes  and  memorandum  sent  to  and  created  by  and  for  CANUTE. 
Also  there  are  the  telegrams  and  memos  \'ritten  individually  by  Eden  and  `lacm.  illan.  These 
contnhute  to  to  very  Vizeahle  riles  indeed.  From  this  information  the  above  picture  of  British 
policy'  has  been  reconstructed. Chapter  4/  Page  89 
the  Tripartite  Working  Group,  which  had  been  set  up  in  Washington  early  in  June,  by 
Embassy  telegram  of  the  1  Ith  of  that  month.  27  The  Americans  wanted  to  speak  on  the 
satellites  and  international  communism;  the  French  wanted  to  speak  on  Germany  and 
European  security.  Eden  was  then  left  with  disarmament  and  the  H-bomb.  At  this 
point  it  becomes  apparent  that  Eden  and  his  Foreign  Secretary  did  not  necessarily  see 
eye  to  eye.  In  a  minute  of  June  14th  on  these  proposals  Macmillan  expressed  the 
opinion  that  as  there  was  little  constructive  to  be  said  on  any  of  the  issues  the  French 
and  Americans  had  taken,  "It  seems  to  nie  that  you  will  have  the  best  of  it".  The 
Foreign  Secretary  was  apparently  quite  happy  with  the  way  in  which  western 
preparations  for  the  Summit  were  shaping  L11).  28  However,  on  Macmillan's  minute 
Eden  responded  in  his  inimitable  red  ink  scribbles  that  Germany  and  European 
security,  rather  than  disarmament,  were  in  fact  the  heart  of  the  matter.  These  were  the 
issues  on  which  the  conference  should  be  concentrating  and  upon  which  he  should  not 
be  excluded  from  expressing  an  opinion.  True  to  his  fabled  ballerina  temperament  he 
continued, 
This  is  just  nonsense  we  are  not  staging  a  play  I  must  be  free  to  say  what  I 
like.  I  have  already  said  this  once.  Apparently  one  has  to  say  everything  2  or 
3  times  about  this  conference.  A.  E.  June  15  [Eden's  punctuation].  29 
Sir  William  Hayter  also  had  reservations  about  the  attitude  the  Tripartite  planners 
in  Washington  seemed  to  be  taking  towards  the  Russians.  In  a  telegram  of  15th  June 
he  expressed  the  hope  that  the  opening  statements  would  not,  given  the  recent 
indications  of  change  in  Soviet  policy,  lead  merely  to  rehashing  past  recriminations  as 
he  feared  the  Washington  telegram  of  1  lth  line  seemed  to  auger.  30  He  did  not  think 
27  PREM  11/894,  Telegram  No.  1370,1  1  th  June  1955,  from  Makins,  Washington,  to  F.  0.  The 
British  were  to  deal  with  the  following, 
(a)  the  build  up  of  Russian  and  (sic)  military  forces  in  the  cold  war;  (h)  the  collective  defence 
arrangements  of  the  West;  (c)  the  burden  of  armaments  and  the  danger  of  the  H-bomb;  (d) 
general  disarmament;  (e)  opportunities  for  the  development  of  world  resources. 
There  is  an  American  record  of  these  discussions  at  FRUS  195-57,  Vol.  V,  pp.  119-360. 
28  PREM  11/894.  June  14th  1955,  Minute  to  Prime  Minister  from  Foreign  Secretary.  This  is  also  an 
interesting  indication  of  where  Macmillan's  thinking  was  to  lead.  In  this  minute  he  quite  clearly 
saw  the  issue  of  armaments,  and  particularly  nuclear  weapons,  as  the  most  important  the  summit 
would  have  to  deal  with.  He  treats  Germany  in  rather  a  dismissive  way.  Eden's  actual  address  (see 
below)  was  to  start  after  all  with  a  striking  depiction  of  the  thermo-nuclear  "stand  off"  in  which 
both  east  and  west  found  themselves.  Makins'  telegram  of  June  11th,  No.  1370,  had  ended  on  the 
forlorn  hope  that,  "I  should  he  __rateful  if  you  would  let  me  know  as  soon  as  possible  if  this  is  likely 
to  he  agreeable  to  the  Prime  Minister". 
29  In  a  more  measured  style  Eden  worked  these  words  into  his  memoirs  thus,  Full  Circle,  p.  291, 
The  more  detailed  preparations  were  ºnade  at  the  official  level  in  Washington.  I  thought  that 
these  were  committing  u.  to  too  detailed  a  pro-gramme.  Jividin-,  up  the  topics  which  each  Head 
of  Government  should  raise.  I  did  not  think  wC  should  he  staging  a  play,  but  ought  to  allow 
each  other  plenty  of  room  for  manoeuvre  to  make  use  of  such  indications  as  there  were  of 
chances  in  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
30  PRE.  Iv1  11/894.  Tcleý_rdm  No.  576.  June  15th  I953;  from  Havter,  Moscow  to  F.  0. Chapter  4/  Page  90 
that  the  west  should  "talk  to  Bulganin  as  if  he  were  Stalin".  31  The  view  taken  by  the 
some  in  the  Foreign  Office  seemed  to  be  closer  to  that  of  Eden  than  Macmillan. 
From  this  point  onwards,  in  line  with  Eden's  opinion,  British  planning  for  the 
conference  was  largely  taken  up  with  the  question  of  German  unity  and  in  particular 
the  "Eden  Plan",  rather  than  disarmament.  It  was  felt  that  this  issue  might  provide  the 
common  ground  necessary  for  the  development  of  a  broader  settlement.  32  Indeed  in  a 
Foreign  Office  brief  submitted  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  the  CANUTE  committee  on 
the  29th  June  disarmament  was  dismissively  treated  thus, 
While  it  has  been  agreed  that  disarmament  should  be  one  of  the  subjects  to  be 
discussed  at  the  4-Power  Talks,  we  do  not  consider  that  it  should  be  discussed 
in  any  detail,  as  it  is  a  highly  technical  problem  and  not  suitable  for  detailed 
consideration  at  this  level.  33 
Although  the  brief  went  on  to  make  clear  that  the  West  should  be  prepared  to  deal  with 
any  Soviet  suggestions  which  might  arise,  there  was  to  be  no  Eden  Plan  for 
disarmament.  34  It  would  seem 
that  Macmillan  was  quickly  brought  round  to  Eden's 
approach. 
From  as  early  as  Eden's  first  mooting  of  a  summit  meeting  to  the  Cabinet  in 
March  the  issue  of  German  unity  had  been  at  the  forefront  of  his  thinking.  The 
realisation  that  a  serious  attempt  would  have  to  be  made  to  get  a  solution  agreeable  to 
east  and  west,  at  least  to  keep  German  public  opinion  quiet,  was  reinforced  by  Soviet 
attempts  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  Adenauer.  35  On  June  7th  the  Soviet 
Government  sent  a  note  to  Bonn  proposing  the  opening  up  of  formal  diplomatic 
relations  with  West  Germany.  36  Macmillan  arrived  for  his  quadripartite  talks  in  New 
31  This  was  a  phrase  which  was  to  enter  Eden's  memoirs  unacknowledged,  Full  Circle,  p.  291, 
32  See  Full  Circle,  pp.  292-294  and  Tides  of  Forrune,  p.  605. 
33  PREM  11/894,  F.  O.  Brief,  June  29th,  1955.  During  the  first  meeting  of  CANUTE  Macmillan  had 
been  asked  to  provide  the  brief  for  the  benefit  of  the  committee.  This  information  is  imparted  by  a 
covering  note  on  the  brief  by  A.  E.  Burroughs  of  the  Foreign  Office. 
34  ibid.,  On  the  issue  of  abolition  of  nuclear  weapons  the  brief  summed  up  the  international  status  quo 
as  follows, 
The  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  also  accepted  an  Anglo-French  proposal  that  [nuclear  weapons]  should  be 
totally  prohibited  after  75  %  of  the  reductions  in  conventional  forces  have  been  completed,  and 
that  the  conversion  of  all  nuclear  stocks  to  peaceful  uses  should  begin  at  this  point.  This 
proposal  was  a  compromise  between  the  previous  Western  view  that  the  prohibition  and 
elimination  of  nuclear  weapons  should  come  after  100%  of  the  conventional  reduction  had 
accrued  and  the  Soviet  view  that  it  should  come  at  the  50%  point.  Once  again  the  United 
States  and  the  Canadians  have  not  yet  accepted  it  for  themselves. 
Macmillan's  thinking  was  to  take  a  new  and  rather  more  controversial  line  on  the  issue  of  the 
abolition  of  nuclear  weapons  after  the  Summit  was  over. 
35  The  Soviets  had  begun  their  extension  of  feelers  towards  Bonn  as  far  hack  as  1954,  according  to 
Dallin,  see  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  After  Stalin.  pp.  261-63. 
36  For  the  full  text  of  this  note  see  H.  Hanak,  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  since  the  Death  of  Stalin,  pp.  57- 
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York  on  16th  June  with  a  brief  including  the  following  telegrams  from  the  British 
Embassies  in  Bonn  and  Moscow  on  this  new  Kremlin  gambit.  37 
Hayter  was  quite  clear  as  to  what  the  Soviets  hoped  to  do,  although  he  did  not 
think  that  it  implied  that  they  were  about  to  abandon  East  Germany;  unless  they  could 
find  some  settlement  more  to  their  advantage.  He  expressed  surprise  that  the  Soviet 
move,  inevitable  though  it  was,  should  have  cone  so  quickly,  only  a  few  months 
previously  Adenauer  had  always  been  referred  to  as  a  "revanchist".  It  was  another 
example  of  "crude  and  hasty  Khrushchev  diplomacy"  which,  in  his  opinion,  would  be 
best  treated  coolly. 
The  conclusions  seem  to  be  that:  (a)  The  Russians  are  in  a  hurry.  They  fear 
that  unless  they  intervene  rapidly  the  German  situation  will  crystallise  in  a 
sense  unfavourable  to  them.  (b)  But  they  think  that  the  German  longing  for 
reunion  is  so  strong  that  they  can  get  the  West  Germans  onto  a  slippery  slope, 
ending  in  a  form  of  reunion  that  will  suit  Soviet  aims.  As  seen  from  here, 
Adenauer's  position  seems  quite  a  strong  one,  and  it  hardly  seems  as  if  he 
need  fall  in  with  the  Soviet  desire  for  speed. 
Sir  F.  Hoyer  Miller,  the  Ambassador  to  West  Germany,  was  even  more  sanguine 
as  to  the  positive  side  of  the  Soviet  move.  He  considered  that  the  opening  of 
diplomatic  links  might  even  have  the  salutary  effect  of  opening  German  eyes  fully  to 
the  fact  that  it  was  Soviet  intransigence  which  stood  in  the  way  of  reunification. 
Adenauer  had  made  it  clear  that,  given  the  pressure  of  public  opinion,  there  was  no 
doubt  that  he  would  have  to  agree  to  the  Soviet  suggestion.  Although  he  was  quite 
prepared  to  take  both  time  and  full  consultations  with  his  allies  over  the  issue. 
Adenauer  was  in  fact  to  travel  to  America  and  raise  the  issue  with  the  western  powers 
in  New  York  before  the  Geneva  summit. 
Hoyer  Miller  ended  with  a  point  which  Hayter  had  also  touched  upon  regarding 
the  substance  of  what  the  Soviet  note  had  said  or  at  least  implied, 
Incidentally,  one  good  thing  about  the  Russian  note  from  our  point  of  view  is 
the  way  in  which  it  tacitly  suggests  the  possibility  of  there  being  two 
Germanys  having  to  co-exist  together  for  an  indefinite  period.  This  may  be 
the  best  solution  if  no  progress  can  be  made  with  the  Russians  over 
reunification  at  the  coming  conferences,  but  in  view  of  the  German  dislike  of 
the  idea  it  is  all  to  the  good  that  it  should  have  been  the  Russians,  and  not 
ourselves,  who  should  have  taken  the  initiative  in  thus  ventilating  the 
matter.  38 
37  PREM  11/894.  Moscow  Telegram  No.  555,  June  8th;  from  Hayter  to  F.  0.  and  Bonn  Telegram 
No.  350,  June  10th;  from  Hoyer  Miller  to  F.  0. 
38  Hayter's  Telegram  No.  555  of  June  8th  made  the  following  comment, 
[I1  think  it  is  too  early  to  conclude  that  the  Soviet  Government  are  ready  to  throw  over  the 
DDR.  It  looks  as  if  they  have  two  alternative  policies  in  mind,  between  which  they  will 
choose  according  to  Adenauer':  reaction.  They  will  try  to  establish  simultaneous  relations 
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This  was  perceptive.  39  Geneva  was  to  be  a  watershed  in  the  cold  war  in  more  than 
just  one  way.  In  the  context  of  western  policy  from  the  late  forties  onwards,  and  in 
particular  British  policy,  it  was  something  of  a  culmination.  With  the  armament  of 
West  Germany  and  its  embedding  in  the  structure  of  NATO  the  defence  of  Western 
Europe  seemed  secured.  40  In  the  aftermath  of  the  July  meeting,  if  not  indeed  before, 
it  was  apparent  that  Europe  had  achieved  something  near  to  equilibrium,  in  the  absence 
of  a  formal  settlement.  41 
However,  contrary  to  Eden's  protestations  about  the  need  to  maintain  freedom  of 
manoeuvre,  the  British  proposals  on  Germany  as  they  developed  in  late  June  and  early 
July  were  complicated  and  involved  considerable  detail.  42  Eden  was  adamant  that  the 
West  should  have  something  to  offer  of  greater  substance  than  merely  a  rehash  of  the 
1954  Eden  Plan  that  had  been  proposed  at  the  Berlin  meeting  of  Foreign  Ministers  of 
that  year.  `ý3  This  had  been  concerned  merely  with  constitutional  provisions  for  free 
elections,  there  was  at  that  point  no  attempt  to  cater  for  the  wider  security  needs  of 
east  and  west.  44  The  situation  in  which  diplomacy  was  to  operate  appeared  to  the 
British  to  be  decidedly  different  from  that  of  January  1954,  when  the  Soviets  had 
refused  flatly  to  give  anything  on  Austria  or  Germany.  The  confrontation  then  fitted 
into  the  pattern  that  had  become  familiar  under  Earnest  Bevin.  Now  with  Austria 
settled  and  the  Soviets  exhibiting  much  greater  flexibility,  Eden  was  not  prepared  to 
stay  pat  on  the  old  battle  lines. 
It  would  be  invidious,  not  to  say  a  little  tedious,  to  go  through  the  development  of 
what  was  to  become  the  second  Eden  Plan  step  by  step.  Particularly  as  it  was  to  prove 
fruitless.  However  a  brief  outline  and  more  importantly  explanation  of  the  rationale 
bloc  into  an  ostensibly  united  Germany,  and  only  if  this  tails  will  they  fall  back  on  the  solution 
of  indefinite  prolongation  of  relations  with  both  Germanys. 
39  See  Full  Circle,  p.  292.  This  view  had  been  expressed  by  Bohlen  to  the  State  Department  in  his 
assessment  of  the  signiticance  of  the  Austrian  Treaty,  Witness  to  Histoºv,  pp.  375-376, 
I  also  pointed  out  that  if  the  Soviet  Union  went  ahead  with  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  armed 
Germany  as  part  of  the  or`_anisation.  this  would  be  a  clear  indication  that  the  Soviet  Union,  for 
the  foreseeable  future,  was  accepting  the  division  of  Germany  as  a  definite  fact  and  was  not 
contemplating  a  radical  revision  in  its  German  policy. 
40  See  above  on  Eden's  foreign  policy  from  1951-55,  and  particularly  Young,  "German  Rearmament 
and  the  European  Defence  Community";  on  Bevin's  foreign  policy  up  to  1951  see  A.  Bullock, 
Ernest  Bevinn. 
41  Macmillan  made  the  following  comment  on  the  discussions  in  America.  Riding  the  Storm,  p.  606, 
Behind  this  apparent  concentration  upon  the  problems  of  Western  Europe  lay  more  urgent  and 
in  many  ways  alarming  dangers  in  the  Middle  and  Far  East.  As  the  weeks  proceeded,  it  became 
more  and  more  apparent  that  these  anxieties  were  more  real  than  those  in  Western  Europe, 
where  at  least  a  form  of  political  and  military  stability  had  been  reached. 
42  This  was  the  cause  of  complaint  from  Dulles  early  in  July,  see  below. 
43  On  this  issue  Eden's  red  scribbles  on  a  telegram  from  Dixon  in  San  Francisco  of  23rd  June, 
reporting  Molotov's  remarks  to  Pinay  on  Germany,  were  to  be  expanded  to  eminently  more  legible 
print  in  Full  Circle  p.  ?  93.  PREI  I  lr'894.  Telegram  No.  58,23rd  June,  1955;  from  Sir  Pierson 
Dixon.  San  Francisco  to  F.  0. 
44  On  the  Berlin  conference  and  the  first  "Eden  Plan"  see  Full  Circle,  pp.  53-76  and  also  Descent  to 
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that  lay  behind  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  British  position  when  they  actually 
arrived  at  Geneva  and  what  they  hoped  that  it  might  achieve.  Basically  the  plan 
centred  around  proposals  for  the  disengagement  of  the  two  sides  in  Europe  and  the 
creation  of  what  would  effectively  be  a  demilitarised  zone.  This  did  not  mean  that 
British  troops  would  be  withdrawn  from  Germany,  but  it  was  hoped  that  force 
limitations  might  subsequently  be  laid  dovv  n  in  particularly  sensitive  areas  of  the 
continent,  with  veritication  provisions  for  East  and  West.  In  effect  both  sides  would 
be  forced  to  concede  territory  to  a  neutralised  glacis  in  the  heart  of  Europe.  Thus  the 
Soviet  Union  and  NATO  would  be  provided  with  some  concrete  guarantee  of  security. 
The  final  phase  of  the  second  Eden  Plan  consisted  of  a  European  security  system 
which  was  to  be  elaborated  involving  Soviet  and  NATO  forces,  again  the  key  words 
being  "joint  control".  t' 
The  Germans  had  also  chipped  in  their  piece  with  a  suggestion  for  a  plan  earlier  in 
June,  which  although  similar  to  the  British  in  that  it  involved  demilitarised  strips,  did 
not  contain  elaborate  provisions  for  an  overarching  European  Security  system.  This 
was  however  quickly  dismissed.  46  It  was  the  Eden  plan  which  was  to  form  the  basis 
of  discussions  over  the  Western  position  in  the  lead  up  to  the  Summit.  Yet  there  was 
more  hanging  on  Eden's  proposals  than  just  the  unity  of  Germany.  As  far  as  Eden  and 
the  CANUTE  committee  were  concerned  it  was  the  essential  First  step  towards  a 
complete  settlement  of  the  cold  war  and  this  more  than  anything  else  explains  why  the 
British  were  prepared  to  devote  so  much  time  to  it. 
Indeed  at  this  point  the  CANUTE  committee  seems  to  have  been  bullish  in  their 
hopes  that  the  Soviets  might  be  willing  to  do  some  kind  of  a  wider  deal,  or  at  least  this 
was  the  line  which  they  took  with  their  allies.  The  Americans  and  in  particular  Dulles 
were  less  enthusiastic.  Dulles  was  worried  that  by  making  too  specific  proposals,  such 
as  the  Eden  Plan,  the  west  might  deliver  itself  a  hostage  of  Soviet  machination.  His 
view  is  treated  in  greater  detail  below.  However  the  British  Government's  attempts  to 
persuade  him  of  the  ripeness  of  the  moment  for  their  plan  `ive  a  valuable  insight  into 
exactly  what  they  were  trying  to  achieve  by  it. 
CANUTE  telegrain  med  Washington  on  Stil  July,  1955,  in  an  attempt  to  calm  the 
State  Department's  edginess  regarding  the  Plan.  47  The  view  of  the  Turkish 
45  Eden  Dives  in  his  memoirs  a  quite  lucid  suniniary  of  the  plan  and  his  intentions,  Full  Circle,  pp. 
292  294.  There  is  a  substantial  body  of  hlannin  ,  papers,  Chicly  of  Staff  reports,  memos  and  some 
very  attractive  maps  outlining  proposed  ",,  trips'  :  ontaincd  at  the  he_!  innin_  of  the  PREM  11/895 
file.  Much  of  the  planners  time  was  taken  up  %%nth  dchating  the  advantage  Western  Powers  might 
gain  by  various  different  ýýeo  ýrahhical  definition.,  ot  the  neutralised  zone. 
46  As  ever  Eden's  memoirs  tend  to  pass  as  ilkv  ;  loss  over  events,  see  Full  Circle,  p.  2293.  The 
CANUTE  committee  gave  a  less  charitable  treatment  in  the  following  teleiram  to  Washington,  "I 
note  that  the  Americans  now  agree  with  us  that  the  Adenauer  plan  is  not  a  starter.  This  is  all  to  the 
Brood  and  we  can  now  expunge  the  Adenauer  plan  as  such  from  our  minis". 
47  PREM  11/895.  Telegram  No.  3183,8th  July.  1955,  CANUTE  to  Washington  Embassy.  The 
telegram,  presumably  the  hand  of  Macmillan,  said  that  the  remarks  had  been  made  by  the  Turkish 
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ambassador  in  Paris  was  quoted  with  approval.  The  Ambassador,  with  forty-one  years 
in  the  Turkish  foreiLTn  ser`-ice  had  said, 
[T]he  Russians  might  now  really  wish  to  reach  an  accommodation,  at  least  for 
a  period  of  years,  with  the  West.  If  the  Russians  had  only  been  intent  on  a 
propaganda  exercise,  he  would  have  had  no  concern.  But  that  did  not  look  to 
him  to  be  the  case.  There  was  only  one  remedy  in  his  opinion.  The  West 
should  not  pitch  their  demands  too  low...  They  should  ask  for  something  it 
would  really  hurt  the  Soviets  to  concede. 
CANUTE  went  on  to  express  the  following,  which  was  described  as  "also  the  Prime 
Minister's  strong  personal  view", 
Our  favourable  posture  justifies  us  in  displaying  boldness  and  imagination  at 
Geneva;  and  I  see  no  reason  to  be  paralysed  by  fears  and  indecision.  Please 
try  to  fortify  Mr.  Dulles  and  the  State  Department,  and  persuade  them  that 
there  is  every  ground  for  self-confidence. 
It  was  on  the  Eclen  Plan  that  the  British  government  wished  to  test  the  Soviets  as 
to  how  far  they  were  prepared  to  go  in  ending  the  cold  war.  Indeed  the  whole  purpose 
of  it  was  to  seize  the  initiative  in  offering  what  Eisenhower  was  to  describe  -  in 
relation  to  his  open  skies  proposal  -  as  a  wL  indow  of  opportunity.  Behind  the  rather 
florid  and  evanescent  optimism  of  these  telegrams  clearly  lies  the  thought  of  Eden. 
Although  there  may  have  been  a  degree  of  playing  up  for  the  sake  of  American 
doubters,  the  CANUTE  committee's  telegrams  to  Washington  give  an  emphatically 
hopeful  view  of  what  might  be  achieved.  In  his  desire  to  open  up  the  East  West 
dialogue  into  a  grand  settlement  of  differences  Eden  resembles  nothing  in  all  the 
diplomatic  world  so  much  as  Churchill.  Here,  more  than  in  his  original  acceptance  in 
March,  1955,  that  a  summit  was  now  desirable,  he  might  truly  be  said  to  have  changed 
his  attitude  with  his  ministerial  office.  However,  for  this  purpose  the  Eden  Plan  had  to 
be  plausible  as  well  as  bold. 
In  a  further  telegram  from  CANUTE  to  the  Washington  Embassy  on  8th  July  the 
committee  emphasised  the  consideration  that  the  Eden  Plan  gave  to  "reasonable"  Soviet 
security  interests.  48  They  defended  the  plan  in  the  following  terms  against  its  negative 
American  reception. 
(a)  For  the  first  time  we  are  negotiating  from  a  position  of  some  strength;  and 
the  Russians  have  an  interest  in  seeking  an  agreement.  Consequently  we  need 
not  concern  ourselves  unduly  ...  whether  any  particular  proposals  will  be 
acceptable  to  the  Russians  in  the  First  round.  (b)  I  agree,  however,  that  we 
should  take  account  of  Western  public  opinion.  we  must  seize  and  keep  the 
initiative  by  putting  forward  proposals  which  are  not  unfair  and  which  dive 
the  Russians  reasonable  security  against  and  threat  arising  from  a  free,  unified 
Germany.  (c)  Our  proposal  for  a  demilitarised  strip  does  not  purport  of  itself 
to  afford  the  Russians  security.  It  is  part  of  a  package  deal  designed  to  do  so 
4S  PRENI  11,  S05.  TeIe,  rain  No.  3IS.  July  Sth.  1955.  r,,  m  CANLTE  to  \VashinLton  Embassy. Ch.  Lpt  r4/  Pa`t  95 
(viz.  demilitarized  strip  plus  Security  pact  plus  agreement  on  c;.  ling  of  forces 
in  the  sensitive  areas). 
The  Eden  Plan  was  specifically  conceived  as  a  proposal  which  would  at  once  give 
the  Soviets  "reasonable  security"  and  provide  a  crucial  test  of  their  future  intentions. 
If  the  bait  were  bitten  the  way  would  be  opened  to  a  general  settlement  which  would 
go  much  further  than  merely  German  unity.  Here  Eden,  and  for  that  matter  the  British 
Government,  thought  he  was  matching  the  boldness  of  his  diplomatic  initiative  with  the 
size  of  both  the  opportunity  and  the  prize  which  were  at  stake.  If  he  had  been  right 
Eden  would  have  proved  post  1945  peacemaker  par  excellence.  However  the  Eden 
plan  erroneously  presupposed  that  the  Soviets  were  prepared  to  be  "reasonable"  over 
Germany  and  that  they  considered  the  cold  war  to  serve  no  further  useful  purpose.  It 
is  indicative  of  just  how  novel  Soviet  policy  had  so  far  been  that  it  seemed  plausible  to 
the  British  Government  that  change  might  vet  reach  to  the  very  heart  of  East/West 
rivalry.  The  Soviets  had  already  come  a  very  long  way  from  the  sterility  of  late 
Stalinism  and  even  Nialenl:  ovisn,.  However.  after  Geneva  it  was  quickly  to  become 
apparent  that  thou`h  Bu1`ganin  and  Khrushchev  were  prepared  to  come  to  a  tacit 
agreement  over  the  division  of  Germany,  they  vet  saw  an  active  future  for  the  Cold 
War. 
Nonetheless  Eden  cannot  be  accused  of  a  lack  of  good  will.  In  conception  his 
proposals  were  every  bit  as  imaginative  as  Eisenhower's  at  Geneva.  They  both  seem  to 
have  been  fired  by  a  perception  that  there  was  a  real  possibility  the  cold  war  might 
have  been  grinding  to  a  close.  The  following  words  from  Eden's  memoirs  might, 
almost,  have  referred  to  Eisenhower's  plan, 
The  Russians  were  SUSPICIOUS  of  control.  This  was  part  of  their  national 
character  and  not  just  to  be  ascribed  to  communism.  I  felt  that  if  a  system  of 
international  control  could  be  established,  even  on  a  limited  scale,  the  dragon 
might  be  found  to  be  not  so  very  dangerous  after  all.  49 
The  essential  difference  with  American  policy  was  in  their  understanding  of  where  the 
key  to  ending  the  cold  war  lay.  For  the  British  it  was  in  building  confidence  by  the 
implementation  of  a  plan  for  Germany  that  was  beneficial  and  agreeable  to  both  sides. 
Eisenhower's  bold  suggestion  for  aerial  inspection  identified  disarmament  verification 
as  the  central  issue.  Both,  as  it  wearily  transpired,  were  wrong. 
ANGLO-A1IERICAN  DIFFERENCES 
The  process  of  bilateral  consultations  in  Washington  throws  an  interesting  light  upon 
differences  in  the  American  and  British  approaches  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The  British 
49  Full  Circle,  p.  2ýý  3.  Eden  :.  t  OUnt  or  the  Geneva  preparations  in  his  memoir.,  although  it  tends  to 
little  too  ,  lýýiýluuuslý  ,  i,  not  hu"lcally  ;  nl  uratc.  Given  that  he  chose  to  weite  so  shortly 
.  liter  the  =vents 
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exhibited  a  more  accommodating  attitude,  although  even  so  they  were  still  awaiting 
considerable  concessions  from  the  Soviets.  However,  the  United  States  was  anxious 
that  in  the  process  of  negotiation  matters  of  principle  concerning  the  "freedom  of 
Eastern  Europe"  might  be  conceded.  Dulles  was,  basically,  not  prepared  to  stop  short 
of  a  complete  Soviet  withdrawal  from  its  satellites.  Indeed,  in  early  May  when 
enthusiasm  for  a  Summit  was  picking  up  in  Britain  and  France,  Dulles  had  expressed 
considerable  reservations  about  the  reliability  of  America's  allies  in  the  continuing 
battle  against  Communism.  50 
Initially  the  State  Department  were  in  agreement  with  the  basic  outline  for  the 
conference  that  had  been  pint  forward  by  the  British.  S  L.  Indeed  in  the  discussions  at 
Embassy  level  little  divergence  of  opinion  seems  to  have  been  registered  between  the 
two  sides.  Where  perhaps  there  was  divergence  of  opinion  was  over  how  inter-related 
these  issues  were;  whether  or  not  it  might  be  possible  to  progress  on  disarmament 
without  any  advance  over  Germany.  This  was  really  the  only  indication,  as  far  as  I 
have  found,  that  the  Americans  might  have  been  prepared  to  try  some  bold  individual 
initiative  as  they  were  less  inclined  to  think  in  terms  of  an  all  inclusive  package. 
Ironically,  given  their  distaste  for  negotiation  with  the  Soviet  Union,  the  most  striking 
proposal  of  the  conference  was  Eisenhower's  Open  Skies  plan  of  the  21st  July. 
However,  there  was  no  consultation  with  the  British  on  the  issue  in  the  lead  up  to  the 
Summit.  This  it  seems  was  most  likely  because  the  State  Department  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  idea  and  in  the  case  of  Dulles  was  positively  lukewarm  in  attitude  towards 
it.  52  The  group  of  ex-officio  "experts"  who  made  the  suggestion  to  Eisenhower  were 
under  the  aegis  of  one  of  his  historically  shady  ideas  men,  Nelson  A.  Rockefeller.  53 
50  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  V,  p.  174,  Telegram  from  the  Secretary  of  State  to  Department  of  State,  9th 
May,  1955.  Dulles  complained  of  the  lack  of  substance  behind  European  hopes  although  he  did 
speak  with  approval  of  Macmillan's  suggestion  that  the  Summit  should  he  seen  as  the  start  of  a 
process  of  detailed  negotiation.  rather  than  an  end  in  itself.  In  a  conversation  of  15th  June,  1955, 
with  Adenauer  in  Washington.  Dulles  went  so  far  as  to  express  his  worries  over  the  British  and 
French  attitude  towards  Geneva,  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  V,  p.  229. 
51  PREM  11/894,  Telegram,  14th  June  1955;  Makins,  Washington  to  CANUTE. 
American  thinking  was  close  to  our  own.  They  saw  the  meeting  as  developing  in  three  stages: 
A.  Frank  opening  statement  by  each  Head  of  Government  on  the  international  situation...  There 
should  not  be  undue  recrimination,  but  also  there  should  he  no  pulling;  of  punches.  B.  Western 
exploration  of  Soviet  motives  and  the  chances  of  making  an  improvement  in  the  situation....  C. 
Identification  of  problems  at  issue  and  discussion  of  methods  for  pursuing  them. 
52  See  W.  W.  Rostow,  Open  Skies,  Eisenhoiver's  Proposal  of  July  21,1955  for  an  insight  into 
American  unofficial  planning  for  the  summit. 
53  Rockefeller  was  a  member  of  the  Operations  Co-ordinating,  Board,  which  was  chaired  by  H.  Hoover 
Jr.,  and  he  was  also  himself  the  chairman  of  "a  special  sub-committee  designed  'to  exploit  Sino- 
Soviet  vulnerabilities'".  Rostow,  Open  Skies,  p.  26.  His  appointment  as  presidential  aide  lasted 
from  1954-57.  His  end  was  sealed  by  the  enmity  of  Dulles,  amongst  others,  Open  Skies,  p.  67. 
Rockefeller  had  in  preparation  for  Geneva  appointed  a  number  of  experts,  from  academia  as  much 
as  government,  to  examine  the  "psychological"  dimension  of  the  cold  war.  According  to  W.  W. 
Rostow  who  chaired  the  group.  known  rather  colourfully  as  the  "Quantico  Panel",  there  was  indeed 
a  deLree  of  rivalry  between  Rockefeller  and  the  Secretary  of  State.  Rostow  claims  it  was  the  panel 
which  worked  out  the  possibility  of  disarmament  verification  through  aerial  supervision.  He  gives 
substantial  documentary  detail  in  his  short  book  on  the  subject.  Furthermore  he  records  its  principle Chapter  4/  Page  97 
It  was  with,  and  indeed  at,  the  State  Department  that  the  British,  not  unreasonably, 
conducted  all  their  co-ordination  meetings  in  early  June,  both  bilaterally  and  in 
tripartite  consultation  with  the  French.  And  it  was  with  Dulles  that  Macmillan  met  at 
the  United  Nations  in  America  in  mid  to  late  June.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that 
nothing  was  said  by  the  State  Department  to  the  British  about  what  was  to  become 
Eisenhower's  publicity  coup,  as  the  State  Department  was  not  involved.  54  From 
Rostow's  account  the  President's  conversation  to  Open  Skies  happened  only  at  the 
eleventh  hour.  55 
Dulles  had  agreed  with  Macmillan's  opinion  that  the  summit  should  be  about 
setting  an  agenda  for  future  meetings,  rather  than  an  attempt  to  lay  down  any  detailed 
proposals.  Yet  the  reasons  underlying  their  shared  desire  to  avoid  another  Yalta  were 
rather  different.  Dulles  great  fear  was  that  it  the  west  put  forward  clear  plans  for  a 
settlement  of  any  of  the  issues  to  be  discussed  the  Soviets  might  then  be  able  to  use 
western  commitments  to  their  advantage.  56  He  was  also  worried  that  any  concrete 
settlement  for  Germany  might  be  taken  by  the  Soviets  to  imply  that  the  west  had 
finally  accepted  the  Soviet  position  in  Eastern  Europe.  '?  Bohlen  expressed  the 
following  opinion, 
I  attended  the  Geneva  Conference  of  1955  simply  because  I  was  ambassador 
to  the  Soviet  Union.  I  was  not  on  intimate  terms  with  any  members  of  the 
administration,  and  in  view  of  my  association  with  Yalta,  Dulles  certainly  did 
not  want  me  in  the  foreground  at  Geneva.  McCarthyism  had  finally  abated, 
members  were  influential  at  Geneva  in  eventually  persuading  the  President  to  use  their  ideas  in  his 
Open  Skies  proposal.  Given  the  concern  of  the  "Panel"  with  psychological  cold  war  it  is  tempting 
to  dismiss  Open  Skies  as  little  more  than  a  cheap  propaganda  gimmick.  There  is  a  memo  in  the 
State  Department  records  outlining  the  ideas  floated  by  the  "Panel"  which  includes  freedom  of  aerial 
inspection,  however  it  does  not  feature  in  any  of  Dulles'  productions  concerning  policy  at  Geneva. 
See  FRUS  1955-57.  Vol.  V,  p.  216,  Letter  from  Chairman  of  the  Quantico  Vulnerabilities  Panel 
(Rostow)  to  the  President's  Special  Assistant  (Rockefeller),  10th  June,  1955  and  , 
for  example,  p. 
239,  Memo  from  Secretary  of  State  to  President.  I  Sth  June,  1955. 
54  Eisenhower's  account  in  Mandate  fir  change  pp.  503-531.  puts  Dulles  in  centre  stage  on  the  issue 
of  pre-conference  planning. 
55  See  also  Eisenhower  the  President,  p.  264. 
56  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  V.,  p.  188,  Memo  of  discussion  at  249th  Meeting  of  NSC,  19th  May,  1955. 
From  the  start  Dulles  had  grave  reservations  about  the  consequences  of  a  Summit  meeting, 
Secretary  Dulles  brought  the  discussion  to  a  close  with  the  statement  that  one  of  the  greatest 
dangers  the  United  States  would  face  at  the  forthcoming  Conference  was  the  danger  that  the 
Soviets  would  present  projects  and  ideas  designed  to  create  the  impression  that  the  United 
States  and  the  free  world  were  willing  to  accept  the  current  situation  in  the  Soviet  satellites. 
Under  the  circumstances  it  would  be  highly  advantageous  for  the  United  States  to  take  certain 
initiatives  to  prevent  any  such  view  gaining  currency. 
Rostow's  account  of  the  American  preparations.  which  uses  some  interesting  documentary  detail, 
_ºives  the  impression  that  Dulles  spent  most  of  his  time  trying,  to  detlect  the  President  from  making 
any  detailed  proposals  of  his  own.  Open  Skies,  pp.  34-56. 
57  Eisenhower  made  this  point  to  Eden  in  a  letter.  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  V.  p.  206.  Letter  from 
Eisenhower  to  Eden.  31st  May.  1955. Chapter  4/  Pa, 
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but  its  effects  lingered  on.  President  Eisenhower  even  felt  it  necessary  to 
assure  the  country  publicly  that  he  would  make  no  secret  deals.  5S 
Macmillan's  hope  was  that  through  a  gradual  process  of  negotiation  firm  progress 
might  be  made  towards  an  end  to  the  cold  war.  According  to  Macmillan,  the  mistake 
made  at  Yalta  had  nothino  to  do  with  appeasement,  but  rather  with  tryin  g  to  do  much 
at  the  one  time.  Indeed  during  the  meeting  of  the  four  foreign  ministers  at  the  United 
Nations  in  New  York  and  San  Francisco,  Macmillan's  soft  talking  was  to  contrast  with 
Dulles'  more  direct  approach. 
According  to  Eisenhower's  account  it  was  Molotov  who  put  up  the  barriers  in  the 
preliminary  discussions  before  Geneva  in  June.  59  Macmillan  also  indicates  that  the 
going  with  Molotov  was  not  entirely  smooth,  although  remarkably  agreeable  given  his 
reputation.  60  However,  Dulles  himself  was  hardly  blameless  in  the  matter.  The 
difference  between  the  Macmillan  and  Dulles  approaches  is  clearly  illustrated  in  the 
reports  which  were  made  to  London  of  their  one  to  one  dealings  with  Molotov. 
Macmillan  talked  to  his  Soviet  counterpart  on  the  22nd  June  in  San  Francisco.  61 
Of  this  conversation  Macmillan  made  the  following  comment  to  London, 
I  asked  what  subjects  he  thought  should  be 
were  broad  possibilities  but  that  "topics 
brought  up.  He  replied 
which  were  undesirable 
that  there 
from  the 
point  of  view  of  one  side  or  the  other  shou  ld  be  avoided.  "  This  may  mean  the 
satelli  tes.  Each  side  should  however  rai  se  the  problems  which  worried  it 
most.  I  said  that  the  task  of  the  Heads  of  Government  would  be  to  divide  up 
these 
try  to 
problems  and  perhaps  to  leave  it  to 
make  some  progress  in  settling  them. 
the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  to 
He  agreed  to  this  proposition. 
Dulles,  on  the  other  hand  went  straight 
in  with  his  cold  war  obsessions  flying  as  he  had 
promised  he  would  to  the  National  Security  Council  on  the  19th  May.  62  Over 
luncheon  with  Molotov  on  the  23rd  June  he, 
[S]aid  that  he  might  also  like  to  raise  the  question  of  the  East  European 
satellites.  He  understood  that  the  Soviet  Government  might  not  accept  this  as 
a  topic  for  future  international  discussion,  but  it  was,  nevertheless,  a  subject 
which  contributed  to  international  tension.  It  also  raised  the  question  about 
proper  execution  of  wartime  agreements.  Mr.  : Molotov  replied  that  the  Soviet 
position  on  this  matter  had  been  made  sufficiently  clear  and  he  had  no  further 
58  Witness  to  Hi.  vtorv,  p.  381. 
59 
, 
'faº,  cl(,  ICfioº-  Chun;  c,  p.  508  Dulles  cones  across  very  clearly  as  Eisenhower's  right  hand  man,  an 
opinion  also  toýr,,  ýarded  by  Rustow. 
60  Ri(lirº,  the  Stoºiºº,  pp.  O05-61  1.  He  gives  the  tollowin  rather  affectionate  account  of  his  impression 
of  \lolotov's  character  after  the  pre-Geneva  talks  were  over. 
In  :  bite  of  hi.  reputation  for  a  hard,  ne  ati\  C.  hrutal  :  attitude,  when  one  saw  him  alone  there 
appeared  an  unexpected  attractivene",  tnd  even  ý'cottne  s.  I  felt  that  the  Russians  wanted  a 
detente,  that  they  \\.  ere  really  tri,,  htened  hý  the  American  hege.  in  Europe,  and  that  they  would 
Ilke  toi  rCýlUL:  the  :  xpenditurc  and  eitert  on  armament`. 
bl  PREý1  I  I.  ýýý-l.  T:  I:  _ram  No.  32.  June  '2nd.  1955.  t'r  ý1i  \LtLmillan  in  San  Francisco  to  F.  0. 
62  See  tootnotc  55. Chapter  4/  Page  99 
comment.  Mr.  Dulles  said  that  he  also  wanted  to  -  raise  international 
Communisºn.  Mr.  Molotov  replied  that  this  was  not  possible  without  getting 
into  internal  affairs.  NIr.  Dulles  said  that  what  he  meant  were  questions  like 
international  propaganda  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  internal  affairs.  Mr. 
Molotov  said  he  1w  nothing  about  this  subject.  63 
The  contrast  with  Macmillan's  circumlocution  is  instructive,  Dulles  had  evidently  been 
imbibing  rather  less  deeply  of  the  Geneva  spirit.  Molotov's  restraint  in  dealing  with 
Dulles'  attack  is  in  its  self  an  indication  of  how  much  store  the  Soviet  leadership  were 
setting  by  the  summit  and  it  is  Dulles  who  comes  across  quite  clearly  in  the  British 
record  as  the  most  reluctant  participator  in  the  pre-Geneva  talks.  This  disparity  with 
British  enthusiasm  was  to  come  out  even  more  strongly  when  the  Eden  Plan  was  laid 
before  the  Americans  in  detail  in  a  note  of  the  4th  July. 
Dullessinitial  reaction  had  seemed  to  Makins  to  be  that  he  considered  the  British 
Plan  gave  far  too  much  away  in  solid  proposals,  though  he  did  not  disagree  with  the 
basis  of  what  was  being  suggested.  Makins  went  on  to  report  in  his  telegram  of  6th 
July  that, 
There  is  a  genuine  fear  here  of  getting  committed  or  trapped  at  Geneva  into 
courses  of  action  on  points  of  substance,  the  implications  of  which  have  not 
been  fully  thought  out.  I  understand  that  this  feeling  was  strongly  reflected 
by  the  President  at  a  meeting  at  the  White  House  this  afternoon.  64 
By  8th  July  Dulles  was  offering  his  own  "tentative  redraft"  of  the  British  note, 
It  is  not  desirable  that  any  cut  and  dried  proposals  should  be  tabled  at  Geneva. 
That  should  be  left  to  the  conference  of  Foreign  Ministers.  But  the  Western 
Heads  of  States  should  inform  the  Russians  that  they  understand  the  Russian 
desire  for  security. 
Dulles  was  hiding  behind  the  Macmillan  formulation  that  the  summit  should  stick 
to  vague  agenda  construction  but  for  rather  different  reasons  than  Macmillan.  It  was 
in  their  attempts  to  persuade  the  State  Department  of  the  rightness  of  the  British  view 
that  the  telegrams  of  the  8th  July  quoted  above  were  sent  to  Washington  from  the 
CANUTE  committee.  A  degree  of  irritation  was  expressed  to  Makins  by  CANUTE, 
presumably  in  line  with  Eden's  own  view,  scribbled  on  the  Washington  telegram  of  the 
63  Molotov  in  riposte  raised  the  issue  of  a  :  ix  power  conference  on  the  Far  East.  Dulles  wondered  if 
the  sixth  power  were  the  Nationalist  Chinese.  %,  Iolotov  replied  he  meant  India.  This  strictly 
confidential  record  of  the  proceedings  was  relayed  to  British  officials  through  the  State  Department. 
PREM  11/894,  Telegram  No.  59.23rd  June,  1955,  From  San  Francisco  to  F.  0. 
64  PREM  11/895,  Telegram  No.  1563,6th  July.  1955.  from  Washington  Embassy  to  F.  0.  Makins 
commented  acerhically  on  the  American  political  system. 
I  am  sure  you  realise  too  that  another  factor  which  is  operating  here  is  the  extreme  difficulty 
which  an  American  Administration  has  in  arriving  at  an  agreed  position  on  any  important 
question.  [to  which  scribbled  by  A.  E.,  "we  cannot  really  help  that"] Chapter  4/  Pa, 
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6th.  65  By  the  8th  July  CAtiUTE  were  still  expressing  their  puzzlement  as  to  what 
exactly  Dulles'  reservations  about  the  British  plan  were.  The  British  began  to  fear  that 
State  Department  doubts  and  hedging  would  loose  the  west  the  initiative  to  the  Soviets. 
Dulles  made  clear  to  Makins  in  further  conversations  on  the  9th  July  what  he 
particularly  objected  to.  Although  dubious  about  proposals  for  demilitarised  strips,  at 
least  until  the  American  military  had  had  time  to  examine  them  in  detail,  Dulles 
wanted  the  British  to  know  that  he  was  not  against  using  the  British  proposals, 
provided,  that  was,  they  were  to  go  into  no  specific  detail  at  the  summit  meeting.  On 
the  issue  of  European  Security  however,  there  was  no  way  that  the  United  States 
would  be  prepared  to  join  in  with  the  other  western  allies  in  providing  a  security 
structure  which  guarantied  the  Soviet  position  as  it  then  stood. 
For  political  reasons  there  was  really  no  question  in  the  foreseeable  future  of 
the  United  States  entering  into  a  commitment  to  come  to  the  defence  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  especially  if  there  was  an  implication  that  this  might  involve 
action  against  the  peoples  of  Eastern  Europe  who  wished  to  liberate 
themselves 
Here  was  the  crucial  difference  between  the  American  and  British  views  at  Geneva. 
The  British  were  prepared  to  accept  that  the  Soviets'  position  in  the  satellite  states  had 
to  be  accorded  some  respect,  provided  that  might  lead  to  a  settlement  of  the  cold  war. 
The  Americans  wanted  to  see  very  much  more  in  the  way  of  surrender  from  the 
Soviets  before  they  would  co-operate  in  an  agreement,  in  essence  a  complete  Soviet 
withdrawal  from  Eastern  Europe.  A  Republican  Party  which  had  been  elected  three 
years  e  1t+r  on  a  pledged  to  role  back  Communism  could  hardly  be  expected  to 
participate  in  its  entrenchment  in  Eastern  Europe.  That  would  seem  too  much  like  a 
return  to  Truman's  reviled  policy  of  containment. 
Over  the  forthcoming  few  days  before  the  Summit  the  American  insistence  that 
there  should  be  no  giving  away  of  specific  details  was  to  prevail.  Such  matters  were  to 
be  referred  to  the  Foreign  Rlinisteri  Conference  the  following  November,  which 
became  something  of  a  'tsin-bin  "  for  the  summit.  This  was  perhaps  a  little  unfair 
considering  that  Eisenhower  was  to  come  out  with  the  most  explicit  detail  of  the 
summit  over  Open  Skies. 
Macmillan  put  forward  a  Foreign  Office  appreciation  of  what  the  conference 
might  yet  achieve  on  the  1  3th  July  for  a  CANUTE  meeting  of  the  following  day.  66 
65  See  footnote  72-  In  a  tole`  Iram  of  8th  July  CAN  UTE  expressed  its  frustration  with  the  American 
ter,  iversations  communicated  by  the  Washington  Embassy  on  the  6th  thus. 
[11f  the  Americans  still  have  misgivings  about  our  wording  of  the  formula  they  should  define 
them  and  sug`_est  an  amended  draft.  `e  have  not  much  time  before  us.  Please  put  the  above 
to  Mr.  Dulles  and  the  State  Department  as  soon  as  possible.  We  are  on  the  threshold  of  the 
conference  ºnd  are  entitled  to  more  than  "some  preliminary  views"  promised  you  by  Mr. 
MacArthur  [of  the  State  Department]. 
66  PREM  1hS95,  Note  by  the  Secretary  of  State  tor  Foreign 
. Affair:.  13th  June,  1955. Chapter  4/  Pace  101 
The  process  of  ne`otiation  which  he  had  originally  suggested  still  seemed  to  have  some 
promise  of  success,  although  the  analysis  was.  perhaps.  a  little  less  rosy  than  it  had 
been  at  the  beginning  of  the  planning  process. 
It  seems  likely  that  the  Russians  will  he  torn  by  two  conflicting  emotions:  a 
desire  that  the  conference  should  not  fail,  and  a  determination  not  to  give  way 
to  the  West,  in  particular  by  agreeing  to  a  German  solution.  The  Western 
Powers  have  a  similar  interest  in  preventing  anything  in  the  nature  of  a 
breakdown  or  deadlock.  Consequently,  if  we  cannot  get  agreement  on  a 
reference  to  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  all  the  subjects  listed  above,  we  should 
aim  at  organising  a  meeting  of  the  Foreign  Ministers. 
The  one  meeting  of  the  CANUTE  committee  for  which  the  minutes  are  available, 
the  fourth  and  final  one  of  13th  July,  threw  a  further  douche  of  cold  water  over  the 
optimism  which  pervaded  CANUTE's  telegrams  to  Washington  of  the  8th  July. 
Present  on  this  occasion  was  Sir  William  Hayter,  who  at  Eden's  request  gave  the 
following  prognostication  of  the  "Russian  attitude", 
[T]he  plan  set  out  in  CAN/  15/55  [for  demilitarized  strips]  was  asking  a  lot  of 
the  Russians.  He  [Hayter]  did  not  think  they  would  be  ready  to  reach  a 
settlement  on  Germany  at  Geneva...  They  would  rather  try  to  tempt  the  West 
Germans  to  accept  unification  on  the  Russian  terms...  There  was  no  real 
reason  why  the  Russians  should  make  the  sacrifices  which  our  plan  would 
require  of  them. 
Yet  Eden  continued  to  insist  that  they  should  offer  his  detailed  proposals  on  Germany. 
However  his  mind  seems  to  have  been  as  much  preoccupied  with  the  necessity  of 
maintaining  a  good  propaganda  profile  as  the  prospects  of  a  major  break  through.  67 
This  is  somewhat  of  a  contrast  to  the  opinions  expressed  to  the  State  Department  of 
less  than  a  week  before.  Perhaps  there  had  been  a  conscious  degree  of  hyperbole 
involved  for  the  sake  of  the  half  converted.  As  far  as  American  opposition  to  laying 
out  concrete  proposals  he  still  held  out  what  was  to  prove  the  forlorn  hope  that, 
Although  it  might  be  INIr.  Dulles'  idea  to  avoid  discussion  of  questions  of 
substance,  he  did  not  think  that  the  attitude  of  the  President  was  nearly  so 
negative. 
On  the  l7th  July  the  last  western  confabulation  before  the  summit  proper  started 
took  place  in  Geneva.  A  compromise,  between  the  American  desire  to  avoid 
dangerous  commitments  and  the  British  to  make  concrete  proposals  was  reached  during 
67  PRENI  1  liS95,  Minutes  of  C.  ANUTE  committee  meeting,  14th  July,  1955.  Eden  had  commented, 
[T]he  main  issue',  should  he  brought  out  in  the  Jiseussion  between  Heads  of  Government  so 
that,  it  the  Russian,,  were  willing  to  discuss  German  reunification,  they  could  he  put  in  the 
position  of  refusing  to  .  ºý:.  rt  it.  He  Jid  not  think  that  deadlock  would  necessarily  he  reached 
by  this  method. Chapter  4/  Page  102 
this  meeting.  In  conversation  with  Eisenhower  Eden  agreed  with  the  President  that  a 
French  plan  put  forte  and  by  Faure,  which  offered  e  en  more  exact  detail  than  the 
British,  was  dangerous  precisely  because  it  was  too  specitic.  Compromise  seems  to 
have  been  more  capitulation  than  anything  else, 
I  added  that  I  agreed  and  that  we  had  to  be  careful  not  to  propound  precise 
boundaries  at  this  stage  or  we  should  be  held  to  anything  we  offered.  I 
thought  the  really  important  issue  at  this  Conference  was  Germany.  I  hoped 
that  he  and  I  would  press  together  strongly  to  try  to  move  the  Russians  on 
this.  The  President  cordially  agreed. 
The  President  was  in  fact  giving  nothing  on  the  line  which  Dulles  had  been  taking  all 
along.  Dulles  had  been  quite  willing  to  accept  the  ideas  that  the  British  put  forward, 
providing  they  were  clothed  in  the  form  of  loose  suggestion  and  he  objected  to  the 
detail  which  the  Eden  Plan  afforded  as  to  how  such  loose  suggestion  might  be  realised. 
Eden  finally  had  agreed,  in  effect,  that  Dulles  had  been  right  all  along.  This  seems  as 
clear  an  indication  as  any  of  where  the  balance  of  authority  lay  between  the  western 
powers  attending  the  Summit.  The  scene  was  Finally  set  for  the  superficially 
anticlimactic  drama  to  begin. 
t- Chapter  5 
The  Geneva  Summit,  1955 
Thermonuclear  Stand-off 
"There  ain't  gonna  be  no  war" 
Harold  Macmillan 
The  Summit  at  Geneva  was  to  convince  the  British  that  the  Soviet  appreciation  of  nuclear 
war  was  now  very  similar  to  their  own.  The  conference  acted  in  this  respect  as  a 
confirmation  of  Foreign  Office  and  Embassy  opinion  as  has  been  outlined  in  Chapter 
Four.  It  also  became  clear  that  the  Soviets  were  relatively  happy  to  accept  the  stalemate 
which  had  been  achieved  in  Europe  between  N.  A.  T.  O.  and  the  Warsaw  Pact,  even  at  the 
cost  of  a  divided  Germany.  In  both  of  these  respects  the  Summit  provides  a  turning  point 
in  the  development  of  British  perceptions  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  and,  indeed,  the  Cold 
War  itself.  However,  it  was  not  yet  apparent  in  the  summer  of  1955  how  the  Soviets 
were  shortly  to  redirect  their  energies  in  the  prosecution  of  a  cold  war  now  to  be  fought 
within  more  limited  parameters. 
ANGLO-SOVIET  TABLE  TALK 
Opinions  differ  as  to  the  suitability  of  the  old  United  Nations  building,  Geneva,  as  the 
venue  for  the  July  Summit.  Eisenhower  records  in  his  memoirs  a  relatively  favourable 
impression  of  the  environment  within  which  East  and  West  met.  Macmillan  however 
most  emphatically  did  not  share  this  happy  memory.  Indeed  he  considered  that, 
The  room  in  which  we  met  filled  me  with  horror  the  moment  we  entered  it.  the 
protagonists  were  sitting  in  tables  drawn  up  in  a  rectangle,  the  space  between 
them  was  about  the  size  of  a  small  boxing  rind...  I  could  think  of  no  arrangement 
less  likely  to  lead  to  intimate  or  useful  negotiations.  I 
Whether  or  not  the  bombastic  conference  chamber  in  which  the  formal  sessions  of  the 
conference  were  held  had  any  negative  impact  or  not,  both  Eden  and  Macmillan  concur 
that  the  crucial  contacts  with  the  Soviet  side  were  made  in  more  informal  surroundings.  - 
Eden  records  that,  "at  a  conference  like  this,  it  is  usual  for  private  discussion  to  be  the 
most  worthwhile.  We  entertained  each  other  informally  and  made  working  occasions  of 
1  The  memoirs  of  Eisenhower  and  Macmillan  differ  in  particular  over  the  appropriateness  of  the 
rooms  decoration.  Eisenhower  gave  the  following  appreciation  of  the  art  which  lowered  down  over 
the  delegates,  "The  mural  is  effective.  The  brutish  characters  remind  the  participant  in  the  drama  of 
the  grim  seriousness  of  his  task".  As  compares  with  Macmillan's,  "the  walls  were  decorated  with 
vast,  somewhat  confused  frescos  depicting,  the  End  of  the  World,  or  the  Battle  of  the  Titans,  or  the 
Rape  of  the  Sabines,  or  a  mixture  of  all  three.  ... 
The  whole  formal  part  of  the  conference  was 
bound  to  degenerate  into  a  series  of  set  orations". 
See  Tides  of  Fortune,  p.  617,  "it  was  only  when  the  Heads  of  Government  or  Foreign  Ministers  met 
in  a  small  room  outside  in  a  restricted  meeting  that  any  serious  discussion  could  take  place". Chapter  5/  Page  104 
the  meals".  3  Indeed,  the  most  profound  impressions  that  the  British  came  home  with 
were  garnered  after  a  private  dinner  with  Khrushchev  and  Bulganin.  `Macmillan's  hopes 
for  informal  "dinner  diplomacy"  were  to  prove  very  well  founded.  4  It  was  in  an  expansive 
post-prandial  atmosphere  that  Eden  and  Macmillan  found  the  Soviets  at  their  most 
candid.  5  With  this  in  mind  a  blow  by  blow  account  of  the  conference  proceedings  seems, 
in  the  context  of  the  present  study,  unnecessary.  6 
However,  that  is  not  to  say  that  the  formal  sessions  were  devoid  of  interest.  They 
revolved  around  set  speeches,  an  entertainment  which  the  four  delegations  took  it  in  turns 
to  provide.  Eden's  contribution,  despite  his  petulant  qualms  expressed  in  June,  was  very 
much  in  line  with  the  division  of  the  agenda  agreed  by  Tripartite  consultations  in 
Washin(,  ),  ton.  7  The  speech,  which  he  gave  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  July,  encapsulates 
what  was  to  seem  of  importance  to  the  British  after  the  conference  was  over  in  respect  of 
how  they  were  to  view  the  new  Khrushchevian  foreign  policy.  He  bean  by  dwelling,  in  a 
manner  appropriately  reminiscent  of  Churchill,  on  the  dangers  and  opportunities  that  the 
present  state  of  nuclear  technology  afforded  to  the  world. 
[T]his  Conference  is  unique  in  history  because  the  conditions  in  which  we  meet 
are  unmatched  in  human  experience.  We  all  know  what  unparalleled  resources 
the  scientific  and  technical  discoveries  of  our  ade  have  placed  within  our  reach. 
We  have  only  to  stretch  out  our  hand  and  the  human  race  can  enter  an  age  of 
prosperity  such  has  never  been  known.  It  is  equally  clear  how  utterly  destructive 
must  be  the  conditions  of  any  conflict  in  which  the  Great  Powers  are  encraged. 
There  was  a  time  when  the  aggressor  in  war  might  hope  to  win  an  advantage  and 
to  realise  political  gain  for  this  country  by  military  action...  nothing  of  the  kind  is 
possible  now.  No  war  can  bring  the  victor  spoils,  it  can  only  bring  him  and  his 
3  Full  Circle,  p.  308 
4  PREM  11/894,  Tel.  No.  495,  New  York  to  F.  0.,  from  Secretary  of  State;  17th  June,  1955. 
During  the  Tripartite  discussions  before  the  conference  Macmillan  expressed  the  following  opinion 
on  the  issue  of  entertainment, 
I  agreed  that  we  did  not  want  banquets  and  I  thought  Mr.  Dulles  idea  of  buffets  splendid.  But  I 
thought  that,  in  addition,  there  could  be  useful  contacts  at  informal  lunches  and  dinners,  and  I 
knew  that  the  Prime  Minister  would  wish  to  feel  free  to  invite  members  of  other  Delegations  to 
quiet  meals.  This  was  generally  accepted  and  we  will  discuss  the  subject  on  these  lines  with  M. 
Molotov  in  San  Francisco. 
Also  Macmillan's  hopes  for  the  success  of  informal  contacts  expressed  in  PREM  11/893,  Tel  No. 
»3,  from  F.  O.  to  Washington,  from  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Dulles;  May  29th  1955.  In  his 
memoirs.  Tides  of  Fortune,  p.  616,  Macmillan  was  candid  enough  to  record  his  condemnation  of 
Presidential  cuisine  after  lunch  with  the  Americans  on  the  17th  July,  "a  disgusting,  meal,  of  large 
meat  slices,  hacked  out...  and  served...  with  marmalade  and  jam.  The  French  were  appalled". 
5  So  important  were  these  informal  discussions  in  the  eyes  of  Eden  that  a  record  of  them  was 
circulated  around  the  Cabinet  at  his  behest  by  Sir  Norman  Brook  on  the  2;  th  July,  1955  before  the 
official  record  of  the  formal  proceedings.  A  copy  is  to  be  found  at  the  end  of  the  PREM  11/895 
tile. 
6  There  is  .  full  record  of  the  Bntish  minutes  of  the  conference's  proceedings  in  the  P.  R.  O.  at  CAB 
133/141.  It  is  a  bulky  141  page  document  which  it  would  be  invidious  and  pointless  to  attempt  to 
summarise  in  any  detail  above. 
7  See  above.  Eisenhower  %tias  also  keen  to  persuade  the  Soviets  of  the  ghastliness  of  thermonuclear- 
nuclear  zwar,  Ambrose.  Eisenhower,  The  Presideººr,  p.  264. Chapter  5/  Pt, 
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victim  utter  annihilation.  These  are  stern  facts  out  of  which  can  perhaps  win 
enduring  peace  at  last.  ` 
Eden  went  on  to  concentrate  on  the  need  to  work  upwards  from  the  detail  to  a 
general  settlement.  He  had  no  time  for  Churchill's  old  emphasis  upon  a  leap  of  human 
sympathy  between  the  Heads  of  State  which  might  lead  from  a  broad  understanding  of 
each  other  to  successful  negotiation  over  particular  problems.  In  this  case  Eden  asserted 
the  detailed  matter  crucial  to  the  development  of  a  modus  vivendi  was  Germanv.  9  This  is 
only  what  might  be  expected  given  the  painstaking  emphasis  during  British  preparations 
for  the  meeting  on  the  need  to  come  up  with  some  compromise  answer  to  the  problem  of 
unification  which  provided  suitable  security  guarantees  for  the  Soviet  Union.  10  The  basic 
premise  upon  which  British  thinking  turned  is  though  quite  brilliantly  clear  from  the 
above.  The  British  Government  no  longer  considered  that  "world  war"  was  a  rational 
extension  of  foreign  policy,  it  was  rather  an  irrational  act  of  global  suicide.  The  question 
which  Geneva  was  to  answer  with  a  conclusive  yes  for  both  Eden  and  Macmillan  was,  did 
the  Soviets  agree? 
On  the  issue  of  the  specifics  in  either  the  formal  negotiations  or  general  discussions, 
Eden  did  not  think  his  American  allies  showed  sufficient  enthusiasm.  It  was  a  point  over 
which  Eden  himself  was  not  prepared  to  let  the  planning  of  the  past  month 
-(--; 
o  entirely  to 
waste.  On  the  19th  discussion  concentrated  on  the  German  question.  It  was  soon 
apparent  to  Eden  that  neither  the  Americans  nor  the  Soviets  seems  quite  to  have  shared 
8  CAB  133/141,  Verbatim  Record,  Second  Meeting  of  the  Four  Heads  of  Government  in  the  Council 
the  Palais  des  Nations,  Geneva,  at  2.45  p.  m.,  18th  July,  1955.  Compare  to  Churchill's  words  on 
the  issue  of  the  Defence  White  Paper  for  1954  on  Ist  March  1954,  see  Gilbert,  Never  Despair,  pp. 
1098-1101.  The  opening  and  closing  statements  of  the  Conference,  of  which  this  was  one,  were  by 
prior  agreement  to  be  made  public.  They  were  printed  for  the  House  of  Commons  in  Command 
Paper  No.  9543,  -Miscellaneous  Series  No.  14,  July,  1955. 
9  Ibid.  Eden  went  on  to  say  with  what  from  the  perspective  of  today  was  almost  a  prophetic  soundness 
of  insi;  ht, 
The  deterrent  against  warlike  action  holds  up  a  warning  hand.  But  the  deterrent  cannot  of 
itself  solve  international  problems  or  remove  the  differences  that  exist  between  us.  It  is  in  an 
attempt  to  make  progress  with  these  problems  and  differences  that  we  are  met  here  today.  And 
at  this  Conference  we  have  to  deal  with  them  mainly  in  the  context  of  Europe.  What  is  the 
Chief  among  them?  There  can  surely  be  no  doubt  of  the  answer.  The  unity  of  Germany.  As 
long  as  Germany  is  divided,  Europe  will  be  divided. 
10  CAB  133/141,  Record  of  Tripartite  Discussions  in  Geneva  before  the  Opening  of  the  Conference  at 
President  Eisenhower's  Villa,  1  th  July,  1955.  At  this  meeting  Eden  had  expressed  the  following 
opinion  on  the  issue  of  Germany. 
[B]y  far  the  most  important  question  to  be  discussed  at  the  Conference  was  that  of  German 
unification.  The  Russians  would  not  be  anxious  to  discuss  this.  But  the  right  tactics  for  the 
Western  Powers  would  be  to  insist  on  discussing  it  and  to  put  forward  proposals  which  the 
Russians  would  find  it  difficult  to  reject.  These  tactics  would  be  advantageous  from  the  point 
of  view  of  public  opinion  in  Germany,  but  they  were  also  likely  to  produce  practical  results. 
The  pressure  for  in  Austnan  settlement  \vhich  the  Nestern  Powers  brought  to  bear  on  the 
Russians  at  the  Berlin  Conference  had  in  the  -nd  horn  fruit. Chapter  5/  Page  106 
his  sense  of  urgency  on  the  issue.  '  l  In  his  replies  to  Eden's  offer  of  assurance  for  Soviet 
security,  Bulganin  made  clear  that  the  division  between  the  two  sides  over  the  problem 
was  very  deep  indeed.  Despite  this,  and  following  Eden's  insistence  that  the  matter  had  to 
be  discussed  further,  it  was  only  in  private  conversation  that  evening  that  Bulganin  and 
Khrushchev  seem  finally  to  have  been  able  to  persuade  the  British  that  they  were  not 
willing  to  change  the  status  quo.  That  the  Soviets  were  prepared  to  discuss  the  matter 
seriously  in  informal  surroundings  Evas  in  marked  contrast,  Eden  reported  back  to  London 
immediately  before  the  meal,  to  the  experience  both  the  French  and  the  Americans  had 
had  in  their  bilateral  dinnertime  exchanges  with  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev.  12 
Immediately  after  he  had  enjoyed  his  dinner  and  chit-chat  with  the  Soviet  leaders, 
Eden  composed  a  minute  recording  his  impressions  of  what  had  been  said.  Serious 
talking  had,  it  seems,  begun  during  the  meal,  Eden  being  sat  between  the  two  Soviet 
leaders.  At  this  point  Bulganin  was  exclusively  Eden's  interlocutor.  Macmillan  however 
recorded  the  clear  impression  that  Khrushchev  was  the  more  authoritative  of  the  two. 
The  two  topics  under  discussion  -ý  ere  unsurprisingly  Germany  and  the  Hydrogen  bomb, 
on  which  Bulganin  expressed  the  Russian  fear  that  Germany  might  again  pose  a  serious 
threat  to  Soviet  security.  Even  after  Eden  referred  to  the  difference  thermonuclear  war 
must  surely  have  made  to  such  considerations,  Bulganin  continued  to  express  his  doubts. 
Bulganin  did  however  go  so  far  as  to  flatter  Eden's  ego, 
Bulganin  said  he  thought  that  some  of  our  suggestions  were  important  and  more 
than  once  in  our  conversation  emphasised  the  part  that  we  would  have  to  play  in 
trying  to  find  a  solution. 
11  PREM  11/895,19th  July,  1955,  From  Prime  : Minister,  Geneva  for  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer, 
Lord  President,  Minister  of  Defence  and  Sir  Michael  Adeane.  Eden  `rave  the  following  account  of 
the  discussion  in  the  Palais  des  Nations  of  that  afternoon, 
[on  the  issue  of  guarantees  to  Soviet  security]  Bulganin  had  said  the  Soviets  could  not  accept 
them  because  they  were  derogatory  to  a  Great  Power.  Bul_anin  made  his  replies  good- 
humoredly  but  indicated  firmly  that  he  had  nothing  more  to  say  on  Germany.  The  President 
then  staggered  us  by  observing  that  the  subject  was  exhausted.  I  said  that  we  must  return  to  it 
because  of  its  very  great  importance,  but  that  we  should  reflect  tonight  on  what  had  been  said 
by  everyone  [my  italics]. 
Matters  were  not  all  sweet  agreement  and  light  of  concord  between  Eden  and  Eisenhower. 
12  ibid.  Eden  continued  to  report  an  exchange  between  himself  and  Bulganin  just  after  the  formal 
session  had  closed, 
Bul,  anin  came  up  to  me  and  admitted  the  reality  of  our  divergence  and  how  serious  was  the 
German  question.  He  said  that  he  thou-ht  I  understood  their  position.  I  said  that  I  did 
understand  that  they  did  not  want  to  see  East  Germany  join  West  Germany  in  NATO.  On  the 
other  hand  how  could  we  devise  a  security  arrangement  which  satisfied  him  and  allowed 
Germany  to  take  her  own  decisions...  he  a`_reed  that  this  was  the  heart  of  the  problem,  and 
made  various  complementary  remarks  about  how  I  Could  resolve  it. 
... 
We  agreed  to  continue 
to  examine  the  topic  after  dinner  :  Oni'ht.  if  rhis'wotv.  s  possible  our  eveninc  should  bei  more 
useful  than  that  (j  the  French  and  the  .  4,  nericuns,  Wirelº  ;  17e  Russians  left  without  any  serious 
talk  immediately  after  the  coffee  [my  Italicsi. 
13  Minute  of  19th  July  from  Tides  of  Fortune,  P.  619.  Macmillan  also  recorded  very  Similar 
impressions  to  those  of  Eden  regarding  the  Soviet  attitude  to  Germany. Chaptzr  5/  Pa_,  t  107 
It  was  not  until  after  dinner  had  been  finished  and  as  the  memo  puts  it  "when  Khrushchev 
was  present"  that  Bulcyanin  got  down  to  what  Eden  considered  the  real  nitty-gritty 
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Once  their  discussion  had  touched  on  the  issue  of  the  form  a  European  ý  ide  security 
organisation  might  take  Bulganin  went  on  to  confess, 
[T]hat  he  wanted  to  say  something  to  me  which  he  had  said  to  nobody  else.  It 
was  really  not  possible  for  his  Government  to  return  to  `Iosco\".  from  this 
Conference  having  agreed  to  the  immediate  unification  of  Germans'.  They  were 
a  united  Government  and  reasonably  solidly  based  in  the  country  but  this  was 
something  that  Russia  would  not  accept  and  if  they  were  to  aciree  to  it,  neither 
the  army  nor  the  people  would  understand  it  and  this  was  no  time  to  weaken  the 
Government.  The  people  would  say  this  was  something  Stalin  would  never  have 
agreed  to.  On  this  therefore  he  simply  could  not  meet  us. 
Bulganin  qualified  this  by  admitting  that  although  the  Soviets  could  not  agree  on  German 
unity  immediately  they  would  be  prepared  to  discuss  the  terms  under  %vhich  the  Foreign 
Secretaries  might  later  turn  their  collective  abilities  to  the  problem.  Molotov  was  also 
present  by  this  point.  Both  Bulýanin  and  Khrushchev  seemed  to  agree  cautiously  with  the 
agenda  which  Eden  went  on  to  su  gest.  l'  However  it  was  quite  apparent  that  the  Soviets 
had  no  enthusiasm  for  a  solution,  even  if  it  were  cacooned  in  the  most  favourable  security 
guarantees  for  the  Soviet  Union.  By  the  ?  1st  July  the  West  German  Government  had  been 
made  equally  aware  that  the  Soviets  were  not  for  criving  any  ground  on  the  issue.  16  Eden, 
who  had  talked  to  Stalin  in  the  lucid  desperation  of  the  war's  worst  moments,  made  the 
following  summation  of  the  implications  of  this  unwonted  surfeit  of  Soviet  candour, 
In  a  long  experience  of  talks  with  Russians,  I  think  that  this  was  the  most 
important  and  certainly  the  frankest  conversation  I  have  known.  I  have  not 
thought  it  useful  to  repeat  the  many  compliments  to  Britain  and  references  to  a 
personal  part  in  relations  in  years  gone  by.  All  this  could  properly  be  ascribed  to 
a  desire  to  divide  us  from  the  Americans.  But  I  do  not  think  that  this  would  be  a 
complete  explanation.  It  is  rather  my  impression  that  they  regard  us  as  the  only 
possible  bridge  between  themselves  and  the  United  States  and  that  they  are 
anxious  that  this  bridge  should  be  built.  The  French  were  never  mentioned,  the 
14  There  is  somewhat  of  an  internal  discrepancy  in  the  memo.  Dinner  is  specifically  said  to  have  been 
"between  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev".  However  the  post-prandial  discussion  is  said  to  have  been 
"...  later 
...  when  Khrushchev  was  present". 
15  Eden's  suggestion  consisted  of, 
(1)  an  instruction  to  study  the  unification  of  Germany,  having  regard  to  the  security  of  all 
concerned;  (2)  study  of  a  security  pact  for  Europe,  or  a  part  of  it;  (3)  study  of  the  limitation  of 
forces  and  armaments  in  Germany  and  in  the  countries  neighbouring  Germany,  and  (4)  study 
the  possibility  of  creating  a  demilitarised  area. 
16  PREM  11/895,  Minute  by  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  21st  July,  1955.  Herr  Blankenthorn,  the  West 
German  Ambassador  in  London,  called  on  Kirkpatrick  on  the  20th  July  asking;  for  `_uidance  as  to  the 
correct  line  the  German  press  should  take  now  it  had  become  clear  the  Soviets  opposed  unification. 
Kirkpatrick  counselled  a  restrained  approach  for, 
eil  the  Russians  ere  for  the  first  time  being  civil  in  manner.  It  was  therefore  important  that 
no  Western  nation  should  he  the  first  to  relapse  into  rudeness.  (11)  We  were  now  at  the  most 
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United  States  were  always  referred  to  with  respect,  and  as  being  our  friends  - 
from  whom  we  should  not  be  divided.  1 1,1 
Eden  was  clearly  quite  taken  with  the  flattery  which  the  Soviets  were,  at  least 
according  to  his  record,  paying  him.  This  contrasts  markedly  with  the  opinions  of  some 
of  the  American  delegation  and  both  that  of  later  biographers  of  Eden  and  historians. 
Emphasis  has  tended  to  be  put  on  the  inglorious  comparison  Eden  must  have  been  forced 
to  make  with  his  crucial  importance  in  the  1954  Geneva  summit  over  the  Far  East  and  the 
relatively  humble  role  assigned  to  him  as  junior  to  the  Americans  in  1955.18  There  is  no 
hint  of  injured  pride  in  any  of  the  British  records  that  have  to  do  with  the  conference. 
Indeed  the  problem  seems  almost  to  have  been  on  the  contrary  one  of  an  inflated 
estimation  of  Britain's  own  abilities  as  go-between,  particularly  in  respect  of  the  Far  East. 
What  is  important  from  the  above  is  that  this  idea  was  not  something  that  Eden  was  trying 
to  force  upon  the  Soviets,  but  something  that  he  perceived  in  what  they  had  to  say. 
Eden  was  impressed  by  the  apparent  willingness  on  the  half  of  the  Soviet  delegation 
to  be  at  the  very  least  frank,  particularly,  the  cynical  might  suggest,  as  they  seemed  to  be 
franker  to  him  than  anyone  else.  This  was  a  perception  that  had  a  profound  effect  on  the 
means  by  which  Eden  would  seek  through  1955  and  1956  to  conduct  his  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  Increasing  emphasis  was  to  be  put,  ironically  once  again  in  the  manner 
of  Churchill,  on  the  efficacy  of  mind  speaking  to  mind.  Even  in  respect  of  Soviet 
intervention  in  the  Middle  East,  Eden  was  to  alarm  the  Americans  by  his  eagerness  to 
discuss  Middle  Eastern  affairs  with  the  Soviets. 
In  this  it  might  be  argued  that  Eden  was  misinterpreting  the  Soviet  motive.  What 
seems  to  have  mattered  to  the  Russians  in  July  1955  was  to  persuade  the  West  that  they 
did  not  want  to  start  a  war.  In  their  sweet  reasonableness  the  Soviets  very  effectively 
managed  to  communicate  this  idea.  Eden's  misjudgement  lay  perhaps  with  his  over 
sanguine  view  of  the  intrinsic  power  of  diplomacy  to  lead  to  a  settlement.  Soviet  niceness 
did  afterall  serve  an  ulterior  motive  which  put  very  profound  limitations  on  the  scope  for 
17  PREM  11/895,  Memorandum  of  Meeting  between  Prime  Minister  and  Soviet  Delegation 
, 
19th 
July,  1955. 
18  In  particular  David  Carlton,  writing  before  the  official  British  record  was  publicly  available,  gives  a 
rather  negative  account  of  the  British  showing  at  the  conference  in  Anthony  Eden  pp.  376-380. 
Eisenhower,  according  to  this  view,  stole  centre  stage  as  Eden  was  left  floundering  in  the  wins.  In 
particular  Carlton's  impression  of  the  Soviet  reception  accorded  to  Eden's  proposals  for  German 
unification  does  not  accord  with  the  material  dealt  with  above.  Indeed  Eden's  subsequent 
enthusiasm  for  meetings  with  the  Soviets  hardly  tallies  with  bitter  disappointment,  nor  with  the 
comments  of  Khrushchev  in  his  memoirs  quoted  below.  Khrushchev  Remembers,  p.  399.  Even 
accepting  that  Eden  was  not  likely  to  put  things  in  an  ill  light  himself,  given  the  ebullience  of  his 
reportage  to  London  the  following  judgement  by  Carlton  seems  a  little  sour, 
Nothing  was  to  come  of  the  Open  Skies  idea,  at  least  not  in  Eisenhower's  time,  but  for  the 
duration  of  the  Geneva  Summit  it  held  the  world  stage  as  something  of  glittering  simplicity 
that  might  serve  to  end  the  arms  race.  Eden's  plan,  by  contrast,  was  too  complicated  and  too 
limited  in  scope  to  have  any  similar  appeal;  and  it  was  received  by  the  Soviets  without 
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diplomacy.  Indeed  it  was  to  become  apparent  very  shortly  after  Geneva  that  the  Soviets 
were  not  interested  at  all  in  having  done  with  East/West  rivalry. 
THE  FAR  EAST 
Eden's  perception  that  both  sides  had  come  to  what  amounted  to  an  agreement  to  differ 
over  Germany  is  further  illustrated  by  his  attitude  towards  the  Far  East.  This  had,  of 
course,  been  an  important  consideration  in  the  lead  up  to  the  conference.  '`  Although 
there  was  no  formal  place  in  the  Conference's  agenda  for  discussion  of  the  Far  East,  Eden 
considered  this  an  area  more  fraught  with  danger  in  July  1955  than  German-  or  European 
security.  The  Soviet  attitude  to  German  negotiations  was  further  evidence  that  all  sides 
were  increasingly  coming  to  an  acceptance  of  the  status  quo.  In  his  conversation  of  the 
19th  July  Eden  and  Bulýanin  amicably  came  to  the  following  agreement, 
I  remarked  to  Marshal  Bulganin  that  though  the  situation  in  Europe  was  difficult 
it  was  not  dangerous.  He  cordially  agreed  and  added  that  the  possibility  of  war 
in  Europe  was  so  far  away  it  was  hardly  worth  talking  about.  He  agreed 
however  that  the  Far  Eastern  situation  was  much  more  anxious.  He  spoke  of 
Formosa  and  the  dangers  there.  I  said  that  Quemoy  and  the  MIatsus  worried  me 
much  more.  20 
Eden,  therefore,  spent  a  very  substantial  part  of  his  informal  soundings  with  both  the 
Americans  and  Soviets  on  the  issues  raised  by  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  the  off-shore 
islands.  '  1 
Indeed  in  his  concern  over  the  Far  East  Eden  was  consciously  playing  the  role  of  go- 
between  for  the  White  House  and  Kremlin  which,  apparently,  had  been  accredited  to  him 
by  the  Soviets  on  the  19th.  '-2  A  part  which  he  had  afterall  made  very  much  his  own  at 
Geneva  in  1954.  This  was  particularly  evident  in  his  separate  conversations  with  the 
Soviet  and  American  delegations  on  the  22nd  July.  Eden  while  at  breakfast  with  the 
Americans  suggested  to  Dulles  that  he  might  use  his  meeting  with  the  Soviets  that 
evening  after  dinner,  the  farewell  function  during  which  Eden  was  to  invite  Khrushchev  to 
19  See  above  on  the  preparations  for  the  conference  and  particularly  Macmillan,  Tides  of  Fortune  p. 
61_2. 
20  PREM  11/895,  Note  by  A.  Eden;  19th  July,  1955.  The  conversation  continued  as  follows,  with  a 
characteristically  flippant,  but  pointed,  aside  by  Macmillan, 
Khrushchev  interjected  here  that  the  Chinese  had  been  very  patient.  He  did  not  think  that  the 
Russians  would  have  been  so  patient.  I  replied  that  he  under-estimated  his  own  statesmanship. 
The  position  of  Quemoy  and  the  Matsus  was  very  difficult  for  the  Americans  and  for 
everybody  concerned.  The  Americans  mi`,  ht  wish  Chian_  Kai-Shek  to  reduce  his  forces  on  the 
island.  It  did  not  follow  from  that  that  they  could  compel  him  to  do  so....  The  Russians 
appeared  to  accept  this...  The  Foreign  Secretary  suggested  that  the  . -americans  would  be  very 
happy  if  Quemoy  and  the  NIatsus  were  sunk  under  the  sea.  This  suggestion  appeared  to 
receive  universal  approbation  except,  possibly.  we  all  admitted  from  an  absent  Chou  En-Lai. 
^_1  PREM  1  1,  S05.  Eden  spoke  specifically  on  the  issue  to  Eisenhower  on  the  1  th  July  and  with  both 
Soviet  and  Amencan  delegations  separately  on  the  22nd.  See  also  Fuil  Circle,  p.  3  11. 
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Britain,  to  urge  patience  on  the  part  of  their  Chinese  friends  in  respect  of  the  of  shore 
islands.  Dulles  had  agreed  that  such  an  approach  by  Britain  would  be  a  good  idea.  '-' 
Thus  it  was  that  the  main  topic  of  conversation  between  Eden,  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev 
on  the  evening  of  the  22nd  was  China  and  Chang  Kai-Shek. 
Eden's  conversation  with  the  Soviets  was,  at  least  according  to  his  own  record,  of 
some  value.  After  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  had  made  clear  their  confidence  in  Mao, 
Chou  En-Lai  and  the  future  of  China,  they  pointed  out  that  it  was  natural  the  Chinese 
should  feel  resentful  of  Chiang  's  occupation  of  the  off  -shore  islands  and  their  debarrment 
from  the  United  Nations.  In  response  Eden  made  the  following  mediation: 
President  Eisenhower  was  doing  his  best  to  keep  his  public  opinion  under 
control  on  the  subject  of  Quemoy  and  the  Matsus.  The  Russians  should, 
however,  recognise  his  difficulties.  This  was  a  subject  on  which  emotions  ran 
high  in  the  United  States...  The  President  was  doing  his  best,  in  spite  of  this,  to 
calm  thins  down  and  to  counsel  patience.  If  lie  were  given  more  time,  all  might 
yet  be  well.  Were  the  Chinese  prepared  to  be  equally  patient?  24 
To  this  Khrushchev  replied  that  "  traditionally  the  Chinese  were  a  patient  people.  He 
believed  that  they  would  not  take  any  rash  action  at  the  present  time",  which  is  ironic 
given  Khrushchev's  later  view  of  Nlao. 
It  is  little  wonder  that  in  his  report  to  Cabinet  and  his  ruminations  in  Full  Circle  Eden 
should  have  laid  such  emphasis  on  this  flattering  role.  25  He  clearly  seems  to  have 
conceived  Britain's  position  between  the  Americans  and  Soviets  as  an  independent  one. 
As  at  Geneva  in  1954  Eden  was  acting  as  honest  broker,  albeit  in  slightly  less  dramatic 
way.  Furthermore  his  perception  of  the  Soviet  attitude  towards  the  British  delegation  at 
Geneva  tended  to  confirm  this  high  opinion  rather  then  anything  else.  Whether  or  not  the 
Soviet  delegation  intended  to  dive  this  impression  for  quite  the  reasons  Eden  conjectured 
is  another  matter. 
"OPEN  SKIES"  AND  OPEN  INVITATIONS 
As  regards  the  most  startling  incident  in  the  conference  proceedings,  the  Eisenhower 
"Open  Skies"  proposal,  the  British  had  nothing  to  do  at  all  with  its  Genesis  and  even  less 
23  PREM  11/895,  Note  by  A.  Eden:  22nd  July,  1955. 
24  ibid.  Eden  drew  the  following  contrast  between  British  and  American  attitudes  to  China, 
Our  own  interests  in  China  had  been  mainly  commercial:  we  had  traded  there  for  a  long  time, 
and  over  the  years  had  earned  a  `rood  commercial  return  from  what  we  had  invested.  But  the 
Americans  during  the  war  and  since  had  poured  money  into  China;  and  the  average  American 
now  felt  that  the  Chinese  had  bitten  the  hand  that  fed  them.  As  a  result  the  Americans  were 
specially  sensitive  about  the  present  situation. 
25  CAB  128/29,16th  Cabinet  Conclusions,  Minute  4:  26th  July,  1955.  Full  Circle  pp.  310-311, 
where  in  places  Eden  quotes  almost  verbatim  from  his  record  of  22nd  July  in  PREM  11/895. 
However  in  his  report  to  Parliament  of  26th  July,  1955,  Hansard  Vol.  544,  Cols.  1212-1217,  Eden 
concentrated  on  the  attempt  at  Geneva  to  solve  the  German  problem  and  the  real  relaxation  of 
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with  the  theatre  which  surrounded  Eisenhower's  offer  on  the  21  st  July  during  a  formal 
session  of  the  conference.  26  Consequently,  the  issue  does  not  directly  reflect  upon  the 
British  understanding  of  Soviet  policy  at  Geneva,  although  indirectly  it  says  a 
considerable  amount  about  the  difference  of  approach  to  Soviet  relations  between  the 
Americans  and  the  British.  It  also  says  something  about  both  power's  lively  concern  to 
score  a  victory  for  Western  propaganda  over  Soviet. 
Eden  was  informed  at  breakfast  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  July  by  Eisenhower  that 
he  was  considering  making  an  effort  in  the  area  of  arms  control  verification  in  an  attempt 
to  break  the  stalemate  over  details  which  had  descended  over  the  conference's  formal 
sessions.  27  It  seems  that  the  Americans  were  no  more  specific  than  this,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  proposal  had  already  been  worked  out  in  some  precision  by  the  "Quantico  Panel", 
because  they  did  not  want  to  risk  compromising  the  element  of  surprise  by  leaks  from  the 
British  or  French  delegations.  A  fact  which  says  much  about  the  American  attitude  to  her 
allies.  On  the  whole  both  Eden  and  Macmillan  thought  Eisenhower's  vague  suggestion 
good  as  it  would  put  the  Soviets  on  the  spot  and  reduce  their  ability  to  make  propaganda 
about  their  own  "ban  the  bomb"  stance.  The  sticking  point  for  the  West  was  that  the 
Soviets  were  not  at  all  clear  as  to  how  to  establish  that  the  bomb  had  actually  been 
banned.  Macmillan  in  particular  came  away  from  his  breakfast  with  the  President  more 
impressed  by  Eisenhower's  abilities  of  diplomatic  gamesmanship  than  the  possibility  of 
turning  the  Summit  in  a  more  fruitful  direction. 
The  British  reaction  to  Eisenhower's  more  specific  proposal  of  the  21  st  July,  as  well 
as  for  that  matter  the  French,  was  warm  but  not  ecstatic.  Indeed  Eden's  own  response 
during  the  formal  proceedings  on  the  21st  is  interesting.  28  As  an  alternative  to 
Eisenhower's  grand  gesture  Eden  suggested  that  it  might  be  helpful  if  the  two  sides  bean 
by  agreeing  to  inspections  within  a  limited  but  increasingly  wide  radius  spreading  out 
from  Germany.  This  was  a  proposal  which  he  had  discussed  with  Eisenhower 
,  again  at 
breakfast,  on  the  20th  July.  29  By  this  means,  Eden  suýýested,  the  two  side  could  build  up 
26  Eden  certainly  could  claim  no  control  over  the  thunderclap  which  dramatically  accompanied 
Eisenhower's  proposal.  See  Amborse,  Eisenhower,  The  President,  p.  265. 
27  See  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  398-403  for  the  American  record  of  this  conversation  and  pp. 
421-24.  It  was  in  a  meeting  of  the  American  delegation  at  6  p.  m.  on  the  20th  July,  that  Eisenhower 
decided  to  table  his  "Open  Skies"  proposal  and  that  the  British  and  French  delegations  should  not  be 
informed  in  any  detail.  It  was  noted  that  at  breakfast  that  day  Eden  and  Macmillan  had  been 
favourable  to  the  general  suggestion  on  inspection  which  Eisenhower  had  made.  Both  Dulles  and 
Nelson  Rockefeller  were  present  during  the  evening  meeting.  See  also  Open  Skies,  for  a  discussion 
of  the  proposal. 
28  CAB  133/141,  Formal  Session  of  the  Conference  21st  July.  Also  see  Eden,  Full  Circle,  p.  304  and 
Macmillan,  Tides  of  Fortune,  p.  620. 
29  In  Full  Circle,  p.  304  Eden  is  perhaps  a  little  disingenuous  in  his  account  of  events  in  his  Memoirs 
when  he  gives  the  strong  impression  that  this  proposal  on  limited  inspection  rights  was  "my  idea". 
This  is  especially  so  as  much  of  his  Memoir  follows  very  closely  on  his  contemporary  record.  The 
Suez  Crisis  is  not  the  only  incident  which  suffers  at  Eden's  hands  for  the  sake  of  posterity.  His 
official  record  of  the  conversation,  PREM  11/895,  Note  by  Anthony  Eden  of  20th  July,  1955,  avers 
the  following, 
[A]t'ter  canvassing  various  possibilities  we  agreed  that  some  immediate  agreement  to  apply 
supervision  to  the  forces  of  East  and  West  in  a  part  of  Europe  would  be  the  best  tangible  result Chaptzr  5/  Pd_,  -,  112 
their  confidence  in  each  other  to  a  point  at  vL  hich  some  ww  ider  settlement  of  the  issue 
would  at  last  be  mutually  acceptable.  3t0  In  this  Eden  showed  not  only  his  wonted 
diplomatic  rational,  but  also  perhaps  a  more  sincere  concern  to  achieve  a  settlement  than 
Eisenhower.  31 
Macmillan's  reaction  is  also  interesting  in  respect  of  the  conclusions  he  was  to  draw 
about  general  Soviet  policy  in  Geneva's  immediate  aftermath.  He  records  in  his  memoir 
that  during  the  Eisenhower  and  Eden  proposals  in  the  Palais  des  Nations  of  the  21  st, 
Thinking  of  the  realities  which  lay  behind  all  this  diplomatic  screen,  I  passed  a 
note  to  Kirkpatrick:  "To  abolish  the  nuclear  now  would  spread  terror 
throughout  Europe".  For  I  was  beginning  to  reflect  more  and  more  upon  the 
strange  fact  that  peace  was  being  preserved,  not  endangered  by  nuclear  power.  ''- 
This  point  was  to  undergo  substantial  development  in  but  a  few  weeks.  It  seems  clear 
that  the  British  reaction  to  "Open  Skies",  a  proposal  wvith  which  they  had  as  little  to  do  as 
the  Soviets,  had  its  critical  side.  Their  approach  to  diplomacy  tended  to  avoid  the  brand 
gesture  in  favour  of  limited  and  consequently,  so  Eden  thought,  more  practical  measures. 
The  Soviet  reaction  was  even  more  ambiguous.  Bulýanin,  who  was  in  the  Chair 
when  Eisenhower  introduced  the  idea,  was  initially  welcoming.  However,  this  had 
possibly  more  to  do  with  being  caught  off  ward  as  the  Americans  had  hoped  the  Soviets 
would  be,  for  Khrushchev  made  very  clear  during  the  buffet  at  the  end  of  the  session  that 
"Open  Skies"  was  simply  not  acceptable.  "  From  this  moment  onwards  Eisenhower 
addressed  his  energies  to  Khrushchev,  who  had  demonstrated  considerably  greater 
authority  in  the  handling  of  Soviet  diplomacy  than  Bulganin.  34 
With  Eisenhower's  offer  still  left  formally  in  the  air  by  the  Soviet  delegation,  the 
British  went  to  the  farewell  dinner  provided  by  the  Soviets  on  the  evening  of  22nd  July.  '' 
we  could  hope  for.  The  President  suggested  that  there  'night  for  instance  be  such  joint 
inspection  to  a  depth  of  100  miles  or  so  on  either  side  of  the  existing  line  in  Germany....  [my 
italics] 
30  Khrushchev  made  the  following  comment  in  his  memoirs,  Khrushchev  Remembers,  p.  399,  on  the 
difference  he  perceived  in  the  British  and  American  approaches  to  negotiation.  Although  not  as 
convivial  as  was  his  experience  of  the  French  delegation, 
[T]he  atmosphere  of  our  conversations  with  Eden  was  certainly  warm.  Naturally  he  was 
following  the  same  general  line  as  the  Americans.  but  he  seemed  to  be  more  flexible  and 
receptive  to  reasonable  ar`uments. 
31  This  is  so  particularly  in  relation  to  the  debate  over  the  balance  in  Eisenhower's  motivation  between 
propaganda  and  diplomacy.  Given  that  the  Soviets  would  probably  not  have  been  able  to  add  by 
over-fliL,  hts  much  more  intelligence  to  that  which  they  already  had,  "Open  Skies"  might  reasonably 
be  dismissed  as  a  little  one-sided.  See  Gaddis,  Strategies  of  Containment,  p.  157  and  pp.  191-193 
for  an  interesting  insight  into  the  American  rational  at  Geneva.  Eden's  rather  more  prosaic  proposal 
demonstrated  his  wonted  concern  with  building  confidence  by  starting  from  small  and  relatively 
undramatic  agreements.  Eisenhower's  biographer  is  considerably  more  sympathetic  to  his  subject 
over  the  issue,  Eisenhower,  Soldier  and  President,  p.  393. 
2  Tides  of  Fortune,  pp.  620-21.  Macmillan  went  on  to  comment,  "this  paradox  was  to  confuse  and 
invalidate  much  of  the  subsequent  arguments  about  disarmament.  " 
,3  There  is  a  memorandum  of  this  conversation  at  FRUS  1955-5  7,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  456-67. 
,4  Amhrose.  Eisenhov  er,  Soldier 
,  und  President,  pp.  392-93. 
35  It  was  only  from  Moscow  that  Bulganin  was  to  make  his  distaste  of  the  proposal  public. Chapter  5/  Pa, 
-,  e  1  13 
It  was  during  this  event  that  Eden  invited  Bul(yanin  and  Khrushchev  to  visit  Britain  the 
following  spring.  Indeed  according  to  Eden's  memoir  there  must  have  been  something  of 
a  romantic  air  to  the  invitation,  delivered  as  it  was  to  Bulganin  on  the  terrace  of  the 
Soviet  delegation's  small  villa.  36  This  however  was  no  last  moment  flight  of  whimsy  on 
the  part  of  Eden.  He  had  already  been  given  cabinet  approval  that  if  he  thought  such  a 
thing  appropriate  he  should  feel  no  compunction  in  asking  the  Soviets  to  visit  Britain.  In 
their  response  to  a  telegram  from  Eden  immediately  after  the  British  delegation's  arrival  in 
Geneva  the  Cabinet  had  expressed  through  Butler  the  following  opinion, 
We  came  to  the  conclusion  that  so  much  depended  on  the  Geneva  discussions 
that  the  judgement  of  yourself  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  would  be  better  than 
ours.  All  we  can  do  is  to  assure  you  of  the  general  support  of  the  Cabinet  in 
whatever  you  decide,  since  we  think  that  no  harm  could  come  from  the  visit  of 
the  Soviet  leaders.  37 
Butler  went  on  to  comment  that  the  decision  to  invite  the  Soviets  depended  very  much  on 
how  Eden  gauged  the  "atmosphere"  of  the  conference.  Although  the  formal  proceedings, 
particularly  during  the  last  couple  of  days,  had  produced  nothing  more  substantial  than 
rhetoric,  Eden  had  been  sufficiently  impressed  by  the  Soviet?  private  candour  finally  to 
pop  the  question.  '18  As  early  as  the  20th  July  Eden  had  given  a  relatively  sanguine  interim 
report  to  Churchill  in  which  pointed  out  the  following  contrast  between  the  formal  and 
informal  proceedings  of  the  conference, 
So  far  the  Russians  show  little  sign  of  movement  in  our  discussions.  The 
Foreign  Secretaries  are  to  try  tomorrow  to  work  out  the  instructions  which 
might  be  given  to  them  on  the  subject  of  German  reunification  and  European 
security.  However,  our  private  discussions  have been  more  hopeful  and  it  seems 
clear  that  both  the  Russians  and  the  Americans  want  to  get  some  positive  results 
from  the  Conference.  '9 
The  Soviets'  flattery  on  the  night  of  the  19th,  and  their  cautious  reasonableness  thereafter, 
had  not  been  entirely  without  effect. 
In  concrete  terms  the  conference  did  not  produce  anything  more  solid  than  a  bland 
communique  of  unexceptionable  platitudes  and  the  instructions  which  were  to  provide  a 
basis  for  the  Foreign  Ministers  to  disagree  over  in  the  autumn.  4°  But  as  Eden  had  made 
clear  to  Churchill  on  the  -"Oth 
July  this  was  about  as  much  as  they  could  expect.  The 
36  Full  Circle,  p.  307:  Eisenhower  ,,  gas  informed  after  the  event. 
37  FO  500/684,  Telegram  No.  52  from  F.  O.  to  UK.  Delegation  Geneva,  from  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  to  Prime  Minister;  19th  July,  1955. 
38  Although  the  Soviets  reserved  their  most  serious  blast  of  cold  war  polemic  until  the  very  last  day  of 
the  conference,  after  the  ins  itation  to  Britain  had  been  made,  on  the  23rd  July.  See  Full  Circle,  p. 
306.  Tides  of  Fortune.  p.  623.  Macmillan  in  particular  thought  that  this  final  outhurst  had  much  to 
do  with  Soviet  "peevishness". 
39  FO  300/OS4.  Teie,  _ram  No.  50  from  UK.  Delegation  Geneva  to  F.  O.,  from  P.  M.  for  Winston 
Churchill.  19th  July,  1955. 
40  See  Cmmd.  95-41  for  the  text  of  the  Directives  for  the  Foreign  Ministers. Chaptzr  5/  Paffe  1  14 
Conference's  success  was  in  the  informal  candour  the  Soviets  had  displayed.  detailed  in 
Eden's  memos  already  discussed  above. 
THE  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  SLN  1MMIT 
Eden  and  Macmillan  reported  their  impressions  of  the  conference  to  a  meeting  of  cabinet 
on  the  26th  July.  4  t  Eden,  interestingly,  concentrated  first  of  all  on  his  private  discussions 
with  Eisenhower  and  the  relatively  agreeable  attitude  he  had  displayed  to%ý  ards  British 
concern  regarding  the  antics  of  Chiang  Kai-Shek.  Eden  was  also  convinced.  again  from 
his  informal  contacts,  that  the  Soviets  were  prepared  to  use  such  influence  as  they  had  on 
the  Communist  Chinese  to  hold  them  back  from  precipitate  action.  After  a  long  treatment 
of  this  Far  Eastern  theme  he  went  on  to  comment, 
In  the  Conference  itself  discussion  had  turned  mainly  on  the  questions  of 
German  unification  and  European  security.  It  had  proved  impossible  to  induce 
the  Russians  to  modify  their  view  that  Germany  could  not  be  unified  until  a  new 
system  of  security  had  been  established  in  Europe.  In  this  they  were  influenced 
by  a  genuine  fear  that  Germany  might  re-emerge  as  a  strong  military  power  in 
Europe.  Even  if  the  Russian  leaders  could  be  persuaded  that  this  could  be 
prevented,  their  freedom  for  manoeuvre  would  be  for  some  time  limited  by  an 
instinctive  fear  of  Germany  among  the  Russian  people.  This  evidently  went  so 
deep  that  even  a  dictatorship  had  to  take  account  of  it.  At  this  Conference,  at 
any  rate,  the  Russians  had  seemed  to  be  more  apprehensive  of  the  resurgence  of 
Germany  than  of  encirclement  by  the  United  States.  The  other  outstanding 
impression  left  by  the  Conference  was  the  desire  of  the  Russian  leaders  to 
establish  more  normal  relations  with  the  Governments  of  the  West.  They 
seemed  genuinely  anxious  to  secure  a  relaxation  of  international  tension  and  a 
friendlier  relationship  with  the  Western  Powers. 
Macmillan  expressed  his  "full  agreement"  with  what  the  Prime  Minister  had  said,  he 
did  however  lay  emphasis  presciently  upon  the  following  in  contrast  to  Eden's 
preoccupation  with  the  Far  East, 
The  Russians  had  seemed  far  less  anxious  than  he  had  expected  about  the 
possibility  of  encirclement  by  the  United  States.  They  were  much  more 
concerned  about  Germany  and,  in  the  long  run  perhaps,  in  the  position  which 
they  might  find  themselves  between  a  resurgent  Germany  and  a  strong  China. 
He  doubted  whether  the  Foreign  Ministers,  at  their  meeting,  in  October,  would 
make  much  progress  towards  the  unification  of  Germany.  But,  if  a  steady 
pressure  were  maintained,  a  solution  might  eventually  be  found  through  some 
sort  of  security  pact  for  Europe.  Meanwhile  it  certainly  seemed  that  the  Russian 
leaders  were  anxious  to  follow  peaceful  policies  in  Europe.  They  had 
presumably  concluded  that,  with  the  advent  of  nuclear  weapons,  European  war 
would  not  serve  their  purposes.  Moreover,  with  the  end  of  the  Stalin  regime, 
they  seemed  less  disposed  to  favour  aggressive  methods  and  would  prefer,  if 
41  CAB  l2S  ý`ý.  16th  Cabinet  Conclusion,  1955.  \I  inutc  4.26th  July.  1955. Chaptzr  5/  Pa,, 
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they  could,  to  devote  their  resources  to  the  development  of  their  internal 
economy 
. 
42 
The  predictions  of  both  `Moscow  and  Bonn  Embassies  as  regarded  the  Soviet  attitude 
over  Germany  were  born  out.  The  Soviets,  it  was  now  clear  to  the  British  executive  were 
not  interested  in  coming  to  a  settlement,  preferring  to  accept  a  status  quo  which  gave 
them  the  substance  of  what  they  wanted,  a  relatively  enfeebled  Germany.  43 
The  Foreign  %Iinistem)  conference  of  October  1955  was  to  mark  the  final  attempt  to 
get  some  kind  of  agreement  on  the  issue  in  line  with  the  directives  which  had  been 
worked  out  at  the  Summit.  Even  before  Macmillan  came  up  against  the  granite-like 
intransigence  of  Molotov  the  British  were  extremely  doubtful  that  any  settlement  would 
be  forthcoming.  Although  interestingly  Macmillan  seems  not  entirely  to  have  given  up 
hope  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  the  26th  July,  the  rock  on  which  such  residual  hope  was  to 
flounder  was  the  West's  insistence  that  Germany  must  be  allowed  freely  to  make  her  own 
security  arrangements  after  unification,  i.  e.  join  NATO.  Only  if  the  Soviets  accepted  this 
as  the  basis  upon  which  to  develop  a  broader  security  system  for  Europe  were  the 
Western  Powers  prepared  to  go  forward.  The  Soviets,  unsurprisiný,  ly,  were  no  more 
prepared  to  loose  their  grip  over  East  Germany  for  a  united  Germany  to  join  the  West 
than  they  had  been  in  195-4.  Their  proposals  included  the  end  of  both  NATO  and  the 
Warsaw  Pact  before  German  unification  and  the  construction  of  an  entirely  new  pan- 
European  security  structure.  The  Western  Powers,  equally  unsurprisingly,  saw  this  as 
little  more  than  a  ploy  to  exclude  America  from  Europe  and  expand  Soviet  influence  into 
a  disunited  West. 
The  prospects  for  a  settlement  at  the  Foreign  Minister's  conference  were  discussed  at 
a  meeting  of  the  FLINT  Committee  on  the  19th  October.  44  If  by  way  of  concession  to 
42  In  his  memoirs  Macmillan  records  that  he  made  a  note  of  his  impressions  of  the  final  "informal" 
meeting  with  the  Soviets  on  the  22nd  July.  In  its  substance  this  very  closely  accords  with  the  points 
that  he  made  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  the  26th  of  that  month,  see  Tides  of  Forru￿e,  p.  6??. 
43  Khrushchev  in  his  memoir  was  quite  specific  on  the  issue  of  what  the  Soviets  wanted  to  avoid  in 
Germany,  Khrushchev  Remembers,  p.  394.  The  order  in  which  he  lists  the  opposition  is  worthy  of 
at  least  passing  note, 
[W]e  knew  that  the  number  one  goal  which  the  En, 
-, 
lish,  American,  and  French  would  be 
pursuing  in  Geneva  would  he  what  they  called  "the  re-unification  of  Germany",  which  really 
meant  the  expulsion  of  Socialist  forces  from  the  German  Democratic  Republic:  in  other  words, 
the  liquidation  of  Socialism  in  the  German  Democratic  Republic  and  the  creation  of  a  single 
capitalist  Germany  which  would,  no  doubt,  be  a  member  of  NATO.  As  far  as  our  own 
position  on  this  issue,  we  wanted  simply  to  sign  a  peace  treaty  that  would  recognise  the 
existence  of  two  German  states  and  would  guarantee  that  each  state  be  allowed  to  develop  as  its 
own  people  saw  Cit. 
44  CAB  130/111,  GEN  506,  FLINT,  Minutes  of  Ist  meeting,  19th  October,  1955.  Macmillan  bean 
the  discussion  by  reference  to  the  following  points  arising  from  press  speculation  about  the  Foreigyn 
Minister's  meeting  at  Geneva. 
[Tjhe  "Times"  leadin  articles  of  the  15th  and  18th  October  had  caused  some  apprehension  in 
Germany  . 
These  articles  argued  that  the  Russians  would  never  agree  to  the  reunification  of 
Germany  ýºmultaneou  lv  ww  nth  the  conclusion  or  a  European  Security  Pact,  and  drew  the 
conclusion  that  we  should  offer  the  Russians  some  concessions  on  European  security  now,  in Chapter  5/  Pa, 
-,:: 
116 
the  Soviet  view  unification  were  entered  on  first  without  an  acceptable  security  structure 
Macmillan  thought  that, 
[S]uch  a  course  would  be  bound  to  brink  upon  us  the  hostility  of  the  German 
Federal  Government.  Some  concession  would  be  justified  to  secure  Russian 
agreement  to  German  reunification,  but  he  shared  the  view  expressed  by  Sir 
William  Hayter  (telegram  no.  158  from  Moscow)  that  the  Russians  were  not 
prepared  to  leave  Germany.  It  was,  therefore,  very  important  that,  despite  the 
arguments  which  were  likely  to  be  put  forward  by  misguided  sections  of  opinion 
in  Western  countries,  we  should  maintain  our  attitude  that  German  reunification 
and  a  European  Security  Pact  must  go  together  [ensuring  the  German  right  to 
enter  NATOI.  4' 
This  proved  to  be  a  reasonable  summary  of  why  the  the  Geneva  Meeting  of  Foreign 
Ministers  was  to  prove  entirely  sterile.  46  Both  Eden  and  Macmillan  seem  to  have 
considered  that  the  focus  of  the  cold  war  had  now  shifted  away  from  a  relatively  stable 
Europe  over  which,  if  only  de  facto,  there  seemed  to  have  been  an  agreement  to  differ.  4 
There  were  certainly  no  ;  rounds  on  which  to  develop  a  mutually  agreeable  settleuuce%fof  ' 
the  German  question.  Furthermore,  the  Foreign  Minister's  meeting,  defined  clearly  the 
limits  of  the  "Geneva  Spirit",  limits  which  had  already  become  apparent  with  the  Czech 
agreement  to  supply  arms  to  the  Egyptian  Government  in  September  (on  which  see  the 
following  chapter).  Indeed,  perhaps  the  most  interesting  issue  to  arise  from  the  October 
advance  of  German  unity,  in  the  hope  that  as  time  went  on  we  might  be  more  amenable.  [The 
Germans  had  been  assured  that  this  was  not  British  Government  policy] 
45  FO  371/116654  NS  1021/69,  Confidential,  from  Sir  William  Hayter,  Moscow  to  Macmillan,  4th 
October,  1955,  is  the  despatch  to  which  Macmillan  refers  in  the  quote.  Hayter  commented  on  the 
remarks  Grotewhol,  the  East  German  leader,  had  made  in  the  East  German  Parliament  on  the  26th 
September  on  the  guarantees  he  had  received  from  the  Soviets  regarding  the  future  of  his  country, 
Put  into  English,  this  means  "the  Russians  have  promised  to  keep  us  in  power  until  such  time 
as  Communists,  fellow  travellers  or  neutralists  control  Western  Germany". 
... 
Soviet  policy 
may  change.  But  a  promise  of  this  kind  must  undoubtedly  have  been 
viven. 
In  these 
circumstances  German  unity  is  not  now,  or  in  the  immediate  future,  achievable. 
46  For  a  full  record  of  the  proceedings  see  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  537-808. 
47  ibid.  Hayter  went  on  to  make  the  followin-,  damming  appreciation  of  the  Soviet  attitude  to  security 
guarantees. 
We  are  sometimes  inclined  to  think  that  the  Russians  badly  want  a  system  of  security  in 
Europe.  Perhaps  they  do.  But  they  want  it  not  because  they  think  it  would  really  offer  them 
g.  security  ainst  attack  (they  have  no  more  confidence  in  paper  guarantees  from  us  than  we 
would  have  in  paper  guarantees  from  them),  but  because  they  regard  it  as  a  step  towards  the 
liquidation  of  N.  A.  T.  0.  and  the  consequent  withdrawal  of  American  troops  from  Europe. 
[thus  Soviets  unlikely  to  agree  to  a  Security  System  that  maintains  both  arrangements]  No 
doubt  the  elaboration  of  se  urity  proposals  including  these  elements  is  useful  exercise  from  the 
point  of  view  of  Western  public  opinion,  but  we  delude  ourselves  if  we  think  it  is  likely  to 
have  any  charm  for  the  Russians.  the  Soviet  Government  do  not  go  in  for  refinements.  Their 
approach  to  most  questions  is  unsophisticated  and  crude.  So  it  will  he  to  this  question,  and 
their  answer  is  not  difficult  to  foresee. Chaptzr  5/  Pa`_-1  I- 
get-together  was  the  light  it  threw  on  the  diminishing  position  of  Molotov  within  the 
Soviet  leadership.  48 
"THERE  AIN'T  GOYNA  BE  NO  VAR" 
It  is  perhaps  putting  a  little  too  fine  a  judgement  in  comparing  the  emphasis  placed  by 
Eden  and  Macmillan  in  their  26th  July  report  to  the  Cabinet  on  the  Summit  meeting  to 
conclude  that  there  was  a  major  difference  between  the  views  of  Her  Majesty's  Prime 
Minister  and  Her  Foreign  Secretary.  However  Macmillan's  over-riding  concern  with  the 
nuclear  dimension  to  the  conference  was  shortly  to  be  made  much  clearer  in  a  private 
memo  of  the  8th  August.  It  was  given  a  limited,  secret  circulation  amongst  certain 
important  members  of  the  cabinet.  49  These  included  Butler  and  Lloyd,  who  were  at  this 
point  Chancellor  and  `-linister  of  Defence  respectively  and  also,  appropriately  enough 
given  the  slip  of  paper  handed  to  him  during  the  formal  session  of  the  Conference  on  the 
21st  July,  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick.  The  note  was,  as  lie  minuted  to  Kirkpatrick,  "...  a  little 
paper  I  have  composed,  to  try  to  clear  my  own  mind.  "5')  Although  too  much  ought  not  to 
be  read  into  what  seem  to  have  been  jottings,  it  seems  reasonable  to  take  them  as  a  fair 
statement  of  the  process  of  thought  which  Geneva  had  caused  Macmillan  to  embark 
upon.  He  expanded  upon  the  crucial  impression  which  Geneva  had  left  with  him 
regarding  the  Soviet's  new  attitude  towards  war  in  a  thermo-nuclear  age.  His  thinking 
was  very  much  a  development  of  the  comments  of  the  Moscow  Embassy  and  the 
Northern  Department  in  the  lead  up  to  the  Summit  on  this  subject.  It  was  also  a  clear 
insight  into  the  policy  implications  of  the  speech  Eden  had  made  to  the  Summit  on  the 
18th  July,  quoted  from  above. 
He  began  by  stating  very  starkly  what  it  was  that  had  forced  the  Soviets  to  be  so 
terribly  nice  to  the  West  at  Geneva, 
48  Molotov's  position  had  faded  very  considerably  since  his  8th  February,  1955  foreign  policy  speech. 
Indeed  so  low  had  it  fallen  by  October  that  many  had  expected  him  to  be  replaced  before  the 
Foreign  Minister's  Conference,  not  least  because  of  criticism  of  his  methods  in  the  journal 
Kommunist  of  the  10th  October.  Molotov's  performance  at  Geneva  was  in  stark  contrast  to  that  of 
the  Berlin  Conference  in  1954  when  he  had  been  confident  and  authoritative  in  his  diplomacy.  By 
October,  1955  he  appeared  thralled  to  other  authorities  within  the  Kremlin  to  whom  he  was  forced 
to  refer  final  judgement.  FO  371  116641  NS  1017/98,  Memorandum,  Hayter,  Moscow  to 
Macmillan,  "The  Power  Relationship  in  the  Soviet  Union",  28th  November,  1955.  At  this  point 
Hayter's  analysis  still  saw  a  vibrant  future  for  the  principle  of  collective  leadership,  albeit  with 
Khrushchev  in  an  increasingly  powerful  position. 
49  Again  Macmillan  was  to  be  quite  specific  in  his  memoirs  as  to  how  Geneva  affected  his  attitude 
towards  the  Soviet  Union  itself  and  consequently  his  whole  philosophy  of  defence.  He  makes  the 
following,  comment  about  his  attitude  to  Geneva  immediately  after  the  conference  was  over, 
In  reflecting  on  Geneva,  a  strange,  and  to  me  novel,  experience,  I  felt  some  encouragement, 
largely  because  of  the  strong  impression  left  in  my  mind  that  all  the  great  nations  who  were  in 
the  nuclear  game  now  accepted  that  modern  war,  that  is  nuclear  war,  was  quite  impossible  and 
could  only  lead  to  mutual  destruction. 
50  He  described  the  note  in  the  following  ,  enns  in  a  covering  letter  to  Butler  of  10th  August  (FO 
800/668),  "Please  destroy  or  return  my  little  memorandum.  It  is  nothing  more  than  a  few  notes  - 
not  tit  for  any  tormal  purpose". Chapter  5/  Pa, 
-,  t  11S 
1.  Everyone  knows  that  the  improvement  in  relations  between  the  Communists 
and  the  Free  World  which  became  evident  at  Geneva,  is  really  due  to  Fear,  not 
to  Love.  It  is  the  first  dividend  of  nuclear  weapons.  2.  But  nobody  likes  to  sav 
this  -  except  with  some  courage,  Mr.  Grossman  in  the  Sunday  Pictorial  (7.8.5  5) 
3.  At  present  the  Soviets  are  held  back  by  fear  of  the  American  H  bombs.  In  a 
few  years  everyone  will  be  held  back  by  fear  of  each  other's  H  bombs.  4.  This 
development,  paradoxically  enough,  has  brought  a  greater  sense  of  security  to 
the  world  than  we  have  had  for  some  time. 
Little  doubt  was  left  in  Macmillan's  mind  that  the  Soviet  attitude  towards  thermo-nuclear 
war  was  effectively  synonymous  with  that  of  his  and  the  British  Government  generally 
There  then  followed  a  grand  construction  from  this  basic  premise  which  was  to  have 
fundamental  implications  for  the  future  of  British  defence  policy  both  before  Macmillan's 
rise  in  1957  and,  more  particularly,  after. 
5.  If  disarmament  means  -  agreement  to  abolish  nuclear  weapons,  it  follows  that 
insecurity  will  result  -  at  any  rate  in  the  Free  World,  a)  because  no  real  system  of 
control  or  inspection  can  be  devised,  b)  because  another  "conventional"  war 
waged  with  all  modern  weapons  short  of  nuclear  would  be  destructive  of 
European  life  and  civilization,  c)  because  we  should  probably  lose  such  a  war.  6. 
Security  may  best  be  maintained  if  nuclear  weapons  are  held  by  the  Great 
Powers  and  known  to  be  so  held. 
In  his  memoirs  and  at  the  time  in  private  Macmillan  expanded  upon  this  point,  laying 
bare  the  fallacy,  as  he  saw  it,  at  the  heart  of  the  argument  for  nuclear  disarmament.  51  If  it 
were  fear  of  nuclear  annihilation  that  kept  the  world  at  peace,  it  was  no  solution  to 
remove  the  cause  of  fear.  His  philosophy  of  defence  was  based  on  a  clear  perception  that 
the  Soviets  had  just  as  great  a  horror  of  the  consequences  of  thermo-nuclear  war  as  did 
the  west.  Upon  this  premise  a  calculation  was  erected  which  may  have  been  utterly 
abhorrent  in  the  event  of  its  inaccuracy  or  a  human  error,  but  was  nonetheless  rational.  5'- 
51  Macmillan  records  in  his  memoirs  the  following  note  penned  on  the  25th  July,  Tides  of  Fortune,  pp. 
624-625, 
"Peace",  say  all  the  leader-writers,  etc.,  "is  now  assured  because  everyone  knows  that  there 
can  be  no  victor  in  war  today.  "  The  after  a  fe  w  intervening  para  graphs  ,  they  go  on  to  say 
"Ban  the  nuclear  bomb.  "  But  is  this  syllogism  really  sound?  Is  the  deduction  correct'?  If  we 
abolish  the  nuclear  bomb  (which  has  abolished  war)  shall  we  not  brink  back  war"  This  is  a 
dander,  even  if  we  succeeded  in  a  water-tight  system  of  control,  inspection  and  all  the  rest. 
which  is  impossible. 
52  Macmillan  is  here  frighteningly  logical  in  his  balancing  of  the  argument.  This  contrast  starkly  with 
the  kind  of  thought  processes  imputed  to  political  leaders  in  respect  of  thermonuclear  weapons  by 
such  proponents  of  disarmament  as  Bertrand  Russell,  albeit  in  the  following  with  reference  to 
Khrushchev  and  Kennedy  in  1961, 
The  most  important  question  before  the  world  at  the  present  time  is  this:  is  it  possible  to 
achieve  anything  that  anyone  desires  by  means  of  war'  Kennedy  and  Khrushchev  say  yes;  sane 
men  say  no.  On  this  supreme  question  Kennedy  and  Khrushchev  are  at  one.  If  one  could 
suppose  them  both  capable  of  a  rational  estimate  of  the  probabilities,  we  should  have  to  believe 
that  the  time  has  come  for  Man  to  become  extinct.  [Bertrand  Russell,  Has  Man  a  Future,  p. 
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It  seems  clear  from  Macmillan's  ruminations  of  July  and  August  1955  that  Geneva  was  a 
turning  point  in  the  development  of  this  crucial  perception  by  the  British  Government  of 
Soviet  foreign  and  defence  policy. 
Macmillan's  memo  of  the  8th  August  was  sent  to  Butler  with  a  covering  note  of  the 
10th  August.  It  reflected  on  one  of  the  main  problems  which  was  to  concern  the  Eden 
Government  until  the  Suez  Crisis  broke,  namely  defence  review.  This  serves,  once  more, 
to  underline  the  fundamental  importance  that  the  impressions  garnered  at  and  around  the 
Geneva  Conference  had  upon  British  thinking  about  the  cold  war. 
It  is  now  clear  to  me  that  nuclear  weapons  are  the  real  protection  of  the  world 
against  war...  [he  then  discussed  the  desirability  of  conventional  defence  cuts, 
particularly  in  the  sensitive  area  of  the  British  army  in  Germany] 
... 
I  really 
believe  that  our  economy  cannot  stand  defence  expenditure  on  the  present  scale 
indefinitely,  and  that  we  ought  to  consider  abandoning  those  parts  of  it  which  are 
really  useless...  I 
The  whole  process  of  defence  review  is  accorded  a  good  chapter  in  Eden's  memoirs.  It 
would  seem  impossible,  given  the  tenor  of  Macmillan's  thinking  after  Geneva,  to  divorce 
from  these  policy  considerations  the  British  Government's  developing  understanding  of 
the  changes  which  were  happening  in  the  Soviet  union  through  1955  and  into  1956.54 
It  was  not,  however,  apparent  to  the  British  in  the  summer  of  1955  quite  how  far  the 
Soviets  wanted  to  cro  towards  a  lasting  settlement  of  the  cold  war.  Indeed  given  that 
Soviet  policy  was  in  a  period  of  flux  it  would  be  surprising  if  the  British  attitude  were  in 
turn  anything  more  than  plastic.  Although  the  Geneva  Summit  had  made  it  quite  plain 
that  the  Soviets  did  not  want  to  leave  East  Germany  and  reduce  their  insurance  against 
another  resurgence  of  German  power,  the  British  Government  seem  to  have  harboured 
quite  expansive  hopes  for  the  future  of  East-West  diplomacy.  This  is  revealed  most 
instructively  in  the  correspondence  which  Macmillan  initiated  with  Dulles  over  an 
American  move  to  publish  certain  conference  documents  unilaterally  in  the  August  of 
53  FO  800/668,  Note  from  Macmillan  to  Butler  of  10th  August,  1955.  Macmillan  also  displayed  a 
more  subtle  approach  to  the  problem  of  deterrence  than  arguably  was  to  prevail  in  the  United  States 
until  MacNamara  and  "graduated  deterrence". 
It  looks  to  me  as  if  we  ought  to  work  towards  a  position  when  we  have:  (a)  nuclear  weapons  to 
protect  us  against  total  war,  and  (b)  the  rest  of  our  forces  by  land  and  sea  and  air  carefully 
or`_anised  for  two  purposes:  (1)  in  Germany  to  prevent  minor  aggression  across  the  frontiers  so 
that  small  incidents  can  be  dealt  with  without  calling  the  appalling  sanction  of  nuclear  attack, 
and  (2)  all  the  various  semi-police  purposes,  Malaya,  Kenya  and  all  the  rest 
54  Eden  makes  the  followin_,  interesting,  comment  on  the  issue  of  defence  review  in  his  memoirs,  Full 
Circle.  pp.  368-369. 
One  consequenc,,  of  the  :  volution  from  the  atomic  to  the  hydrogen  bomb  was  to  diminish  the 
aJv,  tnta  e  of  ph`  sicallI  lar-ger  countries.  All  became  equally  vulnerable.  I  had  been  acutely 
conscious  in  the  atomic  age  of  our  unenviable  position  in  a  small  and  crowded  island,  but  if 
continents,  and  not  merely  small  islands,  were  doomed  to  destruction,  all  was  equal  in  the 
,  rim  reckoning...  I  knew  that  the  Russians  were  husy  applying,  the  new  lessons.  we  had  to  do 
so  in  a  situation  made  more  difficult  by  our  limited  resources. Chapter  5/  Page  120 
1955.  Macmillan  thought  this  a  very  bad  idea  for  the  following  reasons,  which  were 
expressed  in  a  note  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  Sth  August. 
This  American  proposal  seems  to  me  most  undesirable  and  I  have  already 
instructed  Sir  Roger  Niakins  to  do  «hat  he  can  to  discourage  the  State 
Department  from  perusin  it.  My  main  considerations  are-  (a)  our  general 
objection  to  unilateral  and  premature  publication  of  the  proceedings  of 
international  conferences,  (b)  the  understanding  at  Geneva  was  that  our 
discussions  should  be  confidential  except  for  the  opening,  and  closing  statements. 
I  am  sure  that  this  was  one  of  the  factors  which  enabled  us  all  to  speak  more 
frankly...;  (c)  we  are  on  the  threshold  of  ivhcrt  is  gelierally  accepted  to  he  a 
conailluing  process  of  co!  ferennce  and  discussion  >º'itli  the  Russianns.  This  makes 
it  particularly  ruudesirable  to  set  the  pattern  of  pOliccrtion,  tit,  hich  call  ollh 
diminish  the  chances  of  success.  4'  should  aim  at  "opeii  ci  reemeiuts  secretI 
arrived  at"  [my  italicsl.  55 
Eden  scribbled  upon  this  minute,  "I  agree  entirely"  on  August  10th.  The  substance  of  the 
above  was  then  relayed  to  Dulles  in  a  telegram  of  Au<<ust  13th.  56  Dulles  reply  of  the  15th 
August,  although  satisfactory  to  Macmillan,  was  far  from  the  liking  of  Eden.  Eden 
objected  particularly  to  the  suggestion  that  the  restricted  sessions  themselves  might  have 
to  be  made  public.  "There  can  be  no  more  conferences  if  Americans  even  think  of 
publishing  restricted  sessions",  Eden  scribbled  on  the  Washington  telegram  containing 
Dulles  response.  57  Given  that  the  most  valuable  discussions  as  far  as  the  British  were 
concerned  had  happened  outside  the  Conference  hall  altogether,  it  is  perhaps  a  little 
strande  that  Eden  should  have  been  so  insistent  on  this  point.  Clearly,  however,  both 
Macmillan  and  Eden,  impressed  by  Soviet  candour  at  Geneva,  were  eager  that  the  most 
should  be  made  of  the  new  opportunity  for  diplomacy  to  flourish.  Their  approach  to 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  was  wholly  pragmatic. 
Despite  this  August  hope  for  the  future  of  the  Geneva  Spirit,  it  was  soon  to  become 
apparent  that  the  Soviets  willingness  to  negotiate  was  severely  circumscribed  within  set 
limits.  By  the  Foreign  Ministers'  Conference  of  October  1955,  with  the  Czech  Arms  deal 
and  Bulaanin's  edgy  response  to  "Open  Skies"  there  was  little  room  left  for  illusion  as  to 
the  possibility  of  any  concrete  agreements  on  the  main  points  at  issue.  Sir  William  Hayter 
in  a  despatch  of  October  4th  1955,  in  which  he  thought  at  best  the  Soviets  wanted 
"...  breeder  conferences  in  an  endless  series",  delivered  his  considered  judgement, 
55  PREN1  11/879,  PM  55/99,  Note  to  Prime  Minister  from  Foreign  Secretary,  8th  August,  1955. 
56  PRE  111/879,  Tel.  No.  36722.  F.  0.  to  Washington,  for  Dulles  from  the  Foreign  Secretary;  13th 
August.  1955. 
57  PRENt  11/879,  Tel.  No.  1893,  Washington  to  F.  0..  tor  the  Foreign  Secretary  from  Dulles,  15th 
August,  1955..  -\Iso  see  The  Failure  o0  he  Eclen  Goter  nn,  c',  ir,  p.  128,  were  this  exchange  undergoes 
what  might  he  termed  the  Suez  effect,  viewed  as  it  is  through  the  refracting  lens  of  its  significance 
tier  developments  in  105).  Lamb  contents  himself  in  drawing  the  following  conclusion,  This 
betrays  Eden's  attitude  to  Dulles  after  Geneva,  which  was  not  a  wood  omen  for  the  remainder  of  the 
premiership.  "  There  is  no  consideration  of  the  light  which  it  might  throw  on  the  British  attitude  to 
Geneva  and  the  Soviet  Union  generally  in  the  August  of  1955. Chapter  5/  Page  l2l 
Soviet  foreign  policy  now  can,  it  seems  to  me,  be  summed  up  in  five  words 
(most  of  them  foreivln),  detente  and  the  status  quo.  My  U.  S.  colleague  [Charles 
Bohlen]  has  formulated  the  same  thought  as  "peace  at  no  price".  58 
Macmillan's  idea  of  a  thermno-nuclear  "stand-off"  was  to  prove  correct.  Furthermore  his 
brash,  publicity  conscious  pronouncement  "there  ain't  gonna  be  no  war"  seems  an 
admirably  apposite  summary  of  the  Conference's  fundamental  achievement.  ý9 
The  1955  Summit  holds  a  crucial  place  in  the  British  Government's  perception  of  the 
development  of  Soviet  policy;  most  importantly  in  the  conviction  that  the  Soviets  now 
saw  nuclear  war  as  a  self-defeating  exercise  in  global  suicide.  It  is  here  that  the 
importance  of  the  conference  lies.  That  it  came  to  no  concrete  settlements  of  any  of  the 
issues  it  sought  to  explore  is  in  this  sense  irrelevant.  That  was  not,  afterall,  in  the  opinion 
of  Her  Majesty's  Ambassador  in  Moscow  quoted  above  what  the  Soviets  themselves  had 
wanted  the  Conference  to  achieve.  In  communicating  an  awareness  of  certain  rather 
appalling  strategic  facts,  Geneva  was  a  resounding  success,  so  much  so  that  in  the  words 
of  Eden's  memoir, 
[T]he  Geneva  Conference  taught  some  lessons,  which  were  powerfully  to  affect 
the  course  of  events  in  the  next  few  years.  Each  country  present  learnt  that  no 
country  attending  wanted  war  and  each  understood  why.  The  Russians  realized, 
as  we  did,  that  this  situation  had  been  created  by  the  deterrent  power  of  thermo- 
nuclear  weapons.  In  the  minds  of  men  who  commanded  power  in  the  world,  the 
lessons  of  the  Conference  might  result  in  a  reduced  risk  of  total  destruction  to 
the  human  race.  6° 
Eden  went  on,  however,  to  comment 
A  less  comfortable  conclusion  could  also  be  drawn.  the  communist  powers 
would  continue  to  prosecute  their  purpose  by  every  means.  To  do  this,  they 
would  work  in  areas  and  by  methods,  including  the  use  of  conventional 
weapons,  which  they  believed  would  not  entail  retaliation  by  nuclear  weapons. 
Quite  what  these  weapons  and  areas  were  to  be  is  the  subject  matter  of  the  following  two 
chapters. 
js  op.  cit.  From  Sir  William  Hayter,  Moscow,  4th  October,  1955. 
59  Macmillan,  p.  361. 
60  Full  Circle.  pp.  306-07.  Interestingly  Eden  `'oes  on  to  comment  that  this  lead  to  a  Soviet 
determination  to  develop  her  nuclear  technology  to  its  fullest  potential.  This  was  also  clearly 
implicit  in  Macmillan's  private  memo  of  August  Sth  1955  as  a  priority  for  Britain. Chapter  6 
The  Czech  Arms  Deal  and  the  Aswan  Dam 
Descent  from  Pisgah 
"The  news  of  the  proposed  deal  between  Nasser  and  the  Russian  Government  for  the 
supply  of  munitions  of  the  order  suggested  is  a  serious  blow  to  all  our  interests  in  the 
Middle  East". 
Harold  Macmillan 
During  1955,  Khrushchev's  new  foreign  policy  encompassed  considerable  complexities 
which  in  Whitehall's  view  seemed  at  times  to  reach  the  proportions  of  downright 
contradiction.  Whilst  courting  the  braces  of  Western  statesmen  and  the  press  at  Geneva 
in  July,  1955,  the  Soviets  must  already  have  been  well  advanced  in  sponsoring  a 
Czechoslovak  offer  of  arms  to  the  Egyptians.  1  This  was  done,  most  probably,  in  the  full 
knowledge  of  the  hostile  way  the  West  would  react  to  such  a  development.  Nor  was  the 
Czech  arms  deal  the  only  event  to  disturb  the  "Geneva  Spirit",  which  the  Soviets  had 
seemed  so  singularly  eager  to  foster  in  the  summer  of  1955.  During  their  tour  of  India, 
Burma  and  Afghanistan  in  December  (see  Chapter  7),  Bulg.  anin  and  Khrushchev  whilst 
obsequiously  courting  potential  allies  would  do  their  utmost  to  offend  the  feelings  of  the 
British,  who  as  the  ex-colonial  power  were  a  particularly  obvious  target.  When  this  was 
considered  in  tandem  with  the  economic  blandishments  which  the  Soviets  offered,  or 
seemed  about  to  offer,  to  the  newly  independent  "under-developed"  nations,  the  Kremlin 
seemed  to  have  opened  up  an  entirely  new  "front"  in  their  prosecution  of  the  Cold  War. 
The  Middle  East  and  South  East  Asia,  hitherto  areas  were  Western  influence  had  been 
dominant,  were  now  targets  for  peaceful  Soviet  penetration  on  a  level  which  caused 
something  akin  to  panic  in  Whitehall.  This  was  not  a  straight  forward  way  of  ensuring  the 
relaxation  of  tensions. 
However,  to  British  observers,  the  contradictions  in  this  new  policy  proved,  on 
reflection,  to  be  little  more  than  apparent  By  January  1956  the  British  Embassy  in 
1  See  David  J.  Dallin,  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  After  Stalin.  p.  279  who  makes  the  following  point  about 
Soviet  policy  during  the  Geneva  Summit: 
However,  "relaxation  of  tensions"  among  the  great  powers  was  not  the  sum  total  of  the  Soviet 
foreign  political  course  of  the  time.  Behind  the  screen  of  "coexistence"...  the  Soviet 
government  -  and  here  Khrushchev  was  a`_ain  the  driving  power  -  was  pursuing  a  grand 
offensive  in  the  underdeveloped  countries  of  Asia  and  Africa.  As  the  Geneva  Conference  was 
being  prepared.  the  Soviet-protected  Bandung  Conference  was  declaring  its  offensive  against 
the  \Vest;  this  was  followed  by  secret  Soviet-Egyptian  negotiations  concerning  Soviet  and 
satellite  arms  for  Egypt.  At  the  very  time  that  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  were  attending  a 
summit  conference  to  "lessen  international  tensions",  Dimitri  Shepilov  as  in  Cairo  for  talks 
with  Colonel  Nasser. 
Also  Mohammed  Heikal  in  Sphinx  and  Currunissar,  the  Rise  and  Fall  of  Soviet  Influence  in  the  .  -trab 
World,  pp.  57-60  substantiates  Dallin's  view  from  the  Egyptian  perspective. Chapter  6/  Paffe  123 
Moscow  was  expressing  the  view  that  the  Soviet  desire  for  detente  and  their  probing  of 
new  ground  in  Asia,  were  in  fact  merely  two  facets  of  the  one-  policy.  The  Soviet  leaders 
were  anxious  that  relations  with  the  West  should  not  deteriorate  to  the  extent  that  nuclear 
war  became  likely;  given  the  annihilation  which  would  ensue  if  it  -tiere  to  lead  to  the  use 
of  the  new  hydrogen  weapons  that  were  being  developed  on  both  sides.  However, 
despite  this  limitation,  Communism  was  still  to  be  victorious  over  Capitalism.  The  rivalry 
between  the  two  world  systems  was  merely  to  be  sublimated  into  a  battle  between  their 
respective  domestic  economies'  capacity  to  provide  a  better  society  and  for  political  and 
economic  influence  over  the  neutralist  countries  of  Asia  and  Africa.  A  war  which  was  to 
be  prosecuted  by  loans,  technicians,  arms  supplies,  propaganda  and  superior  economic 
organisation.  The  Cold  War  appeared  to  change  radically  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
junketings  at  Geneva,  but  it  most  certainly  did  not  go  away. 
The  British  had  indeed  noted  a  number  of  indications  that  the  Soviets  were  becoming 
interested  in  new  worlds  to  conquer  early  in  1955.  By  January  of  1955  Khrushchev  had 
already  made  clear  his  determination  that  in  the  area  of  economic  and  scientific 
competition  with  the  West,  the  Soviet  Union  would  catch  up  and  overhaul  their  rival  as 
soon  as  possible.  In  a  despatch  dated  the  24th  of  that  month,  Sir  William  Havter  reported 
on  indications  liven  in  the  Soviet  academic  press  of  a  new  much  freer  attitude  to  scientific 
enquiry.  The  old  Stalinist  rigidities  were,  it  seemed,  to  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  No  longer 
was  it  acceptable  merely  to  deride  Western  scientific  research,  it  was  now  to  be  learned 
from  and  improved  upon.  There  was  also  to  be  much  greater  emphasis  on  the  application 
of  science  to  industry.  Hayter  ended  the  despatch  by  commenting: 
I  think  it  can  be  concluded  from  all  this  that  the  present  Soviet  reime  not  only 
attaches  the  highest  priority  to  making  the  Soviet  Union  the  leading  country  in 
world  science,  but  is  at  last  beginning  to  ýo  the  right  way  about  it.  Originality  is 
being  encouraged:  there  is  to  be  no  more  dictatorship  in  science,  and  the  Soviet 
scientists  who  take  an  active  interest  in  foreign  science  will  now  run  little  risk  of 
"toadying  to  the  West".  At  the  same  time  a  more  sensible  attitude  to  science  is 
supported  by  an  immense  effort  to  train  the  new  generation  of  scientists  and 
technicians.  In  1954,  according  to  the  latest  plan  results,  there  were  1,732,000 
students  following  courses  in  higher  educational  establishments.  This  new 
stimulus,  which  is  now  being  liven  in  the  Soviet  Union  to  science  and 
'  technology,  deserves,  I  think,  our  most  careful  attention. 
2  FO  371/116709  NS  11031-33  1,24th  January,  1955.  Hayter  quoted  from  two  academic  journals  which 
were  the  Literar  Gazette  (of  January  11)  and  Questions  of  Philosophy  (No.  6  of  1954).  Hayter 
pointed  out  that  the  Literary  Gazette  article  by  Academicians  I.  Knunyants  and  L.  Zubkov,  "whose 
names  mean  nothing  to  use,  carried  the  development  of  a  freer  attitude  to  scientific  enquiry  "a  stage 
further".  . -\  process  which  thou,  -, 
h  started  by  Stalin  as  early  as  the  summer  of  1950  in  his  articles  on 
linguistics,  had  to  twkait  his  death  for  any  further  significant  development.  Khrushchev  seemed  to 
have  taken  an  important  part  in  the  process.  not  least  by  helping  to  pull  Lysenko  from  his  pedestal 
during  1954.  The  movement  appeared  to  be  gathering  pace.  Although  the  Party  itself  was  still 
reluctant  to  comment  directly  on  the  issue  itself  (Hayter  pointed  out  that  this  was  though  very  much 
in  line  with  their  policy  of  trying  to  het  away  from  Party  edict,  in  science),  Pravda  of  the  20th 
January  1955  had  complained  of  the  conservatism  of  many  Soviet  "industrialists"  in  their  attitude 
towards  new  technology.  Hayter  commented,  "the  party  is  at  present  deeply  concerned  with  the Charter  6/  Page  124 
This  was  a  trend  that  was  to  continue  despite  the  tall  of  Malenkov  in  the  February  of 
1955.  Indeed  as  the  above  report  indicated  it  was  Khrushchev  more  than  anyone  else 
who  was  associated  with  its  development.  In  a  despatch  of  the  22nd  April  signed  by  Cecil 
Parrotk  the  Minister  at  the  Embassy,  for  the  Ambassador,  the  following  comment  was 
made  to  London, 
In  several  recent  reports  I  have  drawn  attention  to  the  attitude  of  the  present 
Soviet  leaders  to  science  and  technolo«v  They  have  allowed  and  presumably 
inspired  the  publication  of  articles  for  the  encouragement  of  different  schools  of 
scientific  enquiry.  Even  more  than  in  Stalin's  day  they  have  stressed  the  need  to 
create  a  closer  link  between  science  and  industry  and  to  promote  the  application 
to  industry  of  the  latest  scientific  and  technological  advances.  Khrushchev 
himself  has  more  than  once  said  that  much  may  be  learnt  from  the  capitalist 
countries,  and  scientists  have  been  told  that  they  must  not  neglect  the  scientific 
achievements  in  foreign  countries  because  of  the  idealistic  form  in  which,  in 
capitalist  society,  positive  contributions  to  scientific  progress  are  often  couched.  ' 
The  despatch  went  on  to  point  out  that  the  Presidium  itself  seemed  to  be  taking  an 
increasingly  important  role  in  the  campaign.  This  role  %  vas  further  emphasised  by  the  part 
played  by  leading  figures  in  the  "All-Union  Conference  of  Workers  in  Industry"  that  was 
held  in  the  Kremlin  between  the  16th  and  19th  of  N  lay  1955.  In  a  despatch  dated  the  27th 
of  May,  Hayter  commented  that  all  available  members  of  the  Party  Presidium  and 
Secretariat  had  attended,  with  Buis  anin  triving  the  opening  address  and  Khrushchev 
"winding"  the  proceedings  up.  Hayter  concluded, 
Finally  I  have  suggested  that  a  motif  running,  through  the  conference  was  the 
lively  consciousness  of  competition  with  the  West.  In  the  last  few  weeks  many 
articles  have  quoted  from  Lenin  to  the  effect  that  the  decisive  factor  in  economic 
competition  between  capitalist  and  socialist  countries  will  be  the  relative  success 
of  each  system  in  developing  productivity  per  worker.  Bulganin  expressed 
confidence  that  in  the  economic  competition  between  the  two  systems  the 
Socialist  system  would  win,  but  said  that  "in  order  to  beat  capitalism  in  economic 
competition,  we  must  aim  at  better  organisation  of  production  and  higher  labour 
productivity".  4 
question  of  the  practical  application  of  science  to  the  economy.  "  This  was  a  theme  to  he  developed 
on  a  `.  rand  scale  by  the  20th  Party  Con`_r:  ss. 
3  FO  371  116709  NS  1103131,22nd  April,  1955,  the  despatch  made  reference  to  a  Presidium 
decision  to  hold  a  more  wide  ranging  conference  on  16th  to  20th  of  May  for  all  workers  in  industry 
on  the  application  of  now  technology.  This  was  the  conference  reported  on  in  the  despatch  of  the 
27th  of  May. 
4  FO  371  116709  NS  1103/31,27th  May.  1955.  Hayter  began  his  despatch  by  commenting  on  the 
important  organisational  rctorms  which  the  conlercnce  introduced  in  control  of  the  economy. 
Gosplan.  the  state  economic  planning,  Kureau,  '  a.  to  he  Split  into  two,.  One  half  forming  a  new 
Economic  Commission.  The  responsihilitic"  kor  Ioon_-  and  short  term  planning  were  to  he  divided 
between  these  institutions.  Also  a  State  Coºmmiitýn  for  LIuc.  ticros  of  Labour  and  wages  was  to  be 
formed  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Kaganovich.  Hayter  closed  his  report  by  assessing  the 
importance  of  these  structural  changes. 
To  sum  up,  I  suggest  that  the  industrial  policies  of  the  present  Soviet  leaders  show  little 
originality.  The  economic  and  technical  measures  which  they  are  propa__ating  are  much  the Chapter  6'  Pa, 
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Clearly  the  Soviet  idea  of  "peaceful  competition"  was  in  the  process  of  formulation 
long  ere  the  20th  Party  Congress  have  it  the  gloss  of  a  ne'  dolma. 
.,, 
'or  was  the  idea  of 
the  competition  of  domestic  economies  the  only  theoretical  development  whose  gestation 
was  traced  by  the  Foreign  Office  at  least  from  early  1955.  An  increase  in  Soviet  interest 
in  economic  links  with  "under  developed"  countries  was  also  remarked  upon  by  the 
Embassy  and  Northern  Department.  Indeed  as  early  as  the  14th  January  a  circular  was 
sent  around  concerned  embassies,  under  the  name  of  no  less  a  person  than  Sir  Anthony 
Eden,  asking  for  details  of  Soviet  economic  activity  in  their  respective  countries 
In  a  letter  of  March  25th  Mr  Slater  of  the  Moscow  Embassy  commented  that  there 
had  been  a  number  of  articles  in  the  Soviet  press  in  recent  weeks  on  the  theme  of 
economic  relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  "under-developed"  nations.  6  He  went 
on  to  say, 
The  Soviet  policy  of  economic  penetration  of  under-developed  countries  for 
political  ends  is  of  course  not  a  new  one,  but  what  is  interesting  is  that  this  policy 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  affected  by  the  change  in  priorities  which  we 
regard  as  mainly  responsible  for  recent  Soviet  behaviour  in  the  field  of  trade  with 
the  industrialised  Vest.  However,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  words  will  be 
matched  by  deeds  as  far  as  the  under-developed  countries  are  concerned 
R.  M.  Russell  of  the  Northern  Department  minuted  on  this  letter  on  the  31  March  that  the 
Soviet  offers  of  steel  to  Burma  and  of  a  power  station  to  India,  which  were  then  current, 
were  examples  of  what  the  future  may  well  have  held  in  prospect  for  Soviet  economic 
diplomacy.  Although  the  attitude  evident  in  this  commentary  seems  positively  languid 
when  compared  to  that  taken  over  the  Czech  arms  deal  of  the  following  September,  these 
indications  of  how  Soviet  interests  were  developing  were  very  definite  straws  in  the  wind. 
If  the  Northern  Department  could  still  afford  to  be  languid  in  the  March  of  1955  the 
view  of  the  Board  of  Trade  expressed  in  a  memo  dated  as  late  as  June  6th  was  positively 
complacent.  It  set  out  to  survey  in  detail  the  extent  of  Soviet  interest  in  large  scale 
construction  projects  in  Asia  and  Africa  and  after  a  somewhat  confused  narrative  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  at  the  time  of  its  writing  there  seemed  to  be  little  to  worry  about.  The 
Northern  Department  were  themselves  not  particularly  impressed.  Mr.  R.  A.  H.  Hibbert 
minuted  on  the  15th  of  June  as  follows, 
same  as  those  which  they  have  advocated  for  many  'Cars...  The  organisational  measures  which 
have  been  adopted  suggest  political  manoeuvrin`_  as  much  as  economic  need.  I  do  not  think, 
therefore,  that  any  remarkable  rise  in  industrial  productivity  in  this  country  can  be  expected. 
Meanwhile  there  are  signs  that  the  relative  economic  stability  of  the  Western  world  and  our 
continuing  technological  progress  are  having  a  salutary  effect  on  the  Soviet  leaders. 
5  FO  371  122094  N  1123/1,  loth  January,  1955. 
6  FO  371  116  716  NS  1123/1.  Moscow.  Embassy  to  Lord  Jellicoe  Northern  Department,  25th  %larch, 
1955.  The  minute  by  Russell,  dated  31st  March,  is  in  the  same  envelope.  Slater  referred  to  the 
most  important  article  in  the  then  recent  Soviet  press  as  The  Development  or  Economic  Co- 
operation  of  the  Countries  of  the  Socialist  Camp  with  Under-Developed  Countnes"  by  A. 
Chistyakov  in  Questions  o'1  Economics  (No.  I  for  1955).  The  article  underlined  the  %,,  illin,  ness  of 
the  Soviet  Union  to  sign  trade  igreements  '.  ith  under-developed  countries. Chapter  6/  Page  126 
I  do  not  think  this  paper  is  very  well  done.  After  reading  it  I  have  no  clear 
impression  on  the  degree  of  Soviet  competition  which  we  are  faciný,...  I  think  the 
correct  conclusion  should  be  that  the  dangers  of  competition  from  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  Overseas  constructional  market  are  at  present  small,  perhaps  even 
insignificant,  but  we  may  shortly  witness  a  rapid  growth  of  Soviet  competition 
which  would  be  aimed  particularly  at  scooping  the  market  in  the  under 
developed  countries,  and  particularly  in  S.  E.  Asia.  This  threat  could  develop  in 
the  next  few  years  and  might  become  serious  even  in  the  short  term.  In  the  long 
term  it  would  certainly  be  serious  as  it  would  mean  that  the  Soviet  Union  was 
staking  out  the  biggest  claims  in  the  market  which  held  the  biggest  promise  for 
the  future.? 
The  concern  expressed  by  R.  A.  H.  Hibbert  was  to  be  shared  on  a  much  wider  scale 
by  the  end  of  1955.  Clearly  although  there  was  an  awareness  in  Whitehall  that  the  Soviet 
Union  was  interested  in  expanding  its  economic  role  in  the  neutral  nations  of  Asia  and 
Africa,  that  awareness  was  limited  in  its  scope.  However  the  dramatic  events  of  the 
autumn  and  winter  were  to  underline  what  the  Soviets  were  trying  to  do  in  their  economic 
diplomacy,  that  is  to  supplant  Western  influence.  By  the  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign 
Secretary's  visit  to  Washington  in  early  1956  concern  had  grown  to  a  sufficient  level  for 
there  to  be  very  serious  talk  of  a  Soviet  economic  offensive.  8  From  1954  the  British  were 
dimly  aware  that  the  Soviet  understanding  of  the  Cold  War  was  undergoing  a  profound 
change.  This  was  gleaned  by  observers  in  Whitehall  and  the  Moscow  Embassy  from  the 
shifting  emphasis  in  Soviet  propaganda  and  official  policy  from  early  1955.  Yet  it  was  a 
change  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  a  new  identity  of  interest  between  East  and  West,  save 
7  FO  371  116716  NS  1123/7.  The  Board  of  Trade  Paper  was  entitled,  "Soviet  Competition  in  Bidding 
for  Overseas  Constructional  Projects"  and  dated  6th  June.  It  was  not  accredited  to  any  particular 
individual,  clearly  being  a  statement  of  departmental  policy  which  was  sent  on  in  due  course  to  the 
Northern  Department  for  their  comment  as  the  experts  on  Soviet  policy.  Hibbert  went  on  to  minute, 
As  regards  details,  points  which  spring  to  my  mind  are  that  Burma  was  offered  a  small  arms 
factory  for  which  we  and  the  Germans  also  bid  (and  the  Burmese  finally  made  no  award)  and  a 
Soviet  economic  mission  has  recently  visited  Sudan  and  may  be  ýoing  to  tender  for  equipment 
for  a  dam  there  in  which  we  are  very  much  interested.  I  think  too  I  have  seen  a  report  that  the 
Russians  have  put  out  feelers  as  regards  building  bridges  in  Burma.  There  is  no  mention  in  the 
paper  of  South  America  and  it  may  be  that  the  Russians  have  not  entered  the  South  American 
construction  market,  but  there  has  certainly  been  a  fair  amount  of  Russian  propaganda  about 
trade  with  South  America  and  the  B.  O.  T.  ought  to  be  sure  that  there  is  no  fire  behind  the 
smoke.  (para  3)  As  regards  reference  to  technical  assistance  at  the  end  of  the  B.  O.  T.  minute, 
the  point  is  I  think  that  almost  all  countries  have  been  reluctant  to  take  up  offers  of  Soviet 
technical  experts,  and  the  Russians  themselves  have  not  made  it  easy  for  anyone  to  find 
technical  experts  of  the  right  quality.  However  a  large  Indian  mission  is  at  present  in  the 
Soviet  Union  inspecting  Soviet  training  facilities  and  we  may  see  a  growing  stream  of  trainees 
from  under-developed  :  ountrie,  `_oing  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  technical  education  and  training. 
I  doubt  whether  it  is  altogether  safe  to  describe  this  as  a  long  term  political  matter.  The  under 
developed  countries  are  not  rich  in  technically  trained  persons  and  if  an  important  portion  of 
their  technical  experts  receive  a  year  or  t\ýos  training  in  the  Soviet  Union,  we  may  find  that  in 
two  or  three  yyear's  time  that  some  of  the  countries  begin  to  show  a  preference  for  Soviet 
equipment. 
3  FO  371  116716  NS  112-1112.  Despatch  from  Moscow  to  Forei`m  Office,  2nd  December,  1955,  and 
Northern  Department  minutin`º  of  the  30th  December,  1955,  being  early  uses  of  this  military 
metaphor. Chapter  6/  Pa`_c  127 
in  the  most  general  sense  of  the  need  to  avoid  thermonuclear  war.  It  was  a  radical  but  in 
no  sense  a  fundamental  change.  This  at  least  was  the  British  perception  by  the  end  of  an 
eventful  year  in  Anglo-Soviet  relations. 
THE  CZECH  ARMS  DEAL  WITH  EGYPT. 
Before  going  on  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  Czechoslovak  Government's  agreement  to 
supply  arms  to  Egypt  on  the  development  of  a  new  understanding  of  Soviet  foreign  policy 
in  Britain,  a  little  background  might  prove  helpful.  It  would  be  quite  wrong  to  suggest 
that  considerations  of  Soviet  power  had  no  influence  on  British  policy  before  the  Czech 
arms  deal  was  concluded.  However  the  threats  posed  by  the  Soviet  Union  before  and 
after  that  date  seemed  in  Whitehall  to  be  of  quite  different  natures.  Up  until  the  Czech 
arms  deal  the  Soviet  Union  was  conceived  as  a  potentially  very  serious  military  challenge 
to  Western  pre-eminence  in  the  area,  but  this  was  in  the  specific  context  of  war.  Only  in 
the  event  of  actual  hostilities  was  the  Soviet  Union  considered  to  be  dangerous.  The 
Baghdad  Pact  was  in  its  initial  conception  a  military  alliance  to  provide  the  same  kind  of 
protection  against  potential  Soviet  aggression  as  NATO  did  for  Western  Europe.  It  was 
in  this  sense  that  it  was  referred  to  by  the  Americans  as  the  Northern  Tier,  a  physical 
barrier  against  the  incursion  of  the  Red  Army  southward  as  NATO  was  westward.  Sir 
Evelyn  Shuckburc1h  outlined  one  of  the  main  principles  of  British  policy  on  the  Middle 
East,  whilst  he  was  the  Foreign  Office  Under-Secretary  for  `fiddle  Eastern  affairs  from 
May  1954  until  June  1956,  as  follows, 
For  the  defence  of  the  area  and  the  oil  against  outside  (author's  italics)  threat  the 
idea  was  that  our  bilateral  treaties  with  countries  like  Iraq  and  Jordan  should  be 
replaced  by  multilateral  defence  arrangements  (Northern  Tier,  Baghdad  Pact, 
etc.  )  which  would  have  a  less  "imperialistic"  connotation  for  local  opinion  and 
which  would  spread  the  burden  more  evenly  amongst  allies.  ` 
In  the  everyday  political  and  economic  relations  between  Britain  and  the  Middle  East  if 
anyone  it  was  the  United  States  who  was  considered  to  be  much  the  most  serious  threat 
to  the  British  position.  10  The  Czech  arms  deal  with  the  Egyptian  Government  have 
Middle  Eastern  affairs,  as  much  as  the  Cold  War,  a  novel  turn.  The  Soviets  had  entered 
into  open  rivalry  for  political  and  economic  influence  in  an  area  that  had  hitherto  been 
exclusive  to  Western  and  especially  British  influence. 
This  new  Soviet  policy  was  a  radical  divergence  from  Stalin's  which  had  viewed  the 
world  in  a  rigidly  bipolar  way.  Working  on  the  theory  that  if  a  country  was  not 
specifically  for  Communism  than  it  must  be  against,  there  was  no  room  for  the 
9  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  210.  Shuckbur  -h  gives  a  brief  resume  of  British  policy  in  the  Middle  East  in  the 
miet-fifties  up  to  the  Suez  Crisis  on  pp.  206-214. 
10  On  the  ins  and  outs  of  Anglo-American  relations  e  er  E, 
-,  \  ,  pt  up  until  1956  see  Peter  L.  Hahn,  The 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Egypt,  1945-1956,  "  Strategv  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Early  Cold 
War,  passim. Chapter  6/  Paý,  --  12S 
development  of  friendly  relations  with  newly  independent  colonial  countries  eager  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  "neutralism".  The  new  regimes  of  post-imperial  India  and  Egypt 
were  little  more  than  the  lackeys  that  the  departing  British  had  put  in  power.  However 
under  Khrushchev  that  view  was  to  change  dramatically  and  it  was  the  negotiation  of  the 
supply  of  arms  to  Egypt  via  Czechoslovakia  which  was  the  first  bold  success  for  this  new 
foreign  policy.  One  commentator  describes  it  in  the  following  terms. 
When  Khrushchev  leapfrogged  over  Turkey  and  Iran  into  the  thick  of  politics, 
his  political-military  interest  in  non  contiguous  regions  was  something  verv  new 
in  Russian  and  Soviet  diplomacy.  It  signified  the  globalization  of  the  Kremlin's 
outlook.  Khrushchev  exposed  the  weaknesses  of  the  U.  S.  policy  of  containment 
in  the  Middle  East  and  demonstrated  to  Arab  (and  other  Third  World)  regimes 
who  had  little  first-hand  experience  with  the  Soviet  Union  that  \Ioscow  was 
prepared  to  help  those  who  opposed  the  west's  efforts  to  retain  a  major  influence 
in  the  region  through  its  network  of  interlocking  military  alliances. 
Which  brinks  us  to  the  British  understanding  of  what  the  Soviet  Union  was  trying  to 
achieve  in  Egypt  in  September,  1955. 
Although  negotiations  between  Nasser's  government  and  the  Soviet  Union  had  been 
going  on  at  least  since  the  summer  of  1955,  it  was  not  until  late  in  September  that  the 
British  learned  of  what  was  afoot.  There  seems  though  to  be  some  confusion  in  the  work 
of  later  day  commentators  as  to  when  exactly  the  news  broke  in  Britain.  Keith  Kyle 
maintains  that 
On  21  September  1955,  the  foreign  Office  dot  the  first  word  ("from  a  delicate 
source")  of  an  event  that  altered  the  Middle  Eastern  scene  radically  and  was  the 
first  step  leading  to  the  Suez  crisis.  This  was  the  Czechoslovak  arms  deal,  which 
Colonel  Nasser  defiantly  affirmed  to  be  a  Soviet  arms  deal  in  his  Alexandria 
speech  of  26  July  1956.12 
However  Richard  Lamb  in  his  book  on  the  Eden  Government  blandly  states  that  "On  the 
2  nd  [September,  1955]  the  news  of  Nasser's  arms  deal  burst  around  the  world".  l'  Lamb 
does  make  the  point  that  Nasser's  sudden  truculence  with  the  British  and  :  americans  in 
negotiations  over  the  "Alpha"  proposals  on  the  previous  day  was  due  to  his  conclusion  of 
the  secret  arms  deal  with  the  Soviets  ("Alpha"  was  the  code-name  for  a  tortuous  Anglo- 
American  proposal  to  bring  peace  between  Israel  and  the  Arab  states  by  a  complicated 
territorial  compromise.  Shuckburgh  was  the  principal  British  fixer  involved  in  the 
project).  Shuckburgh's  diary  entry  for  the  21st  September  gives  no  hint  of  any  indication 
of  what  Nasser  had  been  about,  rather  concentrating  on  Herbert  Morrison's  muck-raking 
11  Alvin  Rubenstein,  . 
Woscmv's  717ird  World  Strareýv,  p.  24.  In  Chapter  one  Rubenstein  talks  of  a 
"Khrushchevian  watershed"  in  Soviet  forei_n  policy.  However,  he  does  tend  to  simplify  the 
international  situation  circa  1955  in  terns  of  a  straiý,  ht  US/Soviet  split. 
1'  Keith  Kyle,  "Britain  ind  the  Crisis,  1955-1956",  in  W.  R.  Ro,  2er  and  R.  Owen  (eds.  ),  Suez  1956, 
the  Crisis  crud  rr.  v  Co,  c.  ýý  105.  Kyle  does  not  _;  o  on  to  illuminate  quite  what  the  "secret 
sources"  he  refers  to  in  the  above  quote  were.  althou  ,h  they  seem  Jetinitelv  to  have  been  contacts  of 
the  American  ambassador  and  not  the  British. 
13  The  Failure  of  the  Eden  Government,  p.  172. Chapter  6/  Paý_t  129 
in  the  debris  of  the  Burgess  and  Maclean  scandal.  On  the  22nd  however  he  comments, 
"our  calm  deliberations  about  the  next  step  in  "Alpha"  have  been  broken  in  upon  by  the 
news  that  Nasser  is  going  to  by  arms  from  Russia.  "  14 
The  record  of  the  PREI  papers  would  seem  to  indicate  that  in  fact  the  22nd  was  the 
date.  In  a  telegram  from  the  U.  K.  deleý,  ation  at  the  U\  dated  22nd  September  Sir 
Pearson  Dixon  reported  that, 
Mr.  Dulles  told  me  at  luncheon  today  that  he  had  had  word  from  Byroade  (the 
US  Ambassador)  in  Cairo  that  the  Egyptian-Russian  arms  deal  had  been 
concluded  and  would  probably  be  announced  within  the  next  twenty-four  hours. 
He  was  very  worried  at  this  development"  15 
This  is  the  first  indication  in  the  PRE`[  file  on  the  "Supply  of  Military  Equipment  to 
Egypt  by  the  Soviet  Union"  of  what  the  two  countries  had  been  contriving  behind  the 
backs  of  the  West.  However,  this  chronological  problem  possibly  has  more  to  do  with  the 
length  of  time  it  took  for  Ambassadorial  telegrams  to  filter  up  to  the  higher  reaches  of  the 
Civil  Service  and  Westminster.  For  there  is  on  file  a  telegram  dated  21st  September,  1955 
of  Sir  Humphrey  Trevelyan's  from  Cairo  indicating  that  his  American  counterpart, 
Byroade,  had  been  informed  by  a  secret,  but  reliable  source  that  Nasser  had  clinched  a 
deal  with  the  Czechs.  16  Kyle  does  after  all  refer  in  the  quote  above  specifically  to  the 
Foreign  Office.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  London  was  aware  something  regarding 
arms  supply  was  being  negotiated  between  the  Egyptians  and  the  Soviets  well  before  a 
deal  was  confirmed.  It  would  seem  that  both  Kyle  and  Lamb  are  right  about  slightly 
different  things. 
The  first  Ministerial  comment  was  a  minute  of  the  22nd  from  Macmillan  to  Eden,  in 
which  Macmillan  noted  that  the  Arms  Deal  was  a  very  serious  issue.  On  it  Eden  as  was 
his  wont,  scribbled,  "Yes,  very  grave".  17  Indeed  the  initial  reaction  on  the  part  of  the 
British  government  was  very  strong  indeed.  Harold  : Macmillan  expressed  the  following 
view  on  the  .'  3rd  September,  for  communication  via  the  Washington  Embassy  to  Dulles, 
The  news  of  the  proposed  deal  between  Nasser  and  the  Russian  Government  for 
the  supply  of  munitions  of  the  order  sugggested  is  a  serious  blow  to  all  our 
interests  in  the  Middle  East.  I  am  sure  the  American  Government  will  agree  that 
this  cannot  be  allowed  to  ýo  on.  ls 
14  Descent  to  Suez.  p.  27S. 
15  PRE  I  11/1291,  Sir  P.  Dixon  from  the  UK.  Delegation  at  the  United  Nations,  New  York  to 
London,  22nd  September,  1955. 
16  FO  371  1  136'  3  JE  1194  1-40,  Sir  Humphrey  Trevelyan,  Cairo  to  F.  O.,  '  Ist  September,  1955. 
There  is  further  detail  on  this  in  Kyle's  recent  book,  Sue,  -,  p.  74.  The  Americans  seem  to  have  had  a 
rather  better  information  network  set  up  in  perhaps  because  there  was  more  respect 
remaining  for  them  among  members  of  Nasser's  vºovemment  than  there  was  for  the  British.  See 
FRUS  1955-57.  Vol.  XIV.  pp.  -IS  1,483-S4  and  492-93. 
17  PRENI  11/1=91,  Minute  for  Prime  Minister  from  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  affairs,  22nd 
September,  1955. 
18  PRENI  11/1291.  F.  O.  to  Washington  Embassy.  from  Macmillan  for  Duliks,  September  23,1955. Chapter  6/  page  130 
The  views  minuted  in  the  Foreign  Office  were  more  particular  as  to  the  threat  that  the 
Soviet  move  posed  for  the  British  position  in  the  Middle  East.  In  a  minute  of  the  23rd  of 
September  to  Macmillan  Shuckburgh  made  the  following  terse  estimation  of  the 
ramifications  for  British  policy  of  the  Soviets'  move, 
We  are  faced  with  the  disagreeable  truth  that  we  must  somehow  keep  Egypt  on 
our  side  even  to  the  extent  of  paying  a  very  high  price  which  may  well  include 
having  to  abandon  Israel.  It  has  long  been  evident  that  we  were  retaining  our 
position  and  interest  in  the  Middle  East  only  because  the  Russians  were  not 
interfering.  Once  they  start  bidding  for  Arab  support  as  they  are  now  doing  we 
are  compelled  either  to  outbid  them  or  to  lose  the  main  source  of  power  on 
which  our  economy  now  depends.  I) 
Shuckburgh's  fright  seems  to  have  taken  him  to  the  extent  of  considering  dropping 
support  for  Israel  completely  in  the  prosecution  of  Britain's  policy  in  response  to  the 
Soviet  move.  Sir  Harold  Caccia's  note  on  the  above  minute  was  rather  more  restrained  in 
its  summing  up  of  Britain's  position  in  the  liuht  of  this  development.  Although  Soviet 
competition  would  have  to  be  dealt  with  vigorously,  he  wondered  if  before  giving  up 
Israel  completely  the  British  might  not  have  to  Let  rid  of  Nasser,  "Especially  if  he 
becomes  publicly  committed  to  the  (arms)  contract".  An  opinion  that  sounds  an  ironically 
percipient  note  in  the  light  of  what  was  to  happen  shortly  thereafter.  200  The  gut  reaction 
of  the  British  underlines  the  novelty  of  the  situation  that  they  faced.  The  Soviets  were  on 
no  accounts  to  be  left  to  pull  of  their  coup  and  enter  for  the  first  time  into  the  Middle  East 
as  an  active  political  player.  Shuckburgh  in  particular  seems  to  have  been  keenly  aware 
that  Britain's  position,  hardly  strong  without  Soviet  competition,  was  now  little  short  of 
parlous. 
However  the  initial  reaction  was  softened  in  a  surprisingly  short  space  of  time  as  it 
became  clear  that  the  Arms  Deal  would  have  to  be  accepted  as  a  fact  of  life.  21  There  was 
indeed  very  little  that  the  British  could  have  done  to  force  the  Egyptians  to  change  their 
minds. 
Immediately  after  the  British  became  aware  of  what  was  afoot  there  followed  the 
process  of  clarification.  The  Ambassador  in  Cairo,  Humphrey  Trevelyan,  attempted  to 
fain  from  the  Egyptians  confirmation  that  the  deal  had  actually  done  through  and  specific 
19  FO  371  113674,  Shuckburgh  to  Macmillan  23rd  September  1955,  quoted  in  Kyle  op.  cit.  p.  106.  In 
his  diary  entry  for  22nd  September  Shuckhurgh  put  the  same  analysis  in  more  dramatic  language. 
"The  folly  and  fragility  of  our  Palestine  policy  is  beginning  to  come  home  to  roost  at  last.  As  long 
as  the  Russians  played  no  role  in  the  ME  we  were  just  able  to  run  with  the  hare  and  hunt  with  the 
hounds.  But  now  they  are  ohviously  beginning  to  make  a  hid  for  Arab  support".  Descent  to  Suez, 
pp.  278-279. 
20  ibid. 
21  ibid.  Kyle  puts  it  rather  effectively  as  follows, 
What  is  intriguing  is  to  follow  the  traces  of  Britain',  line  towards  Nasser's  Egypt  through  the 
next  few  months.  It  started  with  Harold  Macmillan's  instinctive  reaction  to  the  arms  deal- 
"This  cannot  he  allowed  to  go  on"-changed  to  "I  do  not  wish  to  reproach  Nasser  unduly"  in  a 
cable  to  Sir  Humphrey  Trevelyan.  the  ne  British  Ambassador  in  Cairo. Chapter  6/  Pace  131 
details  as  to  what  the  Soviets  were  offering.  In  a  telegram  to  London  of  the  26th 
September  Trevelyan  reported  a  conversation  vv  ith  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Egyptian  army,  with  whom  he  had  dined  the  previous  night.  The  Commander  had 
confirmed  that  the  deal  had  been  concluded  and  justified  it  by  reference  to  the  Egyptians 
need  for  arms  in  the  face  of  the  threat  from  Israel,  arms  which  they  seemed  able  to  get 
only  from  the  Soviets.  It  was  emphasised  that  the  Arms  Deal  had  been  undertaken  not 
out  of  choice,  but  out  of  necessity.  The  Egyptian  army,  it  transpired,  wished  to  continue 
with  British  training,  the  Soviet  connection  was  purely  for  the  supply  of  essential 
equipment.  In  a  following  telegram  Trevelvan  made  clear  that  the  Commander's 
confessions  were  not  literal  but  implicit  in  what  he  had  said.  Trevelyan  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  British  Government  would  have  to  assume  the  American  reports  that 
the  Arms  deal  had  been  sealed  to  be  reliable.  2  An  opinion  which  gives  an  interesting 
oblique  hint  at  the  origin  of  Britain's  information. 
Trevelyan  took  a  relatively  tolerant  view  of  the  Egyptian  move,  a  tolerance  of 
Egyptian  foibles  which  was  not,  sadly,  to  be  shared  in  Downing,  Street  over  the  coming 
year.  He  summarised  the  motives  behind  it  as  follows, 
In  the  last  six  months  the  Israelis  have  demonstrated  their  military  strength  and 
their  readiness  to  use  it.  Nasser  has  told  me  that  his  policy  and  thinking  has  been 
dominated  since  February  by  his  fear  of  Israeli  intentions,  which  has  increased  as 
a  result  of  the  Israeli  elections  and  expansionist  speeches  made  during  the 
campaign  by  Ben  Gurion  and  Beigin.  His  major  preoccupation  had  become  the 
strenýtheniný  of  the  Egyptian  forces  to  meet  the  Israeli  threat.  2, 
The  Egyptians  could  hardly  be  blamed  if,  despite  their  best  efforts  to  find  a  western 
alternative,  the  only  willing  supplier  of  the  needed  arms  had  been  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
Ambassador  pointed  out  that  it  seemed  that  the  Soviets  had  "offered  him  (Nasser)  arms  in 
the  spring  when  resentment  at  the  Turco-Iraqi  pact  was  at  its  height  and  the  impact  of 
neutralist  influences  at  Bandoeng  fresh.  "  Yet  it  was  not  until  after  intensified  efforts  to 
gain  arms  from  the  West  had  failed  that  Nasser  had  been  forced  back  onto  the  Soviet 
offer.  The  British  policy  of  trying  to  maintain  a  balance  between  the  Israeli  and  Arab 
sides  in  the  Middle  East  had  apparently  afforded  the  Soviets  their  opportunity  to  move 
into  the  area  as  a  political  force,  hence  Shuckburgh's  agonised  comments  on  the  need  to 
drop  the  Israelis  altogether.  24  Trevelyan  saw  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Nasser  only  turned 
to  the  Soviets  in  desperation,  what  had  happened  was  not  part  of  a  fundamental  change  in 
the  policy  and  alignment  of  his  regime.  Nasser's  Egypt  remained  basically  anti- 
Communist.  The  Ambassador  advised  against  the  taking  of  any  harsh  retaliatory  action 
22  PREM  11/  1291,  Telegrams  No.  1319  and  No.  1320,  from  the  British  Embassy  Cairo  to  the  F. 
26th  September.  1955. 
23  PREN1  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  1325  from  the  British  Emhas..  Cairo  to  the  F.  O.,  26th  September. 
1955. 
ý4  See  Suez.  pp.  7-76  for  an  examination  of  . An`lo-Eý,  \  rtian  relations  in  the  lead  up  to  the  Czech  Arms 
Deal. Charter  6/  Page  132 
counselling  that  they  should  at  least  wait  and  see  how  bid,  the  arms  deal  was  actually  to 
be.  25 
Macmillan's  reply  of  the  26th  September  to  the  above  series  of  telegrams  was, 
however,  still  rather  tart  in  tone.  He  telexrammed  back  to  Cairo  as  follows, 
I  can  understand  Nasser's  motives  in  turning  to  the  Russians  for  arms  though  as 
you  know  he  exaggerates  in  saying  that  he  has  obtained  "nothing"  from  us.  I  do 
not  wish  to  reproach  him  unduly  but  rather  to  bring  home  to  him  that  he  has 
underestimated  the  risks  for  himself  and  for  Egypt  in  such  a  course.  With  the 
best  will  in  the  world  we  cannot  regard  this  action  as  anything  but  a  grave  dander 
to  Egypt's  relations  with  the  West.  It  is  not  at  all  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  the 
Anýlo/Eýyptian  treaty  on  Suez.  Nasser  himself  has  frequently  made  the  point, 
when  discussing  Middle  East  defence,  that  by  this  treaty  and  the  mention  of 
Turkey  in  the  reactivation  clause,  he  in  effect  entered  into  a  defence  relationship 
with  the  West. 
Macmillan  went  on  to  rail  against  the  absurdity,  in  the  light  of  the  1954  Anýlo-Egyptian 
agreement,  of  having  Soviet  aircraft  on  Egyptian  airfields.  Furthermore,  Macmillan 
complained,  Nasser  was  hardly  being  frank  over  details  and  his  assertion  that  there  had 
been  no  agreement  with  the  Soviets  over  technicians,  did  not  impress  at  all.  Macmillan 
considered  it  an  "equivocal  statement".  The  presence  of  Soviet  technicians  in  Egypt 
would,  he  went  on,  be  "quite  incompatible  with  the  base  agreement".  26 
He  suggested  that  the  real  answer  to  Nasser's  anxieties  over  Israeli  defence 
expenditure  was  to  work  for  a  general  settlement  for  the  Arab/Israeli  dispute,  to  which 
end,  he  added,  the  British  Government  intended  "to  make  a  further  serious  effort"  to  jet 
talks  between  the  Egyptians  and  Israelis  going.  Not  only  was  a  satisfactory  solution  to 
the  areas  problems  at  stake,  but  also  British  and  American  aid  in  the  development  of  the 
Egyptian  economy.  Macmillan  concluded  as  follows,  "it  would  be  folly  to  throw  away 
these  prospects  for  the  sake  of  an  obviously  baited  arms  offer  from  the  Russians". 
However  the  most  dramatic  action  which  Macmillan  took  was  a  direct  approach  to 
Molotov,  who  was  also  attending  the  United  Nations  at  New  York.  Shuckburjh,  who 
had  accompanied  Macmillan  to  New  York  in  his  capacity  as  the  Foreign  Office  chief  for 
Middle  East  affairs,  records  in  his  diary  of  the  26th  September  that  "H.  M.  seems  keen  on 
taking  it  up  with  Molotov.  "  Dulles  and  Macmillan  met  that  evening  and  according  to 
Shuckburah,  who  was  present, 
25  PREM  11/1291.  Telegram  No.  1327  from  the  British  Embassy  Cairo  to  the  F.  0.,  26th  September, 
1955. 
26  PREM  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  846  UK.  Delet!  ation  to  the  UN,  New  York  to  the  F.  0.  Addressed 
to  Cairo  telegram  No.  88  of  September  27th.  Macmillan's  complaint  continued  and  in  referring  to 
the  effect  that  the  deal  would  have  on  domestic  politics  made  the  following  concise  summation  of 
the  effect  of  the  deal.  "British  public  opinion  will  he  astonished  to  learn  that  before  we  have  even 
completed  our  withdrawal  from  Suez  under  the  agreement  which  was  designed  to  establish  new 
relations  of  co-operation  and  friendship  with  Egypt.  the  Russians  are  moving  in.  "  He  went  on  to 
warn  that  Nasser  should  also  take  into  account  Israeli  opinion  and  the  destahilising  effect  the  deal 
would  have  on  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East  in  __eneral.  Macmillan  cautioned  of  the  dangers  of 
an  arms  race  from  which  no  one.  least  cat  all  Egypt.  would  benefit. Chapter  6/P.  ige  133 
[G]ot  more  and  more  worked  up  against  the  prospects  of  a  Soviet  arms  deal 
with  Egypt  as  they  warmed  to  the  subject.  The  thought  of  Soviet  technicians 
sitting  on  the  airfield  we  built,  and  to  which  ke  have  to  return  in  case  of  an 
emeruency  under  the  Treaty,  was  too  much  for  RM.,  and  Dulles  could  not  bear 
the  Egyptian  ingratitude  for  all  the  money  US  has  spent  on  her.  So  they  decided 
to  ýo  for  %,  Iolotov...  27 
This  Macmillan  did  "after  dinner"  on  the  28th  September  when  he  attempted  to 
lecture  Molotov  on  the  intricacies  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  `fiddle  East.  However, 
in  the  words  of  the  Macmillan's  own  record,  Molotov,  phlegmatic  as  ever, 
[R]eplied  that,  although  Mr.  Dulles  had  spoken  to  him  on  this  subject  already,  he 
was  perhaps  insufficiently  briefed.  At  the  time  when  he  had  left  Moscow  he 
knew  that  "not  one  rifle  and  not  one  bullet"  had  been  sold  to  Egypt.  He  knew, 
however,  that  certain  requests  had  been  made  to  Soviet  representatives.  28 
Molotov  then  turned  to  an  exchange  of  information  between  East  and  West  on  their 
respective  supplies  of  arms  to  the  Middle  East.  Macmillan  records  that  he  "naturally 
fluffed  the  answer  to  this  question.  "29 
This  suggestion  was  clearly  not  received  too  seriously  by  Macmillan.  Eden,  on  the 
other  hand,  seems  to  have  been  quite  taken  by  the  concept,  novel  though  it  was.  In  his 
reply  to  Macmillan  of  the  28th  September  he  suggested  that  it  might  not  be  such  a  bad 
idea  after  all,  particularly  if  the  alternative  was  an  arms  race  in  the  Middle  East.  'O  He 
expressed  the  hope  that  Macmillan,  Dulles  and  Pinay  would  agree  to  take  Molotov  at  his 
word.  Indeed  this  belief,  that  in  the  rational  exchange  of  views  solutions  were  to  be  found 
for  most  international  problems,  seems  to  have  been  something  of  a  leitmotif  in  Eden's 
diplomacy.  '  1  However,  it  was  not  an  opinion  that  was  widely  shared  either  in  the  Foreign 
Office  or  by  Macmillan's  American  and  French  colleagues.  ''- 
27  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  ?  80-281. 
3  Or  perhaps,  ý,  iven  his  declining  authority,  Molotov  was  hein, 
-, 
honest 
29  PREM  11/12291,  Telegram  No.  848,  from  UK.  DeleLation  UN  to  F.  0.,  28th  September,  1955. 
30  PRENI  11/1291,  Tele`_ram  No.  1304,  London  to  UK.  Delegation  UN.  to  Secretary  of  State  from 
Prime  Minister.  ^Sth  September.  1955. 
31  See  Full  Circle,  p.  9  for  Eden's  own  outline  of  his  rational  on  re-entering  the  UN  in  195  1  as  the 
new  Foreign  Secretary.  In  this  he  tended  to  look  at  international  problems  from  the  other  end  of  the 
telescope  to  Churchill,  whose  summits  were  conceived  with  consciously  vague  agendas.  The  idea 
being  that  out  of  discussions  on  the  broad  sweep  a  more  detailed  settlement  could  be  worked  out. 
Eden  on  the  other  hand  took  matters  from  the  small  up  to  the  general.  In  this  his  sugvested 
approach  to  Bulganin  over  the  Czech  Deal  was  typical.  Shuckburgh's  comments  on  "shades  of  W.  S. 
C.  "  below  were  in  consequence  possibly  a  little  unfair. 
322  Shuckhurgh  made  the  following  comment  in  his  diary  on  28th  September  on  Eden's  telegram, 
I  had  been  worrvin_t  a  little  as  to  whether  London  would  think  we  have  made  a  mistake  in 
approaching  Molotov  .  heut  Egypt  (though'  actually  Dulles  did  it  first,  on  his  own,  and  there 
was  really  no  option  for  us)  \.  ýhen  a  telegram  arrived  from  the  P%l  ur-ging  us  on  in  the  most 
explicit  terms  -  in  tact  even  suggesting  that  we  should  agree  to  tour-power  consultations  on 
Middle  East  matters,  and  the  he  (A.  E.  )  should  if  necessary  telegraph  to  Bul`_anin.  Shades  of 
W.  S.  C.!  H.  \l.  was  verv  much  surprised  at  this,  and  said  that  it  was  the  same  illusion  that 
Winston  had.  that  there  is  a  sort  of  :  1uh  of  men  at  the  Summit.  There  is  no  such  thing  as Chapter  6/  Page  134 
Macmillan's  reply  of  the  same  day  was  noncommittal.  Deferring  first  of  all  to  the 
need  for  consultation  with  the  Americans  and  then  the  French,  he  went  on  to  point  out  the 
danger  of  bringing  in  the  "Russians  on  too  wide  a  front".  Although  he  did  think  it  might 
have  been  possible  to  narrow  the  consultations  down  specifically  to  the  Palestine 
problem.  33 
Eden  answered  on  the  29th  September  that  he  quite  understood  that  the  Russians 
were  not  wanted  in  on  all  Middle  Eastern  affairs.  However  over  the  arms  deal  he  seems 
to  have  been  quite  convinced  of  the  benefits  of  some  kind  of  mutual  discussion.  Enclosed 
with  the  telegram  was  a  draft  of  a  letter  for  Bulcranin  pointing  out  the  nature  of  the 
Western  policy  of  arms  control  in  the  Middle  East.  )ý  In  consequence  of  Eden's  prodding 
Shuckbur;  h  was  despatched  to  Washington  for  consultations  on  this  issue  with  Dulles  on 
the  29th.  35  Macmillan  followed  him  there  on  the  1st  October. 
Shuckburýh  found  the  State  Department  "much  concerned"  about  the  problems 
attendant  on  any  such  invitation  to  Niolotov.  Although  they  were  not  entirely  negative, 
they  were  "anxious"  to  find  means  of  keeping,  discussion  limited  to  the  arms  deal.  '6 
Meanwhile  Macmillan  was  enýaýiný  in  further  after  dinner  "footsie"  in  the  company  of  the 
Soviet  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  himself.  After  asking  for  clarification  as  to  quite 
exactly  what  "exchange  of  information"  meant,  Macmillan  was  entertained  to  a  rather 
vague  and  inconclusive  conversation.  At  the  end  of  which  Molotov,  with  engaýiný 
candour,  added  that  he  had  not  yet  received  any  further  information  from  his  own 
Government.  '?  Clearly  Macmillan  was  not  ýettiný  far  in  his  attempt  to  reason  with  the 
Soviets  directly. 
Bulganin  in  that  sense.  "  He  can  also  see  that  A.  E.  is  anxious  to  make  peace  all  over  the  place, 
without  much  regard  for  the  consequences.  " 
Shuekburgh  then  suggested  that  the  best  way  around  Eden  would  be  to  push  matters  towards  the 
UN,  already  involved  in  Palestine,  and  so  try  to  limit  any  discussion  merely  to  the  Palestine 
problem.  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  282. 
33  PREM  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  865,  UK.  Delegation  UN  to  F.  0.,  to  Prime  Minister  from 
Secretary  of  State,  28th  September,  1955. 
34  PREN1  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  1327,  London  to  UK.  Delegation  UN,  to  Secretary  of  State  from 
Prime  Minister,  29th  September,  1955. 
35  For  the  comments  that  Shuckhurý;  h  committed  to  his  diary  see  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  '283-284.  He 
seems  to  have  reluctantly  conceded  that  "since  we  almost  certainly  can't  stop  Cairo,  there  is  no 
alternative  to  trying  Molotov.  "  But  he  strongly  emphasised  the  need  to  keep  discussions  limited 
specifically  to  Palestine  by  dealing  with  it  through  the  Security  Council.  On  p.  284  follows  a  more 
acid  commentary  on  the  Eden  approach  as  "even  more  ridiculous  than  that  of  approaching 
Eisenhower  over  Dulles".  and  how  closely  Eden  seemed,  in  a  "perverted  way",  to  be  modelling 
himself  on  Churchill.  Perhaps,  though,  Eden's  appeal  to  Buk-,  anin  displayed  a  more  astute 
perception  of  were  power  really  lay  in  the  Soviet  leadership  and  in  the  development  of  Soviet  policy 
towards  Egypt. 
36  PREMt  11/1291.  Telegram  No.  2323,  Washington  Embassy,  Shuckhur<_h  to  1-'K.  delegation  UN, 
29th  September,  1955. 
37  PRENI  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  881,  UK.  Delegation  to  UN  to  F.  0.,  from  Secretary  of  State,  29th 
September.  1955.  Either  Molotov  was  ling  quite  brazenly,  or.  perhaps  more  probably,  this  is  a 
striking  indication  of  how  tenuous  his  hold  over  the  formulation  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  was 
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The  general  Foreign  Office  view  at  this  point  still  seems  to  have  been  that  the  deal 
should  be  stopped  at  all  costs.  In  a  Telegram  to  Macmillan  of  the  30th  September  Sir 
Harold  Caccia  put  forward  what  might  be  termed  an  intermediate  position.  The  first  aim 
was  to  stop  the  deal  and  the  second  to  demonstrate  to  the  Egyptians  that  "the  policy  of 
concluding,  such  deals  behind  our  backs  does  not  pay",  almost  like  chastising  an  errant 
school  boy.  This  was  to  be  done  by  an  extra  round  of  goodies  for  pro-Western  states, 
particularly  Iraq,  and  American  adherence  to  the  Baghdad  Pact.  However  Caccia,  and  the 
collective  view  of  the  Foreign  Office,  was  on  the  whole  against  punitive  sanctions, 
Our  dislike  at  this  early  stake  of  a  policy  of  "squeezing  Egypt"  is  that  it  might 
help  to  make  a  national  martyr  of  Nasser  in  Egypt  and  gain  rather  then  lose  him 
support  elsewhere.  It  may  be  that  later  we  should  consider  holding  up  sterling 
balance  releases  or  getting  the  Americans  to  make  it  clear  that  there  would  be  no 
money  for  the  High  Aswan  Dani  or  other  projects.  But  we  are  extremely 
doubtful  whether  that  would  be  wise  policy  at  this  stage.  'S 
Caccia  concluded  that  they  "were  no  more  enthusiastic  than  the  Americans  about  taking 
the  Russian  deal  to  the  Security  Council"  Strangely,  Eden  minuted  on  this  telegram  "I 
strongly  agree  with  it  all" 
On  the  30th  Eden,  harried  the  hapless  Macmillan  with  a  further  telegram.  Quite 
obviously  the  adverse  reaction  which  his  idea  had  produced  had  forced  a  certain 
tempering  of  tone.  Now  he  wanted  merely  to  "warn  them  (the  Soviets)  of  the  frass",  in 
the  process  of  which  reference  could  be  made  to  Anglo-American  policy  on  arms 
control.  '`  Dulles  however  remained  unimpressed  with  the  British  suggestion.  40 
On  the  Ist  October  Trevelyan  sent  a  report  to  London  which  further  clarified  the 
situation  in  Egypt.  After  a  meeting  with  Nasser  himself,  Trevelyan  had  been  unable  to 
persuade  the  Egyptian  Government  to  change  its  mind  and  reject  the  Soviet  offer.  Nasser 
it  seemed  was  adamant  that  he  had  no  alternative  liven  the  position  of  Israel.  Moreover, 
"he  said  that  he  must  tell  me  frankly  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  abandon  the  deal.  If  he 
41  did,  there  would  be  a  revolution  in  the  army  the  next  day". 
38  PREM  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  1349,  From  F.  0.  to  New  York,  for  Secretary  of  State  from  Sir  H. 
Caccia,  30th  September,  1955. 
39  PREM  11/1291,  Telegram  No.  1340,  F.  0.  to  New  York,  for  Secretary  of  State  from  Prime 
Minister,  30th  September,  1955.  The  telegram  was  sent  off  in  reaction  to  Macmillan's  initial 
suggestion  that  he  should  first  sound  out  Dulles.  This  Eden  thought  "An  excellent  plan...  ". 
40  PREM  11/1219,  Telegram  No.  2339,  Washington  Embassy  to  UK  Delegation  UN,  to  Secretary  of 
State  from  Shuckhur,  h,  30th  September,  1955.  Shuckburgh  reported  that  Dulles  considered  it 
would  `_ive  the  Soviets  too  great  an  opportunity  to  widen  out  the  discussion  onto  other  Middle 
Eastern  matters. 
41  PREM1  11/1219,  Telegram  No.  1361.  from  Cairo  to  F.  0.,  Ist  October,  1955.  This  was  also  sent 
to  the  Embassies  in  Washington  and  Moscow  as  well  as  the  UK  delegation,  New  York.  In  telegram 
No.  1360  of  the  same  date,  Trevelyan  outlined  the  beginning  of  his  conversation  with  Nasser.  He 
also  reported  that  it  har!  been  revealed  that  morning  in  an  .a  rah  News  Agency  interview  with  Nasser 
that  the  arms  were  actually  to  come  from  Czechoslovakia.  Trevelvan  thought  this  made  no 
difference  to  the  situation.  Nasser  confined  his  comments  on  specitic  details  merely  to  confirmation 
of  where  exactly  the  arms  were  to  come  from. Chaptzr  6/  Pa1, 
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Trevelyan  himself  \.  as  of  the  opinion  that,  although  Nasser  probably  exaggerated  the 
weakness  of  his  position,  nevertheless, 
On  reflection,  I  can  see  no  hopeful  course  for  the  moment  other  than  to  press 
here  and  in  Israel  for  a  Palestine  settlement  without  insisting  on  a  prior 
abandonment  of  Egypt's  arms  deal.  I  doubt  whether  we  can  stop  the  deal  in 
present  circumstances  unless  we  buy  the  Egyptians  off  with  a  more  attractive 
offer  or  buy  Molotov  off  at  probably  a  stiff  price.  42 
These  reports  seemed  to  persuade  Eden  and  Macmillan  that  there  was  no  point  in 
taking  further  measures  with  the  Egyptian  Government  to  try  to  stop  the  deal.  On 
October  3rd  Macmillan  reported  the  state  of  play  in  America  to  be  as  follows. 
In  the  light  of  the  reports  of  our  Ambassador  from  Cairo  we  do  not  believe  it 
possible  to  force  Nasser  to  call  of  the  deal  altogether  by  threats  of  retaliatory 
measures.  I  had,  of  course,  specially  in  mind  Trevelyan's  warnings  on  this  point 
to  which  you  called  my  attention.  So  we  shall  have  to  live  with  it,  even  if  we  can 
limit  it.  Our  interest,  therefore,  is  not  to  represent  it  as  a  great  diplomatic  defeat 
but  rather  to  try  to  minimise  it  and  concentrate  on  increasing  our  benefits,  moral 
and  material  to  the  other  Arab  States.  the  Americans  accept  this  general  policy 
and  will  follow  it  as  far  as  they  are  able.  '  4 
Interestingly,  this  seems  to  indicate  that  Eden  came  round  more  quickly  than  Macmillan  to 
an  acceptance  of  the  deal  as  fait  accompli. 
Macmillan  and  Dulles  met  on  the  3rd  October  and  more  or  less  finally  set  the  Anglo- 
American  attitude.  44  Both  tended  to  take  a  relatively  beniun  view  of  the  motives  behind 
Nasser's  move.  Dulles  made  the  quite  acute  comment  that  Egypt  seemed  to  be  acting  in 
the  manner  of  Tito  in  trying  to  get  the  best  ti-onm  both  sides  in  the  Cold  War.  He 
considered  that  the  Soviet$'  arms  deal  would  only  become  critically  important  if  it  were  to 
lead  to  an  extension  of  their  role  in  the  Middle  East  generally. 
Macmillan's  line  was  though  subtly  different.  He  emphasised  that  from  the  reports  of 
British  and  American  Ambassadors  in  Cairo,  it  seemed  that  Nasser  had  felt  there  to  be  no 
alternative  to  the  deal.  Nasser  "was  a  bit  shaken  by  the  reaction  of  the  West"  and  did  not 
want  to  "quarrel  with  the  western  powers".  He  was,  according  to  this  line  of  argument, 
forced  into  the  hands  of  the  Soviets  against  his  better  judgement  and  regretted  it. 
Although  accepting,  that  the  deal  could  not  now  be  stopped  Macmillan  thought  they 
should  still  try  to  force  Nasser  to  give  them  details  of  exactly  what  was  involved  in  the 
deal,  and  get  an  undertaking  that  he  would  not  allow  Soviet  technicians  into  Egypt.  This 
4"  PRENI  11/1219.  Tele__ram  No.  1365,  From  Cairo  to  F.  0..  2nd  October,  1955.  Trevelvan  and  the 
American  representative  in  Cairo.  \1r.  Allen,  had  i  :  cries  of  conversations  with  Nasser  from  which 
Trevelyan  c  nie  to  the  conclusion  .  looted  above. 
43  PREM  11/12-19,  Telegram  No.  2362,  From  \Vashin  ,  ton  to  London,  for  Prime  Minister  from 
Secretary  of  State.  3rd  October,  1955. 
-14  PREM  11/1-291.  Record  of  a  Meeting'  Between  Mr.  Dulles-  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  Held  at  the 
State  Department  Washington  on  3rd  October,  1955. Chapter  6/  Page  137 
was  as  deep  as  Macmillan's  analysis  seems  to  have  gone.  It  was  Dulles  who  made  the 
following  very  acute  summary  of  what  the  Soviets  \.  %-ere  now  about, 
These  events  flowed  from  the  Geneva  Conference  and  from  all  that  was  implied 
in  the  relaxation  of  tension  between  the  Soviet  Government  and  the  Western 
Powers.  There  had  been  a  complete  chanue  in  Soviet  policy  in  that  instead  of 
treating  everyone  who  was  not  on  their  side  as  an  enemy  they  were  now  seeking 
to  flatter  and  penetrate  more  independent  States.  This  %ý  as  likely  to  be  most 
dangerous  for  the  Western  position,  and  incidents  such  as  the  Czechoslovak- 
Egyptian  arms  deal  were  likely  to  happen  in  all  sorts  of  countries.  45 
The  discussion  ended  with  agreement  that  conversations  with  the  Soviets  on  the  Middle 
East  were  not  a  good  idea,  both  because  of  the  possibility  of  ýiving  away  too  much  on 
Western  policy  and  of  Soviet  devilment.  And  indeed  on  this  issue  that  is  very  much  were 
it  was  left  to  lie.  To  the  "amazement"  of  Macmillan  and  Shuckburyh,  Eden  sent  off  a 
message  to  Bulganin  on  his  own  initiative  on  the  4th  October,  after  it  received  Cabinet 
approval  on  the  same  day.  However  it  was  a  message  that  the  Foreign  Office  had 
succeeded  in  emasculating  by  excising  the  invitation  to  discussions  between  the  two 
sides.  46 
Macmillan  did  not  take  Dulles'  analysis  of  the  change  in  the  Cold  War  particularly  to 
heart.  When  he  addressed  the  Cabinet  on  the  issue  of  the  arms  deal  on  the  4th  October  he 
merely  stated  that, 
The  implications  of  these  developments  were  serious.  It  seemed  likely  that,  with 
the  situation  in  the  Far  East  stabilised  and  a  situation  of  stalemate  in  Europe,  the 
Russians  were  turning  their  attention  to  the  Middle  East.  47 
Macmillan  expanded  on  this  idea  in  the  Cabinet  of  the  ?  0th  October  saving,  "[I]n  the 
Middle  East  the  Russians  had  clearly  embarked  on  a  deliberate  policy  of  opening  another 
front  in  the  cold  war".  48 
Nor  was  Macmillan  to  limit  his  point  of  view  merely  to  the  ears  of  the  Cabinet.  On 
17th  December,  1955,  he  broadcasted  a  chatty  resume  of  the  state  of  foreign  affairs  on 
the  B.  B.  C.  Home  Service.  He  explained  why  the  Government  had  not  been  willing  to 
accede  to  Soviet  requests  for  the  disbanding  of  NATO  and  the  banning  of  nuclear 
weapons  at  the  Geneva  Summit.  Then  he  described  the  stalemate  that  had  descended  on 
45  Shuckhurgºh  has  some  interesting  comment  in  his  diary  entry  of  3rd  October  on  this  meeting,  which 
he  attended, 
Dulles  treated  us  to  a  very  interesting,  philosophical  statement  about  methods  of  handlin`,  the 
Soviet  "new  policy".  He  said  that  if  we  consider  ourselves  entitled  to  goo  visiting  Moscow, 
talking  to  the  Russians,  dealing  between  East  and  how  can  wC  complain  about  small 
countries  like  Egypt  doing  the  same.  " 
This  hardly  -seems  to  be  the  narrow  minded,  bigoted  Dulles  of  popular  le__end.  The  inverted 
commas  around  "new  policy"  are  also  interesting,.  Descent  to  Siren,  p.  'S 
46  CAB  1  ,  S,  CN1(55),  34th  Conclusion.  Minute  8,4th  October.  1955.  Also  Descent  to  Sue-,,  p.  ?  86. 
4;  ibid. 
48  CAB  1_3,  C\1(55),  36th  Conclusions  Minute  1.20th  October.  1955. Charter  6/  Page  138 
Europe  after  the  failure  of  the  Foreign  Minister's  Conference  that  October.  As  at  the 
same  time  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  had  calmed  down,  the  Soviets  were  now  turning 
their  attentions  to  pastures  new, 
[T]he  Russians  have  opened  up,  as  you  have  seen,  a  new  front  in  the  `'fiddle 
East.  They  looked  about  there  and  found  that  in  that  part  of  the  world  they 
could  do  great  damage  to  ourselves  and  our  friends.  Why  is  this'?  Partly  because 
the  Middle  East  is  one  of  the  great  stores  of  oil  which  is  now  being  developed 
increasingly  year  by  year...  So  obviously,  if  the  Russians  can  het  some  control  of 
the  Middle  East  or  at  least  throw  it  into  turmoil,  they  can  cause  discontent  and 
perhaps  revolution  among  the  peoples  there  and  deal  a  serious  blow  to  the 
economy  and  standard  of  living  of  the  West.  49 
Macmillan  ended  with  a  stirring  call  to  the  British  people  to  resist  the  Soviets  in  their 
"turning  to  Asia",  in  the  same  manner  as  they  had  resisted  them  in  Western  Europe. 
However,  this  is  surely  a  little  too  facile.  M'lacmillan's  analysis  viewed  the  change  in 
the  Soviets  foreign  policy  as  little  more  than  a  matter  of  tactics.  Denied  opportunity  in 
the  old  battle  grounds  they  were  simply  in  the  process  of  turning  to  new  areas  where  there 
were  opportunities.  Yet  the  change  was  surely  of  a  profounder  nature  than  that,  beyond 
merely  the  implementation  of  policy  or  the  opening  of  a  "new  front".  As  Dulles  had 
pointed  out,  in  his  meeting  with  the  British  on  the  3rd  October  referred  to  above,  there 
was  a  radical  alteration  going  on  in  the  fund,  -os  )sof  policy,  a  view  that  by  the  end  of  the 
1955  had  much  currency  in  the  Northern  Department.  -  This  was  a  concept  which  British 
politicians  do  not  seem  quite  to  have  grasped  at  this  point.  Eden's  comments  at  the 
Cabinets  of  the  4th  and  20th  October  did  nothing  to  expand  on  or  detract  from  his 
Foreign  Minister's  view.  Indeed  his  most  striking  idea  on  the  4th  was  on  the  question  of 
Britain's  role  in  the  world  in  general.  After  concentrating  on  the  effects  of  the  Soviet's 
move  specific  to  the  British  position  in  the  Middle  East,  he  went  on  to  assert,  in  the  words 
of  the  Cabinet  minute  taker, 
Our  interests  in  the  Middle  East  were  greater  than  those  of  the  United  States 
because  of  our  dependence  on  Middle  East  oil,  and  our  experience  in  the  area 
was  greater  than  theirs.  We  should  not  therefore  allow  ourselves  to  be  restricted 
overmuch  by  reluctance  to  act  without  fill  American  concurrence  and  support.  5° 
Evidence  that  Eden  conceived  of  Britain's  world  role  in  singularly  independent  terms. 
THE  ASWAN  DAM  RIPOSTE 
It  is  clear  that  Eden  and  Macmillan  were  rattled  by  what  the  Soviet  Union  had  achieved  in 
concluding  its  deal  via  the  Czechs  with  the  Egyptian  Government.  The  extremity  of  the 
initial  reaction  can  be  explained  by  reference  to  shock  as  much  as  am-thing  else.  The 
49  A  copy  of  this  address  is  to  be  found  in  the  Northern  Department  tiles  at  FO  371  116695  NS 
10520/40. 
50  CAB  128.  CM(55).  36th  Conclusions  Minute  1,20th  October 
. 
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Soviets  had  in  A.  Rubenstein's  words  "leapfro  ged"  over  the  painstaking  defence 
structure  the  British  had  been  developing  through  the  Baghdad  Pact.  Yet,  although  they 
were  impressed  by  the  novelty  of  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  in  September  1955,  they  were  not 
yet  quite  aware  of  what  the  significance  of  that  novelty  was.  It  was  Dulles  whose 
judgement  proved  more  perceptive  in  this  matter.  The  Cold  War  changed  in  1955  and  the 
Czech  Arms  deal  was  as  important  a  part  of  that  change  as  the  Geneva  Conference  which 
preceded  it.  51  British  policy  in  the  Middle  East,  and  the  rest  of  the  "under  developed" 
world,  could  no  longer  be  conceived  in  the  way  it  had  been.  The  Soviet  Union  had 
entered  the  contest  for  political  favour  and  influence  in  areas  previously  denied  it. 
Although  it  was  to  take  a  little  more  time  for  the  exact  formulation  to  work  its  way  up 
through  the  Foreign  Office,  in  practice  British  policy  quickly  had  to  accommodate  itself  to 
a  new  situation.  The  attitude  that  the  British  Government  took  to  the  financing  of  the 
Aswan  Dam  was  the  first  clear  example  of  this.  5-' 
It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  Soviets  were  not  to  be  content  to  let  the  matter  rest 
at  the  supply  of  armaments.  On  the  10th  October  the  Soviet  intention  to  offer  finance  for 
the  Aswan  Dam,  amongst  other  projects,  was  made  public  in  Cairo.  5'  On  the  14th 
October  Trevelyan  made  the  following  estimation  of  the  E<7vptian  attitude  to  the  Soviet 
offer, 
If  the  Russians  make  offers  which  will  ostensibly  enable  Egypt  to  accelerate  her 
development  projects,  the  Egyptians  will  find  them  very  attractive.  The 
Egyptians  may  want  to  show  their  political  independence  by  accepting  some 
Russian  offers,  but  they  may  also  want  to  show  the  West  that  they  have  not 
fallen  completely  into  the  Communist  lap.  4 
Shuckburuh  in  his  diary  entry  for  the  17th  October  looked  back  on  a  "desperately  busy 
week"  and  concluded  that  his  "main  objective  now  is  to  prevent  Egypt  taking  economic 
aid  from  USSR  -  e.  g.  for  the  High  Aswan  Dam  ,.  55  It  was  directly  in  terms  of 
competition  with  the  Soviet  Union  that  the  British  Government  now  set  about  canvassing 
support  for  a  Western  counter  bid. 
51  Most  studies  of  Soviet  policy  toward  the  Third  World  take  the  Czech  arms  deal  as  their  starting 
point  e.  `_.  A.  Rubenstein  op.  cit.  or  F.  Fukuvama  and  A.  Korbonski  (eds.  ).  The  Soviet  Union  and 
the  Third  World,  the  Last  Three  Decades.  It  was  effectively  the  first  salvo  in  the  "new  cold"  war 
that  Dulles  referred  to  in  his  discussion  with  Macmillan  above. 
5?  Diane  Kunz  in  The  Economic  Diplomacy  of  the  Suez  Crisis,  pp.  48-57,  set,,  the  Anglo-American  bid 
to  finance  the  Dam  in  the  context  of  a  new  "economic  diplomacy". 
53  R.  Lamb,  op.  Cit.,  p.  173.  Lamb  makes  reference  to  a  Foreign  Office  paper  at  FO  371  11806,  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  "there  was  a  serious  danger  that  the  Xl  iddle  East  "will  slip  away  from  us... 
the  Egyptians,  the  Saudi  Arabians,  and  now  the  Russians  are  making  great  efforts  to  undermine  our 
position  and  spending  large  ,,  ums  of  money"".  It  \V  pointed  out  that  the  Middle  East  was  not  only 
vital  as  a  source  of  oil,  but  it  also  provided  Britain  with  some  E600  millions  in  earnings  on  assets 
held  in  the  area,  which  agent  I  considerable  to  payiný_  for  Britain's  energy  requirements. 
Eden's  approach  to  the  Middle  East  when  talkin_,  with  the  Soviet  leaders  whilst  they  were  in  London 
during  April.  1956.  informed  by  such  considerations.  see  Chapter  S. 
54  PREý,  t  11/1282.  Telegram  No.  14-12,  Cairo  to  F.  O.,  1-4th  October.  1955. 
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At  the  Cabinet  meeting,  of  ?  0th  October  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  raised  the 
issue  of  the  need  to  gain  American  support  for  the  financing  of  the  Western  offer.  ''  It 
was  pointed  out  that  at  least  half  of  the  necessary  money  would  have  to  come  from  the 
United  States  as  Egypt  could  certainly  not  afford  the  £33-£-46  million  the  Dam  was 
estimated  to  cost.  This  information,  along  with  the  rational  that  underlay  British  policy, 
that  is  the  forestalling  of  the  Soviets,  was  relayed  to  the  Washington  Embassy  on  the  same 
day.  57  In  the  following  negotiations  with  the  Americans  it  transpired  that  they  tended  to 
view  the  situation  in  a  less  dramatic  light.  At  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  the  ?  5th  October  it 
was  even  suggested  by  Eden  that  Britain  might  try  to  put  forward  a  package  without 
American  support,  such  was  the  importance  he  attached  to  it.  The  Cabinet  `linutes  record 
his  opinion  as  follows, 
The  Prime  Minister  said  that  this  contract,  if  it  could  be  secured  for  the 
consortium,  would  provide  the  most  effective  counterpoise  possible  to  Russian 
penetration  in  Egypt  for  it  would  give  us  a  controlling  influence  over  the  Nile 
waters...  But  it  would  be  essential  to  act  quickly  if  we  were  to  avoid  the  risk  of 
the  contract  slipping  through  our  hands.  -ýx 
American  reluctance  inight  be  stepped  around  by  approaching  private  American 
construction  firms  individually,  or  by  going  alone  into  the  deal  with  the  Europeans. 
Although  the  finance  ministers  at  the  meeting  were  rather  less  enthusiastic  about  this  idea 
than  Eden,  nonetheless  it  is  a  striking  indication  of  how  seriously  the  Government,  and 
Eden  in  particular,  took  the  threat  of  Soviet  economic  diplomacy  in  Egypt.  59 
It  was  not  until  the  17th  December  that  the  Western  offer  was  finalised  by  the  World 
Bank  and  the  United  States  and  that  was  only  after  further  agonisino,  flutters  that  Nasser 
was  leaning  towards  the  Soviets  after  all.  60  In  the  aftermath  of  an  eruption  of 
nervousness  on  the  27th  November  Trevelyan  telegrammed  to  London  that  Nasser,  "has 
not  vet  made  up  his  mind  to  get  the  darn  financed  from  the  Communists",  and  that  though 
he  had  authorised  tentative  negotiations  with  the  Soviets  he  still  would  prefer  to  accept  a 
Western  offer.  61  However,  ultimately  it  was  the  British  and  Americans  who  were  to  balk 
at  carrying  the  project  through  despite  painstaking  negotiations  up  to  the  Summer  of 
1956.  But  this  an  issue  to  which  we  shall  return  later. 
56  CAB  12S,  CM1(55),  36th  Conclusion,  Minute  I.  20th  October.  1955. 
57  PREM  I1/12S2.  Tele_.,  ram  No.  4831,  F.  O.  to  Washington,  ?  0th  October,  1966. 
58  CAB  128,  CVl(55),  37th  Conclusions  Minute  3,25th  October,  1955. 
59  The  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  Peter  Thornycrott,  and  the  Chancellor,  R.  A.  B.  Butler. 
60  For  detail  on  the  discussions  see  he  Economic  Diplomacy  of  the  Suez  Crisis,  pp.  52-55. 
61  PREM1  11/1282,  Telegram  No.  1815,  Cairo  to  F.  O.  Shuckhurgh  put  the  panic  rather  luridly  in  his 
diary. 
Thera  is  a  terrific  scare  that  the  Egyptians  are  going  to  give  the  Aswan  Dam  Project  to  the 
Russians.  It  begins  to  look  as  if  Nasser  is  even  more  unreliable  than  he  seemed,  and  may  even 
he  consciously  I 
handin, 
_ 
over  his  country  to  Communism.  But  I  do  not  quite  believe  that.  I 
think  he  thinks  himself  supremely  clever,  and  i:  playing  East  off  against  West  to  the  last 
moment. 
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In  September,  1955,  the  British  Government  faced  a  radical  new  departure  in  Soviet 
foreign  policy.  Although  it  was  not  yet  fully  apparent  to  many  in  London,  not  least 
Macmillan  and  Eden,  quite  how  profound  this  development  was,  Whitehall  was 
sufficiently  exercised  by  the  Soviet  diplomacy  to  undertake  an  expensive  and  uncertain 
counter  attack  in  the  shape  of  the  Aswan  Darm  proposal  For  the  first  time  London  felt  it 
had  to  take  account  of  an  intrusion  of  Soviet  political  influence  into  an  area  of  traditional 
British  pre-eminence.  This  was  an  intrusion  which  was  to  develop  far  outwith  the 
confines  of  the  Middle  East  even  as  1955  came  to  an  end.  With  the  Bul(yanin  and 
Khrushchev  tour  of  India  and  Burma  British  observers  of  the  Soviet  Union  began  to  see  a 
very  clear  pattern  emerging.  This  is  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. Chapter  7 
Soviet  Economic  Diplomacy  in  the  "Under-developed  World" 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  go  to  Asia 
"The  moment  of  decision  is  upon  us  in  a  big  way  on  world  economic  policy.  So  long 
as  the  Soviets  had  a  monopoly  on  covert  subversion  and  threats  of  military  aggression, 
and  we  had  a  monopoly  on  Santa  Claus,  some  kind  of  seesaw  game  could  be  played. 
But  now  the  Soviets  are  muscling  in  on  Santa  Claus  as  well,  which  puts  us  in  a  terribly 
dangerous  position". 
C.  D.  Jackson 
The  Czech-Egyptian  arms  deal  was  not  to  be  the  only  new  adventure  in  Soviet  foreign 
policy  during  1955.  In  late  November  and  early  December,  1955  Bulganin  and 
Khrushchev  went  on  an  extended  propaganda  drive  around  India  and  South  East  Asia, 
spreading  economic  blandishments  and  anti-Western  vitriol  wherever  they  went. 
Before  going  on  to  examine  the  effect  which  this  had  upon  the  British  understanding  of 
Soviet  foreign  policy,  there  follows  a  precis  of  the  itinerv. 
The  tour  provided  the  Soviet  leaders  with  an  opportunity  to  pay  back  the  visits 
which  Nehru  and  U  Nu,  the  Premier  of  Burma,  had  made  to  Moscow  earlier  in  1955. 
Khrushchev  and  Bulganin  caused  the  greatest  publicity  splash  whilst  in  India  from  18th 
November  to  Ist  December,  being  given  a  tumultuous  welcome  by  the  Indian  people. 
From  the  Ist  December  to  the  7th  they  moved  on  to  Burma  where  their  rhetoric 
seemed  less  effective  on  a  popular  level,  but  their  economic  assistance  was  more 
warmly  received  by  the  Burmese  Government.  As  a  coda  the  Soviets  went  to 
Afghanistan  where  their  contact  with  the  public  was  severely  circumscribed  by  the 
antediluvian  Afghan  Government.  The  Afghan  leader's  logic  did  not  go  so  far, 
however,  as  to  temper  their  enthusiasm  for  Soviet  economic  aid.  All  in  all  it  was 
judged  in  Moscow  to  have  been  a  considerable  success.  1 
It  was  less  successful  in  maintaining  the  Geneva  Spirit,  already  considerably 
reduced  by  the  beginning  of  the  tour.  The  British,  as  the  former  colonial  power,  felt 
targeted  by  the  comments  which  Khrushchev  and  Bulganin  had  felt  it  appropriate  to 
make.  Khrushchev  in  particular  had  said  some  things  which  were  not  to  be  forgotten 
easily  in  London.  Whilst  in  India  Khrushchev  blamed  Britain  directly  for  the  partition 
of  the  old  Empire  on  its  dissolution  and  went  so  tar  as  to  claim  in  a  speech  of  the  24th 
November  at  the  Indian-Soviet  society  reception  in  Bombay  that  "the  British,  French, 
and  Americans  started  the  Second  World  War,  sent  troops  against  our  country  and 
I  At  least  it  we  jud__e  by  the  reports  which  BuIganin  and  Khrushchev  `_ave  to  the  Supreme  Soviet  on 
the  0th  December  which  were  puhlished  in  Prctv(Irc  of  the  same  clay.  There  are  English  translations 
or  these  speeches  in  The  Current  Dicce.  cr  o'1  the  Soviet  P,  *cýv,.  v.  Vol.  VII.  No.  51.  pp.  13-17  and  No. 
pp.  1-4-20.  See  Soviet  Fr,  rei,  r,  POIic\"  Sluice  tý  Hr;  Mir  I/.  pp.  148-163  for  an  evaluation  of  the 
si  niticance  of  Khrushchev'.  new  p  lice  O,  ard  the  °,  inJer-developed"  world. Chapter  ,/  Pa__--  143 
these  troops  were  the  troops  of  Hitler's  Germany".  '-  This  was  the  most  notorious 
outburst  of  a  number  of  tub-thumping  speeches  which  Khrushchev  gave.  Bulganin 
maintained  rather  more  reserve,  but  in  essence  dealt  with  similar  themes. 
Moreover,  there  was  unease  in  Whitehall  as  to  the  implications  of  the  tour  for 
future  Soviet  foreign  policy.  The  emphasis  which  the  Soviet  leaders  had  placed  upon 
economic  assistance  and  the  suitability  of  Soviet  models  of  economic  development  to 
the  "under-developed"  world  heralded  a  serious  challenge  to  residual  British  economic 
interests  in  India  and  South  East  Asia.  It  is  this  analysis  of  the  Soviets  activities  and 
their  implications  for  Britain  in  turn  which  the  following  chapter  will  examine. 
Not  content  merely  to  look  on,  the  visit  in  January,  1956,  of  Eden  to  Washington 
was  conceived  as  something  of  a  counter  blast.  However  the  understanding  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  held  in  Whitehall  was  not,  as  we  shall  see,  always  identical  to  that  of 
Downing  Street. 
THE  BRITISH  ANALYSIS 
The  British  interpreted  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev's  tourism  on  two  levels.  For  the 
Politicians  the  most  important  consideration  seems  to  have  been  the  spleen  that  had 
been  vented  in  Britain's  direction,  both  implicitly  and  directly.  This  caused  a  great 
deal  of  offence  in  London,  even  to  the  extent  of  bringing  the  planned  visit  by  the 
diumvirate  to  Britain  into  doubt.  Eden  and  the  Cabinet  spent  a  substantial  length  of 
time  discussing  this  question  and  it  was  not  until  February  1956  that  they  finally 
decided  that  they  should  not  cancel  their  invitation  to  the  Soviets.  Khrushchev  and 
Bulganin  were  apparently  blithely  unaware  of  the  contradictory  impressions  that  the 
two  sides  to  their  policy  of  peaceful  coexistence  were  creating. 
However  there  were  also  important  long  term  developments  which  were  of  more 
concern  in  Whitehall.  Firstly  the  Soviets'  tour  signified  to  British  officials  a  new 
enthusiasm  for  Asia  in  preference  to  Europe  as  the  cold  war's  battle  ground.  Although 
this  point  was  equally  obvious  to  politicians,  where  Civil  Servants  and  their  masters 
differed  was  in  the  appreciation  of  quite  how  fundamental  a  change  in  the  Soviet's 
attitude  to  the  cold  war  that  this  development  implied.  Secondly  it  seemed  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  as  well  as  the  Treasury,  the  Board  of  Trade  and  the  Ministry  of 
Supply,  that  the  armoury  the  Soviets  were  using  was  profoundly  different  from  that  to 
which  they  had  become  used.  The  Asian  tour  underlined  the  fact  that  the  new  and 
crucial  weapon  in  the  fight  for  political  influence  in  the  area  was  to  be  economic  aid. 
Aid  to  non-aligned  countries,  which  despite  tending  to  an  anti-western  bias.  were  by  no 
stretch  of  the  imagination  Communist.  This  was  complementary  to  the  military 
Published  in  Pravda  and  Izvestia,  26th  November.  There  is  a  translation  of  the  speech  in  The 
Current  Digest  of  the  Soviet  Press,  Vol.  VII.  No.  4S.  pp.  3-.  4.  Indeed  there  is  3  pretty  full 
compendium  of  the  Bulg.  nin  and  Khrushchev  South  East  Asia  Opus  in  Vol.  VII  of  the  Current 
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assistance  which  had  heralded  the  Soviet's  dramatic  entrance  into  third  world  politics 
in  Egypt.  By  the  Twentieth  Party  Congress  in  February,  1956,  British  officialdom  was 
already  quite  familiar  with  the  new  policy  which  Khrushchev  gave  his  ideological 
imprimatur  to. 
There  was  indeed  some  consideration  outwith  the  Foreign  Office  given  to  the  issue 
of  Soviet  economic  diplomacy  in  the  "under  developed"  world  immediately  before 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev's  tour.  3  As  was  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  concern 
for  Soviet  activity  in  this  area  had  been  growing  since  1954.  The  Minister  of  Supply. 
Reginald  Maudling,  expressed  his  worry  about  the  potentialities  of  the  Soviet  economy 
in  the  fight  for  influence  in  the  non-committed  world  in  a  letter  to  R.  A.  Butler  of  24th 
November,  1955. 
I  believe  I  have  mentioned  to  you  before  my  concern  that  the  Russians  may 
start  using  their  economic  strength  in  the  cold  war.  With  the  resources  they 
have  and,  even  more  important,  the  control  over  their  economy  and  their 
export  prices  that  they  can  exert,  it  is  clear  that  they  could  easily  stage  a  major 
economic  offensive  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  they  have  not  done  so 
before.  ` 
He  went  on  to  question  what  the  British  attitude  should  be  if  the  Soviets  were  to 
expand  from  their  first  moves  in  the  Middle  East,  particularly  of  course  in  arms,  and 
their  offer  of  a  steel  mill  to  India.  Should  they  attempt  to  forestall  the  Soviets  at  every 
turn,  or  given  the  hideous  expense  of  such  a  policy,  would  it  be  better  to  "call  their 
bluff". 
The  Treasury  also  took  a  relatively  sanguine  view  of  the  Soviet  economy's 
capabilities.  In  their  opinion,  although  heavy  industrial  products  tended  to  be  crude  by 
Western  standards,  they  were  competitively  priced  and  might  even  have  certain 
advantages  in  third  world  markets.  Sir.  G.  L.  F.  Bolton  sent  his  positive  analysis  of 
Soviet  economic  potentialities  to  Sir  Leslie  Rowan  on  19th  December,  1955,  a  letter 
which  Rowan  thought  important  enough  to  circulate  around  a  number  of  departments 
including  the  Foreign  Office.  Bolton  came  to  the  following  conclusion, 
3  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  8-10.  There  were  also  those  in  America  who  were  becoming 
concerned.  On  10th  November,  1955,  C.  D.  Jackson  an  ex-special  assistant  to  the  President  sent  a 
letter  to  Nelson  Rockefeller,  who  was  still  a  special  assistant,  emphasising  his  concern  for  the  new 
Soviet  economic  policy.  He  expressed  himself  pithily,  if  rather  simplistically  as  follows, 
The  moment  of  decision  is  upon  us  in  a  big  way  on  world  economic  policy.  So  long  as  the 
Soviets  had  a  monopoly  on  covert  subversion  and  threats  of  military  aggression,  and  we  had  a 
monopoly  on  Santa  Claus,  some  kind  of  seesaw  dame  could  be  played.  But  now  the  Soviets 
are  muscling  in  on  Santa  Claus  as  well,  which  puts  us  in  a  terribly  dangerous  position. 
Needless:  to  say  this  analysis  ignores  the  substantial  role  already  played  covertly  by  the  US  in 
operations  such  as  the  overthrow  in  1952  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  Iran. 
4  FO  371  116716  NS  1123/16,  Maudlin__  to  Butler,  24th  November,  1955.  Clearly  Soviet  economic 
potential  was  very  soon  to  he  cashed  in.  Maudlin_,  's  letter  was  timely.  The  Chancellor's  response. 
dated  6th  December  after  the  deluge  had  begun.  was  to  suggest  the  initiation  of  further  study  and 
discussion.  These  studies  formed  the  briefs  background  for  the  Washington  Conference.  see  below. 2 
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We  are  now  faced  by  the  entry  into  world  trade,  not  only  as  a  seller  but  as  a 
buyer  as  well,  of  a  power  disposing  of  far  greater  resources,  human  technical 
and  material,  than,  for  example,  Japan,  when  she  emerged  in  the  latter  years 
of  the  19th  century  as  an  industrial  power...  There  is  no  prospect  of  stopping 
this  development  (except  by  force)  than  there  was  of  stopping  the  expansion  of 
North  America,  and  it  is  in  North  American  terms  that  we  should  think  of  the 
emerging  economic  power  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  satellites.  ' 
As  far  as  the  Foreign  Office  was  concerned  the  "economic  offensive"  had  in  fact 
already  begun.  On  December  2nd,  1956,  Sir  William  Hayter  sent  a  despatch  to 
London  which  examined  the  situation  vis  a  vis  Soviet-British  trade  over  the  past  year. 
Although  he  cane  to  the  conclusion  that  there  had  been  little  increase  in  Soviet  trade 
with  the  West  generally  over  the  period  and  did  not  think  that  it  was  likely  any  would 
happen  in  the  future,  Soviet  external  trade  policy  had  undergone  an  important  change 
in  other  directions.  6  Hayter  drew  attention  to  a  particular  trend  which  he  thought  had 
disturbing  implications  for  the  future. 
There  is  however  one  field  in  which  a  dramatic  change  has  occurred,  i.  e. 
Soviet  trade  with  the  Middle  East  and  South  East  Asia.  Though  the  direct 
effect  on  British  trade  is  not  yet  great.  this  development  is  potentially 
dangerous  to  us  both  politically  and  economically.? 
Furthermore,  as  Mauclling  did,  Hayter  thought  that  the  Soviet  command  economy 
had  certain  advantages  over  the  West  in  using  economic  aid  in  the  battle  for  political 
influence.  It  could  target  the  projects  of  greatest  political  impact,  and  undertake  them, 
regardless  of  their  basic  commercial  viability.  Western  businessmen  were  not  free  to 
act  with  such  financial  indiscretion.  Nor  was  Western  aid  necessarily  exploited  to  best 
propaganda  advantage.  Businessmen  acted  as  individuals,  and  their  assistance  was 
5  FO  371  116716  NS  1123/20,  Bolton  to  Rowan,  19th  December,  1955. 
6  FO  371  116716  NS  1123/12,  Sir  William  Hayter.  Moscow,  to  Selwyn  Lloyd,  London,  2nd 
December,  1955.  Hayter  thought  that  the  Soviets  would  buy  from  the  British  what  they  needed  if 
the  prices  were  competitive,  but  that  they  would  be  more  likely  for  political  reasons  to  favour  West 
Germany.  He  summed  the  situation  up  as  follows, 
Foreign  trade  does  not  represent  more  than  I%  of  the  dross  national  product  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  it  is  estimated  that  four  fifths  of  that  trade  is  carried  on  within  the  Soviet  orbit.  It 
seems  to  me  unlikely  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  ever  expand  its  trade  with  the  West  very 
significantly.  It  is  inconceivable  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  rely  on  the  West... 
7  ibid.  Hayter  went  on  to  detail  some  of  the  indicators  of  this  new  trend, 
Mr.  Malcolm  Macdonald's  (the  High  Commissioner  in  India]  despatch  no.  160  of  November 
15  notes  that  Indo-Soviet  trade  has  expanded  six  times  since  1953.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been 
a  major  participant  in  trade  fairs  throughout  the  N1  iddle  East  and  South  East  Asia,  Soviet 
technicians  are  erecting  a  steel  plant  in  India  and  the  services  of  Soviet  technicians  are  offered 
abroad.  The  satellites  are  playing  a  large  part  in  this  campaign.  I  note  that  it  is  estimated  that 
the  Soviet  bloc  could  export  to  the  free  world  000  million  worth  of  capital  equipment 
annually;  this  might  have  a  telling  effect  if  directed  towards  undeveloped  countries. 
Hohler  in  his  reply  to  the  above  despatch  did  hover  question  the  ti`,  ure  of  £500  million.  He 
suggested  that  it  was  probably  a  typing  error  as  according  to  all  their  information  the  ti__ure  was 
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often  hidden  in  wider  international  frameworks,  such  as  the  Colombo  Plan. 
Meanwhile  the  Soviets,  acting  on  the  level  of  a  collective  state,  could  draw  out 
maximum  political  kudos  from  their  economic  aid.  Also,  Havter  cautioned  that  Soviet 
capabilities  should  not  be  underestimated,  either  in  technology  or  in  their  ability  to 
produce  the  kind  of  capital  equipment  that  the  "Under  Developed"  World  needed.  He 
concluded  his  report  as  follows, 
I  am  not  competent,  nor  have  I  the  facts  here,  to  decide  how  great  is  the 
Soviet  threat  to  areas  where  our  political  and  economic  influence  has  not 
hitherto  suffered  serious  challenge  except  fi"  m  an  ally.  [my  italics]  I  do  not 
think  that  we  have  yet  much  to  fear  in  the  world  as  a  whole  from  the  Soviet 
Union  as  an  external  trader.  But  in  certain  areas,  particularly  the  under 
developed  countries,  on  which  it  seems  that  the  Soviet  Government  is  now 
concentrating  its  attention,  we  have  much  to  lose  and  I  do  not  think  we  shall 
hold  our  around  without  great  effort. 
Not  only  were  Soviet  methods  new,  but  she  was  also  expanding  into  terra  nova. 
This  is  a  point  which  was  to  be  repeated  again  and  again  by  British  officials  and 
politicians  in  the  succeeding  months.  The  cold  war  was  expanding  its  scope. 
The  Northern  Department  expressed  strong  agreement  with  this  in  its  reply  to 
Hayter's  despatch.  8  In  his  minute  on  it  of  December  30th  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  in  line 
with  Hayter's  time  scale,  commented  that  the  change  in  Soviet  policy  had  been 
developing  over  the  past  18  months.  Unlike  Maudling  the  Foreign  Office  was  aware 
that  matters  had  been  coming  to  a  head  for  some  time.  The  despatch,  according  to 
Hohler,  was  opportune  as  Whitehall  was  abuzz  with  what  the  Soviets  were  trying  to  do 
in  Asia,  which  had  been  dramatically  underlined  by  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev's 
flamboyant  progress.  9 
However  as  far  as  the  politicians  were  concerned  the  most  immediate  problem 
caused  by  the  Soviets'  Asian  antics  was  their  inflammatory  rhetoric.  This  comes  out 
quite  clearly  as  the  main  concern  in  Eden's  brief  treatment  of  the  effects  of  the  tour  in 
his  memoirs.  10  The  first  indication  given  to  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  unease  that 
8  ibid.  Hohler  made  the  following  comment  in  his  reply, 
Your  despatch...  of  December  ?  about  Soviet  trade  policy  has  been  read  with  very  great 
interest  in  Whitehall.  It  arrived  most  conveniently  at  a  time  when  everyone  here  in  London 
was  devoting  much  thought  to  the  significance  of  the  Soviet  economic  drive  in  the  under- 
developed  countries,  and  to  the  relationship  between  this  and  the  prospects  for  our  own  and 
other  western  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
9  See  above  on  the  Northern  Department's  view  of  Soviet  interest  in  the  third  world  from  early  1955 
and  below  for  the  British  Ambassador  to  Burma's  interesting  view  on  the  length  of  the  "economic 
offensive's"  gestation. 
10  Full  Circle,  pp.  354-355.  In  this  two  page  treatment  Eden  deals  specifically  with  whether  or  not  the 
visit  by  Bulý_anin  and  Khrushchev  to  Britain  should  be  allowed  to 
`; 
o  on,  giving  his  rationag6ehind 
the  decision  not  to  cancel.  In  only  one  sentence  does  he  refer  to  the  matter  of  deeper  concern  in  the 
Foreign  Office,  and  for  that  matter  in  other  Departments  of  State.  namely  the  Soviet  economic 
offensive  in  Asia. charter  7/  Page  147 
Khrushchev's  comments  were  causing  Eden  was  reported  to  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  by 
Macmillan  in  a  minute  of  the  5th  December.  ýE  He  commented  that  some  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  Cabinet  colleagues  were  pressing  him  to  send  a  message  to  the  itinerant 
evangels,  intended  to  lead  either  to  the  end  of  anti-British  propaganda  or  the 
cancellation  of  the  visit  to  Britain.  Macmillan  was  "not  very  keen"  on  this  idea  and 
thought  that  it  would  be  better  to  await  the  Soviet  leaders'  return  home  before  taking 
any  action.  In  the  meantime  he  asked  if  Hayter  could  be  quizzed  as  to  exactly  what  the 
Soviets  were  trying  to  achieve.  Whether  they  really  wanted  to  go  on  with  the  visit,  or 
were  they  attempting  to  push  the  blame  for  cancellation  on  the  British? 
Before  Hayter's  reply  came  through,  the  Cabinet  met  on  the  6th  December  to 
discuss  how  they  should  react  to  Khrushchev's  speechifying.  12  There  was  no 
discussion  at  all  of  the  implications  of  economic  diplomacy  for  Britain's  position. 
More  crucial  to  the  Cabinet  seems  to  have  been  the  question  of  national  honour.  The 
Marquis  of  Salisbury  in  particular  considered  that  if  the  Soviets  had  not  withdrawn 
their  calculated  insults  by  the  time  of  the  April  visit,  it  would  cause  great  damage  to 
British  prestige  if  it  were  not  cancelled.  However  Salisbury,  a  man  for  whom 
questions  of  personal  integrity  and  self-respect  were  unusually  important,  was 
something  of  a  lone  voice.  13  The  "general  view",  according  to  the  minutes,  was  more 
hesitant  and  a  decision  was  deferred  until  further  discussion  and  consultations  had 
taken  place.  Presumably  this  referred,  amongst  other  things,  to  the  Embassy's  view  on 
what  the  Soviets  were  attempting  to  achieve. 
The  Cabinet  then  generally  agreed  the  following  rationale  behind  the  Soviet's 
actions, 
[I]t  might  be  that  having  concluded  that  the  risk  of  early  nuclear  war  was 
slight,  they  saw  the  immediate  struggle  for  power  in  terms  of  a  struggle  for 
influence  over  Eastern  peoples,  and  had  decided  that  abuse  would  help  them 
in  undermining  the  confidence  of  Eastern  countries  in  Western  powers. 
There  was  no  mention  at  all  of  the  role  played  by  economic  aid  in  the  realisation  of 
this  Soviet  objective.  The  Cabinet  conclusions  present  an  interesting  and  rather 
immature  view  of  what  peaceful  co-existence  actually  meant. 
In  spite  of  the  provocation  which  had  been  offered  it  was  too  early  yet  to  take 
the  view  that  peaceful  co-existence  with  the  Soviet  Union  was  unattainable 
and  until  we  were  in  a  position  to  bring  all  the  neutral  powers  into  the 
It  was  obvious  that  the  direct  references  to  Britain  must  cause  offence  in  this  country  and  make 
many  doubt  the  value  of  a  visit  from  the  Soviet  leaders  in  such  circumstances.  It  also  seemed 
clear  that  Marshal  Bulganin  and  Mr.  Khrushchev  vvvere,  fi.  r  the  present,  more  interested  in 
making  friends  and  it  fluencing  people  in  Asia  than  in  Europe.  [My  Italics[ 
11  FO  371  116687  NS  1051221115.  Minute  from  Macmillan  to  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick.  5th  December. 
1955. 
12  PREM  11/1606,  CN1(56),  45th  Conclusions,  : Minute  3.6th  December.  1955. 
13  See  Anthony  Erlen,  pp.  365-371  and  381.  Rhodes  James  makes  clear  that  this  side  to  Salisbury's 
nature  had  led  him  to  risk  resignation  threats  on  a  number  of  occasions. Chapter  7/  Pave  14S 
Western  orbit  it  would  remain  to  our  advantage  to  pursue  a  policy  of  peaceful 
co-existence,  if  the  terms  on  which  it  could  be  secured  were  not  humiliating. 
Clearly  the  executive  still  cherished  the  Churchillian  idea  of  a  grand  settlement  of 
differences  that  would  lead  to  a  general  peace,  on  all  levels  of  Great  Power  activity. 
Equally  clearly,  at  least  in  retrospect,  and  in  prospect  by  early  1956,  this  was  not  what 
the  Soviet  themselves  wanted. 
It  was  pointed  out  by  persons  unnamed  in  the  Cabinet  minutes  that  over  the  years 
some  pretty  stiff  things  had  been  said  by  members  of  British  Governments  about  the 
Soviet  Union.  Having  agreed  that  excerpts  from  both  the  most  notorious  of 
Khrushchev's  speeches  and  the  most  acrid  British  comments  should  be  circulated 
together,  the  Cabinet  deferred  its  decision  until  further  discussion.  Indeed  the  decision 
was  not  to  be  made  for  some  time.  The  next  Cabinet  meeting  to  consider  the  matter 
was  not  held  until  the  11th  January,  1956  and  only  by  the  16th  of  February  was  a 
definite  decision  made  in  favour  of  going  ahead  with  the  visit.  In  between  there  was  to 
be  some  degree  of  humming  and  hawing  between  the  Moscow  Embassy  and  London.  14 
Hayter's  response  to  Macmillan's  inquiry  came  back  in  two  telegrams  of  the  7th 
December.  15  He  argued  that  the  Soviets  had  not  intended  to  make  quite  the  anti- 
British  splash  that  they  had.  Rather  they  became  carried  away  by  their  own  rhetoric. 
Hayter  also  made  a  clear  distinction  between  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev,  the  latter  being 
the  main  perpetrator  of  offending  propaganda.  16  The  Northern  Department  was  not  so 
charitable  in  the  construction  which  it  placed  on  events.  17  They  agreed  with  the  view 
that  the  Cabinet  had  taken  the  previous  day.  Is  Nevertheless  the  Department  did  not 
think  that  the  Soviets  were  trying  to  get  the  British  to  cancel  the  visit.  All  effort,  they 
thought  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  odium  of  cancellation  should  fall  on  the 
Soviets.  After  considering  a  variety  of  possible  reactions,  the  best  seemed  to  be  a  calm 
and  measured  public  answer  to  Khrushchev's  "slanders"  by  either  the  Prime  Minister 
or  Foreign  Secretary.  This  was  the  line  which  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  had  taken  and 
14  PREM  11/1624,  CM(56),  3rd  Conclusions,  Minute  4.1  l  th  January,  1956  and  CM(56),  15th 
Conclusions,  Minute  7,  dated  16th  February  1956. 
15  FO  371  169487  NS  105  12/119.  Moscow  Telegrams  No.  1443  and  1444,7th  December,  1955. 
16  Although  he  admitted  that  this  might  have  si-nit  ed  little  more  than  the  differences  in  their  two 
personalities. 
17  FO  371  116687  NS  1051?  /  119.  Minute  by  J.  G.  Ward.  7th  December.  1955. 
18  Ward  added  the  following  to  the  Cabinet's  opinion. 
There  also  seems  force  in  the  Yugoslav  Ambassador's  comment  to  Sir  I.  Kirkpatrick  that  the 
Soviet  leaders  are  probably  victims  of  their  own  propaganda  and  genuinely  believe  much  of  the 
abuse  they  level  at  the  Western  record  in  Asia.  In  any  case,  this  anti-British  campaign  in  India 
fits  in  with  recent  manifestations  of  a  sharper  Soviet  policy  shown  at  Geneva  and  by  their  drive 
in  the  Middle  East. 
This  seems  rather  ;  loser  to  the  appreciation  of  the  South  East  Asia  tour's  significance  which  was 
eventually  to  prevail. -Chapter  7/  Page  149 
which  Eden  was  to  take  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  12th  December.  As  regarded 
the  actual  visit  itself  Macmillan  chose,  in  line  with  the  Cabinet,  to  defer  his  decision.  19 
Thus  Eden,  by  way  of  a  stop  gap  measure.  in  his  reply  to  the  adjournment  debate 
on  the  12th  December,  rebutted  the  specific  Soviet  allegations  about  British 
colonialism.  In  response  to  Khrushchev's  charge  that  Britain  had  sought  to  steal  the 
last  crust  of  bread  from  the  mouths  of  the  Burmese,  he  pointed  out  that  in  reality 
substantial  economic  aid  had  already  been  given  by  Britain  through  the  Colombo  Plan 
since  1951.20  He  argued  that  it  was  in  fact  the  Soviets  who  were  the  modern 
colonialists  and  that  they  had  been  recognised  as  such  by  politicians  in  non-committed 
countries.  It  was  on  this  point  that  the  matter  was  allowed  to  rest,  at  least  in  the  public 
eye,  until  the  final  decision  about  the  visit  had  been  made.  21 
Expanding  a  little  from  the  narrow  theme  of  Khrushchev's  rhetoric,  in  a  letter 
dated  December  13th  1955,  Sir  William  Hayter  offered  his  interim  comment  on  the 
significance  of  recent  events  in  relation  to  Soviet  foreign  policy.  22  Although  deferring 
any  more  permanent  assessment  until  matters  had  been  made  clearer  at  the  meeting  of 
the  Supreme  Soviet  scheduled  for  December  23rd,  the  wisdom  of  which  the  Northern 
Department  entirely  agreed  with,  lie  did  make  the  following  points.  23  Europe  had 
apparently  been  "put  on  ice"  at  Geneva  and  now  the  Soviets  were  turning  to  pastures 
19  This  he  scribbled  on  the  8th  December  at  the  end  of  Ward's  7th  December,  Northern  Department 
minute. 
20  Khrushchev  made  a  variety  of  such  accusations  while  in  Burma,  for  example  at  Mandalay  airport  on 
6th  December,  of  which  a  translation  is  in  the  Current  Digest  of  the  Soviet  Press,  Vol.  VII,  No.  49, 
p.  6.  Khrushchev  also  repeated  his  peculiar  analysis  of  the  cause  of  World  War  II  at  Rangoon  in 
which  Hitler  acted  as  Mr.  Chamberlain's  poodle.  Khrushchev  went  on  to  cite  the  Crimean  War  as 
evidence  of  Britain's  undying  hostility  towards  the  Soviet  Union  without  any  apparent  irony.  He 
also  made  much  of  the  Soviet's  ability  to  absorb  Burmese  rice  surpluses.  His  diatribe  was  duly 
printed  in  Pravda  7th  December,  1955.  There  is  a  translation  in  the  Current  Digest,  Vol.  VII,  No. 
49,  pp.  6-9.  On  the  Colombo  Plan  See  Ernest  Bevin,  Foreign  Secretary,  pp.  743-750. 
21  Hansard,  Vol.  547.  Clos.  955-957.  There  followed  an  analysis  of  peaceful  coexistence  on  similar 
lines  to  that  of  the  Cabinet's  on  the  6th  December.  After  reasserting  that  "fundamentally" 
Communist  policy  aimed  at  world  domination  he  went  on  to  say, 
How  then-and  here  I  come  back  to  the  Asia  problem-can  there  he  real  co-existence  between 
Soviet  Russia  and  ourselves,  since  we  would  never  accept  Communism  or  they,  presumably, 
the  kind  of  Parliamentary  system  in  which  %%e  believe''  Well,  we  have  always  been  willing  to 
try  to  work  out  this  problem,  and  we  are  still  willing  to  do  it  now,  because  we  cannot  believe 
that  any  Government,  knowing  the  real  nature  and  consequences  of  modem  war.  would  lead 
their  country  to  the  brink.  But,  co-existence,  if  it  is  to  succeed,  has  to  he  a  two  way  traffic, 
and  equal  tolerance  and  understanding  has  to  he  shown  by  the  countries  on  either  side. 
Eden  had  clearly  not  yet  cottoned  on  to  the  idea  that  what  the  Soviets  were  up  to  in  Asia  was  in  truth 
all  part  of  their  peaceful  coexistence  policy.  Indeed  there  is  something  of  a  logical  hiccup  here. 
After  asserting  that  Communism  did  still  want  to  dominate  the  world,  he  then  expressed  the 
implicitly  idle  hope  that  the  Soviets  could  he  made,  somehow,  to  agree  to  forget  their  reason  for 
existence. 
22  FO  371  122782  NS  1021/8,  Sir  William  Hayter  to  dlr.  J.  G.  Ward.  Moscow,  13th  December, 
1955. 
?3  The  Northern  Department  was  also  in  a`_reement  with  the  preliminary  assessment  which  Hayter  went 
on  to  lay  out.  FO  371  122782  NS  1021/8,  Minute  by  qtr.  J.  G.  Ward,  20th  December,  1955. Charter  7/  Page  150 
new  in  Asia.  24  Bulganin's  and  Khrushchev's  romp  to  Burma  was  the  most  significant 
indication  of  this  fundamental  geographical  shift  in  their  interests.  25  This  was  by  now 
becoming  something  of  a  commonplace.  Hayter  made  the  following  wry  comment  on 
where  the  summer  Summit  amity  fitted  in, 
In  this  context  the  proposed  visit  to  England  is  probably  a  slight 
embarrassment.  It  was  accepted  in  the  full  flush  of  the  July  Geneva 
bonhomie,  but  is  now  somewhat  inhibiting  when  the  policy  is  one  of  attacks 
on  the  Western  position  in  Asia,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  N.  A.  T.  O. 
However  considering  that  the  acceptance  of  a  British  invitation  for  a  Parliamentary 
visit  had  just  been  published  in  the  Soviet  papers,  Hayter  did  not  think  that  Bulganin 
and  Khrushchev  wanted  to  cancel.  26  With  this  J.  G.  Ward  in  London  also  agreed. 
There  was  no  mention  of  the  role  of  Soviet  economic  power  in  their  diploºnacy,  the 
letter  being  conceived  as  an  answer  to  the  specific  problem  of  where  the  proposed  visit 
to  Britain  fitted  in.  The  letter  met  with  the  approval  of  Sir  lvone  Kirkpatrick  and  was 
passed  on  to  No  10  where  it  "was  read  with  great  interest"  according  to  the  note  of 
appreciation  which  Ward  sent  of  to  Moscow  in  reply.  Clearly  the  Embassy's  view  on 
the  points  above  was  not  uncongenial  to  that  of  Eden. 
24  This  very  much  calls  to  mind  the  view  that  Macmillan  tool  of  Soviet  policy  by  late  1955,  See 
above. 
25  FO  371  116694  NS  10520/6.  Mr.  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  in  a  letter  of  13th  December  to  N.  J.  A. 
Cheetham  of  the  British  Delegation  to  NATO  headquarters  commented  that  the  slant  of  the  Soviet's 
propaganda  was  another  indication  of  where  their  interests  had  turned. 
[Cheetham  had  rather  condescendingly  suggested  that  Khrushchev's  comments  on  the  causes  of 
World  War  Two  were  for  the  consumption  of  the  "gullihie  illiterates"  of  Asia]  I  do  not  think 
that  in  general  Soviet  propaganda  to  illiterate  or  semi-illiterate  peoples  tends  to  dwell  very 
much  on  the  origins  of  the  Second  World  War,  as  the  peoples  in  question  can  only  have  a  small 
interest  in  matters  so  far  removed  from  their  own  experience.  Khrushchev  and  Bulganin's 
descent  into  South-East  Asia  is  a  new  development  in  Soviet  policy,  and  the  main  lines  of 
Soviet  propaganda  which  they  have  been  concerned  to  put  across  have  dealt  with  the  history  of 
problems  nearer  to  hand  to  their  audiences. 
26  Hayter  made  the  following  comment  on  the  personal  morality  of  the  Soviet  leaders, 
A  rather  disquieting  feature  of  recent  weeks  has  been  the  increase  in  unashamed  mendacity, 
both  in  the  speeches  of  Soviet  leaders  and  in  the  press.  Khrushchev  must  know  perfectly  well 
that  his  account  of  the  causes  of  the  last  war,  (that  Hitler  had  attacked  the  Soviet  Union  with 
the  connivance  of  the  West)  his  description  of  the  partition  of  India  and  his  statement  that  the 
people  of  Kashmir  has  made  its  choice  in  favour  of  India  are  all  inaccurate  and  misleading,  and 
the  servile  press  here  follows  this  lead  with  alacrity. 
H.  A.  F.  Hohler.  however,  in  his  letter  quoted  ;  hove  I  footnote  "'  I  of  13th  December  thought  that, 
"it  is  very  likely  that  Khrushchev  himself  believes  in  the  version  of  history  which  he  sought  to 
propagate  in  South-East  Asia,  and  which  stems  after  all  from  the  basic  premises  of  Communist 
dogma,  that  there  is  an  irreconcilable  opposition  between  capitalism  and  Communism,  and  that 
capitalism  breads  war". Chapter  7/  Page  151 
THE  VIEW  FROM  THE  EMBASSIES  AND  THE  HIGH  COMMISSION 
The  importance  of  economic  aid  in  the  Soviets'  strategy  became  even  more  apparent  to 
British  observers  as  1955  wore  to  its  end.  Reports  were  sent  to  London  from  the 
Embassies  in  Burma,  Afghanistan  and  the  High  Commissioner  in  India,  giving  their 
assessment  of  what  the  Soviet's  tour  had  achieved.  It  was  clear  to  all  three  posts  that 
the  most  singular  development  was  the  Soviet  use  of  economic  power  in  an  attempt  to 
undermine  western  influence.  Khrushchev's  rhetoric  had,  in  their  opinion,  been  the 
least  successful  part  of  his  diplomacy.  More  dangerous  in  the  long  term  was  the  aid 
which  the  Soviets  were  now  prepared  to  offer  to  noncommitted  Asian  countries. 
Particularly  in  Burma  the  Soviets  made  very  effective  use  of  this  new  asset  in  their 
flirtation  and  the  British  Embassy  in  Rangoon  expressed  its  grave  concern  for  the 
consequences  of  this  success.  In  India  and  Afghanistan  a  more  phlegmatic  attitude 
prevailed  on  the  part  of  British  officials  towards  the  Soviet  achievement.  Largely,  it 
would  seem,  because  Soviet  offers  of  economic  goodies  met  with  much  less 
receptiveness,  or  were  much  less  efficacious.  there  than  in  Burma. 
The  South  East  Asia  and  Middle  East  Department  of  the  Commonwealth 
Relations  Office  put  out  the  following  preliminary  appreciation  of  the  Soviet's 
intentions  in  India,  dated  17th  December,  1955.  They  considered  that  the  Soviets  had 
had  two  main  objectives, 
(a)  To  persuade  Indian  government  that  policy  of  non-alignment  was 
compatible  with  close  political  relationship  with  Soviets  and  that  Soviet  policy 
was  to  support  the  aspirations  of  peoples  in  Asia  against  Western  Powers  who 
still  have  imperialist  designs.  (b)  To  make  a  direct  appeal  to  the  people  of 
India  by  playing  to  the  crowd. 
At  the  level  of  P.  R.  the  tour  had  been  an  undoubted  success.  It  was,  the  C.  R.  0. 
observed  somewhat  condescendingly,  the  kind  of  thing  the  Indian  people  enjoyed. 
However,  Government  circles  and  "the  more  responsible  newspapers"  had  quickly 
become  disturbed  by  the  vehemence  of  the  Soviet's  anti-Western  speechmaking. 
Indeed  they  thought  that  the  propaganda  aspect  might  actually  have  been  counter 
productive.  Nor  had  the  Soviets  succeeded  in  pressing  their  economic  or  military 
favours  on  the  Indians.  Overall  the  only  advantage  gained  might  have  been  in 
Communism's  popular  appeal.  27 
27  PREM  11/1606.  Outward  Telegram  from  Commonwealth  Relations  Office  No.  368,  to  UK.  High 
Commissioners.  17th  December,  1955.  On  the  issue  of  economic  aid  it  made  the  following 
comment:  "the  economic  announcement  makes  it  clear  that  the  Soviets  have  failed  in  their  objective 
of  concluding  precise  economic  arran`ºements  during  the  'sit  which  would  bind  the  economies  of 
the  country  closely  together  and  enable  Soviet  technicians  to  enter  India".  Technicians  seem  to  have 
been  regarded  as  a  particular  hughear  in  the  mid-1950's.  The  report  concluded  that  to  the  official 
mind  the  tour  may  have  highlighted  the  attracti'  cne'.  ut  the  Commonwealth  and  the  dangers  of  co- 
operation  with  the  Soviets. Chapter  7/  Page  152 
This  initial  prognosis  was  further  expanded  on  in  a  C.  R.  0  circular  to  U.  K.  High 
Commissioners  of  28th  December,  1955,  which  was  produced  after  consultation  with 
the  High  Commissioner  in  India  himself.  '-8  It  made  a  similar  assessment  to  that  above 
about  the  effect  of  the  visit  on  the  population.  It  considered  that  Bulganin's  and 
Khrushchev's  championing  of  the  anti-colonialist  and  non-aligned  causes  had  won  them 
sympathy.  Indeed  they  even  considered  that  their  flattery  of  India's  policy  had  resulted 
in  a  less  critical  Indian  attitude  towards  Soviet  activities.  This  they  feared  might  lure 
Nehru  further  into  the  Bear's  den  than  perhaps  he  had  bargained  for.  Yet  even  so  the 
anti-Western  acid  which  they  had  spilt  had  caused  some  offence  in  Government  and 
journalistic  circles.  Although  the  Soviet  visit  seemed  to  have  enjoyed  little  tangible 
economic  success,  fears  were  expressed  for  what  might  yet  happen  on  this  still  novel 
front.  There  had  been  a  commitment  to  sell  a  further  one  million  tons  of  Soviet  steel 
to  India,  but  this  was  not  considered  important.  More  ominously,  despite  the  lack  of 
public  agreements  on  economic  aid  or  arms  supply  which  the  British  had  feared  would 
be  made,  they  were  worried  that  behind  the  scenes  negotiations  had  been  started 
towards  more  substantial  Soviet  involvement  in  the  Indian  economy.  There  was 
concern  that  the  long-term  situation  might  still  move  in  the  Soviet's  favour  because  of 
their  ability  to  offer  very  large  Financial  inducements.  It  was  this.  rather  than 
Khrushchev's  hyperbole,  that  posed  the  most  serious  threat  to  the  Western  interest.  29 
Overall  they  considered,  due  to  the  lack  of  any  tangibly  immediate  result,  that,  "in 
terms  of  immediate  practical  results  visit  has  in  the  main  been  less  value  to  the  Soviet 
Leaders  than  was  to  be  feared". 
This  rather  sanguine  view  of  the  Soviets  achievement  was  not  reflected  by  the 
Burma  Embassy's  report  on  the  road  show  halt  in  their  patch.  Indeed  the  Burma  leg 
saw  the  most  vicious  and  specifically  anti-British  attacks,  delivered  in  a  series  of 
impassioned  speeches  by  Khrushchev.  The  British  Ambassador,  Mr.  Gore-Booth,  in 
his  despatch  of  19th  December  put  the  visit  in  the  context  of  a  growing  Communist 
campaign  in  the  "under-developed"  world.  A  campaign  which  he  dated  back  to  1954, 
The  visit  marked  a  climax  of  Communist  psychological,  political  and 
economic  penetration,  begun  by  the  visit  of  Chou  En-lai  to  Rangoon  in  the 
summer  of  1954,  furthered  by  the  Burmese  Economic  Mission  to  Moscow  and 
the  Satellite  capitals  in  February  1955.  and  by  U  Nu's  [The  Burmese  Prime 
28  PREM  11/1606,  Outward  Telegram  from  the  Commonwealth  Relations  Office  No.  384  to  UK. 
High  Commissioners,  28th  December.  1955. 
29  This  matter  was  to  cause  increasing  concern.  The  effect  of  Soviet  economic  penetration  into  India 
was  the  subject  of  a  Commonwealth  Relations  Office  Brief  of  23rd  January  for  the  Washington 
Conference,  FO  371  123203  ZP  28/90.  It  stressed  the  importance  of  encouraging*  the  Americans  to 
increase  their  aid  to  India  as  a  means  to  forestall  the  Soviets, 
They  [the  Americansi  have  been  inclined  in  the  past  to  talk  of  restricting  their  aid  to  India.  As 
is  said  in  SSC(56)4  [a  Cabinet  Office  Brief  by  the  Treasury  which  I  have  sadly  been  unable  to 
trace],  which  has  been  prepared  as  a  Brief  on  the  Soviet  Bloc's  economic  offensive  for  use 
during  the  Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Washington.  we  do  want  tu  ur,  e  the  Americans  to  give 
more  aid  to  India. Chapter  7/  Page  153 
Minister]  subscription  to  the  doctrine  of  positive  coexistence  on  the  occasion 
of  the  visit  of  Marshal  Tito  in  February  last.  'O 
Khrushchev,  Gore-Booth  conjectured,  saw  Burma  as  an  Indian  and  British  sphere  of 
influence.  31  This  was  not  a  situation  which  Khrushchev  was  prepared  to  allow  to 
continue, 
As  the  Soviet  visit  progressed  it  seemed  to  be  the  intention  of  the  visitors  to 
deliver  direct  blows  at  the  British  position  in  Burma  and,  having  undermined 
our  economic  position  here,  to  inflict  the  maximum  damage  on  our  surviving 
influence  to  remove  a  barrier  to  long-term  Soviet  plans  for  the  Communist 
domination  of  Burma;... 
Interestingly  though  Gore-Booth  did  not  consider  that  the  most  publicised  and 
obviously  anti-western  part  of  the  visit,  the  speechmaking,  had  had  a  particularly 
important  impact.  Khrushchev's  antics  were  an  "interesting  example  of  the  diplomacy 
of  appealing  to  the  people  over  the  heads  of  their  Government",  but  little  more.  On 
the  whole,  he  thought,  the  Burmese  had  already  passed  through  their  intense  anti- 
colonial  phase  immediately  before  and  after  independence  and  so  Khrushchev  had 
failed  quite  to  hit  the  right  note.  Moreover  the  behaviour  of  the  Soviet  contingent  had 
been  "boorish  and  inconsiderate  by  any  standards",  to  the  extent  of  causing 
embarrassment  to  the  Burmese  leaders.  Although  some  noted  hot  beds  of  Communism, 
such  as  the  University,  received  the  speeches  enthusiastically,  more  dangerous  to 
Western  interests  in  the  Embassy's  opinion  was  the  economic  aid  that  the  Soviets  had 
offered. 
If  the  propaganda  speeches  were  addressed  to  the  youthful  and  semi-literate, 
the  economic  results  were  such  as  to  appeal  direct  to  the  Government.  At  one 
stroke  the  Soviet  leaders  gave  the  impression  of  removing  the  Burmese  fears 
of  a  rice  surplus  by  simply  offering  to  take  it  whatever  its  size.  This  was  the 
supreme  gesture  of  Russia's  ability  and  willingness  to  help  Burma  in  her 
economic  problems  and  in  the  implementation  of  her  development 
programme,  so  recently  placed  in  jeopardy  by  the  failure  of  the  rice  market. 
The  implication  was  obvious.  The  Soviet  Union  could  help  where  the  West 
30  PREM  11/1606  DB  1631/25,  British  Embassy  Burma.  Mr.  Gore  Booth  to  Mr.  Macmillan,  dated 
19th  December.  1955.  The  quote  continues 
Chou  En-lai  had  beguiled  U  Nu  with  his  personal  mixture  of  charm  and  impressiveness,  and 
had  inflated  his  confidence  in  his  ability  to  handle  the  Communist  powers.  Thakin  Tin  in  his 
[economnic]  mission  to  Moscow  had  revealed  Burma's  financial  plight.  her  desperate  anxiety  for 
her  economic  future,  and  [particularly  for  her  rice  trade],  in  the  absence  of  any  help  from  the 
West;  Marshal  Tito's  theories  had  spread  before  U  Nu  the  vision.  particularly  attractive  to 
him,  of  serving  the  cause  of  peace  by  treating  the  Communists  and  the  West  on  equal  terms. 
31  Largely  due  to  Tito's  1955  February  visit  and  the  surprise  he  expressed  at  the  extent  of  surviving 
British  "traditions.  ideals  and  influence".  These  opinions.  he  thought,  may  well  have  arrived  in 
Moscow  via  Bel_ýrade. Chaptcr  7/  Page  1  54 
had  failed,  and  where  the  United  States  had  aggravated  Burma's  troubles  by 
her  surplus  rice  disposal  policy.  32 
There  was  little  doubt  in  the  Embassy  that  the  success  of  the  Soviet  visit  had 
hinged  on  their  ability  to  buy  the  Burmese  with  massive  economic  subsidies.  33  This 
was  the  crucial  difference  between  it  and  the  Indian  leg  of  the  tour.  Whereas  little  in 
the  way  of  economic  blandishment  had  been  accepted,  or  perhaps  offered,  in  India, 
Burma  had  been  eager  for  anything  that  the  Soviets  had  to  give  and  the  Soviets  had 
come  bearing  a  wide  variety  of  gifts.  This  is  what  caused  the  rather  different  British 
assessments  of  the  tour's  success.  Even  in  India  unease  was  expressed  that  more 
Soviet  aid  might  be  in  hand  for  the  future.  Economic  diplomacy  had  clearly  become 
central  to  the  new  Soviet  foreign  policy.  '  [t  had  also  become  a  matter  for  brave 
concern  to  British  observers  in  the  Field. 
The  last  stop  of  the  tour  in  Afghanistan  was  by  contrast  a  much  less  spectacular 
affair.  Largely  because  of  their  authoritarian  and  reactionary  nature,  the  Afghani 
leaders  were  keen  to  play  clown  the  importance  of  the  visit.  There  was  to  be  no 
repetition  of  the  grandiose  and  "surprising  spectacle"  that  had  lilt  India  and  then,  going 
up  a  gear,  swept  on  to  Burma.  35  The  visit  was  advertised  as  routine  and  Khrushchev 
was  not  allowed  opportunity  for  further  posturing  as  demagogue.  This  was  a  visit 
between  leaders.  Furthermore,  Afghanis  did  not  want  to  indulge  in  "unnecessary 
burning  of  Western  bridges",  according  to  the  British  assessment.  36 
32  Since  the  1930's  American  agricultural  policy  had  been  geared  to  stimulating  production  and 
sponsoring  price  stability  by  lush  government  subsidy.  This  resulted  in  huge  surpluses  which  by  the 
1950's  had  reached  embarrassing  proportions.  At  the  start  of  his  administration  Eisenhower  set  out 
to  introduce  some  kind  of  market  discipline.  but  without  success.  See  Charles  C.  Alexander, 
Holding  the  Line,  the  Eisenhower  Presiclc'Hc-v,  195?  -1961,  p.  39  and  pp.  163-164.  Also,  Elmo 
Richardson,  The  PP  eS"iclency  (yDºt"ighr  D.  Eiseºrhuºº"c'r,  1).  47.  The  depression  of  prices  caused  by 
this  on  world-wide  markets  for  agricultural  produce  was  substantial,  a  problem  to  which  the  Soviets 
seemed  to  offer  the  Burmese  a  quick  solution.  See  also  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol.  IX;  pp.  13-18,  "Study 
Prepared  by  the  Policy  Planning  Staff,  Soviet  Economic  Penetration".  4th  April,  1956. 
33  On  this  the  Burma  Embassy  report  ended, 
Thera  seems  little  doubt  that  in  the  present  circumstances  it  is  this  economic  element  in  the 
Soviet  approach  to  Burma  which  contains  the  most  serious  threat  both  to  British  interests  and 
to  Western  influence  `_enerally.  The  threat  is  the  more  serious  because  it  is  hard  to  brin`_  home 
to  the  Burmese  leaders  the  clanger  in  which  they  are  placing  themselves. 
34  There  is  an  interestinu,  aside  in  Gore-Booth's  account  on  the  nature  of  the  Chinese-Soviet 
relationship, 
One  is  bound  to  ask  oneself  whether  the  visit  was  undertaken  in  consultation  or  competition 
with  the  Chinese.  There  is  in  Rangoon  little  evidence  on  which  to  build  an  answer.  The 
disposal  to  North  Vietnam  of  rice  acquired  by  the  Soviet  Union  from  Burma  argues  a 
considerable  degree  of  Sino-Soviet  co-operation.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
Soviet  and  Chinese  efforts  to  penetrate  Burma  contain  an  element  of  competition.  We  shall 
watch  closely  for  any  indications  one  way  or  the  other. 
35  This  was  Churchill's  description,  Soviet  Foreignº  Puli  -v  Since  Stalin,  p.  308. 
36  PREM  11/  1606  DA  10338/1.  Sir  Daniel  Lascdlle,  to  Selwyn  Llovd,  Despatch  No.  76.23rd 
December.  1955.  He  referred  to  the  "resolute  and  able  evasion,  vasion  of  attempts  to  get  them  to  criticise 
the  Baghdad  Pact"  a"  evidence  of  the  Afghani  un%%ºIIºngne,  to  do  more  damage  to  Western  contacts 
then  entirely  necessary. Chapter  7/  Page  155 
Indeed,  the  British  Embassy  in  Kabul  displayed  similar  sang-froid  to  the  C.  R.  O.  in 
its  view  of  the  impact  of  the  Soviets'  visit.  37  The  Soviets  had  made  substantial  offers 
of  economic  aid  and  diplomatic  support  for  Afghani  efforts  to  break  the  large  ethnic 
Afghani  minorities  from  the  West  of  Pakistan.  The  Afghanis  hoped  to  use  Soviet 
support  to  force  the  creation  of  a  new  "Pushtunistan"  on  the  countries  eastern  border.  38 
However  the  British  did  not  think,  on  past  form,  that  Afghanistan  would  give  much  in 
return.  They  had  always  proved  adept  at  accepting  subsidies  without  any  feeling  of 
obligation  and  there  was  no  reason  why  this  should  not  apply  to  Soviet  monies  as  much 
as  those  of  British  India. 
Even  so  Lascelles  feared  that  the  reactionaries  in  power,  who  would  be  "First  in 
the  firing  line"  in  the  event  of  a  Communist  take  over,  were  not  "fully  conscious  of 
having  brought  their  country  into  peril  of  extermination.  "  The  Soviet  threat  loomed  in 
a  more  direct  and  traditional  way  than  in  either  Burma  or  India.  The  subtleties  of 
economic  diplomacy  were  in  consequence  of  rather  less  importance.  He  ended  his 
despatch  with  an  expression  of  unvarnished  contempt  for  Afghanistan's  leaders,  "they 
are  merely  ignorant,  over-confident  and  grasping  gamblers  with  a  dislike  of  the  West 
which  is  a  by-product  of  their  territorial  `_reed"  . 
Clearly  in  the  case  of  India  and  Burma  although  the  inflammatory  rhetoric  had 
been  the  greatest  cause  of  concern  in  the  Cabinet,  those  on  the  ground  took  a  relatively 
dim  view  of  its  efficacy.  Indeed  although  it  may  have  won  the  Soviet  leaders  some 
popularity  among  the  masses,  its  effect  on  Governing  circles  tended  if  anything  to  be 
negative.  More  important  to  British  observers  in  South  East  Asia,  and  particularly 
Burma,  were  the  attempts  that  had  been  made  to  exert  Soviet  influence  through 
economic  aid.  For  the  first  time  the  Soviets  were  trying  to  use  their  economic  muscle 
to  buy  political  influence  in  countries  which  remained  resolutely  non-communist.  The 
direct  threat  that  this  posed  to  British  and  Western  interests  was  keenly  felt  in 
Whitehall.  This  was  the  issue  which  was  to  concern  it  as  Eden  and  Lloyd  prepared  for 
their  departure  to  Washington  in  January  1956.39  By  mid-December  studies  had 
37  Dallin  argues  that  althou`ºh  small,  AfLhanistan  was  at  that  point  attracting  considerable  attention 
because  of  its  strategic  position  in  relation  to  the  Middle  East.  He 
.;  omments.  "the  visit  proved  to 
be  of  considerable  importance.  It  was  more  than  .a  new  stage  in  Soviet  relations  with  Afghanistan;  it 
affected  the  entire  power  structure  of  the  Near  East".  Sovier  Furei,  '  ,i  Policy  After  Stalin.  p.  311. 
38  See  Sovier  Foreign  Policy  After  Stalin,  pp.  312-313  on  this  issue.  Pushtu  was  one  of  the  variants  of 
the  Afghan  language's  name.  This  would,  if  achieved,  have  substantially  weakened  Pakistan, 
member  of  the  despised  Baghdad  Pact  and  recipient  of  large  amounts  of  American  military  and 
economic  aid.  The  Soviets,  the  British  Embassy  reported,  had  offered  to  the  Afghanis  a  loan  of  100 
million  US  dollars. 
39  FO  371  116716  NS  1123/4.  One  western  politician  particularly  concerned  by  this  economic 
offensive  was  Lester  Pearson  the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada.  Maudlin`º,  whilst  visiting  Canada,  sent 
a  note  to  Lloyd  of  the  6th  December  1955,  gºivin_º  Pearson's  view, 
I  also  had  a  word  with  him  about  a  particular  hohhyhorse  of  my  own  at  the  moment,  which  is 
the  need  to  organise  our  defences  against  the  new  Russian  economic  war...  I  find  that  Pearson 
is  also  keenly  interested  in  this  point  and  I  gather  he  m  as  thinking  of  raising  it  at  the  NATO 
meeting.  His  idea  is  that  we  should  consider  .  allin`_  the  Russian  bluff  by  Some  such  step  as Charter  7/  Page  156 
already  been  put  in  hand  and  they  were  to  provide  much  of  the  material  for  the 
Washington  Conference  briefs.  40  Evelyn  Shuckburgh  graphically  expressed  this 
concern  for  the  tide  of  events  in  his  diary, 
Clark  [Sir  William  Clark,  Deputy  High  Commissioner  in  Delhi. 
.  .  tells  me 
that  Nehru  has  given  us  explicit  assurances  of  his  continued  independence  of 
policy,  refusal  to  buy  arms  from  Russia.  etc.,  but  in  the  lucid  watches  of  the 
night  I  could  not  avoid  the  conclusion  that  all  of  Asia  is  moving  steadily  out 
of  our  ambit  and  that  our  Western  civilisation  will  soon  be  strangled  and 
subjected,  with  its  bombs  unusable  in  its  pocket.  Fortunately  in  the  daylight 
such  gloomy  prognostications  are  overlaid  by  veneers  of  busy  confidence.  41 
Nor  was  there  to  be  a  let  up  in  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev's  boorish  behaviour 
towards  Britain  at  the  4th  Session  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  from  the  26th  to  30th 
December  1955.  Cecil  Parrotr  the  Minister  at  the  Moscow  Embassy,  sent  a  gloomy 
report  to  London  dated  6th  January.  42  The  main  iteni  had  been  a  "long  and 
objectionable"  survey  by  Khrushchev  on  foreign  affairs,  the  gist  of  which  was  a  further 
dig  at  the  old  colonial  powers,  chief  of  whom  was  Britain.  Western  economic  aid  was, 
according  to  Khrushchev,  nothing  more  than  an  age  old  vice  wearing  a  new  hat. 
Although  he  included  a  few  flattering  comments  as  to  the  present  character  of  the 
British  people,  Parrot  concluded, 
But  these  perfunctory  insertions  did  nothing  to  alter  the  fact  that  this  speech, 
so  far  from  furthering  his  alleged  object  of  reducing  tension,  can  have  done 
nothing  but  raise  it;  and  it  was  obvious  from  his  delivery  that  he  enjoyed  the 
whole  proceeding  g. 
Just  as  disturbing,  from  Britain's  point  of  view,  was  the  self  assurance  with  which 
the  Soviet  leaders  had  made  their  commnments.  The  East  Asian  tour  had  considerably 
boosted  their  confidence  and  this  was  reflected  not  only  in  Khrushchev's  Supreme 
Soviet  speech  but  also  in  Bulganin's  New  Year  toasts, 
In  one  of  the  toasts  which  he  proposed  at  the  New  Years  party  at  the  Kremlin 
Bulganin  said:  "May  1956  be  a  better  year  than  1955  has  been,  but  1955  was 
a  very  good  year  indeed".  He  received  much  applause  for  this  statement. 
The  Soviet  leaders  seem  to  be  saying  in  effect  that  there  defensive  positions 
asking  them  to  come  in  with  us  on  a  big  scale  in  helping,  the  under-developed  areas,  on 
condition  that  the  aid  were  channelled  through  some  United  Nations  oruanisation. 
40  FO  371  116716  NS  112-3/14.  At  FO  371  123199  ZP  2S/6,  there  is  a  note  by  Patrick  Hancock  of 
the  Foreign  Office  for  the  Secretary  of  State  setting  out  the  Prime  Minister's  main  concerns  as  to 
what  they  wanted  from  the  talks.  There  follows  it  summary  of  the  Treasury  and  Foreign  Office 
briefs.  Sadly  as  they  were  subsequently  classed  as  Cabinet  papers  they  were  removed  from 
departmental  tiles  to  the  Cabinet  Office.  As  tar  it,  I  am  aware  from  the  Cabinet  indexes,  these  briefs 
are  not  available  to  public  scrutiny.  Their  titles  wwrere.  "Russian  Capabilities,  Russian  Intentions  and 
Action  Already  Taken  by  the  United  Kingdom". 
41  Descent  to  Sue:.  p.  3  10. 
42  FO/371  122765  NS  101512,  Despatch  from  Mr  Parrot.  \1os  w,  to  Northern  Department,  6th 
January.  1956. Cha;:  cr7/Pa`_e  157 
are  in  good  order  and  that  their  offensives  on  the  other  fronts  are  going  very 
well.  Sooner  or  later  the  weight  of  the  offensive  will  be  again  directed  against 
Europe.  43 
Not  only  were  the  Soviets  engaging  in  a  novel  form  of  cold  war,  but  they  also 
seemed  supremely  confident  that  they  would  win  it.  It  is  then  hardly  surprising  that  so 
much  attention  should  have  been  given  by  the  British  in  the  lead  up  to  the  Washington 
Conference  to  this  very  problem. 
THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE. 
The  Washington  Conference  which  took  place  at  the  end  of  January,  1956,  was 
conceived  not  only  as  a  reaction  to  the  direct  political  threat  that  the  new  Soviet  policy 
posed,  but  also  as  a  propaganda  counter  attack.  Eden's  treatment  of  the  meeting  in  his 
memoir  is  instructive.  Although  he  dates  its  genesis  back  to  the  failure  of  the  Geneva 
Foreign  Ministers'  Conference  in  November  and  the  lack  of  agreement  over 
Germany's  future,  lie  points  out  that  the  most  immediate  problem  seemed  the  situation 
in  the  Middle  East, 
This  was  the  main  topic  which  I  wished  to  discuss  in  the  United  States. 
Soviet  arms  continued  to  flow  into  Egypt  from  Czechoslovakia,  and  Moscow 
was  showing  an  increasing  determination  to  intrude  into  Middle  Eastern 
affairs.  This  was  traditional  Soviet  policy,  making  itself  felt  at  a  time  of 
growing  confidence.  44 
This  is  despite  the  concern  in  Whitehall  that  the  Conference  should  deal  with  the  most 
disturbing  recent  development,  the  Soviet's  flexing  of  their  economic  muscle. 
In  a  telegram  to  the  Washington  Embassy  of  December  28th  Eden  had  made  very 
similar  priorities  clear  as  those  laid  out  in  his  memoir.  He  added  in  reference  to  the 
proposed  joint  declaration  that, 
I  would  like  us  to  be  able  to  set  down  to`ether  in  plain  and  simple  terms  what 
it  is  that  our  two  countries  should  stand  for  in  world  policy;  what  we  believe 
should  be  the  pattern  of  international  relations  and  our  own  beliefs  in  civil 
43  Parrot  made  it  further  interesting  comment  can  the  indication  this  seemed  to  give  of  Khrushchev's 
political  strcnLth. 
In  comparison  to  the  relatively  unobtrusive  role  he  played  in  the  last  session  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet  in  August,  he  seemed  now  to  stand  as  the  arbiter  of  the  whole  of  Soviet  policy,  both 
internal  and  external.  While  Khrushchev  was  speaking,  Molotov  sat  in  the  back  row  and 
indeed  took  no  active  part  in  the  session  at  all. 
44  Full  Circle,  p.  331.  Quite  what  is  meant  by  traditional  Soviet  policy  is  not  made  clear.  It  was 
apparent  to  the  Foreign  Office  that  what  the  Soviets  were  doing;  was  something  new.  Re  above,  e.  g. 
Descent  to  Suet.  pp.  278-279.  Perhaps  the  great  statesman  was  referring  to  Imperial  Russia's 
fishing  for  influence  in  the  region  throughout  the  19th  century  and  into  the  20th.  Although  that  had 
really  more  in  common  with  Stalin's  bullying  tactics  in  his  policy  towards  Middle  Eastern  States 
contiguous  with  the  Soviet  Union  after  1945.  See  SuViet  Forei,  rr  Policy  After-  Stalin  pp.  20-21  and 
pp.  101-110,  also  Galia  Golan.  Soviet  Policies  in  f  he  Middle  East  pp.  8-9. Chapter  7/  Page  158 
rights  and  individual  freedom.  This  seems  all  the  more  important  now  when 
the  Russian  vehemence  in  Asia  and  elsewhere  may  have  created  a  certain 
reaction  against  them.  We  must  show  that  we  have  a  positive  face  to  match 
their  barbaric  garb.  45 
Eden  had  obviously  digested  something  of  the  opinions  expressed  by  his  officials  in  the 
field,  at  least  as  far  as  Soviet  rhetoric  was  concerned.  Capital  was  to  be  made  out  of 
the  unease  that  the  Soviets'  had  caused  their  hosts.  The  Washington  Declaration  was 
conceived  as  a  specific  reply  to  Khrushchev's  acrid  attacks  on  the  west  in  South  East 
Asia.  The  Conference,  in  Eden's  view,  was  to  address  the  problems  that  the  Soviets' 
policy  had  created  for  the  west.  But  these  were  not  necessarily  the  same  kind  of 
problems  which  his  permanent  officials  were  discussing  in  preparation  for  meeting  the 
Americans.  Eden  concentrated  in  particular  on  the  difficulties  that  Britain  now  faced 
in  the  Middle  East.  It  was  in  basis  to  be  another  opportunity  to  go  over  a  number  of 
old  chestnuts,  including  American  involvement  in  the  Baghdad  Pact.  Arguably  it  was 
Eden's  understanding  that  savoured  of  traditionalism,  rather  than  Soviet  policy.  There 
was  no  mention  of  the  Soviet  Asian  tour  and  the  impact  of  economic  diplomacy  on 
Britain's  position.  Eden's  myopic  view  was  to  have  a  stultifying  effect  on  the 
Conference. 
In  the  minutin;  that  was  spawned  before  the  Conference  a  different  view  emerges 
of  what  it  was  about.  Not  only  was  there  concern  as  to  what  should  be  done  about  the 
new  Soviet  offensive,  but  it  was  frankly  admitted  by  some  that  Britain  was  in  a  very 
poor  position  to  do  much  herself.  There  was,  in  certain  cases,  a  clear  understanding  of 
the  profound  implications  for  Britain's  position  in  the  world  of  the  Soviets'  move 
towards  a  global  policy  under  Khrushchev.  46  On  3rd  January,  1956  Guy  Millard,  one 
of  Eden's  private  secretaries,  made  the  following  comments  in  an  aide  memoire  for  his 
master, 
You  may  wish  to  be  reminded  before  your  next  meeting  on  Washington 
preparations,  that  you  said  that  you  would  like  to  discuss  the  question  of 
economic  aid  for  the  Middle  East  and  other  under-developed  countries.  The 
points  which  you  had  in  mind  were  I  think  the  following:  Are  we  going  to  try 
to  meet  the  threat  of  Russian  economic  penetration  wherever  it  appears,  by 
outbidding  them  for  offers  of  economic  support?  Or  would  it  be  better  to 
invite  the  Russians  to  match  their  promises  with  performance,  in  the 
expectation  that  they  will  not  in  fact  be  able  to  do  so?  If  the  latter  policy  is 
considered  too  dangerous,  then  where  are  we  to  find  the  extra  resources  which 
45  PREM  11/1334,  Telegram  No.  6200,  Prime  Minister  to  Washington  Embassy,  128th  December, 
1955.  In  a  Foreign  Office  telegram  of  the  same  date  the  toIlowin`_  was  but  top  of  the  agenda. 
"World  Review  -  Russian  intentions.  car.  ºhilihr.  and  tactics.  and  counter  measures  with  special 
emphasis  on  the  Middle  East  and  Asia".  PREM  II/  133-1.  Tclc__ram  No.  6200,  Foreign  Office  to 
Washington. 
46  On  the  dramatic  change  which  Khrushchev  initiated  in  Soviet  toreign  policy  and  the  development  of 
its  role  as  a  -,  Iohal  superpower  see  Alvin  Ruhenacin.  Moscmt  'slhir"dl  World  Strategy.  pp.  19-31. Chapter  7/  Page  159 
we  shall  need  to  devote  to  economic  aid'?  1i  e  can  only  come  from  economies 
in  the  military  sphere.  47 
Millard's  note  went  on  to  suggest  that  money  might  be  found  through  a  reduction  in 
the  size  of  the  British  army  in  Germany.  There  was,  though,  no  indication  that  Britain 
might  not  be  capable  of  coping  with  the  situation,  even  if  with  difficulty.  Others  were 
less  sanguine. 
In  a  minute  of  10th  January,  1956  Peter  Thornt  coF)  President  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  went  even  further  in  his  gloomy  prognosis  of  Britain's  financial  ability  to  meet 
the  new  challenge  of  Soviet  economic  diplomacy.  In  the  process  of  stating  trade 
matters  which  had  been  of  particular  concern  to  his  department  and  the  Americans  he 
began  with  the  following, 
THE  ECONOMIC  COLD  WAR:  We  need  the  U.  S.  to  give  all  financial 
assistance  possible  towards  paying  for  large  capital  projects  in  the  Middle  East 
and  South  East  Asia  as  a  counter  to  Russian  penetration:  for  economic  reasons 
we  hope  that  this  aid  would  as  far  as  possible  be  "untied"  to  U.  S.  exports.  " 
Clearly  the  gloss  that  Eden  lays  on  the  Washington  visit  in  his  memoirs  will  not 
entirely  do.  The  Government  was  well  aware  that  any  departure  into  the  realms  of 
economic  diplomacy  would  have  to  be  paid  for  out  of  already  strained  budgets. 
Thorntjc,  wft  went  even  further,  insisting  that  an  essential  purpose  in  discussions  with 
the  Americans  must  be  to  persuade  them  to  undertake  the  main  Financial  burden  in  any 
economic  counter  offensive.  The  British.  lie  blatantly  admitted,  were  dependent  on 
American  strength  in  this  new  cold  war  as  Britain  simply  (lid  not  have  the  wherewithal 
to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge.  Nor  was  Thorn  :  's  a  lone  voice.  In  a  telegram  from 
Eden  to  the  Washington  Embassy  of  ?  8th  January,  1956  sent  whilst  en  route,  he  passed 
on  the  government's  assessment,  and  that  most  definitely  included  his  officials,  of  what 
Britain  wanted  from  the  Conference.  It  started, 
(1)General:  (a)  acceptance  by  the  United  States  of  nature  and  scope  of  the 
Soviet  threat,  notably  in  the  Middle  East.  (b)  Understanding  that  the  United 
Kingdom  will  continue  to  do  all  it  can;  but  main  share  of  any  new  economic 
measure  must  fall  on  the  United  States.  (c)  agreement  on  continuous 
consultation  for  balanced  programme  of  aid.  (i)  to  allies,  c.  f.  Baghdad  pact 
and  (ii)  to  uncommitted  countries  c.  f.  Sudan,  Libya.  Indonesia  and  India. 
Implicit  in  this  was  the  need  to  persuade  the  Americans  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
situation  and  the  minute  continued  to  make  this  quite  explicit.  48  Indeed  it  seems  that 
47  PREINI  11/1334  Note  for  the  Prime  Minister  hy  G.  E.  : MM(illard.  3rd  January.  1956.  It  continued 
interestingly  as  follows.  "one  possibility  might  he  to  withdraw  a  Division  from  Germany.  But  we 
might  have  to  face  the.  risk  that  the  Americans  would  wish  to  do  the  same.  This  is  a  point  which 
you  said  that  you  might  want  to  discuss  with  the  President.  It  might  be  that  General  Gruenther 
could  `_et  along  now  with  fewer  divisions". 
48  The  penny.  in  relation  to  what  the  Soviets  meant  by  peaceful  co-existence.  seemed  to  have  dropped 
at  least  with  the  Civil  Service  drafters. Chapter  7/  Page  160 
the  British  did  not  think  that  their  ally  viewed  the  Soviet  economic  threat  with 
sufficient  gravity.  In  a  Minute  of  30th  December  by  Patrick  Hancock  of  the  Foreign 
Office  for  Lloyd,  Eden's  main  concerns  for  the  Conference  were  set  out.  They 
concentrated  very  heavily  on  the  Russian  "probing...  all  round  their  periphery"  and 
what  should  be  the  appropriate  western  response.  Hancock  went  on  to  comment, 
The  P.  M.  's  points  (a),  (b)  and  (c)  [summarised  above]  had  been  in  the 
forefront  of  our  minds  in  making  preparations  for  the  discussions  in 
Washington.  This  particularly  since  Mr.  Dulles  opined  at  the  last  NATO 
meeting  that  the  Russians  had  only  a  surplus  of  obsolescent  arms,  technicians 
and  hot  air.  We  do  not  agree  with  this  view,  which  we  think  dangerously 
complacent.  49 
Hancock  went  on  to  outline  the  Treasury  and  Foreign  Office  briefs,  which  put  forward 
the  very  serious  view  the  British  took  of  Soviet  capabilities.  These  were  to  be  sent  to 
the  Americans  in  advance  of  the  Washington  meeting. 
The  picture  is  perhaps  a  little  reminiscent  of  that  in  1946-47  in  Greece,  Iran  and 
Turkey.  In  1955  Britain  faced  a  new  Soviet  threat  with  which  she  was  not 
economically  competent  to  cope.  This  was  certainly  not  the  first  time  that  Britain  had 
felt  disadvantage  by  an  inadequate  economic  performance,  however  her  inadequacies 
were  being  probed  in  a  new  and  taxing  way  . 
The  Soviets  were  now  biding  to  replace 
western  markets  for  raw  materials  and  to  supply  manufactures  and  development  aid  to 
governments  which  were  not  Communist  and  in  which  Britain  still  had  considerable 
economic  interests.  Once  more  she  was  forced  to  turn  to  the  United  States.  Just  as  in 
1946  there  was  also  apprehension  expressed  that  the  Americans  would  need  persuading 
both  of  the  threat's  seriousness  and  Britain's  own  financial  inadequacy.  50  In  fact, 
according  to  their  advisers,  Eden  and  Lloyd  were  supposed  to  be  going  to  Washington 
in  1956  with  something  of  a  mendicant  air.  51 
In  our  view  the  Russian  threat  of  con/)etirive  cu-cxisrelice  [mv  italiesi  is  serious  in  itself  and 
requires  strenuous  efforts  to  hold  our  allies  and  uncommitted  countries.  It  is  essential  we  agree 
on  the  nature  and  de-ree  of  the  Russian  threat.  It  so,  we  should  have  fruitful  discussions  on 
problems  in  various  parts  of  the  world,  of  which  the  Middle  East  is  the  most  threatened. 
49  FO  371  123199  ZP  28/6,  F.  O.  minute  by  Mr  P.  F.  Hancock,  30th  December.  1955. 
50  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  10-12.  Eisenhower  certainly  scans  to  have  been  rather  less  panicked 
in  December.  1955  than  were  the  British.  In  a  letter  to  Dulles  of  the  5th  December,  1955  from  his 
retreat  at  Gettysburg  he  concentrated  on  the  innate  economic  strengths  of  America  and  the  free 
world,  although  he  did  vo  on  to  acknowledue  that  the  Soviets  had  the  advantage  of  attack  and  could 
concentrate  their  aid  more  effectively.  Eisenhower'.  more  reassuring  assessment  has  stood  the  test 
of  time  rather  better  than  that  of  British  officialdom. 
51  This  is  very  clearly  expressed  in  the  C.  R.  O.  Brief  of  23rd  January.  1956.  FO  371  123201  ZP 
28/90.  on  India  and  Soviet  economic  penetration  already  lluOted  above.  Its  conclusions  demonstrate 
something  of  the  illusion  that  officials  seem  to  have  Iahoured  under  in  reuard  of  what  the 
Conference  was  actually  for.  "the  forthcoming  visit  to  Wa.  hiný-ton  will  deal  with  the  steps  necessary 
to  counter  the  Soviet  economic  offensive.  In  SSC4  it  IS  :  ut  ested  that  the  Americans  should  be 
asked  to  give  special  consideration  to  India.  "  lt  then  %vent  on  to  outline  the  matters  of  detail  which 
could  be  discussed  if  the  issue  provoked  further  conversations  and  the  pressure  that  should  be  out  on 
the  Americans  to  increase  the  amount  of  aid  they  were  giving.  As  it  turned  out  the  Washington 
Conference  hardly  touched  on  what  the  C.  R.  0..  clearly  thought  was  its  main  function. Charter  7/  Page  161 
On  this  Lloyd  is  rather  more  candid  in  his  memoirs  than  Eden.  He  makes  the 
following  point, 
Those  who  contend  that  Suez  was  a  watershed  in  our  national  history  often 
maintain  that  Eden's  Government  still  regarded  Britain  as  capable  of 
independent  action  on  a  global  scale.  It  needed  Suez,  they  say,  to  convince  us 
that  we  were  no  longer  a  great  power.  This  is  very  wide  of  the  mark.  We 
knew  the  facts  only  too  well.  During  our  talks  in  Washington  [in  January, 
1956],  Eden  put  in  a  paper  on  our  economic  situation.  The  Second  World 
War  had  turned  us  from  the  world's  greatest  creditor  to  the  world's  greatest 
debtor.  We  could  not  undertake  any  more  external  commitments.  52 
The  record  is  very  111UC11  on  the  side  of  Lloyd's  account,  although  there  is  a  point  on 
which  he  subtly  obfuscates. 
Oddly  enough  despite  the  crystal  clarity  with  which  the  Civil  Service  summed  up 
what  Britain  wanted  out  of  the  Conference,  the  actual  negotiations  in  Washington  were 
something  of  a  disappointment.  There  was  little  discussion  of  either  economic 
diplomacy  or  the  need  for  America  to  take  pay  for  most  of  the  work.  Conversations 
concentrated  on  the  general  European  situation,  the  Middle  East  and  the  need  to  find  a 
solution  for  the  Arab-Israeli  problem,  the  Buraimi  Oasis  dispute  between  the  Sultan  of 
Oman  and  Saudi  Arabia.  China  and  atomic  natters.  ''  The  issue  of  Soviet  economic 
diplomacy  was  most  directly  addressed  during  the  visit  to  Canada  that  followed  after 
the  Washington  discussions  ended.  There  Lester  Pearson,  as  Reginald  Maudlin'),  had 
commented,  seemed  to  have  niade  something  of  a  speciality  out  of  the  issue. 
There  was  one  discussion  between  Lloyd  and  Dulles  on  the  issue  of  Soviet 
economic  penetration  in  the  "under-developed"  world  during  the  Washington  leg  of  the 
trip.  On  February  ist  they  net  in  the  State  Department  to  discuss  the  issue  as  well  as 
the  progress  of  the  World  Bank's  discussions  with  Nasser  over  the  Aswan  Dam.  The 
Americans  do  indeed  seen  to  have  taken  a  more  casual  attitude  than  the  British.  The 
following  exchange  serves  to  illustrate  this  difference, 
Mr  Allen  [of  the  State  Department]  said  that  there  was  a  point  of  view  that  we 
should  carry  on  as  though  the  Russians  had  made  no  move  in  the  Middle  East. 
If  the  Russians  were  prepared  to  offer  impossible  terms  such  as  the  loan  to 
Egypt  of  $600  million  for  50  years  at  2  per  cent,  we  should  not  pay  much 
attention.  Sir  Harold  Caccia  remarked  that  unfortunately  some  projects  were 
too  dangerous  to  treat  in  this  way.  54 
52  Suez  1956.  p.  42.  He  went  on  to  say,  "Our  gold  and  dollar  reserves  only  covered  three  months' 
imports.  All  this  made  the  safeguarding  of  our  -supplies  of  oil  from  the  Middle  East  the  more 
important.  What  we  did  not  foresee  were  the  actions  that  would  he  taken  against  us  by  the  United 
States  Government". 
53  See  Suez  1956,  pp.  41-42.  There  is  a  bulky  print  record  of  the  Washington  discussions  in  PREM 
11/1334.  Also  the  American  record  at  FRUS  1955-57.  Vol.  X.  pp.  304-312  and  Vol.  XI,  pp.  467- 
68. 
54  PREM  11/1334,  Record  of  a  Meeting  Between  Mr.  Lloyd  and  Mr.  Dulles  in  the  State  Department 
on  Wednesday,  Ist  February,  1956,  at  10.30. Chapter  7/  Page  162 
However  there  was  basic  agreement  between  the  tv.  o  sides  that  as  they  could  not 
be  expected  to  undercut  every  offer  the  Soviets  made,  the  Western  response  would 
have  to  be  flexible.  Yet  there  was  no  mention  of  the  need  for  American  to  take  the 
main  part  of  the  financial  burden.  Nor  was  there  even  any  discussion  of  the  necessity 
to  take  concrete  measures  to  counter  the  Soviets'  move.  The  matter  was  taken  no 
further  than  an  agreement  that  a  "mechanism  should  be  set  up  through  the  British 
Embassy  in  Washington  for  the  exchange  if  information  on  Soviet  economic 
penetration".  This  seems  pretty  small  beer  in  comparison  to  the  grandiose  objectives 
which  had  been  set  out  during  British  preparations  for  the  Conference.  On  the  Aswan 
Dam,  perhaps  the  most  singular  example  of  the  way  the  new  cold  war  was  to  be 
fought,  discussion  amounted  to  little  more  than  Dulles  informing  Lloyd  that 
negotiations  between  Nasser  and  the  World  Bank  were  close  to  collapse.  This  Dulles 
blamed  on  Nasser  and  went  on  to  suggest  that  he  did  not  even  think  the  Egyptian 
economy  was  strong  enough  to  sustain  the  expense.  Lloyd  made  a  suitably  non- 
descript  noise  in  return.  55 
Equally  in  Canada,  although  Lester  Pearson  was  much  concerned  by  the  need  to 
respond  to  the  Sovie&  new  strategy,  discussions  with  the  British  did  not  get  much 
beyond  agreement  to  exchange  information.  56  On  the  7th  February  Eden,  Pearson  and 
Lloyd  in  Ottawa  discussed  the  issue  leaving  the  matter  hanging  on  the  need  for  further 
consultations.  Just  as  in  the  United  States  nothing  concrete  was  decided  upon  at  all. 
Much  of  the  Washington  Conference's  time  was  in  fact  taken  up  by  rather  windy 
rhetoric,  the  chief  of  which  was  the  Joint  Declaration.  57  it  emphasised  the  principles 
of  freedom  and  individualism  which  it  stated  the  Free  world  stood  for  against  those  of 
collectivist  darkness.  58  Eden  also  delivered  speeches  to  Congress  and  the  Press  which 
played  on  similar  themes  and  underlined  the  important  change  which  seemed  to  have 
occurred  in  the  Cold  War. 
The  Declaration  was  written  with  Khrushchev's  rhetoric  in  South  East  Asia  very 
much  in  mind.  On  6th  January  Evelyn  Shuckburah,  who  was  to  take  part  in  the  final 
process  of  drafting  in  Washington,  minuted  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  about  his  concern 
that  the  Declaration  should  have  some  relevance  to  Asia.  He  hoped  that  it  would  not 
55  ibid..  "Mr.  Selwyn  Lloyd  sui=gested  that  if  it  meant  we  gained  an  element  of  control  over  the 
Egyptian  economy  [which  was  exactly  why  Nasser  was  "o  against  the  conditions  the  World  Bank 
was  trying  to  impose,  it  might  he  advantageous.  hut  at  present  our  contributions  to  the  Dam  looked 
like  a  reward  for  vice".  This  was  a  very  half  hearted  defence  of  it  project  which  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  Czech-arms  deal  the  British  had  been  hysterically  keen  should  tall  to  the  West. 
56  The  discussions  lasted  from  3rd  to  Sth  February'.  There  is  a  print  copy  of  the  minutes  at  PREM 
11/1334. 
57  See  Descent  tu  Suez,  pp.  32S-332.  Most  of  January  31st  and  February  Ist  were  taken  up  by  the 
drafting  of  the  Declaration  and  Com.  munieluý.  Shuckhurgh  did  not  have  a  very  high  opinion  of  the 
performance  of  Eden  and  Lloyd  at  the  conference,  "I  envy  the  . Americans  having  Ike  and  Dulles  to 
deal  with  over  their  foreign  affairs.  It  seems  to  me  that  these  two  have  continuity  of  policy,  serious 
ideas  and  courage,  and  that  our  team  by  comparison  i,,  frivolous".  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  330. 
58  Miscellaneous  No.  1  (1956),  Cmd  9700. Chaptcr  7/  Page  163 
be  confined  to  "stale  cliches  from  the  European  cold  war".  59  And  indeed  the  finished 
product  made  substantial  reference  to  what  had  already  been  achieved  by  the  West  in 
the  way  of  economic  aid  in  Asia,  moreover  insisting  that  such  aid  was  not  intended  to 
increase  Western  economic  or  political  power.  Yet  the  Declaration  and  its  following 
Communique  were  confined  to  very  broad  generalities.  No  specific  new  proposals 
were  brought  forward  at  all  in  answer  to  what  the  Soviets  had  embarked  upon  in  Asia, 
rather  they  contented  themselves  by  a  well  worn  reference  to  the  Colombo  Plan. 
Similarly  Eden's  speech  to  the  U.  S.  Congress  on  the  2nd  of  February,  1956 
confined  itself  to  the  general.  It  did  make  a  very  clear  analysis  of  the  way  in  which  the 
threat  from  the  Soviet  Union  had  changed.  60  In  the  face  of  thermo-nuclear 
annihilation  a  "mutual  deterrent"  against  war  on  a  world  scale  had  been  created. 
However  this  had  not  led  to  peace,  but  rather  forced  the  rivalry  down  to  a  subtler  plain 
of  economic  blandishment  and  political  influence. 
Brought  to  a  halt  in  Europe,  Soviet  expansion  now  feels  its  way  south  and 
probes  in  other  lands.  There  is  nothing  particularly  new  in  this.  You  can 
read  it  all  in  Russian  imperialist  history.  But  the  emphasis  has  changed,  and 
the  symbols  and  methods  too.  This  is  a  struggle  for  men's  minds,  once 
expressed  in  these  regions  by  conflicting  faiths,  but  now  in  rival  ideologies. 
From  the  Kremlin  streams  forth  into  the  lands  of  what  we  call  the  Middle 
East,  and  into  all  Asia,  a  mixture  of  blandishments  and  threat,  offers  of  arms 
and  menaces  to  individuals,  all  couched  in  terms  of  fierce  hostility  for 
Western  ideals. 
Eden  continued  to  look  at  the  ways  in  which  the  west  should  respond  to  this  new 
challenge.  As  in  the  declaration,  there  was  nothing  more  than  vaugery  on  Anglo-U.  S. 
unity,  the  settlement  of  regional  conflicts  and  the  flexibility  of  approach  that  should  be 
taken  in  seeking  to  counter  Soviet  economic  aid.  Eden  did  not  even  make  reference  to 
the  need  for  America  to  take  the  major  part  in  this  new  campaign.  His  emphasis  was 
firmly  on  partnership.  6  t 
By  way  of  contrast  the  discussions  between  Eden,  Lloyd,  Eisenhower  and  Dulles 
while  the  former  were  in  Washington  concentrated  on  details  rather  than  a  general, 
fundamental  reappraisal  of  where  the  cold  war  was  going  and  what  needed  to  be  done 
about  it  by  whom.  On  this  point  Lloyd's  account  is  a  little  misleading.  He  gives  the 
impression  that  it  was  Eden  who  "put  in  a  paper  on  the  economic  situation"  which 
clearly  laid  out  Britain's  financial  weakness.  during  the  talks.  62  This  would  have  been 
59  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  317. 
60  Extract  from  the  Congressional  Record  (Senate)  for  2nd  February,  1956,91956  (Cols.  1627  and 
1628). 
61  Opinions  differed  on  the  effectiveness  of  Eden'-  speech.  According  to  Shuckhurgh.  both  he  and  Sir 
Leslie  Rowan  thought  at  the  time  that  the  speech  was  poor  even  though  it  seemed  a  popular  success, 
Descent  to  Suez.  p.  332.  Lloyd  in  his  memoirs  .  on"iders  it  to  have  been  "brilliant"  and  "perhaps 
the  best  feature  of  the  Conference",  Suez  1956.  p.  42.  which  possibly  says  more  about  Lloyd's  view 
of  what  the  visit  itself  achieved  than  Eden's  spe  hmakin_-. 
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entirely  in  line  with  the  objectives  which  had  been  set  out  before  the  British  arrived  in 
Washington  by  the  Civil  Servants.  However  the  only  paper  that  resembles  Lloyd's 
outline  in  his  memoirs  was  not  in  fact  delivered  by  Eden,  nor  written  by  him.  It  was 
entirely  the  work  of  permanent  officials  at  the  Treasury  and  designed,  on  the 
suggestion  of  Sir  Leslie  Rowan,  to  be  left  with  the  Americans  and  Canadians  as  a  kind 
of  aide  memoirei3  After  making  clear  the  financial  and  economic  precariousness  of  the 
British  position,  with  particular  reference  to  the  inadequacy  of  British  gold  and  dollar 
reserves,  it  underlined  the  following  point,  "[w]e  cannot  take  any  more  external 
commitments".  The  note  finished  with  a  futile  opinion  as  to  the  purpose  of  the 
"Statement  at  end  of  meeting".  "We  hope  this  can  contain  both  declaration  and 
definite  decision  for  actions,  which  are  essential  in  present  dangerous  situation".  Such 
expectations  of  concrete  proposals  were  to  be  frustrated.  The  Statement  was  to  be  no 
more  than  a  banal  assertion  of  Anglo-American  unity. 
The  clear  implication  of  Civil  Service  opinion  was  that  the  Americans  would  need 
to  be  invited  to  take  the  lead  in  this  new  cold  war.  Yet  there  does  not  even  seem  to 
have  been  an  attempt  by  Eden  or  Lloyd  to  make  such  an  invitation  during  the 
discussions.  The  minuting  and  briefing  for  the  Washington  visit  makes  quite  plain  that 
the  Civil  Service's  main  concern,  and  indeed  that  of  a  number  of  politicians,  notably 
Thornyo  t,  was  the  Soviet's  economic  offensive  in  Asia  and  the  need  to  persuade  the 
Americans  to  pay  for  counter  measures.  Lloyd's  memoir  gives  the  impression,  by 
reference  Rowan's  note,  that  Eden  had  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  predicament  that  the 
British  found  themselves  in  early  1956.  However  the  opinions  that  the  aide  memoire 
so  pungently  expressed  were  those  of  officials  and  not  Eden.  The  "paper"  was  in  fact 
in  the  nature  of  a  round  robin  letter. 
This  gap  between  official  advice  and  the  politicians'  activities  came  out  in  the  9th 
February,  1956  report  to  the  Cabinet  on  what  the  Washington  visit  had  achieved. 
Neither  Eden  nor  Lloyd  once  mentioned  economic  diplomacy,  concentrating  instead  on 
the  minutiae  of  Anglo-American  relations  and  the  general  position  in  Europe.  Eden 
63  FO  371  123203  ZP  28/94.  Sir  Leslie  Rowan's  coverin`_  note  of  the  28th  January  suggested  that  the 
aide  nernoire  should  he  left  with  the  President.  The  Treasury  note  went  as  follows. 
Our  mad  or  problem  is  the  magnitude  of  U.  K.  's  continuing  external  commitments.  Last  war 
turned  us  from  world's  `_reatest  creditor  to  world's  `'reatest  dchtor.  Our  ; gold  and  dollar 
reserves  are  now  only  about  $2,100  million.  These  are  hacking  for  the  whole  sterling  system, 
which  finances  halt'  the  world's  trade  and  payments  and  for  which  there  is  no  alternative. 
These  reserves  are  entirely  inadequate...  equal  to  under  25  %  of  cost  of  our  imports...  we 
cannot  take  any  more  external  commitments. 
Compare  this  to  Lloyd's  summary  of  "Eden's  paper"  in  Suez  1956,  p.  42, 
The  Second  World  War  had  turned  us  from  the  World's  greatest  creditor  to  the  world's 
greatest  debtor.  We  could  not  undertake  any  more  external  commitments.  Our  __old  and  dollar 
reserves  only  covered  three  month's  imports. 
The  phrasing  is  too  similar  for  mere  coincidence. Charter  7/  Page  165 
reported  that  on  Germany  the  two  sides  held  very  similar  opinions.  64  However,  there 
was  some  divergence  over  European  unity  and  the  Messina  Conference.  On  the 
Middle  East  both  sides  reaffirmed  the  validity  of  the  Tripartite  Agreement  of  1950  and 
agreed  that  more  effort  was  needed  on  the  settling;  of  the  Arab-Israel  tension.  Yet 
despite  British  eagerness  to  drag  them  in,  the  Americans  remained  unwilling  to  do 
much  more  than  give  moral  and  some  economic  support  to  the  Baghdad  Pact.  On 
other  areas  of  concern  in  the  area,  in  particular  the  Buraimi  dispute  and  Saudi  misuse 
of  financial  muscle,  the  Americans  had  made  soothing  noises  in  response  to  British 
complaints.  China  and  Chiang  Kai-Shek  remained  a  source  of  disagreement.  Eden 
ended  his  report  by  reference  to  the  discussions  on  Atomic  energy.  Here  he  expressed 
the  hope  that  information  that  the  President  had  agreed  to  pass  on  would  save  some 
money. 
At  this  point  it  would  be  instructive  to  recall  the  objectives  which  were  set  out  by 
officials  for  the  talks  as  discussed  above.  Despite  their  advice  and  concern  with 
fundamentals  of  strategy,  discussions  did  not  get  beyond  immediate  details  which  had 
been  British  concerns  long  before  any  great  change  in  Soviet  policy  had  been 
perceived.  Such  brief  reference  as  there  was  to  economic  diplomacy  did  not  make 
clear  British  inadequacies  or  come  to  any  concrete  decisions  for  action.  More 
important  to  Eden  seenis  to  have  been  the  formulation  of  high  sounding  oratory.  It  is 
therefore  little  wonder  that  Lloyd  expressed  his  disappointment  with  what  the 
conference  had  achieved  in  his  memoirs. 
The  talks  in  Washington  with  Eisenhower  and  Dulles  were  rather 
disappointing.  I  have  always  been  doubtful  about  highly  publicised  meetings 
between  heads  of  government.  65 
They  had  in  fact  hardly  touched  at  all  on  priorities  which  the  Civil  Service,  if  not  the 
Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Secretary,  clearly  perceived.  It  almost  seems  that  as  soon 
as  the  two  statesmen  stepped  off  the  Queen  Eli,  -.  aherh  they  conjured  a  new  agenda  of 
their  own  in  blithe  disregard  for  their  advisers  in  the  Treasury,  Foreign  Office  and 
Board  of  Trade.  After  expressing  his  opinion  on  the  success  of  the  proceedings 
Lloyd's  account  goes  on  to  make  an  interesting  comment  on  the  incompetence  of 
Heads  of  State  in  dealing  with  issues  of  policy, 
If  there  has  been  full  preparation  before  and  there  is  some  specific  and 
realisable  objective  they  may  be  successful.  After  a  good  dinner  at  the 
Embassy  in  Moscow  in  1959  I  told  Khrushchev  and  Macmillan  what  I  thought 
64  PREM  11/13334,  a  draft  minute  of  9th  January.  1956  by  Sir  Ivonc  Kirkpatrick  for  the  information  of 
the  Americans  laid  out  the  British  position  on  Germany.  It  made  clear  that  there  had  been  no  change 
in  British  policy  since  the  Geneva  failure.  The  Wet  German  population  and  Adenauer  seemed  to 
have  taken  the  end  of  hopes  for  reunification  well.  and  the  primary  objective  was  therefore  to  build 
on  this  and  draw  Germany  into  the  Western  European  ý:  ommunity.  Thus  the  West  would  make 
certain  that  even  after  Adenauer.  West  Germany  would  he  sutticiently  anchored  to  resist  such 
temptations  as  the  Soviets  might  offer. 
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of  them.  I  said:  If  one  side  says  3  and  the  other  side  says  5,  you  Heads  of 
Government  are  competent  to  agree  on  4.  It'  it  is  more  complicated  than  that, 
you  have  not  the  time  to  prepare  adequately  or  to  be  properly  briefed  on 
detail;  you  will  probably  do  more  harm  than  good.  I  do  not  think  that  either 
was  very  pleased,  but  it  is  so  and  when  it  is  seen  that  nothing  important  is 
achieved  at  a  Summit  Meeting  there  will  be  a  feeling  of  anti-climax.  This 
applied  to  our  meeting  in  Washington.  66 
Both  Eden  and  Lloyd  were  very  hard  worked  amen,  but  even  at  that  it  is  striking 
and  somewhat  mysterious  that  their  actions  should  have  been  at  such  variance  with  the 
advice  of  their  experts.  Moreover  it  is  very  odd  that  they  should  deal  so  lightly  with  a 
matter  which  had  become  of  crucial  concern  to  Whitehall  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  tour  of  South  East  Asia.  This  is  an  important  point  which 
surely  would  bear  further  examination.  For  it  was  Eden  and  the  Egypt  Committee, 
and  not  the  permanent  officials,  who  jealously  guarded  the  decision  making  process 
through  the  Suez  Crisis. 
Y 
The  Washington  Conference  proceedings  were  vapid  and  in  consequence  are  generally 
considered  of  small  importance.  And  yet  in  January  1956  permanent  officials,  if  not 
quite  all  politicians,  perceived  that  a  crucially  important  development  for  the  future  of 
Britain's  role  as  a  great  power  had  occurred.  The  Soviet  leader's  tour  in  Asia  signified 
a  further  step  towards  a  global  policy.  Whitehall  realised  all  too  well  that  as  the  Soviet 
super  power  moved  out  into  the  wider  world,  British  power  would  be  forced  to  recede 
before  it.  Just  as  in  1947,  the  crucial  objective  then  became  to  get  the  Americans  to 
take  their  place.  Lloyd's  memoir  implicitly  admits  that  this  is  where  the  significance 
of  the  Washington  Conference  lay.  Although  in  a  limited  way  Eden  was  trying  to 
increase  American  support  for  Britain's  position  by  securing  an  American  commitment 
to  the  Baghdad  Pact,  he  put  the  emphasis  in  his  conversations  with  Eisenhower  and  his 
speeches  on  partnership.  Yet  matters  had  long  gone  beyond  this  point.  The  reality  of 
Britain's  dependence  on  American  economic  muscle  in  this  new  economic  cold  war 
was  readily  admitted  by  the  likes  of  Sir  Leslie  Rowan  and  Peter  Thorney  fs4r  It  would 
take  Suez  for  the  scales  to  fall  completely  from  Eden's  eyes  concerning,  economic 
weakness. 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev's  tourism  at  the  end  of  1955  played  an  important  part  in 
the  British  Government's  (if  not  Eden's)  understanding  of  the  changing  nature  of 
Soviet  foreign  policy.  By  the  20th  Party  Congress  more  or  less  all  the  innovative 
themes  which  were  to  be  raised  by  Khrushchev  had  been  put  into  practice  during  the 
following  year.  The  "Zone  of  Peace",  for  example,  was  an  established  fact  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  in  British  eyes  by  the  end  of  1955.  However,  the  importance  of  this 
66  ibid.  pp.  40-41. Chapter  7/  Page  167 
change  and  its  implications  for  Britain  had  not  been  fully  digested  by  Eden.  It  was  not 
until  after  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  extended  their  tourism  to  include  Britain  that  the 
gap  between  the  permanent  officials'  understanding  of  the  limits  of  Soviet  style 
coexistence  and  the  Prime  Minister's  was  fully  closed. Chapter-  8 
The  Impact  of  the  20th  Party  Congress  and  the  Soviet  Visit  to  Britain 
Taking  Tea  with  Dukes  and  Duchesses 
"Back  at  Number  10,  I  had  to  decide  what  our  policy  should  now  be.  The  present 
Soviet  rulers  had  as  much  confidence  as  their  predecessors  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of 
communism.  They  were  unshakeable  determined.  The  methods  they  would  employ 
might  be  different  from  those  of  Stalin  and  they  might  be  harder  to  meet...  We  had  to 
consider  the  adjustments  needed  in  our  policies  to  cope  with  a  new  situation,  for  a  new 
situation  it  undoubtedly  was". 
Anthony  Eden 
Our  attention  must  now  turn  to  developments  after  the  visit  to  Washington  which  were 
further  to  confirm  the  Northern  Department  in  its  analysis  of  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
The  20th  Party  Congress  provided  a  theoretical  proof  for  what  had  already  become 
apparent  in  practice.  It  was  also  increasingly  difficult  for  Eden  to  evade  the 
fundamental  importance  of  what  had  happened  in  the  Soviet  Union,  the  visit  of 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  to  Britain  in  April  of  1956  was  to  prove  particularly 
important  in  this  context. 
Consequently,  the  issue  of  a  response  to  the  Soviet  "economic  offensive"  which 
had  been  put  on  a  backburner  during  the  visit  to  Washington,  basically  relegated  to 
discussions  with  the  Canadians,  became  increasingly  important.  Indeed  the  wider 
realities  of  peaceful  coexistence  in  a  thermonuclear  age  were  to  provide  much  of  the 
inspiration  behind  the  defence  and  foreign  policy  review  which  Eden  presided  over  in 
the  lead  up  to  the  Suez  Crisis.  There  were  even  those  who  argued  that  the  manner  in 
which  international  rivalry  was  developing  and  would  in  future  express  itself  might 
provide  Britain  with  a  way  out  from  her  financial  difficulties.  Impecunity,  as  ever, 
provided  a  powerful  stimulus  to  innovation. 
However,  the  long-term  significance  of  all  of  this  is  less  important  for  the 
purposes  of  this  thesis  than  the  evidence  it  provides  for  changing  British  perceptions  of 
Soviet  policy.  By  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers  Conference  of  July,  1956  in 
London  there  was  essentially  a  consensus  within  the  British  Government,  both  in  terms 
of  what  was  happening  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  significance.  The  gap  between  the 
opinions  of  permanent  officials  and  politicians  had  been  closed.  The  crises  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East  which  degenerated  into  violence  during  the  second  half  of 
the  year  Fitted  quite  comfortably  into  this  new  framework. 
The  process  of  sorting  out  what  implications  this  analysis  had  for  British  policy  in 
turn  was  disrupted  by  Nasser's  nationalisation  of  the  Suez  Canal.  This,  effectively,  is 
the  point  at  which  the  curtain  falls  upon  my  research.  However.  I  shall,  amongst  other 
things.  suggest  in  my  conclusion  that  the  British  Government's 
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foreign  policy  had  a  profound  and  often  undervalued  influence  upon  Eden's  reaction  to 
this  "theft". 
THE  PARTY  CONGRESS 
As  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  geared  up  towards  its  Twentieth  Party  Congress  the 
attention  of  the  British  Embassy  in  Moscow  was  focused  on  the  implications  which  it 
might  have  for  Khruslhchev's  position  within  the  leadership.  In  preparation  for  the 
main  event,  the  Communist  Parties  of  the  Republics  which  made  up  the  Soviet  Union, 
as  was  the  tradition,  held  their  own  congresses.  Sir  William  Hayter,  in  a  despatch  of 
the  3rd  February,  1956,  commented  on  the  prominence  which  had  been  given  to 
Khrushchev  at  a  number  of  these  events.  This  indication  of  the  First  Secretary's 
growing  importance  was  further  bolstered  by  shifts  in  the  Party  hierarchy  which 
seemed  to  favour  his  supporters.  Hayter  concluded  that  the  all  Soviet  Congress  was 
likely  to  be  the  vehicle  for  a  substantial  entrenchment  of  Khrushchev's  position  once 
more  at  the  expense  of  both  Malenkov  and  Molotov,  although  he  very  much  doubted 
that  Khrushchev  would  be  powerful  enough  to  assail  directly  their  personal  positions 
on  the  Presidium.  1  The  British  Embassy's  attention  at  this  point  was  Firmly  set  upon 
the  implications  which  the  Congress  might  have  for  the  future  of  the  Soviet  leadership. 
However,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  20th  Party  Congress  was  not  merely  to 
be  another  demonstration  of  Khrushchev's  command  of  political  infighting.  Although 
there  could  be  no  doubting  that  his  position  was  enhanced  by  the  Congress  there  was 
no  indication  that  any  decisive  move  towards  a  despotic  grasp  on  power  had  been 
made.  Furthermore,  in  some  ways  the  Congress  manifested  the  limitations  of 
Khrushchev's  position  as  much  as  the  strengths.  '-  It  was,  rather,  in  the  arena  of 
1  FO  371  1227767  NS  1017/4,  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Selwyn  Lloyd,  3rd  February,  1956.  The 
difficulties  which  Ponomarenko  and  Shatalin  were  facing  in  the  process  of  re-election  and  the 
promotion  of  Dudorov  as  Minister  of  Internal  Affairs  were  adduced  as  further  evidence  of 
Khrushchev's  rising  influence.  The  former  were,  of  course,  "Malenkov  men"  and  the  later  was  a 
"Khrushchev  man".  Hayter  also  thought  that  the  1955  plan  results  and  the  1956  Budget  seemed 
increasingly  to  suggest  that  there  had  been  a  very  real  division  over  economic  policy  in  1954/55, 
rather  than  merely  it  political  struggle  dressed  up  in  industrial  clothing.  The  1955  Plan  results  in 
particular  showed  a  very  sharp  change  in  economic  policy  in  the  course  of  the  year.  with  a  shift  back 
to  heavy  industrial  production.  FO  371  122862  NS  1102/6.  Despatch,  Chancery,  Moscow  to 
Northern  Department,  7th  February,  1956.  This  view  had  already  been  put  forward  tentatively  by 
the  Embassy  to  the  Northern  Department  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  Malenkov's  fall  almost  a 
year  earlier,  FO  371  116638  NS  1017/37,  Letter  from  Hayter  to  Hohler,  18th  February,  1955.  See 
Power  and  Policy,  pp.  270-271. 
2  FO  371  122770  NS  1015/109,  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Lloyd,  8th  larch.  1956.  In  this  the  Embassy 
provided  a  detailed  analysis  of  changes  in  the  Party's  composition  and  the  effect  of  the  Congress  on 
the  leadership.  Khrushchev's  "authority"  seemed  to  have  been  substantially  increased  but, 
[I]n  attacking  the  cult  of  the  individual  personality,  many  members  of  the  Central  Committee 
may  have  wanted  to  warn  Khrushchev  as  much  as  anyone  else  that  there  must  be  no  more 
Stalins.  The  re-election  of  the  same  eleven  members  of  the  Presidium,  and  the  tone  of  personal 
authority  with  which  many  of  them  spoke.  also  suggests  that  Khrushchev's  power  is  genuinely 
limited  by  the  need  to  a`_ree  with  his  closest  colleagues.  In  short.  I  think  that  the  20th  Party Chapter  8/  Page  170 
general  policy  that  the  Congress  was  to  provide  most  of  its  interest.  The  two  speeches 
which  Khrushchev  delivered,  on  the  14th  February  in  public  and  the  24th  February 
notoriously  in  private,  were  provoking.  The  first  excited  by  its  ideological  novelty  and 
the  second  startled  by  its  historical  candour.  3 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Congress  British  observers  suffered  a  bout  of  deja  vu.  4 
This  was  not  because  they  did  not  understand  the  importance  of  the  ideological 
innovations  contained  in  Khrushchev's  14th  February  speech,  but  that  they  seemed 
little  more  than  the  logical  corollary  of  the  practice  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  over  the 
previous  three  years,  and  in  particular  1955.5  The  new  formulations  on  different  paths 
to  socialism,  the  nonsense  of  war  in  a  thermonuclear  age  and  peaceful  competition  did 
not  cut  a  great  deal  of  ice  in  London.  The  implications  of  the  Secret  Speech  took  a 
little  longer  to  become  clear,  not  least  because  the  Congress  had  ended  before  news  of 
Khrushchev's  denunciation  of  Stalin  began  to  filter  through  to  the  western  world.  As 
far  as  British  observers  were  concerned  it  was  this  aspect  of  Khrushchev's  reformism, 
when  they  were  fully  apprised  of  it,  which  was  the  most  unusual. 
In  a  despatch  of  the  29th  February,  1956,  Sir  William  Hayter  did  go  so  far  as  to 
suggest  that, 
It  is  probable  that  the  20th  Party  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party  will  be 
chiefly  remembered  for  the  promulgation  of  the  two  new  doctrines  on  the 
possibility  of  future  wars  and  on  differing  ways  to  socialism.  6 
Hayter  was  particularly  impressed  that  the  Congress  had  ended  the  Soviet  Communist 
Party's  long  adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  the  inevitability  of  war.  As  late  as  1953,  he 
pointed  out,  Stalin  had  been  underlining  it  in  his  Economic  Problems  of  Socialism. 
Indeed,  Stalin  was  now  altogether  passe, 
Congress  has  increased  Khrushchev's  authority  and  stature;  but  it  has  made  it  more  unlikely 
than  ever  that  he  will  become  personal  dictator. 
3  English  translations  of  both  speeches,  Khrushchev's  Central  Committee  Report  and  the  Secret 
Speech  are  respectively  to  he  found  in  Leo  Gravliow  (ed.  ),  Current  Soviet  Policies  11,  The 
Documentary  Record  of  the  20th  Communist  Parry  Congress  and  its  Aftermath,  pp.  29-59  and  pp. 
172-188.  The  former  was  published  by  Pravda  on  the  15th  February,  1956,  the  latter  is  in  the 
English  translation  of  Khrushchev's  own  apologia,  Khrushchev  Remembers,  pp.  341-353.  For 
detailed  treatment  of  the  domestic  and  political  importance  of  the  Secret  Speech  in  particular  see 
Khrushchev,  the  Years  in  Power,  pp.  66-74:  Khrushchev  and  the  Soviet  Leadership,  pp.  33-39  and 
Power  and  Policy,  pp.  263-291.  On  Khrushchev's  ideological  innovations  in  foreign  policy  which 
were  outlined  in  his  Central  Committee  Report  see  "Action  and  Reaction  in  Khrushchev's  Foreign 
Policy".  pp.  237-260  and  Soviet  Foreign  Police,  pp.  61. 
4  There  is  a  very  bulky  printed  record  of  the  avalanche  of  reports  and  despatches  which  Sir  William 
Hayter  sent  hack  to  London  on  the  Congress  at  FO  371  122770  NS  1015/109. 
5  Edward  Crankshaw  argues  in  his  1966  hook,  Khrushchev,  a  Biography.  p.  227,  that  the  importance 
of  these  modifications  -  which  amounted  to  a  rewriting  of  Leninism  -  was  not  gasped  in  the  West  at 
the  time  because  of  the  not  unnatural  tendency  to  regard  all  statements  of  policy  as  exercises  in 
deception".  Crankshaw's  comment  is  not  entirely  applicable  to  the  British  Foreign  Office.  They 
did  not  discount  Khrushchev's  theonsing  as  bogus.  but  rather  tended  to  down  play  its  practical 
importance  as  they  considered  it  already  to  have  been  put  into  effect. 
6  FO  31  122770  NS  101  /  109.  Despatch.  Hayter  to  Lloyd.  29th  February,  1956. Chapter  8/  Page  171 
Lenin  was  the  dominating  figure  of  the  20th  Congress,  which  was  represented 
by  most  speakers  as  a  loyal  return  to  his  teachings,  and  it  is  indicative  of  the 
practical  approach  of  the  present  Soviet  leadership  that  even  Lenin  can  be 
repudiated  when  it  suits  their  book.? 
However,  in  a  further  despatch  specifically  on  the  Congress'  treatment  of  foreign 
policy  issues  Hayter  was  less  enthusiastic.  8  He  pin-pointed  the  three  most  important 
themes,  already  stated,  which  Khrushchev  had  raised  in  his  speech  of  the  14th 
February  and  which  had  not  been  substantially  added  to  or  modified  by  any  subsequent 
comment.  Hayter  went  on  to  present  a  summary  of  the  salient  points. 
Khrushchev  had  begun  his  speech  by  stressing  the  economic  confidence  with 
which  the  Soviet  Vnion  faced  the  West-9  He  continued  to  "contrast  the  behaviour  of 
the  war-mongers  with  that  of  the  peace-lovers",  a  theme  which  fitted  in  well  with  his 
development  of  the  new  "Zone  of  peace"  doctrine.  t0  After  a  few  relatively  moderate 
gibes  against  colonialism,  Khrushchev  had  once  more  emphasised  his  Government's 
desire  for  better  relations  with  Western  Powers,  particularly  Britain  and  France; 
although  Hayter  pointed  out  that  nothing  new  was  on  the  table  regarding  any 
outstanding  international  questions  such  as  Germany.  Finally  Khrushchev's  attention 
had  turned  to  the  favourite  topic  of  the  moment,  peaceful  coexistence.  Although 
admitting  that  the  report's  tone  had  been  reasonable,  Hayter  made  of  it  a  withering 
summary, 
The  report  in  general  is  characterised  by  a  more  marked  degree  of  dishonesty 
than  one  is  accustomed  to  expect  even  from  Soviet  leaders.  Khrushchev 
cannot  really  be  so  ill-informed  as  to  believe  that  shrinking  Western  domestic 
markets  are  a  feature  of  the  Western  economic  scene.  Nor,  of  course,  can  he 
believe  the  fiction,  repeated  once  again,  that  Hitler  was  helped  by  the  West. 
He  does  not  pause  to  reconcile  his  praise  for  the  heroic  struggle  of  the 
communist  parties  abroad  with  his  ardent  advocacy  of  the  five  principles 
[Nehru's  five  principles  of  neutralism].  His  "zone  of  peace"  concept  is  a 
patently  dishonest  attempt  to  suggest  that  the  states  concerned  are  following 
7  ibid. 
8  FO  371  122770  NS  101  /109,  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Lloyd.  Ist  March.  1956. 
9  ibid.,  Hayter  took  pleasure  in  exposing  Some  of  the  flaws  in  Khrushchev's  assessment  of  the 
economic  situation, 
In  stressing  the  embarrassment  for  capitalism  of  the  expansion  of  the  socialist  market,  the 
Soviets  are  of  course  being;  thoroughly  inconsistent.  If  the  expansion  of  the  socialist  market  is 
intensifying  the  difficulties  of  the  capitalist  world,  why  the  impassioned  plea  for  a  greater 
volume  of  trade  which  figures  in  a  later  section  of  the  report'?  Why  rail  against  the  stultifying 
effect  on  East/West  trade  of  discriminatory  practices  by  the  West,  if  by  following  these 
practices  capitalism  is  contributing  to  its  own  decay'?  For  there  is  no  question  of  the  socialist 
camp  requiring  this  commerce;  "The  development  of  the  countries  of  socialism",  says 
Khrushchev,  "is  characterised  by  their  complete  self-sufficiency...  ".  Once  again  the 
fraudulence  of  Soviet  pretensions  to  favour  an  expansion  of  trade  with  the  West  stands 
exposed. 
10  ibid.,  Hayter  interpreted  this  to  include  at  least  India,  Burma,  Indonesia.  Afghanistan,  Egypt,  Syria 
as  well  as  neutral  countries  such  as  Austria  and  Finland. Chapter  8/  Page  172 
the  same  foreign  policy  as  the  Soviet  Union.  He  is  apparently  unconcerned  by 
the  inconsistency  between  condemnation  of  the  policy  of  "massive  retaliation" 
and  his  own  threat  of  a  "crushing  repulse  to  the  aggressors".  And  he  caps  it 
all  by  characterising  perversion  of  the  truth  as  a  peculiarly  bourgeois  vice. 
The  Ambassador  concluded  his  despatch  thus, 
To  the  extent  that  it  is  covered  by  this  despatch  [i.  e.  foreign  policy],  the  Party 
Congress  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  grandiloquent  restatement  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  in  its  ideological  context.  As  such  it  is  of  interest,  but  I  can  see 
no  sign  of  any  new  line  eºnerging. 
This  was,  essentially,  the  view  which  the  Embassy  and  Northern  Department  were 
to  share  even  after  maturer  reflection.  It  was  also  the  view  which  the  Northern 
Department  was  to  pass  on  to  the  rest  of  Whitehall.  Ideology  was  all  well  and  good, 
but  the  writing  had  long  been  on  the  wall.  In  his  report  for  the  first  quarter  of  1956, 
Hayter  downplayed  the  significance  of  both  the  end  of  Lenin's  dogma  that  war  formed 
an  integral  part  in  the  fall  of  capitalism  and  the  new  latitude  afforded  in  a  nations 
struggle  towards  socialism.  Furthermore,  he  added  a  heavy  dose  of  ulterior  motivation 
to  his  analysis, 
These  two  innovations  are  interesting  and  important  in  form,  but  they  imply 
not  so  much  a  change  in  Soviet  foreign  policy  as  the  supply  of  new 
implements  for  executing  existing  policy.  Lenin's  doctrine  of  the  inevitability 
of  war  was  an  obvious  handicap  to  a  government  preaching  peace  and  co- 
existence,  and  its  elimination  was  clearly  only  a  matter  of  time.  the  new 
theory  of  the  parliamentary  road  to  socialism  is  clearly  a  useful  weapon  in  the 
present  campaign  for  popular  fronts  and  for  the  conciliation  of  nationalist 
movements  with  parliamentary  beliefs.  12  Neither  of  these  two  new  doctrines 
really  fundamentally  alters  the  direction  which  Soviet  foreign  policy  has  been 
pursuing  since  the  death  of  Stalin.  13 
In  its  treatment  of  external  relations  there  was  little  in  the  ?  0th  Party  Congress  to 
change  the  apprehension  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  which  the  British  Government  had 
11  FO  371  122768  NS  1015/60,  Minute  by  Northern  Department,  24th  March.  1956.  This  minute  was 
entitled  Twentieth  Party  Congress  of  the  CPSU  and  was  printed  for  the  consumption  of  the  rest  of 
the  Foreign  Office  and  other  Government  Departments.  It  considered  that  the  Party  Congress  "put 
the  seal"  on  the  "steady  evolution"  of  Soviet  policy  since  Stalin's  death  and  that  this  "achievement" 
was  considerable  given  the  apparent  veneer  of  unity  which  the  leadership  had  maintained  at  the  same 
time.  However,  the  organic  nature  of  these  changes  was  once  again  emphasised,  growing  as  they 
did  from  the  Soviet  Government's  attempts  over  the  recent  past  to  come  to  terms  with  a 
thermonuclear  age.  The  Americans  had  come  to  very  similar  conclusions.  FRUS  1955-1957,  Vol. 
XXIV,  p.  59  Memorandum  of  Discussion  at  the  277th  Meeting  of  the  National  Security  Council, 
Washington.  ? 
7th  February.  1956.  For  Charles  Bohlen's  personal  recollections  see  Witness  to 
History,  pp.  393-396. 
12  ibid.,  Northern  Department  pointed  out  that  Khrushchev's  emphasis  on  different  paths  was  not 
entirely  new  as  this  had  been  Khrushchev'.  theme  on  his  vo.  it  to  Belgrade  in  the  first  half  of  1955. 
The  credence  __iven  to  the  parliamentary  process  was.  however,  quite  novel. 
13  FO  371  122769  NS  1015/88,  Despatch.  Hayter  to  Lloyd.  4th  April,  1956  and  Minute  by  R.  A. 
Hibbert,  5th  April.  1956.  The  Northern  Department  was  in  appreciative  agreement  with  the 
Embassy's  prognosis. Chapter  8/  Page  173 
developed  since  1953,  and  particularly  in  the  course  of  1955.  There  was  certainly  no 
hint  that  the  Cold  War  was  coming,  even  ever  so  slowly,  to  an  end.  14  Khrushchev's 
innovations  were  explained  by  Hayter  and  the  Northern  Department  too  adequately 
within  the  existing  framework  for  there  to  be  any  need  of  a  re-evaluation.  Indeed, 
there  seemed  good  reason  for  greater  concern  as  to  the  efficacy  of  Soviet  foreign 
policy  in  its  continuing  attempt  to  undermine  the  West.  In  all  of  this  the  British 
probably  did  under-estimate  the  importance  of  the  doctrinal  innovations  which 
Khrushchev  had  launched  and  certainly  do  not  seem  to  have  been  aware  of  the 
implications  which  they  had  for  Sino-Soviet  relations.  15 
However,  Khrushchev's  savaging  of  the  Stalin  legacy  fitted  a  little  less 
comfortably  into  the  pattern  because  of  its  violence.  It  was  not  quite  so  easy  to  see 
what  the  Soviets  had  to  gain  by  such  a  move.  Clearly  Khrushchev  was  taking  a 
considerable  risk  in  damming  the  marl  with  whom  so  much  of  Communism's 
credibility,  within  and  without  the  Soviet  Union,  was  inextricably  bound. 
The  first  indications  that  there  had  been  a  secret  side  to  the  Congress'  proceedings 
were  reported  by  the  Embassy  in  a  telegram  of  the  12th  March.  16  It  seemed  from 
"fairly  well  authenticated  rumours"  that  Khrushchev  had  kept  his  most  caustic  remarks 
about  Stalin  to  a  special  meeting  at  the  very  end  of  the  Congress.  Details  at  this  point 
were  sketchy,  but  the  basic  outline  was  apparent.  17  There  were  further  intimations  that 
14  FO  371  122765  NS  1015113,  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Lloyd,  17th  February,  1956.  In  his  immediate 
reaction  to  Khrushchev's  14th  February  speech  which  Eden  read  and  agreed  with,  Hayter 
philosophised, 
A  genuine  agreement  to  live  and  let  live  with  an  expanding  Marxist  State  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  The  only  hope  is  that  this  State  should  cease  to  he  expanding,  cease  to  be  genuinely 
Marxist...  Are  there  any  traces  in  this  speech  of  the  beginning  of  such  a  process?  It  is,  I  fear, 
too  early  to  answer  this  question  in  the  affirmative.  The  process,  if  ever  it  begins  at  all,  will 
certainly  be  an  unconscious  one,  and  long  after  the  regime  has  become  essentially  conservative 
it  will  continue,  like  the  regimes  that  grew  out  of  the  French  and  American  revolutions,  to 
intone  revolutionary  slogans...  I  do  not  think  that  there  is  anything  in  this  speech  which  would 
justify  us  in  believing  that  this  stage  has  now  been  reached,  consciously  or  unconsciously.  On 
the  contrary  it  threatens  us  with  new  and  more  insidious  dangers. 
Hayter  was  though  rather  tickled  by  Khrushchev's  proposal  to  set  up  "hoarding  schools",  largely  as 
an  attempt  to  deal  with  increases  in  hooliganism  among  the  Soviet  young.  The  Winchester  educated 
Ambassador  could  not  but  notice  overtones  of  Dr.  Arnold  in  the  rhetoric  used  to  candy  the  idea  by 
the  Communist  Party's  First  Secretary. 
15  On  this  see  Donald  S.  Zagoria,  The  Sinu-Soýº4et  Conflict,  1956-61.  pp.  39-65,  and  David  Floyd, 
Mao  against  Khrushcheº'.  Both  Zagoria  and  Floyd  in  a  sense  a`*ree  with  the  Foreign  Office  view  of 
1956,  in  so  far  as  the  impact  of  doctrinal  reform  on  Sine-Soviet  relations  was  to  take  a  couple  of 
years  to  come  to  its  bitter  fruit  whereas  the  division  over  the  secret  speech  and  de-Stalinisation 
became  more  immediately  apparent. 
16  FO  371  122767  NS  1015/43,  Telegram  No.  263,  Hayter  to  London.  12th  March,  1956.  For  the 
American  reaction  which  was  not  appreciably  different  from  the  British  see  FRUS  1955-57,  Vol. 
XXIV,  pp.  72-108.  For  Khrushchev's  account  of  the  genesis  of  the  Secret  Speech  see  Khrushchev 
Remembers,  pp.  3341-35-3). 
17  ibid.,  Stalin,  it  seemed,  had  tortured  and  killed  to  the  extent  that  his  lieutenants  answered  his 
summons  in  fear  of  their  lives.  Khrushchev  had  also  accused  Stalin  of  ignoring  warnings  about 
Germany's  surprise  attack  in  1941  and  of  having  "liquidated"  30.000  of  the  Soviet  armies  best 
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Stalin  was  also  about  to  be  publicly  thrown  from  his  place  of  honour,  literally  in  the 
removal  and  destruction  of  the  many  monuments  to  his  vanity.  18 
Over  the  following  days  the  trickle  of  evidence  increased,  leading  the  Embassy  to 
conclude  that  the  Soviet  Government  was  attempting  to  transmit  the  revelation  of  this 
new  Stalin  to  its  people  gently,  so  as  to  cushion  the  shock.  19  By  the  end  of  March 
sufficient  information  had  become  available  for  Havter  to  send  a  full  despatch  on  the 
subject  to  London.  20  Indeed  by  this  point  it  reasonably  accurate  account  of  what 
Khrushchev's  speech  contained  had  already  appeared  in  the  Western  press.  '-1  Hayter's 
despatch  fleshed  out  a  little  upon  the  content  of  the  speech.  However,  the  biggest 
question  left  in  the  minds  of  foreign  observers  was  not  about  the  actual  text,  but  about 
causation.  Hayter  stressed  that  it  was  not  so  much  the  theme  of  anti-Stalinism  which 
was  new,  but  the  vehemence  of  its  expression, 
Stalin  was  gradually  assuming  life-size,  and  if  this  process  had  been  continued 
the  "cult  of  the  individual"  could,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years,  have  been 
eliminated  without  any  psychological  upheaval...  But  Khrushchev  and  his 
colleagues  have  not  been  content  with  this,  and  have  decided  to  tell  the  Soviet 
people  the  whole  truth,  or  a  great  deal  of  it,  about  Stalin's  tyrannical  ways. 
Why  should  Khrushchev  have  decided  on  this  new  approach?  Hayter  did  not  think 
that  the  explanation  would  be  found  by  reference  to  the  Cold  War  as  the  confessions  of 
the  Congress  were  much  more  likely  to  harm  the  unity  and  credibility  of  the 
"international  Communist  movement"  than  they  were  to  aid  it.  '-'-  Rather  he  suggested 
that  there  were  three  factors  at  work.  Firstly.  the  Cult  of  Stalin  stood  in  the  way  of  the 
modern  society  which  the  Communist  leadership  was  attempting  to  create  in  the  Soviet 
18  FO  371  122767  NS  1051/54.  Despatch,  Moscow  Chancery  to  Northern  Department,  15th  March, 
1956.  By  this  point  it  was  known  that  Khrushchev  had  also  castigated  Stalin's  self  glorification  and 
made  some  reference  to  the  Doctor's  Plot.  However,  the  impact  upon  graven  images  was  yet 
limited, 
Although  Khrushchev  is  reported  to  have  said  that  statues  of  Stalin  would  gradually  be  reduced 
in  number,  we  have  so  tiºr  only  heard  of  one  hein`*  removed  -  from  the  entrance  of  the  hall  of 
the  Moscow  Conservatory.  It  seems  rather  unusual  for  Soviet  musicians  to  be  in  the  political 
avant  `;  adle. 
This  situation  was  very  soon  to  change. 
19  FO  371  122767  NS  1015/55.  Telegram  No.  302.  Hayter  to  London.  19th  March,  1956.  Hayter 
reported  that  "many  sources"  confirmed  the  existence  of  a  letter  outlining  Khrushchev's  criticism  of 
Stalin  which  was  being  read  Out  at  ad  hoc  meetings  of  Party  Members  in  "Soviet  institutions  and 
factories". 
20  FO  371  122767  NS  1015/67.  Despatch.  Hayter  to  Lloyd,  23rd  March,  1956.  So  quick  had  details 
filtered  out  to  the  West  that  Havter  thought  the  Soviet  leadership  must  have  intended  Khrushchev's 
Secret  Speech  to  he  secret  only  in  name.  Copies  had  been  available  for  purchase  at  a  Danish 
Embassy  reception  on  the  11th  March. 
21  The  Tunes.  17th  March,  1956. 
Robert  Rhodes  James  is,  presumably,  not  referring  to  the  opinion  of  the  British  Government  when 
he  asserts  that  Khrushchev's,  "Islensational  repudiation  of  Stalin  had  led  some  to  believe  that  he  was 
likely  to  he  less  assertive  of  Soviet  policies  outside  Russia.  a  delusion  that  was  to  be  swiftly  dashed 
by  experience  of  this  cruel,  cunning,  but  not  wholly  unattractive  villain".  See  Anthony  Eden,  pp. 
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Union.  Stalin  had  stood  for  the  stifling  of  individual  initiative,  a  quality  which  was 
essential  for  the  further  development  of  the  Soviet  economy.  23  Secondly.  it  may  have 
been  that  Khrushchev  felt  it  necessary  to  finish  the  Congress  with  his  expose  in  an 
attempt  to  will  around  party  members  who  were  not  impressed  by  the  new  line  which 
had  been  promulgated  during  the  previous  days.  24  In  this  Hayter  was  referring  to  the 
rank  and  file  and  not  a  clique  within  the  leadership.  Thirdly,  there  was  perhaps  a  less 
"rational"  factor  to  be  considered.  Stalin's  worms  might  finally  have  taken  a 
posthumous  opportunity  to  bite  back  after  years  of  humiliation  and  suffering  at  his 
hands.  25  Hayter  was  quite  clear  that  whatever  the  leadership's  motivation  may  have 
been  the  policy  was  fraught  with  dangers, 
Once  again  they  have  ignored  the  effect  on  foreign  Communist  Parties.  They 
have  deliberately  taken  the  risk  of  offending  a  large  proportion  of  their  own 
people.  They  have  laid  themselves  open  to  the  charge  of  doing  nothing  to 
restrain  Stalin  during  his  lifetime.  All  this  is  a  measure  of  their  personal 
hatred  of  Stalin  and  their  confidence  in  the  strength  of  their  own  position  now. 
The  Foreign  Office's  understanding  of  why  Khrushchev  had  indulged  himself  did 
not  change  greatly  over  the  coming  months,  not  even  after  the  final  appearance  of  a 
complete  text  of  the  speech  on  the  4th  June.  1956  by  the  good  office  of  the  US  State 
Department.  The  resignation  in  this  same  month  of  both  Molotov  and  Kaganovich 
from  their  Ministerial  posts  did  lead  to  some  speculation  as  to  the  importance  of 
Khrushchev's  speech  in  respect  of  his  control  over  the  leadership.  However, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  Kaganovich,  the  issue  was  by  no  means  clear  to  British 
observers.  26  But,  in  the  main,  Hayter's  emphases  on  the  need  to  foster  the  initiative  of 
the  Soviet  citizen  and  less  rational  impulses  seemed  sound.  E.  E.  Orchard,  in  an 
23  Hayter  to  Lloyd,  23rd  March,  1956.  Haytcr  reflected,  "they  [the  Soviet  leaders]  want  to  turn  the 
Soviet  people  into  a  progressive,  efficient,  enterprising.  scientifically-minded  nation;  in  fact  to  turn 
the  Soviet  Union  into  a  kind  of  Socialist  United  States  of  America...  It  is  easy  to  imagine  that  they 
felt  hampered  everywhere  by  the  heritage  of  Stalin".  The  failure  to  shuffle  off  the  legacy  of  Stalin 
was,  of  course,  to  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the  ultimate  collapse  of  Soviet  power. 
24  ibid.  Hayter  reported  that  it  seemed,  "very  likely  that  after  Khrushchev's  and  Mikoyan's  speeches  at 
the  congress  many  delegates..  may  have  defended  Stalin  and  criticised  the  new  line". 
25  ibid.  Hayter  postulated,  "the  Soviet  leaders  may  have  wanted  for  a  long  time  to  remove  the 
innumerable  monuments  to  so  repulsive  a  memory.  But  it  is  only  now,  in  the  flush  of  confidence 
after  the  20th  Party  Congress.  that  they  have  felt  able  to  take  the  decisive  step  to  blacken  Stalin's 
name"  . 
?6  On  the  Ist  June  Molotov  resigned  in  favour  of  D.  T.  Shepilov  who  at  this  point  was  a  pronounced 
Khrushchevite  and  apostle  of  liberalisation.  Kaganovich  followed  on  the  6th  June.  leaving  his 
position  as  Chairman  of  the  State  Committee  on  Labour  and  the  Wage  Question.  see  Power  and 
Policy,  p.  291.  There  was  some  debate  as  to  the  importance  of  Ka_ganovich's  decline,  not  least 
because  Khrushchev  had  made  references  in  the  secret  speech  to  both  his  and  Molotov's  Stalinist 
past  which  implicated  them  in  the  appointment  of  Yezhov  and  thus  the  purges  of  the  thirties.  The 
truth  of  the  matter  was  not  entirely  clear  to  the  Foreign  Office  at  the  time,  FO  371  122771  NS 
1015/122.  Despatch,  Moscow  Chancery  to  Northern  Department,  15th  June,  1956.  and  Minutes  by 
T.  E.  Bridges,  28th  June.  1956,  ans!  E.  E.  Orchard.  30th  June.  1956.  Molotov's  position  was  also 
the  subject  of  some  speculation,  not  least  because  of  favourable  references  in  Voprns-v  Istorii  to  his 
role  in  1917.  It  seemed  he  was  down,  but  not  yet  quite  Out. Chapter  8/  Page  176  V 
Information  Department  Minute  of  the  13th  June,  went  so  far  as  to  liken  the  Secret 
Speech  to  the  Jewish  Day  of  Atonement, 
The  Russians  remain  an  emotional  people  and  Khrushchev  may  have  felt  that  a 
major  act  of  collective  political  expiation,  redeemed  by  the  transfer  of  guilt  to 
Stalin  as  the  scapegoat,  would  re-enthLIse  Soviet  society  with  some  of  its  old 
Communist  fervour...  the  denunciation  of  Stalin  is  also  a  token  of  greater 
personal  security.  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  intelligentsia  and  administration 
will  exercise  greater  initiative  the  more  they  sense  they  are  safe.  27 
The  20th  Party  Congress  acted  as  a  grand  confirmation  of  the  Foreign  Office's 
assessment  of  Soviet  policy  over  the  previous  year  or  more.  So  much  so  that  it  seemed 
at  the  time  to  be  rather  unremarkable  in  most  aspects.  The  Secret  Speech  was  the  one 
truly  surprising  development,  apparently  owing  as  much  to  emotion  as  rational 
calculation.  Certainly  it  was  very  shortly  to  have  a  calamitous  impact  upon  the 
stability  of  the  Soviet  Common  wealth.  28  However,  more  immediately  important  in 
influencing  the  attitude  of  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  was  Bulganin's  and  Khrushchev's 
descent  on  Britain  from  the  18th  to  the  27th  April,  1956. 
THE  VISIT 
Khrushchev's  and  Buläanin's  visit  to  Britain  was  witness  to  some  very  frank  talking, 
particularly  on  the  side  of  the  hosts.  However,  possibly  the  most  important  impact  of 
the  event  was  the  influence  it  had  upon  Eden's  appreciation  of  Soviet  foreign  policy.  29 
The  analysis  which  the  Northern  Department  had  developed  during  1955  finally  seems 
to  have  been  fully  taken  on  board  as  a  consequence  of  the  impressions  which  were 
garnered  by  both  Eden  and  Lloyd,  although  there  was  still  to  be  flickers  of  the  vanity 
of  statesmanship.  30 
27  FO  371  122771  NS  1015/127,  Minute  by  E.  E.  Orchard,  13th  June,  1956.  Orchard  further 
commented  that  this  last  point  was  something  of  a  two-edged  sword  and  that  the  "initiative"  of  the 
Russian  people  might  not  always  work  to  the  advantage  of  the  Soviet  Government.  He  had  begun 
his  piece  as  follows,  "although  there  is  every  sign  that  Khrushchev's  denunciation  of  Stalin  is  the 
culminating  point  of  a  long  process  which  began  within  three  weeks  of  his  death,  its  emotional 
impulsiveness  and  unexpected  (though  qualified)  historical  realism  have  injected  the  most  potent 
stimulant  yet  into  the  post-Stalin  system".  There  was  also  a  Northern  Department  submission  on  the 
issue  at  FO  371  122771  NS  1015/117,  which  has  not  been  released  under  the  thirty  year  rule.  It 
seems,  however,  unlikely  that  this  would  contain  any  great  difference  of  opinion. 
28  By  the  summer  of  1956  it  was  clear  that  the  Soviet  Government  was  having  second  thoughts  about 
the  wisdom  of  de-Stalinisation.  particularly  in  relation  to  Eastern  Europe.  FO  371  122785  NS 
1021/50,  Despatch.  C.  Parrot,  Moscow  to  F.  0.,  27th  June,  1956  and  minute  by  T.  Brimelow,  21st 
August,  1956. 
29  For  an  appreciation  of  its  place  in  the  Soviet  'schema  see.  Diaren«  in  Europe,  pp.  68-70. 
30  FO  371  122821  NS  10522/307.  Telegram  No.  2172,  from  Selwyn  Lloyd  to  Sir  Roger  Makins. 
Washington.  18th  April.  1956.  Clarification  of  Soviet  intentions  was  the  main  British  objective. 
The  talks  were  justified  to  the  Americans  by  Lloyd  in  the  following  terms.  "we  are  not  optimistic  of 
achieving  si:  _nificant  results,  hut  we  may  have  the  opportunity  of  the  probing  the  Soviet  mind.  I 
need  hardly  say  that  we  shall  take  care  not  to  prejudice  the  interests  cat  our  allies  or  to  get  out  of  step 
on  matters  which  are  of  joint  allied  concern".  He  then  went  on  to  list  British  objectives  which  I 
paraphrase  as  follows.  Firstly,  new  light  on  Soviet  thou.  hts  on  the  international  situation  and  what Chaptzr  8!  Page  177 
There  had,  of  course,  been  some  debate  within  Government  as  to  whether  the  visit 
should  be  allowed  to  go  ahead  as  a  consequence  of  Khrushchev's  virulently  anti-British 
rhetoric  in  the  previous  year.  However,  diplomacy  prevailed  over  amor  propre,  not 
least  because  the  Soviets  made  it  quite  clear  that  they  very  much  wanted  the  visit.  31 
Hayter  observed  the  Soviet's  concern  for  the  success  of  the  venture  in  his  report  for  the 
first  quarter  of  1956 
, 
"relations  with  the  United  Kingdom  reached  a  high  pitch  of 
synthetic  cordiality,  in  Moscow  at  any  rate,...  in  preparation  for  the  forthcoming  visit 
of  the  Soviet  leaders  to  Great  Britain".  3-  He  ww  . 1s  even  invited  to  address  the  Soviet 
people  via  television  in  the  lead  up  to  the  visit.  a  novelty  which  seems  to  have  been 
carried  of  with  some  aplonib.  33 
British  pique  was  confined  to  the  trimming  of  the  programme  of  events  which  was 
4  to  be  enjoyed  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Socialism.  I  Even  so  they  were  subjected  to 
an  intensive  introduction  to  what  Whitehall  considered  the  essentials  of  British 
civilisation  which  included  Oxford  University,  a  nuclear  reactor  and  Holyrood  Palace 
as  well  as  tea  with  her  Majesty.  35  This  rather  narrow  slice  of  British  life  was  reflected 
in  the  apartments  chosen  for  the  Soviets  in  Claridges  Hotel.  36 
their  ainis  really  are.  Secondly.  to  repeat  criticism  of  Soviet  policies  and  acts.  Thirdly,  to  probe  the 
possibility  of  new  departures  to  settle  hi-1  issues.  Fourthly,  to  cast  light  on  the  situation  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  particularly  after  the  deposition  of  Stalin.  Fifthly,  to  ask  the  visitors  to  clarify  their 
recent  repudiation  of  the  doctrine  of  inevitable  contli:  t  and  how  they  propose  to  operate  peaceful 
coexistence  and  competition.  Sixthly,  to  take  them  LIP  on  their  desire  tor  closer  contacts. 
31  FO  371  122817  NS  1052/187,  Minute,  H.  A.  F.  Hohl:  r.  lath  March.  1956. 
32  FO  371  122769  NS  10  15/88,  Quarterly  Report.  Hay  ter  to  Selwyn  Lloyd,  4th  April,  1956. 
33  FO  371  122820  NS  1052/292,  Despatch,  Hayter  to  Northern  Department,  20th  March,  1956.  In  a 
letter  of  the  Ist  April  the  Northern  Department  .  ongrttuktted  Hayter  on  successfully  walking  the 
tightrope  between  servility  and  offence.  The  text  of  Havter's  broadcast  was  also  published  in 
Pravda,  20th  March.  , 
34  FO  371  122809  NS  1052/20,  Minute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  5th  January  1956,  submitting  reduced 
programme  of  events.  At  FO  371  122832  NS  105_'  583.  H.  A.  F.  Hohler  gave  the  following 
justification  for  the  visit  despite  the  adverse  turn  of  the  international  atmosphere  after  Geneva  in 
July  in  a  brief  dated  30th  April,  1956,  prepared  for  Selwyn  Lloyd's  meeting  with  the  West  German 
Foreign  Minister  Herr  von  Brentano, 
We  nevertheless  decided  to  persevere  with  the  visit  as  we  felt  that  the  increase  of  tension  made 
talks  with  the  Soviet  leaders  more,  rather  than  less,  necessary.  For  this  purpose  London  was 
the  most  suitable  place.  Our  perseverance  has  hen  justified  in  the  course  of  the  long  and 
strenuous  talks  which  took  place  during  the  visit. 
35  Hayter  records  in  his  memoirs  misgivings  about  the  itinerary,  A  Double  Life,  p.  137, 
The  programme  that  had  been  designed  for  them  was  not  one  I  should  have  chosen  myself;  it 
took  them  to  a  number  of  historical  and  beautiful  places,  but  neither  of  them  had  any  visual 
sense  or  interest  in  history,  and  they  saw  little  of  the  modern  industrial  or  agricultural  areas  in 
which  Khrushchev  at  least  would  have  been  really  interested... 
Hayter  expressed  these  reservations  at  the  time  in  FO  371  122838  NS  1052/606,  Minute,  Sir 
William  Hayter,  3rd  May,  1956.  Khrushchev  had  -ýpccitically  made  comment  at  the  and  that  he 
would  have  preferred  to  see  more  farms  and  tactonc:.  ý.  although  Hayter  thought  Khrushchev  most 
relaxed  "at  a  tea-party  in  Holvrood  Palace  attended  by  -verv  duke  and  duchess  in  Scotland". 
36  Peter  Wright  in  Spycwclwr,  The  Candid!  Awohl  ().  %,  ralY!!  \  Oj  (r  Settiur  Intelligence  Officer,  pp.  72-73, 
recalls  the  hugging,  of  Khrushchcv's  suite  by  : NI15 
.  t7-  a  .  onsidcrahle  technical  achievement  which 
produced  little,  apart  trum  the  following,  "he  I  Khru!.  h:  hcv  I  wiLs  an  extraordinarily  vain  man.  He 
stood  in  front  of  the  mirror  preening  himself  fur  hours  at  a  time,  and  tossing  with  his  hair  parting.  I 
recall  thinking  that  in  Eden.  Khrushchev  had  found  the  perfect  match". Charter  8/  Page  178 
There  had,  indeed,  already  been  something  of  a  precursor  in  the  visit  during 
March  of  Malenkov  in  his  diminished  capacity  as  Minister  of  Electric  Power 
Stations.  37  Hugh  Gaitskell  in  particular  seems  to  have  gained  a  very  positive 
impression  after  a  total  of  five  hours  of  conversation  with  Malenkov.  This  experience 
provided  a  pointed  contrast  with  the  disastrous  hospitality  which  the  Labour  Party 
offered  Khruslhchev.  38 
Those  planning  the  event  in  the  Foreign  Office  were  much  concerned  with  the 
potential  for  embarrassment  of  Khrushchev's  habit  of  extempore  speechifying.  39  He 
had  afterall  built  up  a  substantial  reputation  in  the  held  since  1953.  This  was  the  main 
factor  behind  the  relatively  limited  exposure  to  the  Great  British  public  which  the 
Soviet  leaders  were  afford,  although  there  was  also  some  concern  that  the  wrong  sort 
of  people,  that  is  extreme  left  sympathisers.  might  provide  a  supportive  audience.  40 
Given  the  debacle  which  Khrushchev's  one  substantial  ad  hoc  contribution  caused 
within  the  confines  of  a  House  of  Commons  function  room  in  the  company  of  the 
Labour  Party,  caution  over  Khrushchev's  behaviour  was  probably  justified.  41  Less  so 
was  concern  for  the  reaction  of  the  British  people.  In  fact  Khrushchev  and  Bulganin 
faced  a  politely  indifferent  and  at  times  even  hostile  populace.  So  much  so  that  Hayter 
thought  it  must  have  been  a  confusing  experience  for  the  Soviets,  given  that  the 
capitalist  government  seemed  more  genially  inclined  to  them  than  the  oppressed 
proletariat.  42 
37  There  is  a  record  of  this  visit  at  FO  371  122953  NS  163  10  and  122954  NS  16310. 
38  See  Phillip  Williams,  Huh  Gair.  vkell,  p.  412  and  also  Phillip  Williams.  cd..  The  Diaty  of  Hugh 
Gaitskell,  pp.  482-493  which  contains  a  record  of  the  conversations.  In  Harry  Hopkins  account  of 
the  40's  and  50's,  The  New  Look,  p.  385.  there  is  a  striking  photograph.  taken  during  the  visit,  of 
Malenkov  in  festal  mood  sar  wiched  between  two  members  of  the  Dagenham  girl  pipers  band 
dressed  as  extras  from  Brig  O'Doon. 
39  There  is  a  large  amount  of  material  on  preparations  for  the  visit  at  FO  371  l?  '8l?  NS  1052,1  2813 
NS  1052  and  122814  NS  1052. 
40  Khrushchev  complains  of  this  in  his  memoir.  Khrushchev  Remembers.  p.  409.  Lloyd  is  quite 
specific  on  the  issue.  Suet  1956,  pp.  62-63,  "it  had  been  feared  that  their  visit  would  provide  an 
opportunity  for  large  left-wing  demonstrations".  The  Northern  Department's  minuting  in 
preparation  for  the  17th  April  makes  clear  that  they  expected  the  Soviet  leaders  would,  behave  as  it 
was  in  their  interests  to  put  on  a  good  international  show.  However,  the  risk  of  exposing  so  volatile 
a  man  as  Khrushchev  unchaperoned  was  not  to  he  taken,  FO  371  122813  NS  1052/96.  Northern 
Department  Minute.  Ist  March,  1956. 
41  FO  371  122810  NS  [052/31,  Minute  by  H.  A.  F.  Hohler,  23rd  January,  1956.  Ironically  at  this 
point  Hohler  was  expressing  concern  that  such  a  meeting  fitted  in  with  other  Soviet  attempts  to  get 
J(i"ý  with  European  Socialist  Parties.  He  hinted  darkly  "the  idea  may  have  emanated  from  a 
Russian  source.  "  Dulles  was  to  take  comfort  from  the  dinner,  illustrative  as  it  was  of  the  difficulties 
the  Soviets  would  face  in  encouraging  co-operation  between  Communists  and  Socialists  in  Western 
countries.  FRUS  1955-57.  Vol.  XXIV.  p.  118.  %  emorandum  of  Discussion  at  289th  Meeting  of  the 
National  Security  Council.  Washington.  2Sth  June.  1956. 
42  FO  371  122834  NS  l052'606.  Minute.  Haytcr.  3rd  May.  1956.  On  the  diplomatic  niceties  of  the 
translation  of  "hot).  hood  see  also,  -1  Double  Lije.  p.  137. Charter  S  Page  179 
A  desire  to  oil  the  wheels  of  diplomacy  also  informed  the  Foreign  Office's  attitude 
to  the  substantial  mail  which  was  received  from  the  public  on  the  visit.  Most  of  it, 
although  not  all,  was  hostile  and  consequently  fobbed  of.  43 
Eden  is  quite  clear  in  his  memoirs  that  the  main  benefit  gained  by  the  encounter 
was  the  chance  to  speak  plainly  with  the  Soviets  and  develop  some  deeper  mutual 
understanding.  44  Indeed  he  went  to  considerable  lengths  to  ensure  the  talks  were 
accorded  the  kind  of  secrecy  which  he  thought  their  importance  demanded.  45 
Khrushchev,  in  contrast,  seems  to  have  been  rather  less  impressed  by  the  business  side 
of  the  visit.  46  Quite  probably  this  is  a  reflection  of  the  much  more  substantial  impact 
which  Eden's  experience  had  upon  his  estimation  of  the  enemy  than  vice-versa. 
The  formal  talks  held  at  the  start  of  the  visit  in  Downing  Street  gave  the  habitual 
issues  of  East  West  debate,  inevitably,  a  British  twist.  47  The  two  most  lively 
discussions  were  held  over  colonialism  and  Middle  Eastern  affairs,  as  might  be 
expected  given  the  difficulties  which  the  British  had  faced  as  a  consequence  of  Soviet 
foreign  policy  over  the  previous  year. 
The  first  meeting  gave  Eden  a  chance  to  hit  back  at  the  Soviet  rhetoric  in  India  and 
South  East  Asia.  48  According  to  the  British  record,  at  least,  he  did  so  with  some 
dignity  and  force.  Khrushchev  and  Bulganin  asserted  that  their  speeches  had 
denounced  colonialism  in  the  abstract  rather  then  the  British  particular,  consequently 
they  considered  Britain's  offence  to  have  been  caused  of  misunderstanding.  So  far  as 
Britain  was  in  the  process  of  decolonialisation  they  were  in  fact  offering  a  backhanded 
compl  i  ment.  49  Eden  was,  however,  not  prepared  to  let  the  matter  rest  so  easily, 
suggesting  that  if  this  was  the  Soviet  view  they  should  publicly  compliment  Britain's 
conversion  of  Empire  into  Commonwealth.  There  was  also  some  attempt  by  the  other 
British  Ministers  present.  R.  A.  B.  Butler  and  Selwyn  Lloyd,  to  pin  the  colonialist  tag  on 
the  Soviets.  Khrushchev  responded  by  stressing  peaceful  evolution  as  the  means  by 
which  he  hoped  socialism  might  be  achieved  in  other  countries.  There  was,  he  insisted, 
no  threat  of  Soviet  interference  abroad,  whether  through  force  or  subversion. 
43  For  example  FO  371  122810  NS  1052/34,  letter  from  Mr  Barnett  Janner  MP,  President  of  the 
Board  of  Deputies  of  British  Jews,  6th  January,  1956.  This  letter  asked  for  an  interview  with 
Khrushchev  in  order  to  raise  some  less  than  diplomatic  questions.  The  Northern  Department  palmed 
off  this  request,  as  so  many  others,  with  formulaic  and  vague  platitudes. 
44  Full  Circle,  pp.  354-366.  There  is  a  substantial  printed  record  of  the  formal  talks.  informal 
conversations  and  impressions  of  the  Soviet  leaders  at  FO  371  122836. 
45  There  was  even  considerable  reservations  about  showin`_  the  minutes  to  the  Americans:  FO  371 
122834  NS  1052/605,  %tinute  by  J.  G.  Ward,  7th  May,  1956. 
46  Khrushchev  Remembers,  p.  404.  Khrushchev's  account  dwells  on  the  sight  seeing  rather  than  the 
plain  talking.  "substantively  cur  talks  didn't  add  much  to  what  had  come  out  of  our  Geneva 
meeting". 
47  The  old,  but  persistent  chestnuts  included  European  Security,  German  reunification.  disarmament, 
strategic  controls  on  East-West  trade  and,  as  Eden  puts  it  in  his  memoir,  "the  hardy  biennial  so 
grimly  described  as  "Cultural  exchanges"".  Eden'.  love  cat  flowers  provided  in  this  metaphor  a 
pungence  generally  lacking,  from  his  prose,  Full  Circle.  p.  360. 
48  FO  371  122836,  Record  of  First  Plenary  Meeting.  19th  April,  1956. 
49  Ibid.  Khrushchev  went  :o  tar  as  favourably  to  compare  the  French  habit  of  clinging  on  in  Indo- 
China  and  North  Africa  with  Britain's  more  gracious  retreat  from  Empire. Chapter  8/  Page  180 
Selwyn  Lloyd  also  took  the  opportunity  to  quiz  the  Soviets  directly  about  their 
commitment  to  peaceful  coexistence.  As  the  record  puts  it.  "the  Foreign  Secretary 
said  that  there  was  a  view  in  this  country  that  the  new  developments  in  the  Soviet 
Union  were  only  a  change  of  tactics".  Which  point  Bulganin  replied  to,  after  some 
diversion, 
They  [the  Soviets]  were  amused  by  the  suggestion  that  recent  steps  taken  by 
them  merely  had  been  a  change  of  tactics.  He  referred  to  the  Austrian  State 
treaty  and  the  communiques  after  their  visits  to  Yugoslavia  and  India.  It  was 
impossible  to  imagine  that  the  recent  Congress  simply  represented  a  change  in 
tactics.  New  principles  had  been  set  forth  relating  to  both  to  their  internal  and 
to  their  foreign  policy.  50 
The  discussion  ended  with  a  bland  endorsement  of  the  principle  of  non-interference  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  others. 
The  second  meeting  on  the  20th  April  was  specifically  concerned  with  the  Middle 
East  and  provides  an  interesting  indicator  of  the  British  Government's  understanding  of 
its  vital  interests.  It  is  important  to  understand  that  the  following  statement  was  not 
merely  an  expression  of  personal  opinion,  but  the  considered  view  of  the  British 
Government  which  had  been  established  in  discussions  before  the  Soviets'  arrival.  51 
The  memo  of  the  20th  April  exchange  records, 
The  Prime  Minister  referred  to  a  natter  which  affected  the  position  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  We  were  dependent  in  our  industrial  life  on  outside 
supplies  of  oil.  Without  that  oil  we  should  have  unemployment  and  we  should 
slowly  starve  to  death.  Our  Russian  friends  would  understand  that  we  were 
not  prepared  to  allow  that  to  happen.  For  us  the  supply  of  oil,  mainly  from 
the  Persian  Gulf  area  was  literally  vital. 
Eden  went  on,  in  a  melodramatic  flourish  which  probably  owed  rather  more  to  his  own 
inspiration, 
He  thought  that  he  must  be  absolutely  blunt  about  the  oil  because  we  would 
fight  for  it.  52 
50  ibid. 
51  FO  371  122827  NS  1052/485,  Record  of  Discussions  held  in  the  Prime  Minister's  Office  at  the 
House  of  Commons,  16th  April,  1956.  At  this  meeting,  the  following  advice  had  been  t'iven, 
There  was  some  discussion  of  the  briefs  on  the  Middle  East.  Sir  William  Hayter  expressed  the 
view  that  the  best  line  to  take  on  this  was  to  bring  home  to  the  Russians  the  seriousness  of  the 
subject,  by  explaining  the  vital  nature  of  our  interests.  They  should  be  made  to  realise  that 
interference  in  the  Middle  East  was  a  serious  matter. 
Eden's  account  cat'  the  negotiations  in  Full  Circle  tends  tu  over  emphasise  the  role  he  personally 
played  in  deciding  the  British  Position.  Havter  ,  gas.  eßt  course.  in  Britain  for  the  duration  of  the 
Soviet  visit. 
52  FO  371  122536.  Record  of  Second  Plenary  \Ieetin_.  20th  April.  1956.  Eden's  concern  for 
"unemployment"  provides  a  quaint  contrast  with  Conservative  politicians  Ot  our  own  day.  Perhaps 
the  Suez  Crisis  would  not  have  led  to  Such  a  mess  it  dir.  , "vlaior  had  been  in  har`e. Charter  8/  Page  181 
Such  frankness  seems  to  have  startled  Khrushchev.  53 
Eden's  bellicosity  is  probably  more  illuminating  of  his  own  frame  of  mind  than  it 
was  influential  over  Soviet  foreign  policy.  Not  least  because  by  November  of  the  same 
year  his  threat  was  proved  most  emphatically  to  be  sincere.  This  was  not  to  be  the 
only  expression  of  concern  regarding  Soviet  involvement  in  the  Middle  East.  Eden 
extended  a  number  of  feelers  in  an  attempt  to  sound  them  out  on  the  coordination  of 
action  in  the  interest  of  peace,  in  particular  over  Palestine.  '-  An  equitable  settlement 
of  Arab-Israeli  disputes  would,  of  course,  greatly  have  been  to  Britain's  advantage.  55 
Khrushchev  was  not  prepared  to  play  ball. 
The  talks  were  supplemented  by  informal  conversations  which  went  over  much  the 
same  ground  although  at  times  in  a  more  whimsical  style.  Selwyn  Lloyd  especially 
employed  a  twee  line  in  diplomatic  euphemism,  referring  to  intelligence  sources  as 
"little  birds"  whilst  discussing  with  Khrushchev  the  problem  of  Soviet  arms  supplies  to 
Yemen  and  the  Middle  East  in  general.  56  These  contacts  were,  in  their  way,  valuable 
in  affording  the  British  a  chance  to  get  to  know  the  Soviet  leaders  and  to  evaluate  the 
relationship  between  them.  57  It  seemed  quite  clear  that  Khrushchev  was  the  man  in 
authority,  although  there  was  more  debate  over  the  quality  of  his  personal  relations 
with  Bulganin;  Hayter  thought  them  to  be  excellent.  58 
However,  the  Soviets  were  not  about  to  make  unguarded  comments  on  matters  of 
policy.  Despite  considerable  priming  on  the  issue  of  de-Stalinisation  neither  Bulganin 
53  Ibid.  The  record  continues,  "Mr  Khrushchev  said  that  the  Prime  Minister  would  hardly  find 
sympathy  with  the  Soviet  Government  if  he  said  that  he  was  prepared  to  start  a  war.  They,  for  their 
part,  would  only  resort  to  war  if  an  attack  were  made  on  them  or  on  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries". 
Khrushchev  also  went  on  to  raise  Soviet  concerns  over  the  Baghdad  Pact.  Eden  reports  this 
exchange  accurately  in  Full  Circle,  pp.  358-359.  Lloyd  talks  about  this  session  as  the  "one  occasion 
when  they  [the  talks  seemed  to  approach  a  flash  point",  Sue;  1956,  p.  62.  Also  see  Evelyn 
Shuckburgh's  diary  entry  for  the  day  which  records  the  reaction  of  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  also 
present  at  the  Downing  Street  talks,  Descent  to  Suez,  p.  354. 
54  FO  371  122827  NS  1052/492,  Record  of  Conversation  between  Eden  and  Khrushchev  18th  April, 
1956.  This  was  indeed  one  of  the  first  serious  issues  which  Eden  raised  with  Khrushchev  in  a 
private  dinner  at  Claridges  on  the  18th  April  immediately  after  the  Soviets  had  arrived  in  London. 
Khrushchev's  response,  according  to  the  record  of  Thomas  Brimclow  who  was  translating,  was  not 
encouraging,  "Khrushchev  said  that  he  did  not  see  how  they  could  intervene  in  something  that  was 
up  to  the  Israelis  and  Arabs  to  settle".  Also  Ivone  Kirkpatrick's  report  of  the  visit  to  Pearson  Dixon 
at  the  United  Nations:  FO  371  121236  V  1054/105.  Letter,  Kirkpatrick  to  Dixon,  1  1th  May,  1956. 
55  See  Descent  to  Suez,  pp.  209-366.  This  aim  consumed  much  the  most  frustrating  part  of  Evelyn 
Shuckburgh's  time  after  1954. 
56  Khrushchev's  account  of  this  makes  rather  more  of  the  "birdie"  metaphor  than  Lloyd's.  Khrushchev 
retorted  that  Britain  was  just  as  guilty  of  selling  arms  in  the  area.  Possibly  something  was  lost  in 
the  translation  of  his  following  remark,  "wouldn't  it  he  nice  if  Al  the  birdies  started  chirping  the 
same  thin.,  in  both  our  ears  -  that  we  should  assume  a  mutually  hinding,  obligation  not  to  sell  arms  to 
anyone". 
ýKhrushcheº'  Remembers,  p.  404.  See  Site:  1956.  p.  63  for  an  entertaining  account  of  the 
journey  to  Harwell  atomic  power  -station 
during  which  the  "birds"  did  their  chirping.  Also  FO  371 
122831  NS  1052/573,  Record  of  a  Conversation  between  S.  S.  O.  F.  A.  and  Bulganin  and 
Khrushchev  on  the  Journey  between  London  and  Harwell,  21  ý%t  April.  1956. 
57  At  least  this  was  Selwyn  Lloyd's  opinion.  Suez  1956.  p.  62 
58  FO  371  122834  NS  105"606,  Minute,  Sir  William  Hayter.  3rd  May.  1956  and  Minute,  H.  A.  F. 
Hohler,  3rd  May,  1956.  Hohler  pointed  out  the  Npccial  police  interpreter.  a  Mr  Perry.  had  detected 
signs  of  strain  between  the  two.  The  Northern  Department  tended  towards  Hayter's  view. Chaptz  r8/  Page  182 
or  Khrushchev  gave  anything  away,  saving  that  they  agreed  it  was  a  good  thing. 
Indeed,  on  the  19th  April,  in  the  aftermath  of  dinner  at  10  Downing  Street  Churchill 
adopted  the  curious  role  of  Stalin's  advocate  commenting  to  Bulganin  that  he  "had 
always  found  Stalin  as  good  as  his  word  and  a  great  war  leader,  but  could  not  speak  of 
pre-war  events.  "  Bulganin  limited  himself  to  confessing  that  lie  "had  advised" 
Khrushchev  to  make  his  Secret  Speech.  59  The  Soviet  leaders  proved  no  more  candid 
abroad  than  when  at  home. 
Eden  informed  the  British  public  in  a  television  broadcast  after  the  departure  of  the 
Soviet  leaders  that  the  talks  were  "the  beginning  of  a  beginning°.  6o  The  hope  was  that 
this  dialogue  might  continue  and  produce  more  substantial  results  than  the  bland 
communique  which  was  issued  jointly  in  London-61  There  were  even  plans  made  for  a 
return  visit  by  Eden  to  Moscow.  62  Overall  the  "Bulge  and  Khrush"  tour  proved  a  high 
point  of  goodwill  between  Britain  and  the  Soviet  Union,  carrying  the  "spirit  of 
Geneva",  albeit  in  a  rather  scaled  down  form,  into  1956. 
There  were  two  notorious  incidents  which  might  have  turned  the  aftermath  rather 
more  sour,  but  neither  had  any  substantial  impact.  The  clash  between  Khrushchev  and 
the  Labour  Party  was  clearly  no  responsibility  of  the  Government.  It  was  caused  by  a 
combination  of  Khrushchev's  bombastic  extempore  speech,  made  at  the  request  of 
junior  members  of  the  Labour  group.  including  lames  Callaghan,  and  the  insistence  by 
Gaitskell  that  the  issue  of  Soviet  maltreatment  of  Social  Democrats  in  Eastern  Europe 
should  be  raised.  Matters  were  made  considerably  worse  by  George  Brown's 
combative  response  to  Khrushchev.  who  was  later  to  observe  that  if  he  were  British  he 
would  be  a  Conservative  voter.  63 
The  Commander  Crabbe  Affair  was  potentially  much  more  embarrassing.  It  was 
also  fogged  in  considerable  mystery  which  a  House  of  Commons  debate  on  the  10th 
May,  1956  did  nothing  to  disperse.  64  It  seems  that  a  relatively  minor  official  had 
sanctioned  an  attempt  by  the  retired  Commander  Crabbe  to  examine  underwater  the 
hull  of  the  Soviet  leader's  cruiser  at  anchor  in  Portsmouth.  This  was  in  contradiction 
of  Eden's  explicit  and  very  sensible  instructions  that  no  such  secret  operations  should 
occur  during  the  visit  to  Britain.  Crabbe's  decapitated  body  was  washed  up  some  time 
later.  However,  the  Soviets  were  just  as  keen  as  the  British  to  further  the  atmosphere 
59  FO  371  122830  NS  1052/551,  Record  of  Conversations  at  the  Dinner  at  No.  10  Downing  Street, 
April  19th.  1956.  Eden  later  again  introduced  the  subject  of  co-operation  over  Palestine  into 
conversation  with  Buivanin  to  little  suc  ss. 
60  There  is  a  copy  of  the  address  at  FO  3-1  122835  NS  1052/630. 
61  This  was  published  in  a  House  of  Commons  White  Paper.  Cmd.  9753.  April.  1956. 
62  The  plan  was  to  visit  the  Soviet  Union  later  in  the  same  year  as  a  means  of  keeping  the  process 
going.  There  is  a  melancholy  tilt  full  with  the  ephemera  of  futile  or  anisation  at  FO  371  122837 
NS  1052.  Also  Full  Circle,  p.  362.  The  Suez  and  Hungarian  crises  made  such  a  visit  impossible. 
63  Khrushchev''  account  and  that  of  Brown  and  Gaitskell.  unsurprisingly,  do  not  agree,  see 
Khru  lichee  Remembers.  hp.  41'1-413.  George  Brown.  In  Wv  Wen'.  pp.  69-75,  Hugh  Gairskell,  pp. 
413-414.  The  Diary  of  Hu,  i'h  Guirskell.  pp.  505-5  I  S.  also  . -Indru,,  v  Eden.  p.  434. 
64  Hcuc.  curd  Vol.  552.  cols.  1760-1764. Chapter  8/  Page  183 
of  cordiality  and  so  they  graciously  made  no  tuss.  65  Indeed,  the  controversy 
surrounding  the  incident  tends  to  act  in  the  historiography  as  something  of  a 
distraction.  66 
What  was  much  more  important  than  botched  espionage  or  international  glad- 
handing  was  the  final  push  which  the  visit  gave  Eden  in  reconsidering  Soviet  foreign 
policy.  Hovering  behind  the  pleasantries  remained  the  darker  competitive  side  of  the 
Soviete  new  talk  of  coexistence.  On  occasions  it  came  unpleasantly  to  the  fore,  as 
during  the  discussion  on  the  Middle  East.  Eden  comments  in  his  memoirs  that  he  was 
quite  aware  of  the  limits  of  Soviet  amiability.  Indeed  in  private  he  dwelt  on  this  as  the 
most  important  lesson  of  the  visit.  He  recalled  his  thoughts  on  returning  from  waving 
Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  off  at  Victoria  station, 
Back  at  Number  10,1  had  to  decide  what  our  policy  should  now  be.  The 
present  Soviet  rulers  had  as  much  confidence  as  their  predecessors  in  the 
ultimate  triumph  of  communism.  They  were  unshakeably  determined.  The 
methods  they  would  employ  might  be  different  fror»  those  of  Stalin  and  they 
might  be  harder  to  meet.  Many  influences  had  served  to  bring  about  this 
change,  including  the  power  of  the  nuclear  deterrent  as  a  major  influence 
against  world  war.  We  had  to  consider  the  adjustments  needed  in  our  policies 
to  cope  with  a  new  situation,  for  a  new  situation  it  undoubtedly  was.  67 
It  would  seem  that  in  terms  of  the  Foreign  Office  assessment  of  Soviet  policy  which 
Eden  had  essentially  ignored  during  his  January  visit  to  Washington,  the  penny  had 
finally  dropped.  68  This  was  one  of  the  most  important  factors  which  lead  him  to  call 
for  a  fundamental  re-evaluation  of  Britain's  defence  policy  which  took  place  in  early 
July,  1956.69 
65  FO  371  122885  NS  1216/9,  Telegram  No.  603,  Hayter  to  F.  0..  10th  May,  1956.  Hayter  made  the 
following,  assessment  of  the  Soviet  response  on  the  10th  Flay, 
Since  my  return  Bulganin  and  Khrushchev  have  been  effusively  friendly  to  me...  It  seems 
therefore  that  they  are  anxious  to  keep  up  it  favourable  atmosphere  its  regards  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  while  continuing  attacks  on  the  Labour  Party,  and  this  coupled  with  the  silence 
of  the  Soviet  press,  makes  me  think  that  they  are  unlikely  to  exploit  the  frogman  incident  and 
that  the  least  Said  soonest  mended  should  he  our  motto. 
Also  see  Anrhonv  Ecleu,  pp.  436-438,  Full  Circle.  pp.  165-366  and  Khº"ushc"hev  Remembers,  pp. 
411-412. 
66  For  example  Lord  Blake's  treatment  of  the  Soviet  visit  is  entirely  taken  up  with  the  Crabbe  farrago, 
The  Decline  of  Power,  pp.  360-36  1.  The  errant  M  16  officer.  Nicholas  Elliott  is  about  to  publish  his 
memoirs,  The  Guardian.  12th  January,  1994.  Needless  to  say  he  passes  the  accusation  of 
incompetence  further  up  the  chain  of  command. 
67  Full  Circle.  p.  362.  Also  Descent  to  Sue:,  p.  353;  Shuckburgh,  in  response  to  William  Barker's 
impression  that  Eden  was  falling  for  Bul`_anin  and  Khrushchev's  charm,  expressed  the  following 
confidence,  "1  told  him  that  A.  E.  always  looks  as  if  he  is  falling,  for  that  kind  of  thing:  but  that  in 
reality  he  has  a  very  shrewd  idea  of  what  he  is  up  against".  Barker,  an  expert  on  Soviet  affairs,  was 
assisting  with  interpretation. 
68  This  was  also  the  line  which  Lloyd  took  in  conversations  with  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  von 
Brentano  during  his  April  visit  to  London.  T  234/67.  Record  of  Meeting  in  Foreign  Office  at  3 
p.  m.  on  Monday.  30th  April.  1956. 
69  FO  371  123  187  ZP  514?.  Eden  to  Lloyd.  31st  May,  1956.  Eden  set  out  the  parameters  for  this 
review  in  Full  Circle,  p.  363.  Sidney  Aster  picks  up  the  point  in  his  biography  of  Eden. Chapter  8/  Page  18  4 
This  review  was  to  raise  some  interesting  points  about  the  future  of  Britain  in  a 
world  which  was  increasingly  defining  international  rivalries  in  economic  terms.  70 
Indeed,  there  had  already  been  rumblings  about  the  pointlessness  of  preparation  for  all- 
out  war  when  the  Soviet  Union  was  unlikely  to  choose  such  a  destructive  course  of 
action.  Sir  Christopher  Steel,  head  of  Britain's  permanent  delegation  to  NATO  in 
Paris,  pointed  out  in  a  despatch  of  the  26th  April,  1956  that  even  if  hostilities  were  to 
begin  despite  Soviet  intentions,  as  the  defence  of  the  West  depended  on  the  use  of 
nuclear  weapons,  "[Western  Europe]  would  be  smoking  and  impassable  wilderness  in 
which  man's  only  thought  would  be  self-preservation  and  where  organised  existence, 
let  alone  organised  warfare  had  practically  ceased-.  71  Of  what  value  would  a  few  extra 
tanks  and  aeroplanes  be  then?  Eden  was  himself  at  last  grappling  with  the  response 
Britain  ought  to  make  to  so  profound  a  change  in  the  context  of  Cold  War  rivalry.  72 
The  review  reveals  a  considerable  amount  on  the  opinions  held  at  the  top  level  of 
Government  about  Britain's  future  as  a  world  power  and  the  means  by  which  she  was 
to  secure  it.  Alongside  an  awareness  of  her  smallness  in  comparison  with  the 
continental  giants  of  America  and  the  Soviet  Union,  not  to  mention  the  potential  of 
China,  India  or  Canada,  there  was  also  the  problem  of  keeping  up  with  the  industrial 
competition  provided  by  a  renascent  West  Germany.  Much  had  been  achieved  since 
1945,  but  most  of  the  money  had  come  from  America  and  no  great  power  could  long 
survive  dependent  upon  charity.  However.  great  store  was  laid  by  "prestige"  factors 
which  increased  Britain's  ability  to  intluence  events  and  the  question  was  set 
confidently  in  terms  of  how  Britain  was  to  maintain  her  status  amongst  the  first  rank  of 
states.  73  Although  there  may  have  been  some  who  wondered  whether  she  should  really 
be  there  at  all,  their  voice  did  not  survive  the  drafting  of  position  papers.  74 
These  issues  are  not  of  immediate  interest  to  this  thesis.  Yet  there  are  profound 
problems  here  for  any  explanation  of  Eden's  behaviour  during  the  Suez  Crisis.  Why 
confusingly  given  exactly  the  same  title  as  Robert  Rhodes  James'  hook.  Anthony  Eden,  pp.  138-140. 
Civil  Servants  had  been  preparing  papers  for  such  a  review  since  at  least  March,  substantially  before 
the  Soviet  visit  kindled  Eden's  enthusiasm  for  the  venture,  FO  371  123187  ZP  5/30G,  Sir  R.  Powell 
Ministry  of  Defence  to  P.  H.  Dean.  F.  O.,  28th  March.  1956. 
70  There  is  a  considerable  amount  of  material  in  the  F.  O.  tiles,  FO  3:  1  123187,123188  and  123191, 
but  the  relevant  Cabinet  papers  do  not  seem  yet  to  he  open. 
71  FO  371  123187  ZP  5/31G,  Sir  C.  Steel,  UK  Permanent  Delegation,  Paris  to  Sir  R.  Powell, 
Ministry  of  Defence,  26th  April,  1956.  This  despatch  was  a  thoughtful  piece  on  Britain's  future 
defence  requirements.  It  was  used  by  officials  from  the  Treasury.  Defence  Ministry  and  Foreign 
Office  in  the  drawing  up  of  "The  Future  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  World  Affairs". 
72  William  Clark.  From  Three  Worlds,  Memoirs,  p.  165.  In  his  diary  entry  for  the  19th  June,  1956 
Clark.  Eden's  press  adviser,  thought  this  one  of  the  main 
. 
justifications  for  his  continued  support  of 
the  administration. 
[Ylet  for  all  my  personal  dislike  of  the  PM...  I  do  realise  that  in  politics  he  stands  for  what  is 
best  and  most  liberal  and  central.  It  is  he  who  has  seen  the  possibility  of  reducing  our  vast 
burden  of  conventional  arms  in  the  light  of  the  hydrourn  bomb  and  the  change  in  Russia;  he 
has  seen  the  change  from  Cold  War  to  the  trade  struggle  and  told  the  nation  about  it... 
73  FO  371  123191  ZP  9/12.  The  Future  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  World  Affairs.  This  was  put 
forward  for  the  consideration  of  the  Ministerial  committee  set  up  by  Edon. 
74  FO  371  123191  ZP  9/5.  Minute  by  Sir  H.  Caecia.  30th  April.  1956. Chapter  8/  Page  185 
should  a  Government  apparently  so  clearly  aware  of  its  precarious  dependence  on 
American  financial  strength  and  the  importance  of  prestige  in  its  foreign  policy, 
recklessly  gamble  with  both'?  75 
To  return  to  matters  more  immediate,  Soviet  deeds  continued  to  confirm  their 
words.  In  the  first  half  of  1956  there  was  an  increasing  amount  of  evidence  feeding 
back  to  Whitehall  further  illustrating  the  new  methods  which  the  Soviets  had  adopted 
in  their  engagement  with  the  West. 
ECONOMIC  COLD  WAR 
Whitehall's  concern  over  the  use  of  economic  power  in  the  advancement  of  Soviet 
influence  was  particularly  acute  in  the  case  of  Egypt.  Although  this  was  by  no  means 
the  only  cause  of  friction  between  Nasser  and  the  British,  it  seems  to  have  played  an 
increasingly  important  role.  By  the  summer  of  1956  it  provided  Eden  with  one  of  his 
main  arguments  against  continuing  Anglo-American  support  for  the  funding  of  the 
Aswan  High  Dam.  This  reversal  of  the  British  Government's  initial  enthusiasm  is  a 
measure  of  how  far  Anglo-Egyptian  relations  had  deteriorated  in  less  than  a  year.  That 
it  was  Dulles  who  chose,  on  the  19th  July,  to  break  the  arrangement  off  abruptly  was  a 
consequence  of  different  American  tactics  rather  than  any  trans-Atlantic  disagreement 
over  strateýy.  76  The  episode  provides  an  interesting  indication  of  the  seriousness  with 
which  the  British  Government  as  a  whole  now  viewed  "peaceful  competition".  It  also 
betrays  a  dangerously  feverish  streak  in  Whitehall's  assessment  of  Egyptian  politics. 
On  the  19th  April,  1956,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Cairo  sent  to  London  a  clear- 
headed  analysis  of  the  threat  which  Soviet  involvement  in  Egypt  posed.  77  It  outlined 
the  general  conditions  which  had  over  the  previous  year  favoured  Soviet  foreign  policy 
in  the  Middle  East.  78  The  rise  of  Arab  nationalism  and  the  decline  of  colonialism  had 
75  See  Diane  B.  Kunz,  The  Economic  Diploinarv  of  the  Sue:  Crisis,  pp.  186-194  on  the  importance  of 
having  money".  The  final  refuge  taken  by  Kunz's  explanation  of  British  policy  in  the  mysteries  of 
"mid-summer  madness"  would  probably  not  satisfy  most  historians  of  the  Crisis,  but  I  think  she  has 
a  point. 
76  There  is  a  considerable  controversy  over  this,  see  Keith  Kyle,  Sue;,  pp.  123-130;  The  Economic 
Diplomacy  of  the  Suez  Crisis,  pp.  65-72;  Anthony  Eden,  pp.  445-453:  Suez,  1956,  pp.  68-72  and 
Full  Circle,  pp.  419-422.  Also  FO  371  119058  JE  1422/297G.  Minute  by  D.  A.  H.  Wright,  27th 
November,  1956  on  Harold  Caccia  "slin`ºin`g  mud  Of  our  own  making"  at  Mr.  Hoover  in 
Washington  over  the  American  termination  of  the  dang  project.  The  matter  is  best  summed  up  by 
Kunz  on  p.  71  of  her  book, 
As  Makins  [British  Ambassador  in  Washington]  had  indicated,  British  officials  had  not  yet 
decided  to  inform  the  Egyptian  Government  about  the  Aswan  decision.  However,  their 
objections  were  a  matter  of  form  rather  than  substance,  and  they  recognised  that  given 
American  circumstances  and  the  fact  that  this  was  mainly  American  money.  Dulles  had  the 
right  to  make  the  decision.  Furthermore.  British  officials  betrayed  a  sense  of  relief  that  the 
irksome  dam  problem  was  solved. 
77  FO  371  1  18846  JE  1024/I,  Despatch,  Sir  Humphrey  Trevdlyan  to  Selwyn  Lloyd.  19th  April.  1956. 
78  ibid.,  Trevelyan  dated  the  launch  of  the  Kremlin',  IleWW  \liddIC  Eastern  policy  quite  specifically  to  a 
Soviet  Foreign  ºMinistrv  announcement  of  the  16th  . Aril,  1955.  This  had  been  immediately  before Chapter  8/  Page  186 
created  an  ideal  environment  in  which  their  new  emphasis  on  "blandishments  and  aid" 
could  play  merry  havoc.  The  Czech  Arms  deal  and  anti-Isreali  posturing  were  now- 
bolstered  by  the  switch  of  Egyptian  staple  produce,  cotton  and  rice.  from  glutted 
Western  to  Communist  markets.  All  of  which  increased  the  opportunities  for  Soviet 
"technicians"  to  apply  directly  their  baleful  intluence  over  Egyptian  affairs. 
Although  at  this  point  the  Embassy  %  as  Careful  to  keep  the  issue  in  perspective, 
there  was  no  doubting  that  the  relationship  posed  a  serious  problem  for  Britain. 
Trevelyan  cautioned, 
I  cannot  emphasise  too  greatly  the  necessity  for  contriving  some  means 
whereby  Egyptian  cotton  can  be  marketed  through  Western  channels  and 
Egypt's  deficits  with  the  Sterling  area  and  Western  Europe  liquidated,  if 
Egyptian  economic  dependence  on  the  Soviet  Bloc  is  to  be  limited.  79 
However,  the  Cairo  Embassy  maintained  a  sober  attitude  towards  Egypt's 
connection  with  the  Soviet  Union,  a  sobriety  which  was  increasingly  at  odds  with 
opinions  held  in  London.  Up  to  the  final  moments  of  the  Western  proposal  for  the 
Aswan  High  Dam,  Trevelyan  continued  to  think  that  Nasser  would  always  prefer 
dealing  with  Britain  or  America  over  the  Soviet  Union,  despite  persistent  rumours  to 
the  contrary.  These  rumours  came  to  a  crescendo  during  the  visit  of  Demitri  Shepilov, 
the  new  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  to  Egypt  in  June,  1956.80  Furthermore,  Trevelyan 
advised  London  that  even  accepting  the  project's  political  and  financial  problems,  it 
offered  too  111UC11  by  way  of  advantage  merely  to  be  abandoned,  particularly  if, 
subsequently,  the  Egyptians  were  to  Find  a  Soviet  alternative.  81  Trevelyan  was  not 
prepared  quite  yet  to  regard  Nasser  as  an  unsalvageable  victim  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
This  view  was  in  contrast  to  the  opinions  of  important  figures  within  the  Foreign 
Office.  On  the  7th  June,  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick  made  the  following  guarded  reference 
to  the  British  attitude  towards  Nasser  in  a  conversation  with  Eugene  Black  of  the 
World  Bank, 
the  opening  of  the  Bandoeng  Conference  of  non-aligned  states,  thus  the  announcement  had  initially 
been  interpreted  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  no  more  than  propaganda. 
79  ibid..  Trevelyan  did  express  some  reservations  rewarding  the  capacity  of  Communist  markets  to 
absorb  Egyptian  production.  Furthermore,  he  had  considerable  doubts  about  the  ability  of 
technicians  to  interfere  with  Egyptian  society  given  the  stridently  hostile  attitude  which  Nasser's 
Government  took  a`_ainst  indigenous  Communists.  However,  his  concern  for  the  impact  of  cotton 
exports  seemed  to  have  been  shared  by  Kaissouni.  the  pro-Western  Egyptian  Minister  of  Finance, 
FO  371  119055  JE  1422/206G,  Telegram  No.  1086.  Trevelyan  to  F.  O.,  21st  June,  1956. 
80  FO  371  113847  JE  1025/10,  Despatch.  Trevelyan  to  Lloyd.  28th  June.  1956. 
81  FO  371  119055  JE  1422/206G,  Telegram  No.  1087.  Trevelyan  to  F.  0.,  21st  June,  1956. 
Trevelyan  insisted,  somewhat  inelegantly, 
I  can  only  repeat  my  view  that,  however  distasteful  it  may  he  to  maintain  our  otter  in  the  light 
of  recent  political  developments  here,  the  situation  is  essentially  no  different  from  that  which 
lead  us  to  make  the  offer  in  December,  1955.  and  that  it  is  in  our  interests  to  conclude  the 
negotiation  on  the  aides  memoirs..  in  view  of  the  most  serious  effect  on  Egyptian  future 
relations  over  many  years  with  the  West,  if  the  Communists  are  to  build  the  dam. Charter  8/  Pave  187 
I  did  not  say  very  much  about  our  attitude  except  to  remark  that  it  seemed  to 
me  to  be  a  matter  of  assessing  the  political  situation  in  Egypt.  If  Nasser  was 
really  committed  body  and  soul  to  the  Russians,  as  many  people  thought,  the 
building  of  a  Dam  by  some  Russians  would  only  be  of  marginal  importance.  82 
This  coy  reference  to  British  opinion  was,  in  fact,  indicative  of  the  consensus  view  of 
the  Foreign  Office.  Archibald  Ross,  responsible  for  the  African  Department,  deployed 
the  following  argument  against  the  Dain  in  a  paper  dated  25th  June,  1956,  written  for 
the  benefit  of  the  Prime  Minister. 
When  the  plan  was  mooted  there  was  a  reasonable  prospect  that  the  Czech 
Arms  Deal  would  be,  as  Nasser  assured  us,  "once  and  for  all"  and  that  he 
would  keep  other  Soviet  technicians  out  of  Egypt  if  lie  obtained  help  for  the 
Dam  from  the  West.  This  hope  has  been  progressively  contradicted  by 
events.  The  Russian  grip  on  Egypt  is  already  considerable.  and  it  is  too  late 
to  keep  the  Russians  out.  Indeed,  whether  Nasser  realises  it  or  not,  he 
probably  could  not  now  free  himself  from  them  if  he  wanted  to.  83 
Ross  pointed  out  that  favours  for  Egypt  created  tensions  with  more  reliable  and  less 
courted  states  such  as  Iraq  and  besides  which  there  was  the  problem  of  financing  the 
British  contribution.  By  this  point  a  dangerous  combination  of  impotence,  frustration 
and  fatalism  had  come  to  dominate  Whitehall's  thinking  on  the  issue. 
All  of  these  arguments,  with  a  little  pepping  up  of  metaphors,  were  in  turn 
coin  municated  to  Dulles  via  Sir  Roger  Makins  as  reasons  why  the  British  Government 
was  having  very  serious  second  thoughts.  s-t  Ultimately,  the  case  against  proved 
irresistible.  What  was  the  point  in  spending  scarce  resources  in  attempting  to  tilt  the 
political  balance  in  Egypt  when  it  looked  increasingly  likely  that  Western  money  could 
have  little  impact.  The  British  thought  that  the  best  policy  would  be  to  let  the  matter 
chunter  on  without  abruptly  turning  Nasser  down,  although  he  was  effectively  being 
written  of  as  a  loss  to  the  Soviets.  85  Dulles,  forthright  as  ever,  took  more  decisive 
action.  86 
82  FO  371  1199055  JE  1422/190G,  Minute  by  Sir  Ivone  Kirkpatrick,  7th  June.  1956.  The  World 
Bank  was  to  loan  the  largest  portion  of  the  monies  needed  to  finance  the  Aswan  High  Dam,  the 
United  States  and  Britain  providing  the  rest  through  grant  aid.  Black,  the  American  President  of  the 
Bank.  was  its  main  representative  throughout  the  tortured  and  ultimately  futile  process  of 
negotiating  detail.  See  The  Economic  Diplumncy  uj*the  Suez  Crisis,  pp.  58-72  and  Suez,  pp.  82-85. 
83  FO  371  119057  JE  1422/270G.  Minute  by  A.  D.  M.  Ross,  25th  June.  1956.  Ross  had  just  taken 
over  Evelyn  Shukbur`:  h's  position  in  charge  of  the  Levant  and  African  Departments,  see  Descent  to 
Suez,  pp.  356-358.  Shuckburgh's  attitude  toward  the  clans  and  Soviet  influence  in  Egypt  was  at  one 
with  that  of  the  Foreign  Office,  "tant  pis".  If  Vassar  wanted  to  play  with  tire,  the  best  way  to  teach 
the  error  of  his  ways  would  be  to  let  him  burn  his  Lingers. 
84  FO  371  119056  JE  1422/225;  Telegram  No.  3153  from  F.  O.  to  Washington,  10th  July,  1956. 
"...  Nasser  is  already  enmeshed  in  the  Soviet  net"  was  ;  uhstituted  for  Ross'  "Russian  grip".  This 
Telegram  was  drafted  in  close  consultation  with  the  both  Eden  and  Macmillan. 
85  FO  371  119056  JE  1422"37G.  Minute  by  A.  D.  M.  Ro-,.,.  I3th  July,  1956. 
86  Kunz  argues  this  had  more  to  do  with  Dulles'  desire  tee  demonstrate  domestically  his  "dominance"  in 
the  development  of  American  torei`m  policy.  She  alum)  :  u-__ues  that  this  was  al  clear  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  Americans  to  exert  economic  influence  on  Egypt  by  administering  a  salutary  shock.  In 'Chapter  8/  Pave  188 
By  the  summer  of  1956  not  only  was  the  British  analysis  of  Soviet  polic}, 
increasingly  emphasising  the  importance  of  economic  aid  as  a  conduit  of  political 
influence,  it  also  accorded  it  a  singular  success  in  the  case  of  Nasser.  87  Yet  there  was 
little  consideration  given  to  the  implications  this  might  have  for  the  British  position  in 
Suez.  If  Nasser  really  was  "enmeshed"  by  the  Soviet's  intrigue,  Western  access  to  the 
Canal  was  surely  already  imperiled.  Indeed  one  Foreign  Office  official  of  the  time  in 
looking  back  has  commented  that  the  main  reason  Nasser's  nationalisation  came  as 
such  a  surprise  was  because  of  this  preoccupation  with  Soviet  intentions,  by 
comparison  with  Soviet  aid  the  amount  of  money  canal  revenues  would  have  yielded 
for  canal  building  seemed  relatively  trivial.  ss  That  in  the  long-term  Trevelyan's  view 
was  to  prove  more  sound  does  not  diminish  the  importance  of  the  British  Government's 
gloomy  prognosis  at  the  time.  s9 
As  might  be  expected,  thought  was  being  given  to  the  means  by  which  the  West 
should,  in  more  general  terms,  respond  to  this  type  of  economic  challenge.  From  the 
start  of  1956  there  had  been  British  consultations  with  allies  as  to  how  western  aid 
might  best  be  deployed  and  increased  in  order  to  counter  Soviet  policy.  This  had  been 
one  of  the  main  issue  discussed  during  the  visit  of  Eden  and  Lloyd  to  Canada  in 
February,  in  contrast  to  its  treatment  whilst  the  pair  were  in  Washington.  At  this  point 
there  had  been  agreement  on  little  more  than  informal  consultations.  90 
This  process  took  up  much  of  the  time  devoted  to  the  issue  in  the  first  half  of 
1956,  both  with  individual  allies  and  within  NATO.  There  was  considerable 
discussion  over  how  best  to  target  and  coordinate  aid  to  make  maximum  impact  against 
the  Soviet  bloc.  The  one  issue  over  which  Whitehall  had  no  doubts  was  that  the 
British  Government  could  simple  not  afford  to  spend  any  more  money  itself,  how 
convenient  it  would  be  if  others  might  supply  that  which  was  lacking.  Western 
Germany  in  particular  was  targeted  as  an  ally  who  had  as  yet  contributed  very  little 
development  aid.  The  visit  of  Herr  von  Brentano,  the  German  Foreign  Minister, 
between  30th  April  and  3rd  May,  1956  provided  an  ideal  opportunity  for  the  raising  of 
the  issue-91 
The  first  proposal  which  the  British  put  forward  concerned  the  formation  of  a 
group  of  "blood  donor"  nations  who  could  channel  aid  to  areas  most  at  risk  from  the 
this  Dulles'  policy  was  a  resounding  failure.  The  Economic  Diploºnoct'  of  the  Suez  Crisis,  pp.  71-72 
and  pp.  192-194. 
87  CAB  130/113.  GEN/518/6/2(d),  Revise;  Egypt,  Note  by  the  F.  0.,  23rd  June,  1956.  It  was 
thought  politic  to  tone  down  this  conclusion  at  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers  Conference  as  it 
was  likely  that  the  Indians  and  Sri  Lankans  would  pass  the  information  on  to  Nasser. 
88  This  is  the  view  of  Sir  Harold  Beeley  in  Wm.  Roger  Louis  and  Hedley  Bull  (eds.  ),  The  Special 
Relationship  curd.  -1ºr  lo-American  Relations  since  1945,  pp.  '_85-93. 
89  See  Suez,  pp.  550-55  1.  Also  see  Sphinx  and  Commissar  for  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  bumpy 
history  of  Soviet-Egyptian  relations  up  to  Saclat. 
90  PREM  I  1/  1334,  Record  of  a  discussion.  Ottawa,  on  7th  February.  1956. 
91  FO  371  120805  VEE  10055/30.  F.  O.  Brief, 
. Aid  to  Underdeveloped  Countries,  30th  April,  1956. 
There  is  a  hill  record  of  the  conversations  at  T  '-  34/67. Charter  8/  Page  189 
Soviet  offensive  which  were  thought  to  be  the  Middle  East  and  South  East  Asia.  92 
They  were  keen  that  this  organisation  should  be  separate  from  both  NATO  and  the 
United  Nations.  93  In  the  first  case  it  was  important  that  aid  should  not  carry  with  it 
too  obvious  a  political  purpose,  precisely  the  accusation  which  the  west  was  making 
about  the  Soviet's  activities.  94  In  the  second  case,  Soviet  presence  in  the  United 
Nations  would  make  it  almost  impossible  to  maintain  the  political  ends  for  which  the 
aid  was,  of  course,  intended.  Whitehall  wanted,  not  unnaturally,  both  to  have  its  cake 
and  to  eat  it. 
Prospective  confederates  in  the  venture  had  rather  different  ideas.  The  Germans 
had  already  expressed  a  preference  for  developing  existing  structures  within  NATO, 
Brentano  had  spoken  along  these  lines  whilst  in  London.  The  Americans  proved  not 
especially  keen  to  reach  any  Final  decision,  not  least,  perhaps.  because  it  was  they  who 
would  have  to  provide  the  lions  share  of  any  increased  Financial  commitment  to 
development  aid.  This  had  been  made  quite  plain  in  January  by  British  permanent 
officials  whilst  in  Washington  with  Eden  and  Lloyd.  Indeed  the  British  were  at  times  a 
little  irked  by  their  attitude.  95  However,  the  most  substantial  diversion  was  provided 
by  the  French.  They  put  forward  a  plan  in  May  which  allowed  for  the  channelling  of 
aid  through  the  United  Nations  and  it  was  this  plan  which  dominated  much  of  the 
discussion  on  the  issue  up  to  and  after  the  Suez  Crisis  broke.  Predictably,  it  was 
christened  after  its  chief  sponsor  Christian  Pineau,  who  was  at  this  point  the  French 
Foreign  Minister.  Needless  to  say,  the  British  were  none  too  impressed,  not  least 
because  there  was  already  a  UN  agency,  SUNFED,  which  was  co-ordinating 
development  aid.  96 
It  is  hardly  surprising,  given  her  financial  embarrassment,  that  Britain  was  unable 
to  stamp  her  leadership  on  the  argument  over  how  to  respond  to  the  challenge  of  Soviet 
economic  aid.  The  one  nation  with  sufficient  muscle  to  draw  the  Western  Allies 
together,  the  United  States,  seems  to  have  reacted  to  the  threat  with  considerably  more 
sang  froid.  Furthermore,  inter-allied  discussions  were  soon  to  be  side-tracked  by  the 
92  ibid.,  At  least  these  were  the  areas  in  which  the  British  felt  their  own  interests  were  most  threatened. 
93  Although  the  British  were  favourahly  inclined  towards  expanding  NATO's  "non-military  activities" 
at  a  time  when  direct  Soviet  aggression  seemed  less  likely.  Nevertheless.  it  NATO  were  to  have 
become  the  main  conduit  for  development  aid  some  members  of  the  Commonwealth,  notably  India, 
would  he  profoundly  unhappy.  CAB  130/113,  GEN/518/6/3(b).  Cabinet  Committee  on 
Commonwealth  P.  M.  's  Meeting,  Note  by  F.  0.,  14th  June,  1956. 
94  There  was  also  the  problem  of  fractious  and  impoverished  allies  within  NATO,  to  wit  Greece  and 
Turkey.  FO  371  120804  VEE  10055/4G,  Letter  from  J.  E.  Coulson  to  D.  A.  H.  Wright, 
Washington.  5th  April,  1956.  In  a  reply  of  18th  April  to  Coulson's  letter  Caccia  laid  out  the 
Government's  "blood  donor"  idea.  The  Problem  of  Turku-Greek  relations  would  not  arise  because 
they  would  not  be  invited  to  join  the  select  gathering.  However,  the  Americans  expressed 
considerable  concern  over  this  issue. 
95  FO  371  120809  VEE  10055/135.  Minute  by  R.  A.  Hibbert.  13th  Au`_ust.  1956.  In  commenting  on 
a  State  Department  positional  paper  which  had  been  sent  by  the  Washington  Embassy,  Hibbert 
complained  that  although  a  balanced  approach  was  to  he  recommended,  the  Americans  "now  seem  to 
be  in  danger  of  under-estimating  the  Soviet  threat". 
96  FO  371  120810  VEE  10055%165.  Minute  by  P.  H.  Gore-Booth,  31st  October,  1956.  SUNFED 
stood  for  Special  United  Nations  Fund  for  EconomiL:  Development. Chapter  8/  Pave  190 
onset  of  a  more  immediate  crisis  in  Egypt.  Yet,  this  should  not  be  allowed  to  mask  the 
gravity  which  the  British  Government  accorded  to  the  issue  in  the  first  half  of  1956. 
Although  incapable  of  doing  very  much  herself.  Britain  was  acutely  aware  that 
something  needed  to  be  doile.  97  Eden's  press  adviser  William  Clark  recalls  in  his 
memoirs, 
What  was  horrifying  was  our  impotence  in  Britain,  which  had  nothing  to  do 
with  whether  Eden  was  a  strong  Prime  N,  nister.  The  fact  was  that  Britain 
was  weak,  especially  in  the  new  cold  war  of  economic  aid.  We  could  not 
make  it  worthwhile  for  Baghdad  to  stay  with  the  West,  nor  Persia  where  there 
was  bound  to  be  trouble  soon.  Nor  India  nor  Cylon.  America  could  do  this; 
but  in  election  year  would  not.  98 
JC  }C  S,  C 
By  1956  the  main  lines  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  seemed  confirmed.  There  were  new 
developments,  not  least  the  radical  turn  which  was  given  to  the  programme  of  de- 
Stalinisation  at  the  20th  Party  Congress,  but  overall  the  Soviets  seemed  concerned  with 
consolidating  the  changes  in  their  presumptions  and  tactics  which  had  developed  since 
1953  and  particularly  during  1955.  Furthermore,  Eden  was  finally  awakened  to  the 
real  importance  of  what  was  going  on,  a  fundamental  re-shaping  of  the  context, 
although  not  the  nature,  of  the  Cold  War.  Indeed,  in  one  key  area,  Egypt,  the  Soviet 
Union's  new  approach  was  undeservedly  credited  with  a  most  spectacular  success.  A 
start  was  also  made  on  the  process  of  assessing  the  implications  for  such  developments 
on  British  policies  in  turn. 
There  were,  however,  still  differences  between  the  Prime  Minister  and  his 
officials.  The  process  of  drafting  the  briefs  for  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Minister's 
Conference  at  the  end  of  June  1956,  provides  an  interesting  vignette  of  the  aspirations 
to  which  those  in  high  office  are  peculiarly  vulnerable.  99  The  Northern  Department 
expressed  irritation  with  the  recasting  given  by  Sir  Norman  Brook  to  their  brief  on 
Soviet  policy.  They  had  attempted  to  give  it  "a  somewhat  gloomy  ring,  partly 
because  we  were  concerned  to  provide  Ministers  with  a  corrective  to  Mr.  Nehru's 
excessively  optimistic  outlook".  100  Brook  had  toned  down  the  difficulties  caused  by 
Soviet  penetration  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East  and  introduced  vague  and  generalised 
talk  about  a  "major  change  in  Soviet  foreign  policy"  which  seemed  to  hint  at 
97  There  is  a  valuable  Treasury  summary  of  the  British  attempt  to  co-ordinate  a  counter  to  Soviet 
economic  diplomacy,  dated  11th  September,  1956  at  FO  371  120809  VEE  10055/130G.  This  was 
written  for  the  benefit  of  the  British  delegation  due  to  attend  the  annual  IMF  meeting  in 
Washington.  It  dates  the  problem  hack  three  years.  commenting  that  "the  tempo  of  this  drive  has 
greatly  increased  over  the  rast  year". 
98  From  Three  Worlds.  p.  163. 
99  Full  Circle.  pp.  375-377. 
100  FO  371  122785  NS  1021/5?.  Minutes  by  Northern  Department  and  J.  G.  Ward,  21st  June.  1956. Chaptcr  8/  Pat.  -c  191 
something  more  than  the  Foreign  Oi'tiLC's  limited  expectations  for  peaceful 
coexistence.  Patrick  Dean  explained  that  this  had  been  dune  as, 
Sir  Norman  Brook  thought  it  woulcl  be  useless  to  put  before  the  Prime 
Minister  something  which  he  would  not  willingly  accept  and  he  therefore 
suggested  a  redraft  which  in  his  view  was  closer  to  the  Prime  Nlinister's  way 
of  thinking  and  would  be  easier  to  put  across  to  the  Commonwealth  Prime 
Ministers  without  arousing  their  hostility.  101 
Eden,  it  seems,  still  harboured  Churchillian  hopes  for  the  possibilities  of  statesmanship 
in  East-West  relations. 
However,  the  view  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  which  was  presented  to  those  trusted 
amongst  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers  at  the  conference  was  essentially  no 
different  from  that  of  the  Northern  Department.  This  select  group  included  the 
"white"  commonwealth  plus  Pakistan,  but  not  India.  %ý.  'hich  is  an  interesting  reflection 
of  the  Commonwealth's  strenngtlhs.  The  Kollo  ing  -analysis  was  put  forward  by  Eden 
for  their  consunmption, 
The  main  threat  to  our  international  position  is  now  political  and  economic 
rather  than  military...  Big  change  is  realisation  by  Soviet  leaders  of  what  war 
waged  with  thereto-nuclear  weapons  would  meeatn.  Now  unlikely  that, 
tempted  by  an  enormous  superiority  in  conventional  forces,  they  will  take 
action  liable  to  result  in  a  major  war.  10' 
This  is  a  quite  reasonable  summary  of  the  view  of  Soviet  policy  which  had  matured  in 
the  Foreign  Office  before  the  end  of  1955  and  became  a  general  perception  the 
following  summer.  The  change  in  Britain's  view  of  the  Soviet  threat  was  firmly 
established. 
'IA  June,  1956.  Dean  thought  it  possible  to  101  ibid..  P.  Dean  and  Sir  I.  Kirkpatrick,  Minutes  of  - 
change  certain  key  phrases.  but  Kirkpatrick  did  not  think  the  issue  Of  Sufficient  importance  to  cause 
a  fuss.  Sadly  the  brief  on  Soviet  policy  is  not  yet  open  to  public  inspection,  despite  the  availability 
of  most  of  the  others. 
102  CAB  13011  13,  GENS  18i6'  30.  Defence  Policy.  Vote:  or  "Additional"  Meeting  with  Prime  Ministers 
of  Canada.  Australia.  New  Zealand.  South  Atrica.  Pakistan  and  the  Federation  [Rhodesia  and 
Nvasalandl,  30th  June.  1956.  Eden  spoke  alonv  these  lines  at  the  first  meeting  of  this  __roup  on  the 
3rd  Jule.  1956.  although  service  :  hier  seemed  rather  te'.  keen  on  the  idea  of  major  cuts  in 
conventional  defence  co  mmittmments.  FO  37  1  123)  187  ZP  5,47 
. 
Minute  by  P.  Mallet,  4th  July,  1956. Conclusion 
The  British  Government's  understanding  of  Soviet  policy  changed  markedly  in  the  period 
after  Stalin's  death.  Indeed  on  the  arguments  laut  forward  in  this  thesis  we  might  go 
further  and  assert,  according,  to  western  perceptions,  that  19  55  was  the  pivotal  year  in  this 
process  and  that  by  1956  Khrushchev's  innovations  were  firmly  established. 
As  far  as  the  British  understood  it  Malenkov  had  presided  over  a  transitional  phase  in 
Soviet  history.  From  the  perspective  of  the  20th  Part,  Congress  of  1956  it  was  clear  to 
British  observers  that  many  of  the  ideological  formulations  had  roots  that  went  back  at 
least  to  1953.  However,  it  was  only  in  19»  thattlie  debate  between  "conservative"  and 
"liberal"  elements  within  the  Soviet  leadership  came  to  some  kind  of  resolution. 
Consequently,  Ntalenkov's  foreign  policy  appeared  to  otter  very  little  that  seemed  new. 
It  conceived  of  Moscow's  international  interests  in  much  the  same  way  as  Stalin  had, 
although  there  might  have  been  some  change  in  presentation  it  went  little  further  than 
that.  This  repackaging  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  did  in  itself  cause  problems  for  British 
interests,  particularly  over  the  rearmament  of  Germany,  but  did  not  necessitate  any  re- 
evaluation  of  British  foreign  policy  in  turn. 
In  this  environment  negotiations  were  conceived  of  by  Eden  and  his  officials  as  a 
hollow  game  of  diplomatic  advantage.  The  one  exception  was  the  problem  of  Indo- 
China.  Here  there  was  sufficient  community  of  interest  in  avoiding  a  disastrous  escalation 
of  the  conflict,  and  sufficient  statesmanship  on  the  part  of  France,  for  a  compromise  to  be 
worked  out.  Churchill's  view  was  rather  different,  but  then  Churchill's  political  career  was 
littered  with  many  romantic  but  lost  causes.  A  summit  meeting,  with  Nlalenkov  must  be 
added  to  the  list. 
I955  and  1956  were  to  be  much  more  exciting  years.  Although  the  fundamental 
objective  set  by  either  side  remained  constant,  the  means  by  and  manner  in  which  these 
objectives  were  to  be  realised  altered  radically.  On  the  simplest,  but  not  necessarily  least 
important  plain,  Soviet  and  Western  leaders  tigere  pleasant  to  each  other  in  public  as  they 
had  never  been  since  the  end  of  World  War  [I.  In  more  concrete  terms  the  Soviets  gave 
up  their  faith  in  achieving  the  world  socialist  utopia  through  Lenin's  "frightful  collisions" 
and  a  more  pacific,  thought  nonetheless  "competitive",  emphasis  on  economic 
developments  emerged.  Furthermore  the  Cold  War  was  changing  in  more  than  just  means 
and  mores.  The  scene  of  battle  shifted  from  that  which  had  become  so  familiar  by  1953. 
the  old  certainties  of  Churchill's  iron  curtain  and  stalemated  confrontation  in  the  Far  East 
were  superseded  by  what  might  be  termed  a  war  of  movement  on  a  global  scale. 
This  change  had  much  to  do  with  the  development  of  new  weapons  technology  and 
in  particular  the  hydrogen  bomb.  For  the  first  time  it  became  apparent  that  wars  could  no 
longer  be  conceived  in  terns  of  winning  and  loosinu  sides.  Global  war  could  not  now  be 
considered  as  a  rational  extension  of  external  policy,  however  desperate  the 
circumstances.  British  military  planners  were  relatively  quick  in  coming  to  this  conclusion 
which  contributed  to  the  Duncan  Sandes  defence  revie\ý  in  1957.  It  as  a  defence  review Ctºn,  Iu.  ion  /  Page  193 
which,  in  all  probability,  would  have  been  completed  under  Eden  in  1956  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  Suez  Crisis. 
Yet  more  important  in  terms  of  the  Cold  \\'ar  were  the  innovations  in  Soviet  policy 
which  similar  conclusions  about  thermonuclear  war  led  to  under  the  leadership  of 
Khrushchev.  Although  there  is  some  debate,  [r  example  Shulman.  as  to  when  the 
beginnings  of  "peaceful  coexistence"  in  Soviet  thinking  should  be  dated,  there  is  little 
doubt,  and  this  very  much  applies  to  the  vie%ý  s  of  British  observers,  that  it  was  not  until 
1955  that  it  really  took  ofd'.  Indeed,  even  as  late  as  February,  1955  it  looked  as  if  the  stale 
certainties  of  high  Stalinism  were  about  to  re-trench  themselves.  Only  after  Khrushchev's 
political  ascendancy  had  been  established  did  any  radical  departure  from  the  past  occur. 
With  the  signing  of  the  Austrian  State  Treaty  of  that  April  it  was  apparent  that  something 
rather  different  was  about  to  break  upon  the  world. 
The  change  in  Moscow's  attitude  was  reflected  in  a  tow-sided  Soviet  policy  which 
seemed  to  the  British  at  times  more  than  a  little  self-contradictory  The  danger  of 
thermonuclear  annihilation  led  the  Kremlin  to  attempt  a  cooling  down  of  the  international 
atmosphere.  This  they  achieved  with  some  success  at  the  Geneva  Summit  of  1955  and  in 
their  goodwill  meetings  with  the  French  and  British  through  1956.  The  visit  of 
Khrushchev  and  Bul  anin  to  London  in  April  of  that  year  marked  for  Britain  a  high  point 
in  the  charm  offensive.  Yet  this  did  not  mean  that  the  Eastern  lion  was  prepared  to  lie 
down  with  the  k'estern  lamb.  Although  there  may  have  been  an  element  of  "wedge 
driving"  in  the  Soviet  courtship  their  main  concern,  as  far  as  the  British  interpretation 
went,  was  to  avoid  the  irrational  negation  of'  all  that  they  had  been  working  towards. 
New  means  were  developed  to  facilitate  the  defeat  of  capitalism  which  were  not 
synonymous  with  global  apocalypse.  Domestically,  the  need  to  overtake  the  West  in 
terms  of  industrial  output  was  stressed.  This  theme  was  given  increasing  importance 
through  1955  and  emphasised  at  the  20th  Party  Congress  in  1956.  Sir  William  Hayter 
thought  it  part  of  the  explanation  for  the  violence  of  Khrushchev's  attack  upon  Stalin  in 
his  Secret  Speech.  Internationally,  the  use  of  economic  strength  in  the  continuing 
competition  between  East  and  West  was  also  crucial  and  it  was  this  point  which  was  to 
pose  the  greatest  challenge  to  Britain's  world  position. 
The  Soviets  bean  to  turn  their  attentions  towards  the  independent  countries  of  the 
"under-developed"  world  (Khrushchev's  "zone  of  peace")  which  Stalin,  and  indeed 
Stalinists  such  as  N/lolotov,  had  tended  to  dismiss  as  puppets  of  the  West.  Khrushchev 
conceived  his  foreign  policy  in  a  global  rather  than  a  European  context.  Unlike  Stalin  he 
was  not  prepared  to  limit  direct  probing,  to  areas  immediately  contiguous  with  the  Soviet 
Union  itself.  For  the  first  time  the  Soviets  began  actively  to  cultivate  the  attention  of 
existing  regimes  in  Asia  and  Africa  by  of  erinu  to  supply  economic  aid  and  military 
hardware.  Up  until  1955  Soviet  activity  in  the  area  had  largely  consisted  of  supporting 
communist  states,  parties  and  insurgents,  particularly  in  Korea  and  Vietnam,  although 
Stalin's  support  for  the  Chinese  Nationalists  before  1949  was  something,  of  an  exception. ConLlu"icýn  /  Pa, 
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Khrushchev's  peaceful  coexistence  involved  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  existing,  structures  of 
avowedly  non-communist  states  such  as  India  and  EL,  pt,  states  in  which  Western 
influence  had  up  till  that  point  dominated  unchallenged.  It  was  this  aspect  of  the  Soviet's 
new  policy  which  caused  the  most  concern  in  Whitehall. 
It  became  slowly  apparent  to  British  politicians  that  the  Geneva  cordiality  was  not 
going,  to  lead  on  to  a  grand  Churchillian  settlement  of  the  Cold  War,  or  even  a 
gentlemen's  agreement  to  ditfer.  The  Geneva  SLI11111111  xý  as  not  to  lead  on,  as  had  been 
hoped,  to  a  process  of  negotiation  terminating  with  a  resolution  of  the  conflict.  In  fact  it 
was  to  make  Britain's  world  position  more  difficult  to  maintain.  The  rules,  rather  than  the 
object  of  the  game,  were  changing. 
Although  the  realisation  of  this  dawned  on  officials  in  the  Northern  Department  by 
the  end  of  1955,  it  was  not  until  after  the  Soviet  visit  to  Britain  in  April,  1956,  that  it  had 
become  clear  to  Eden  that  the  Soviets  posed  a  ne%%  type  of  threat  rather  than  a 
diminishing  threat.  The  most  dramatic  herald  of  this  policy-  as  the  Czechoslovak  arms 
deal  with  Egypt  in  September.  1955,  followed  quickl\'  in  November  and  December  by 
Bulganin's  and  Khrushchev's  economic  diplomacy  cum  publicity  drive  in  South  East  Asia. 
The  Soviets  were  bidding  to  replace  Western  influence  in  areas  of  traditionally  exclusive 
British  interest.  Furthermore  in  the  case  of  Egypt  and  the  Middle  East  these  .  sere,  of 
course,  areas  considered  vital  to  the  maintenance  of  Britain's  economic  well  being.  It  was 
for  Britain  not  merely  a  matter  of  nursing  her  imperial  pride,  but  insuring  her  industrial 
future.  Eden  made  quite  clear  to  Khrushchev  whilst  he  as  in  London  that  the  key  issue 
was  access  to  oil  and  that  Britain  would  go  to  very  considerable  lengths  to  guarantee  it. 
The  British  Government  was  also  aware  that  this  as  not  a  threat  which  she  had  the 
resources  to  deal  with.  In  the  immediate  panic  of  the  Eur  ptian  arms  deal  Eden  turned  to 
the  United  States  as  the  main  source  of  finance  for  the  Aswan  Darn  project  which  was 
also  considered  a  target  for  the  Soviet  predator.  Equally,  in  the  first  half  of  1956  when 
the  scope  of  Soviet  economic  diplomacy  had  become  apparent  it  was  the  Americans  to 
whom  the  British  turned.  The  "economic  offensive",  as  it  had  become  known,  was  taken 
very  seriously  in  the  highest  circles  in  London.  more  seriously  it  seems  than  in  America 
for  obvious  reasons.  Indeed  by  the  summer  of  1956  the  Soviet  policy  had  been  accorded 
a  singular  success  in  the  case  of  Egypt.  For  Britain  the  stakes  included  parts  of  the  world 
which  were  vital  to  her  survival  and  also,  perhaps  perceptions  of  her  own  inadequacy 
increased  the  sense  of  anxiety  which  at  times  bordered  on  despair.  Egypt,  once  more,  was 
the  cause  of  great  anguish.  Britain's  world  role  was  shrinking,  further  in  the  face  of  a  new 
form  of  super-power  competition  which  was  in  the  process  of  development.  As  in  the 
immediate  aftermath  of  World  War  II,  central  to  her  policy  was  the  need  to  bring  the 
United  States  into  areas  '0  hich  she  no  longer  had  the  power  to  control.  1  This  was 
t  Indeed,  Selwyn  Lloyd  sought  to 
. 
dustily  Suez  a"  the  means  by  ,  %hich  this  end  was  achieved.  Suez, 
1956.  P.  25o.  Also,  The  Economic  Diploinoo'  c?  /'  tl,  e  Suer  Cº"i.  ci.  c,  pp.  153-185.  Donald  Neff, 
Warriors  (it  Sue:.  Eisenhower  takes  America  two  the  Middle  E(L,  t  in  1956  and  David  Devereux.  The 
Formulation  (?  t*  British  Defi'mrc  e  Police  towards  the  A  iclclle  East.  1948-1956,  pp.  153-  185. 
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especially  evident  in  Eden's  increasing  effort  to  Induce  the  Americans  to  take  an  active 
role  in  the  Baghdad  Pact  and  in  Whitehall's  attempt  to  encourage  the  Americans  in 
countering  the  Soviets  economic  diplomacy 
. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  the  Soviet  intervention  in  the  "under-developed"  world  had  a 
further  knock-on-effect.  For  the  first  time  countries  such  as  Egypt  enjoyed  a  free  market 
in  arms  supply.  Ironically,  the  Soviets  introduced  choice  into  an  area  which  had 
previously  been  monopolised  by  the  West.  if  not  Britain  herself  Whether  or  not  the 
rather  hysterical  claims  that  the  British  made  for  the  efficacy  of  Soviet  military  and 
economic  aid  as  a  conduit  for  political  influence  were  true,  Britain  now  faced  nationalist 
regimes  which  had  an  unprecedented  freedom  of  manoeuvre.  No  loner  dependent  on 
Western  sources  of  aid  and  materials,  Nasser  extended  his  weings.  both  metaphorical  and 
literal,  as  never  before. 
In  retrospect  British  fears  were  e\auuerated.  Ho«  ever,  Whitehall  was  not  alone  in 
attributing  too  great  a  potential  to  economic  diplonmacy.  Khrushchev  himself  proved  to  be 
over  sanguine  in  the  hopes  he  had  for  this  ne'  törne  of  Soviet  influence.  The  crucial  point 
as  regards  understanding  Britain's  policy  is  that  officials  and  politicians  did  actually 
believe  that  the  Soviet  economy  had  the  capacity,  realised  and  potential,  to  pose  a  very 
serious  threat.  It  was  compared  to  the  rise  of  America's  industrial  strength  in  the  19th 
century.  No  one  at  the  time  could  foresee  that  the  1950's  were  to  prove  the  high  point  for 
Soviet  economic  development  rather  than  a  launching,  pad  into  stratospheric  growth.  the 
electronic  revolution  of  the  60's  and  70's  was  to  leave  the  Soviet  Union  staýýering  a  long 
way  behind  as  it  sank  into  stagiation  and  Ultimately  dereliction.  This  was  all  yet  for  the 
future.  As  far  as  British  observers  at  the  time  understood.  Soviet  domestic  economic 
strength  would  not  only  pose  a  direct  challenue  to  the  West,  it  %%ould  also  increase  their 
ability  to  out-bid  in  economic  diplomacy.  Furthermore,  it  is  easy  to  forget  that  the  British 
were  facing  a  direct  challenge  in  areas  of  the  \ý  orld  v  hich  were  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  her  between  1945  and  1955.  Prior  to  1955  the  only  substantial  power  in  the  Middle 
East  that  the  British  had  to  compete  with  in  peace-time  had  been  the  United  States,  after 
1956  the  British  were  only  too  glad  when  the  Americans  seemed  to  contemplate  taking 
over.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  she  tended  to  exaggerate  the  possible  effect  of  Soviet 
interference,  given  the  stakes  for  which  she  thought  she  was  playing.  As  Eden  said  on  a 
number  of  occasions,  the  British  Government  was  not  prepared  to  let  Britain  be  slowly 
throttled.  \Vhat  is  important  is  that  the  British  Government  perceived  Egypt  to  be 
dangerously  close  to  Soviet  domination,  if  not  already  quite  lost  to  the  enemy. 
By  1956  the  Cold  war  was  a  different  thing,  from  that  which  it  had  been  in  1954. 
Khrushchev  had  entered  the  Soviets  into  a  race  to  out  produce  and  out  develop  the 
capitalists.  Areas  of  the  world  which  had  been  ignored  by  the  Kremlin  were  for  the  first 
Britain  and  American  hoIi,:  y  in  the  attermath  ut  WOlid  War  II  scc.  H.  B.  Ryan,  The  Vision  of 
Anglo-.  -  lneric  a.  the  US-UK  Alliance  and  /u'  E/,  ic  Col,  l  War.  and  ;  ra"er  J.  Harhutt.  Churchill, 
America.  (111(1  the  Orii  ,  nl'.  o'1  the  Cole!  Wirr.  A  hroadcr  u\  crvicw  i,  pr  ided  by  D.  Cameron  Watt, 
Succ"eedlin  lohn  B11l1:.  411cc'ric"u  ill  Plat, 
. 
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time  since  the  1920's  considered  crucial  auents  in  undernminim.  t  the  West.  Economic  and 
military  aid  were  the  means  to  influence  the  alkmments  of  governments  which  were 
beyond  direct  political  control.  It  was  against  this  back<<round  that  the  Suez  Crisis 
exploded  in  the  summer  of  1956. 
Although  it  was  not  originally  intended  that  this  thesis  should  stray  into  the  murky 
and  often  dredged  waters  of  the  Suez  Crisis  itself,  it  seemed  important  to  make  some 
mention  of  it,  at  least  to  mark  out  ground  for  future  research.  The  Cold  War.  as  Gladwyn 
Jebb  had  said  in  1950,  was  the  overall  context  in  which  Britain  formulates  her  foreign 
policy.  2  Therefore,  it  seems  inevitable  that  as  it  expanded  to  take  in  the  peacetime  politics 
of  the  Middle  East,  it  should  also  have  had  an  important  effect  on  Anglo-Egyptian 
relations.  The  burden  of  the  above  is  that  it  did  crucially  poison  the  British  view  of  Egypt 
through  1955  and  1956.  It  allowed  Nasser  an  unprecedented  freedom  of  action  and 
created  an  atmosphere  of  ; general  despair  in  British  policy  makin`  circles.  Against  this 
background  the  desperation  of  Eden's  actions  in  the  October  and  November  of  1956  seem 
rather  less  out  of  proportion  to  the  surrournciinUs 
There  are  those  who  argue  that  the  Cold  War  had  nothing  to  do  with  British  policy  in 
the  Middle  East.  Britain,  they  assert,  was  merely  trying  to  retain  her  position  of  imperial 
dominance  and  that  the  Suez  Crisis  must  be  pl:  iced  in  the  context  of  her  attempts  post 
1945  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  Egyptian  nationalism.  \V  Scott  Lucas  has  recently 
written  a  book  on  Suez  which  develops  such  an  interpretation.  However,  this  overlooks 
the  fact  that  from  1955  Britain  was  forced  to  deal  with  a  new  form  of  Soviet  intrusion. 
No  more  was  Britain's  anti-Soviet  planning  conceived  merely  as  part  of  her  military 
strategy,  but  in  terns  of  political  influence  during,  peacetime  and  the  Middle  East  was  one 
of  the  main  targets  of  Soviet  interest. 
It  is  this  general  context  which  has  been  too  much  ignored  by  Historians.  The  actual 
details  of  British  complicity  in  the  Israeli  attack  on  Egypt  have  in  themselves  acted  as 
something  of  a  distraction.  Too  much  time  has  been  spent  in  the  particular 
circumstances  to  unckerctranA  rrofrij  the  overall  framework  in  which  British  policy  was 
being  made,  and  this  contra  Scott  Lucas,  was  a  Cold  War  framework  and  not  one  limited 
to  the  Middle  East.  It  is  little  wonder,  given  this  shortcoming,  that  the  role  of  the  Soviet 
Union  during  the  crisis  tends  to  be  ignored  or  dismissed  with  the  lightest  flick  of  the  hand. 
Although  the  Soviet  role  in  the  actual  events  was  indeed  limited,  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  the  background  to  the  crisis  and  British  thinking  during  it.  without  an 
appreciation  of  the  influence  that  by  1956  the  Soviets  had  developed,  or  at  least  the 
British  thought  they  had  developed,  in  the  area.  Consequently,  I  suggest  that  this  thesis 
must  rest  on  the  side  of  Keith  Kyle  who  suns  up  Eden's  thinking  as  follows, 
I 
Quoted  by  Anne  Del-_hton  in  Anne  Dzighton  (;:  J.  ),  Bi  wain  and  the  Fi,  -.  %r  Cald  Ww".  p.  1.  This 
volume  of  essays  contains  one  by  W.  Scott  Lucas.  "The  Path  to  Suez:  Britain  and  the  Stru__, 
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the  fiddle  East.  1953-56".  which  condemns  as  simplistic  attempts  to  interpret  the  Crisis  as  a  Cold 
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Eden  say  Nasser  acting  as  Russia's  stooue  to  destroy  the  political  and 
commercial  basis  of  Britain's  cheap  file!  supply  in  the  diddle  East  Having  dot 
control  of  the  Suez  Canal,  he  would  succeed  in  all  his  conspiratorial  plans  and 
thus  acquire  hegemony  over  oil  states  lit-  e  KLM-alt,  Iraq  and  even  Saudi  Arabia... 
The  oil  companies  would  be  nationalised,  the  prices  sour  upwards  and  the 
European  economies,  just  rescued  at  high  cost  by  the  Marshall  Plan,  would  be 
put  in  immense  jeopardy.  3 
It  would  be  foolish  to  claim  that  there  '\  ere  not  a  range  of  other  factors  involved,  not 
least  Eden's  own  standing  within  the  Conservative  Parte,  but  it  is  equally  foolish  to 
overlook  so  fundamental  a  matter  as  the  impact  of  So%  iet  foreign  policy.  Sir  William 
Hayter  goes  so  tar  in  his  memoirs  to  lay  the  blame  for  both  the  Hungarian  and  the  Suez 
Crisis  on  the  new  foreign  policy  which  Khrushchev  had  set  in  motion  in  1955.  This  is 
perhaps  what  you  might  expect  from  an  e\-British  Ambassador  in  Moscow,  but  it 
underlines  the  turbulence  caused  by  \'Iosco'.  '.  's  dual  policy  of  relaxation  of  tensions  and 
continued  competition. 
Both  Suez  and  Hungary  were  the  consequences  of  actions  taken  by  the  Soviet 
Government.  But  they  were  undesired  and  unforeseen  consequences,  inspired  by 
the  unpredictable  reactions  of  others  to  Soviet  actions  de`igned  to  produce 
different  results,  and  they  caused  the  Soviet  Government  to  adopt  courses  which 
they  did  not  intend  to  follow  and  which  vitiated  their  own  previous  policies.  In 
Hungary  the  policy  of  cautious  relaxation  of  pressure  had  led  to  an  explosion.  In 
the  Middle  East  Soviet  sapping,  and  mining  at  Western  positions,  while 
outwardly  professing  to  respect  them,  caused  the  Western  Powers  to  react  with 
unexpected  violence  ... 
4 
There  is  not  enough  space  to  say  as  much  on  the  Soviet  Union  and  Suez  as  I  would  like, 
but  there  are  problems  here  which  I  look  ior-ww  and  to  examining  in 
`greater 
detail  in  the 
future. 
Something  ought,  perhaps,  to  be  said  by  ww  ay  ot'a  codicil  on  the  connection  between 
the  Suez  Crisis  and  the  problems  which  the  Soviet  Union  encountered  in  Hungary  toward 
the  end  of  1956.  In  particular,  the  impact  of  the  Anglo-French  ultimatum  to  Egypt  and 
Israel  upon  the  Soviet  decision  to  use  force  against  Imre  Nay's  revolution.  In  his  memoir 
Hayter  provides  a  clear  account  of  his  opinion  at  the  time  closely  based  on  Foreign  Office 
papers  and  the  diary  of  his  wife.  5  His  conclusion  seems  sensible  and  balanced.  The 
3  Suez,  p.  554 
4A  Double  Life,  p.  152.  Hayter  considers  that  it  was  this  violence  that  forced  Khrushchev  to  make 
his  belligerent  outburst,  threatening  "rocket  attack:  ".  in  order  that  Soviet  prestige  be  maintained  in 
the  Arab  World.  Thus  he  betrayed  the  good-%%  Ill  v.  hach  in  1955  his  diplomacy  had  built  up  with  the 
West.  This  view  has  been  developed  by  several  studies  of  the  Soviet  role  in  the  Middle  East  post 
1955.  See  for  example  0.  M.  Smolensky'.,  article  "\lo,,:  ow  and  the  Suez  Crisis,  1956:  A 
Reappraisal".  Political  Science  Quarrerhv  Vol.  LXXX  (December.  1965)  and  Galia  Golan,  Soviet 
P.  (;  C;  tj  in  i/u'  Middle  Ecrm.  The  ke  point  i,  that  \los  o%%  made  its  threats  after  it  had  become 
publicly  clear  that  the  United  States  moulcl  not  iipport  it,  errant  allies.  For  a  discussion  of  the 
British  reaction  see  Sue:.  pp.  456-60. 
5 
.4 
Double  Life.  pp.  142-154.  Havter  does  nothin_,  to  hide  hi, 
distress 
at  the  foolishness  of  military 
intervention  in 
Suez.  Indeed  he 
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Soviet  Union  conceived  of  Nagy's  announced  desire  to  %,.:  ýhdra%ý  completely  from  the 
Warsaw  Pact  as  a  direct  challenge  to  their-  siren  tlh  in  Europe.  So  vital  as  the 
maintenance  of  this  position  that  it  is  very  doubtful  that  the  Soviet  leadership  could  have 
taken  any  other  action  than  to  invade  Hungary.  Howwz'.  er.  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  embroilment  of  Britain  and  France  in  a  similarly  nmurk\  enterprise  in  Egypt  served  to 
strengthen  the  hand  of  those  such  as  Zhukov  who  advocated  a  violent  solution  to  the 
problem  of  too  much  reform  in  Hungary.  At  a  crucial  point  the  British  and  French 
Governments  made  it  much  easier  for  Khrushchev  to  accept  e\treme  action  and  for  him  to 
get  away  with  it. 
By  the  end  of  1956  "peaceful  coexistence"  had  gone  throuS-1h  something  of  a  refining 
process.  The  exuberance  of  amity  which  Khru  hchev  had  displayed  darin`,  the  Geneva 
Conference,  1955  and  in  London,  1956  had  been  dulled  by  Hunv_ary  and  Suez.  In  this  the 
British  thought  that  he  had  forced  himself  into  an  own  uoaI  However,  these  two  crises 
did  not  fundamentally  alter  the  British  idea  of  Soviet  torek  n  policy  Ina  brief  of  the  11  th 
February,  1957,  the  Northern  Department  advised  Sekmi  Lloyd  that, 
Although  the  Hungarian  Crisis  has  shown  the  Soviet  Union's  readiness  to  defend 
its  vital  interests  by  force...  they  understand  the  danUers  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
wish  to  avoid  courses  of  action  which  might  bring  the  risk  of  war.  "Peaceful  co- 
existence"  is  probably  only  temporarily  in  suspense 
Indeed  it  was  vital  to  the  success  of  Soviet  toreign  policy  that  this  be  so, 
[b]ecause  their  [Soviet]  long-terns  strategy  must  still  be  to  turn  the  flank  of  the 
Western  Powers  by  nleans  of  penetration  of  underdeveloped  countries  and 
agitation  against  the  Colonial  Powers.  They  have  their  eves  on  Africa  as  well  as 
Asia  and  the  Middle  East.  6 
Seen  in  this  context  the  Soviet  involvement  in  Egypt  becomes  symptomatic  of  a  profound 
development.  Britain  was  not  only  dependent  on  American  power,  as  the  events  of 
October  and  November,  19-56,  cruelly  proved.  She  was  also  being  squeezed  by  the 
extension  of  Soviet  political  influence  into  the  wider  world.  This  involved  the  Soviets  in 
areas  which  Britain  had  formerly  held  unchallenged  except  by  indigenous  nationalist 
forces  and  at  times  her  erstwhile  allies.  As  superpower  rivalry  extended  onto  a  global 
theatre,  Britain  found  herself  increasingly  pushed  out  of  the  running.  The  superpowers 
were  to  take  an  ever  increasing  share  of  the  limelight  in  this  new  Cold  War  as  the 
traditional  European  Powers  found  that  they  had  not  the  resources  to  compete. 
To  read  foreign  policy  histories  of  the  period  one  might  at  times  almost  think  that 
developments  in  the  Soviet  Union  were  peripheral  if  not  irrelevant  to  understanding  the 
Foreign  Office  shortly  after  his  return  to  London  in  1957.  Sir  Le  lie  Fry.  the  British  representative 
in  Budapest  during  1956.  laid  emphasis  upon  the  military  realities  of  Soviet  thinkin__.  a  neutral 
Hungary  was  simply  unacceptable  to  them.  FO  71  l  'S665  NH  1017/3,  Fry,  Budapest.  to  Hayter, 
London,  21st  November.  195  '. 
6  FO  371  128989  NS  1021.5.  F.  O.  Minute.  R.  H.  A.  Elihhrrt.  I  Ith  February.  1957.  Baer  for  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  his  Visit  to  Portu__aI. Cunclu"ion  /  Pa, 
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dynamics  of  British  policy  itself  This  was  not  so  Soviet  policy  changed  in  profound 
ways  between  1953  and  1956,  at  least  this  was  the  perception  amongst  Foreign  Office 
officials  and  British  politicians  of  the  time.  It  is  clear  from  the  available  records  that  by 
1956  they  felt  they  were  being  forced  to  respond  to  a  radically  new  kind  of  Soviet  threat. 
Moreover  the  context  of  international  rivalr\  within  which  this  threat  was  set  had  also 
changed  with  the  advent  of  thermonuclear  weapons.  The  British  Government  found  itself 
reassured  in  regard  of  the  unliklihood  of  World  War  Three.  Hoxýever,  it  also  drew  some 
less  comfortable  conclusions  about  the  trend  Soviet  foreign  policy  was  taking  in  other 
directions.  British  power  was  in  fact  shrinking  betöre  a  new  Cold  War  where  economic 
rather  than  military  muscle  was  the  deciding  factor.  This  competition,  in  the  guise  of 
Soviet-American  rivalry  in  the  Third  World,  has  orily  just  cone  to  an  end. Appendix 
Foreign  Office  Officials 
The  following  will  provide  a  brief  resume  of  the  careers  of  the  key  Foreign  Office 
officials  whose  opinions  provide  much  of  the  raw  material  for  this  thesis.  These  are 
not  intended  to  be  exhaustive,  but  to  provide  some  idea  of  where  individuals  Fitted  into 
the  overall  structure  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  experience  which  he  or  she  had  of 
foreign  affairs.  It  will  be  obvious  from  what  follows  that  the  division  between 
specialist  and  generalist  was  very  clear  in  relation  to  the  career  paths  which  individuals 
took. 
The  main  source  for  this  endeavour  is  the  Foreign  Office  List,  which  provides  an 
interesting  reflection  of  the  institution's  ethos  in  itself.  Whose  Who  has  also  been  used 
to  supplement  the  List  which  is  not  entirely  complete  in  its  information  about  staff 
members.  One  short  word  ought  to  be  said  about  jar`on.  When  a  person  is  said  to 
have  been  awarded  an  "allowance"  for  a  language  it  means  that  they  have  attained 
sufficient  aptitude  in  it  to  be  given  a  Financial  bon-u.  ý. 
Brimelow,  Thomas.  Joined  the  Foreign  Service  in  1938,  becoming  probationer 
Vice  Consul  at  Danzig.  During  1942  he  was  transferred  to  the  Moscow  Embassy  and 
in  1945  to  the  Northern  Department  in  London.  In  1948  he  was  promoted  to  become 
the  Consul  in  Havana  before  returning  to  Moscow  in  195  1  where  in  the  same  year  he 
gained  an  allowance  for  knowledge  of  Russian.  He  played  an  important  role  in  the 
Embassy  Chancery  collecting  basic  data  on  Soviet  Affairs  and  producing  analysis. 
After  a  spell  in  Ankara  between  1954  and  1956  he  returned  to  London  to  become  Head 
of  the  Northern  Department.  Between  1973  and  1975  Brimelow  enjoyed  the  eminence 
of  Permanent  Under-Secretary  and  was  subsequently  elevated  to  Parliament  as  Lord 
Brimelow. 
Conolly,  Violet.  1943  appointed  as  an  Attache  at  the  Embassy  in  Moscow.  In 
1946  she  was  transferred  to  London  as  an  Assistant  in  the  Research  Department.  In 
1953  she  became  an  Adviser  on  Soviet  Affairs  in  the  Northern  Department  acting  as  a 
link  between  Northern  and  Research  Departments.  Her  influence  on  thinking  about 
the  Soviet  Union  was  thus  considerable.  She  maintained  this  position  throughout  the 
fifties,  going  on  to  a  notable  career  as  an  economic  analyst.  A  good  example  of  the 
genre  is  Siberia  Totlay  and  Tomorrow:  a  Stu(ly  of'  Economic  Resources  Problems  and 
Achievements,  which  was  published  in  1975. 
Conquest.  George  Robert  Acworth.  Joined  the  Foreign  Service  in  1946  and 
remained  there  until  1956  working  in  the  Research  Department.  He  left  for  a  varied 
career  in  Soviet  History  and  Poetry.  He  was  visiting  Poet  at  the  University  of  Buffalo 
in  America  during  1959-60  and  Literary  Editor  of  the  Spectator,  1962-63.  He  has 
published  a  number  of  books  including,  Power  and  Polity  in  the  USSR  (1961),  The 
Great  Terror  (1968).  Inside  Stalin's  Secret  Poýlicc  (1985)  and  Harvest  of  Sorrow 
(1986).  The  first  of  these  works  is  much  relied  upon  in  Chapter  1. Appendix  /  Page  201 
Gascoigne,  Sir  Alvery  Douglas  Frederick.  fought  in  the  First  World  War  and 
joined  the  Foreign  Office  in  1919.  Enjoyed  a  varied  career  including  the  position  of 
Consul  General  for  the  Tangier  Zone  and  Spanish  Morocco  between  1939  and  1944. 
He  was  promoted  in  1946  to  become  the  UK  Political  Representative  with  the  rank  of 
Ambassador  in  Japan  where  he  stayed  until  195  1.  At  this  point  he  was  transferred  to 
Moscow  as  the  Ambassador,  serving  up  to  his  retirement  in  1953.  As  such  his  name 
and  opinions  figure  prominently  in  the  second  chapter. 
Grey,  Paul.  Joined  Foreign  Service  in  1933  and  transferred  to  Rome  in  1935, 
returning  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  1939.  After  a  spell  as  Private  Secretary  to  the 
Parliamentary  Under-Secretary  of  State  between  1941  and  1943  he  held  a  variety  of 
posts,  within  the  foreign  office  as  Head  of  the  South  East  Asia  Department  and  abroad 
in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  the  Hague  and  Lisbon.  In  1951  he  was  promoted  to  the  position  of 
Minister  as  the  Moscow  Embassy  where  he  remained  until  1954,  acting  as  the  Charge 
d'Affairs.  As  such  he  frequently  acted  as  an  understudy  to  the  Ambassador.  During 
1954  he  was  appointed  an  Under  Secretary  of  State  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  in  1957 
he  became  the  Ambassador  at  Prague. 
Harrison,  Sir  Geoffrey  Wedgewood.  Began  his  Foreign  Office  career  in  1932, 
went  to  Japan  in  1935  were  he  gained  an  allowance  for  Japanese.  There  followed  a 
variety  of  postings  including  that  of  Minister  at  the  Embassy  in  Moscow  between  1947 
and  1949.  He  returned  to  London  in  1949  and  became  the  Head  of  the  Northern 
Department  until  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Deputy  Under-Secretary  of  State  and 
as  such  he  superintended  the  Northern  Department  (although  Deputy  Under-Secretaries 
generally  had  a  number  of  Departments  to  look  after  and  in  this  Harrison  was  no 
exception).  In  1954  Sir  John  Ward  took  over  the  responsibility.  During  1956 
Harrison  went  on  to  become  the  Ambassador  to  Rio  de  Janerio. 
Hayter,  Sir  William  Goodenough.  Ambassador  from  1953  to  1957,  prior  to 
which  he  had  had  a  varied  career  in  the  Foreign  Service  from  postings  in  Shanghai 
before  the  war  to  Washington  between  '  1940  and  1944.  Immediately  before  going  to 
Moscow  he  was  the  Minister  at  the  Embassy  in  Paris.  In  early  1957  Hayter  returned 
to  London  as  a  Deputy  Under-Secretary  of  State  and  was,  for  a  brief  period,  the 
superintendent  of  the  Northern  Department.  In  1958  he  left  the  Foreign  Office  to 
become  the  Warden  of  New.  College  Oxford  where  he  stayed  until  1976.  He 
considered  resigning  over  the  Anglo-French  intervention  in  the  Suez  Crisis  in  the 
autumn  of  1956  and  something  of  the  horrer  he  felt  over  that  folly  seems  to  have 
influenced  his  decision  to  leave  in  1958,  although  there  was  also  the  more  positive 
appeal  of  Oxford. 
Hibbert,  Reginald  Alfred.  After  serving  in  the  Forces  between  1942  and  1945, 
Hibbert  joined  the  Foreign  Office  in  1946  and  during  1947  was  stationed  at  the 
Bucharest  Embassy.  In  1950  he  returned  to  London  where  he  remained  until  1952 
when  he  was  sent  to  Vienna.  In  1954  he  became  a  member  of  the  Northern Appendix  /  pave  202 
Department  before  setting  out  for  Guatemala  in  1957  were  he  acted  as  Charge 
d'Affairs  in  1958  and  1959.  Hibbert  might  be  termed  a  Northern  Department  regular 
whose  opinions  played  an  important  role  in  the  formulation  of  minutes,  briefs,  etc. 
Hohler,  Henry  Arthur  Frederick.  Appointed  to  the  Foreign  office  in  1934, 
Hohler  was  sent  to  the  Budapest  Embassy  in  1936  where  he  received  an  allowance  for 
Hungarian  in  1937.  In  1941  he  returned  to  London  from  whence  he  was  posted  to 
Berne,  Helsinki  and  finally  in  1949  to  Moscow  where  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
Counsellor.  In  1951  he  was  appointed  Head  of  the  Northern  Department  which 
position  he  held  until  during  1956  he  went  to  the  Embassy  at  Rome  as  the  Minister. 
Thus,  Hohler  held  a  key  post  through  the  period  covered  by  this  thesis.  As  the  man 
immediately  responsible  for  the  Foreign  Office's  assessment  of  Soviet  Affairs  his 
opinions  play  a  very  important  role  in  my  interpretation,  second  only  to  that  of  the 
Ambassador  who  was  supported  by  the  staff  of  the  Moscow  Embassy's  Chancery. 
flutchinss,  Raymond  Francis  Dudley.  Employed  as  a  Senior  Assistant,  working 
in  the  Soviet  Section  of  the  Research  Department.  In  1958  he  was  promoted  to 
Research  Assistant  Grade  2  and  also  qualified  for  an  allowance  in  Russian.  Hutchings 
was  one  of  the  "backroom  boys"  who  produced  detailed  assessments  of  Soviet  affairs. 
Jellicoe,  Earl.  Worked  in  the  German  Department  of  the  Foreign  Office  between 
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Department  regular. 
Kirkpatrick,  Sir  Ivone  Augustine.  Fought  with  some  distinction  in  the  First 
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in  the  inter-war  period  he  became  the  Director  of  the  Foreign  Division  of  the  Ministry 
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for  Germany  after  which  he  was  appointed  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State  at  the 
Foreign  Office  from  1953  to  1957.  As  such  he  was  the  presiding  eminence  at  the 
Foreign  Office  for  much  of  the  period  covered  by  this  thesis.  Most  important 
Northern  Department  minutes  filtered  upwards  to  Government  Ministers  through  his 
hands. 
Morgan,  Henry  Travers.  Served  in  the  Forces  between  1939  and  1946.  In  1946 
he  became  a  member  of  the  Permanent  UK  Delegation  to  the  U.  N.,  moving  in  1948  to 
the  Embassy  in  Moscow.  During  1950  he  was  transferred  to  the  Northern  Department 
where  he  stayed  until  1954  when  he  went  on  to  Mexico  City. 
Mason.  Sir  Paul.  Joined  the  Foreign  Service  in  1928  and  enjoyed  a  wide  variety 
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position  of  Assistant  Under-Secretary  of  State  and  in  1954  he  became  Ambassador  at 
the  Hague. 
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and  1951  and  in  1952  transferred  to  London  as  a  Senior  Assistant  working  in  the 
Research  Department.  In  1957  he  returned  to  Moscow.  Orchard's  role  was  similar  to 
that  of  Raymond  Hutchings. 
Roberts,  Sir  Frank.  Joined  the  Foreign  Office  in  1930  and  after  a  number  of 
postings,  including  Cairo  where  he  gained  an  allowance  for  Arabic.  he  was  appointed 
Minister  plenipotentiary  to  Moscow  in  1945.  His  rise  continued  and  in  1949  he 
became  the  Deputy  High  Commissioner  in  India.  In  1952  he  achieved  Ambassadorial 
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Steel,  Sir  Christopher  Eden  Joined  the  Foreion  Office  in  1927  and 
enjoyed  a  wide  variety  of  diplomatic  and  political  postings  before  and  during  the  war. 
In  1945  he  became  a  Counsellor  and  Head  of  the  Political  Division  of  the  Allied 
Control  Commission  for  Germany  (British  Element).  Between  1949  and  1953  he  was 
the  Minister  in  the  Washington  Embassy.  From  thence  he  was  appointed  the  UK 
Permanent  Representative  to  the  North  Atlantic  Council  in  Paris  and  in  1957  he 
became  the  Ambassador  in  Bonn.  During  his  time  in  Paris  he  maintained  close  contact 
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Sykes,  Richard  Adam.  Started  his  Foreign  Office  career  in  1947  and  rose 
quickly  through  a  number  of  posts,  including  Nanking  and  Peking  to  become  a  First 
Secretary  in  1952.  In  the  same  year  he  began  work  at  the  Northern  Department  with 
responsibility  for  Soviet  Affairs.  In  1954  he  became  Private  Secretary  to  the  Minister 
of  State  and  then  went  abroad  during  1956  to  Brussels  and  1959  to  Santiago.  Between 
1952  and  1954  he  played  a  similar  role  to  the  of  Earl  Jellicoe  and  R.  A.  Hibbert. 
Uffen,  Kenneth  Janes.  Joined  the  Foreign  office  in  1950  and  during  1953  he 
was  both  promoted  to  Second  Secretary  and  attached  to  the  Northern  Department, 
where  he  stayed  until  1955  when  he  was  transferred  to  Buenos  Aires. 
Ward,  Sir  John  Guthrie.  Started  his  Foreign  office  career  in  1931  and  was  sent 
to  a  wide  variety  of  posts  in  the  following  years.  These  included  Bagdad  where  he  was 
given  an  allowance  for  Arabic  in  1934.  In  1950  he  became  the  UK  Deputy  High 
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role  he  superintended  the  Northern  Department  up  tu  his  1957  posting  as  Ambassador 
at  Buenos  Aires,  acting  as  the  link  between  the  Department  and  Sir  hone  Kirkpatrick. 
Watson,  John  hIugh  Adam.  Began  his  service  with  the  Foreign  Office  in  1937. 
Another  official  to  have  earned  an  allowance  for  Arabic.  during  a  sojourn  at  Cairo  in 
1943.  Became  the  Information  Liaison  Officer  at  the  Washington  Embassy  in  1950 
where  he  stayed  until  transfer  back  to  London  as  the  Head  of  the  African  Department. 
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WWWallinger,  Sir  Geoffrey  Arnold.  Joined  the  Foreign  office  in  1926  and  served 
in  a  wide  variety  of  places  including  Chungking  and  Cape  Town.  In  1949  he  became 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  at  Budapest  and  after  a  spell  as  Ambassador  in  Bangkok  he 
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Vienna  at  the  right  moment  as  it  was  in  1955  that  the  negotiations  towards  an  Austrian 
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